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subjects related to productivity - the most reliable indicator for competitiveness over the 
longer term - and is prepared in the context of ‘Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable 
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industrial and competition policies.
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Foreword
This is the 14th edition of the Commission’s European 
Competitiveness Report (ECR). The first ECR was pub-
lished in 1997, on the basis of the 1994 Industry Council 
resolution, which called on the Commission to report 
annually on the competitiveness of European industry. 
As in previous editions, the ECR 2011 analyses a num-
ber of topics that are important for the competitiveness 
of the EU industry and economy. The analysis is based 
on economic theory and empirical research. The aim of 
the report is to contribute to policymaking by drawing 
attention to recent economic trends and developments 
and by discussing policy implications. 
The first chapter presents an overview of the recovery 
from the recent recession, changes in GDP in the EU and 
the Member States, labour productivity and employ-
ment. The analysis shows that the experience of the 
recession varies according to how the countries were 
involved in the build-up of imbalances in the period 
2000-07. It also argues that the competitive sectors that 
grew in a balanced way before the crisis will continue to 
be the leaders during the recovery. The specific role of 
R&D and innovation in the process of economic recov-
ery is analysed, arguing that a strong and sustained 
recovery will depend on the capacity to create an envi-
ronment in which firms can thrive, and where innova-
tions are created and taken to the market.
Chapter 2 analyses knowledge intensive business 
services (KIBS) and their role as sources of innovation, 
technologies and as inputs for manufacturing and the 
whole economy. KIBS are defined as computer and 
related activities, R&D and other business services. Their 
importance for the rest of the economy has become vis-
ible as firms increasingly tend to develop new services 
as part of a product package that includes physical, 
tangible goods. This is a prominent feature of what has 
been called the “convergence process”. The conver-
gence of manufacturing and services is an opportunity 
for the European manufacturing sector to increase its 
competitiveness and market base. The shares of direct 
and indirect KIBS in total exports have increased over 
time for both the EU-12 and EU-15. Measured directly, 
KIBS activities account for 4% of EU-12 and 11% of EU-15 
exports and, if measured indirectly, KIBS account for 9% 
of EU-12 and 18% of EU-15 exports.
Chapter 3 shows that the EU space sector is a world 
technology leader in certain segments and enjoys 
a strong competitive position inter  nationally, especially 
in heavy launchers and associated launching services 
as well as in satellite communication services. Together 
with the United States, it is a major net exporter of space 
products, and less hampered than its US competitor by 
export control rules. The EU space sector is heavily influ-
enced by public policies, funding and procurement, but 
the share of commercial customers is growing. In order 
to remain competitive the sector needs to secure its 
supply of skills and sustain innovation efforts and R&D 
funding. It should also be vigilant in the face of compe-
tition from emerging space nations eager to build up 
their own space industries and become less dependent 
on the EU and US space sectors.
Chapter 4 analyses the EU’s import dependence on 
non-energy raw materials and how this affects the com-
petitiveness of certain EU manufacturing industries. 
In terms of raw materials, two main competitiveness 
areas can be distinguished for the sectors analysed. The 
first one refers to the cost competitiveness effects on 
essential raw material inputs, stemming from different 
sources such as increasing global demand, trade restric-
tions, transport costs etc. The second competitiveness 
issue concerns company strategies, including recycling 
and use of substitute materials etc., applied to tackle 
scarcity of raw materials. Access to raw materials can 
be facilitated by different policy tools, such as ensur-
ing a better operational and regulatory environment 
for industries affected by the scarcity of raw materials, 
fostering a global level playing field in trade and invest-
ment, ensuring intelligent exploration and exploitation 20
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of the resources available in Europe, and encouraging 
R&D and innovation into substitutes, better recycling 
techniques and sustainable production.
Chapter 5 reviews the progress made in moving EU 
industry towards a more sustainable growth path over 
the last 10-20 years. The analysis reveals that EU industry 
overall has improved its resource efficiency, carbon and 
energy intensity during the period and that these trends 
are continuing in most sectors and Member States. The 
overview of public policy instruments currently in use 
showed that, at the EU level, attention has recently 
been strongly focused on energy and controlling car-
bon emissions. However, the number of policy initia-
tives is increasing, with the emphasis of policy attention 
shifting towards sustainable consumption and produc-
tion, green public procurement and, more recently, 
resource-efficiency. Choosing and designing a coherent 
and effective mix of policies is crucial to improving eco-
performance and facilitating industry’s simultaneous 
transformation towards more sustainable ways of pro-
duction and improved competitiveness. Aspects such 
as the whole life cycle of products and different stages 
of the supply chains, complementarities between the 
existing national and regional regulatory frameworks, 
enforcement and monitoring costs, effects on competi-
tiveness and compliance burdens on EU industry need 
to be taken into account in the selection and design of 
these policies.
Chapter 6 examines the interplay between industrial 
policy, competition policy and trade policy in promot-
ing the strengths of European companies and enhanc-
ing their competitiveness. In the light of the EU enlarge-
ment, the expansion of global value chains and the 
recent economic and financial crisis, it argues that there 
is great potential and underexploited synergies in the 
existing competitiveness-related policies. As underlined 
in the 2010 Industrial Policy Communication, the key 
challenge is to create a framework that accompanies 
firms through all phases of their life cycle and provides 
the right incentives for them to increase their com-
petitiveness in a globalised environment. The remain-
ing challenges involve refocusing on the needs of the 
real economy, and in particular on improving access to 
finance and creating a global level playing field (as also 
highlighted in Chapter 4).21
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1. Introduction
The European Union and the world economy are recov-
ering from a deep global economic crisis, but this pro-
cess has been relatively slow. In view of the difficult eco-
nomic situation, global competition has become much 
tougher while the need to remain competitive on the 
world market has become more important.
The 2011 European Competitiveness Report is prepared 
in the context of the ‘Europe 2020 strategy for smart, 
sustainable and inclusive growth’ and in consideration 
of its major flagships, in particular ‘An integrated Indus-
trial Policy for the Globalisation Era. Putting Competi-
tiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage’ which was 
adopted by the Commission in October 2010.
The Report looks first at the overall economic perfor-
mance and its impact on productivity - the key factor 
for competitiveness in the long run - as well as the role 
of R&D and innovation in this process. Developments in 
a number of sectors and topics that are key for the com-
petitiveness of European industry and its economy in 
general are then analysed. These topics include conver-
gence in knowledge intensive services, the competitive-
ness of the European space sector, access to non-energy 
raw materials and EU industry in a context of sustain-
able growth. Finally, the Report analyses the relationship 
between the EU industrial and competition policies as 
well as the changes in this respect that have taken place 
over the last decade.
2.  Crisis, recovery and the role 
of innovation
The European Union is recovering from the effect of the 
major global crisis in 2008-2010. The recession origi-
nated from the accumulation of considerable imbal-
ances in the pre-crisis period 2000-07, notably the infla-
tion of house and stock prices in the US and some EU 
Member States, and the subsequent unbalanced capital 
flows.
The crisis has affected all EU Member States and, with 
the exception of Poland and Slovakia, no country expe-
rienced less than a full year of recession. Even if by mid-
2009 most countries had started to recover, some Mem-
ber States like Greece, Ireland or Romania were still in 
recession by the beginning of 2011: after almost three 
consecutive years of decreasing income. The experi-
ence is also mixed when it comes to the depth of the 
recession, ranging from a tiny one-quarter point drop in 
Poland to a 25 percent loss during the more than two 
years of recession in Latvia. The reason is that not all 
countries played the same role during the accumulation 
of these imbalances and, consequently, not all countries 
are affected in the same way. On the one hand, coun-
tries like Latvia, Ireland or Spain, which were severely 
affected by a housing bubble, are now going through 
a major readjustment. On the other hand, there are 
countries like Austria, Belgium or Germany that can be 
seen mostly as suffering the collateral effects from the 
readjustments in the US and in the first group of Mem-
ber States; these countries have been affected chiefly 
through international trade, but also through the expo-
sure of their financial systems to loans made to coun-
tries with large imbalances.
As expected, employment reacted later and is recover-
ing more slowly. In countries not directly affected by 
internal imbalances, the contraction of employment 
(and the increase in unemployment) has been moder-
ate. Belgium, Germany or the Netherlands experienced 
slight changes, while countries like Estonia or Spain 
have seen their unemployment rates soar by 15 per-
centage points. This distinctive reaction of employment 
can be explained by the different exposure to mispriced 
assets and, to a lesser extent, to other factors such as the 
degree of openness or the introduction of certain struc-
tural reforms before the crisis. In countries affected by 
these distortions, households had the incentive to bor-22
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row in order to purchase these assets. Once the bubble 
burst, the price of these assets drops mechanically and 
caused and exposed the vulnerability of highly indebted 
households. Hence, in these countries there are two rea-
sons why their unemployment is rising by more than 
the average and also more persistently. First, they are 
undergoing a major structural readjustment, namely 
the downsizing of the construction sector which is hav-
ing permanent effects. Second, households and firms 
are trying to deleverage, i.e. reduce the level of liabili-
ties relative to assets by cutting down consumption and 
increasing savings, thus slowing down the recovery 
and worsening the business conditions for firms which, 
in turn, are then reluctant to hire new workers. In con-
trast, the countries not affected by the bubble faced 
better prospects of a swift recovery, with the result that 
employers were able to resort to labour sharing schemes 
which kept employment at a relatively stable level.
Despite the severity of the recession, it has not come 
close to wiping out a decade of relatively strong growth. 
All in all, most EU countries display reasonable records 
of real growth during the decade 2000-10. This is partic-
ularly true for EU-12 countries, immersed in a catch-up 
process following their accession to the EU. Two excep-
tions stand out among EU-15: namely Portugal and Italy, 
which literally stagnated during these years and have 
ended up at roughly the same point as they started.
A glance at the sectoral reactions to the recession 
reflects the aggregate picture described above. Manu-
facturing output initially fell steeply by some 20%, 
before recovering strongly over the last two years. 
However, manufacturing output is still some 9% below 
its peak and manufacturing jobs have fallen by around 
11%. Construction of buildings (excluding civil engineer-
ing) has dropped by more than the average and has not 
yet begun to recover. Other sectors not directly related 
to the construction boom will recover relatively quickly. 
The way countries are performing along this reces-
sion, at the aggregate level, will depend on the relative 
importance of each of these sectors. However, perform-
ing sectors will do well wherever they are established in 
terms of sustained growth of productivity. That is, the 
key to the future competitiveness of the EU lies in per-
forming sectors that already did well in the past years 
and that will now lead the recovery.
This line of reasoning also explains the apparent para-
dox of countries which have been hit hard by the reces-
sion, and yet have shown an overall reasonable perfor-
mance over the decade. This is in principle a good sign 
for the medium-term recovery outlook and raises the 
issue of how to support innovation and productivity 
growth in the EU.
The focus here is on R&D and innovation, because it is 
regarded as an important source of sustained growth. 
The EU is characterized by a lower intensity than the US 
and a remarkable heterogeneity in R&D intensity across 
Member States. However, a closer look at the individual 
US states shows that the internal variability is not differ-
ent from that within the EU. This variability reflects pat-
terns of regional specialization which may be optimal 
from the social point of view. In that sense, it is worth 
recalling that the new Europe 2020 strategy maintains 
the Lisbon strategy target of a 3 percent for R&D inten-
sity for the EU as a whole (rather than for each individual 
Member State).
One possible explanation for these differences is that EU 
Member States tend to specialize in sectors character-
ized by a lower R&D intensity. However, a closer look at 
the figures shows that, even if the sectoral composition 
plays a role, most of the differences with the US can be 
associated with lower EU intensities in individual sec-
tors rather than an over-representation of low-intensive 
sectors in the EU. Furthermore, when comparing simi-
lar firms from across the Atlantic, they turn out to be 
remarkably similar in that they are making similar efforts 
in terms of R&D. These two pieces of evidence together 
show the frequency with which we find innovative firms 
in the US being compared with the EU. Hence, the key 
area is the relatively poor commercialisation of R&D and 
non-technological innovation in the EU, rather than R&D 
per se. The EU must therefore do more than just foster 
basic research in order to create ideas, and it needs to 
create the right business conditions for new technolo-
gies and innovations to be developed and commercial-
ised on the market. The whole process has to be com-
plemented by an adequate level of intellectual property 
rights protection: enough to give incentives to innova-
tors but not so much that it hampers the creation of new 
ideas or shifts research too soon away from academia by 
offering excessive incentives to privatise basic lines of 
research. The EU is currently working with a High Level 
Group of experts to examine how to improve the com-
mercialisation of key enabling technologies.
3.  Knowledge intensive services
The importance of services for the economy has steadily 
increased over time in most OECD countries. This pro-
cess known as “tertiarization” means not only that ser-
vices are taking up increasing shares of GDP, but also 
that they are playing an increasingly important role 
in intermediate inputs for manufacturing, and high-
tech manufacturing in particular. Knowledge intensive 
business services (KIBS) are especially important in this 
development. KIBS are defined according to the NACE 
classification, NACE REV 1.1. as including the categories 
computer and related activities (NACE 72), research and 
development (NACE 73) and other business activities 
(NACE 74). Their importance as sources of innovation, 23
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technologies and inputs has increased steadily over 
time. As a consequence, linkages between KIBS and 
manufacturing industries in different countries have 
strengthened over time.
The tendency of KIBS firms to develop new services as 
part of a product package that includes physical, tan-
gible goods is a prominent feature of what has been 
referred to as a “convergence process”. This process 
encompasses manufacturing firms which have also 
begun to offer services as part of a package including 
both the physical product and services. High-tech prod-
ucts, for example, are often sold in combination with 
maintenance services.
The “convergence process” and the increasing role 
of KIBS for manufacturing have consequences for the 
external competitiveness of EU manufacturing firms as 
implied by the increasing share of KIBS in value added 
exports, especially for high-tech manufacturing goods. 
But KIBS are important for external competitiveness per 
se, since the share of the services trade in the overall 
trade has grown over time.
Growing importance of knowledge intensive sectors in 
the economy
Services industries have grown in importance over the 
last decades in terms of both output and employment. 
Within services, KIBS play an important role and have 
been the main source of job creation in Europe in the 
past decade and have also contributed substantially 
to value added growth. The share of services in GDP 
has grown over time and now amounts to some 70% 
in the EU and Japan and almost 80% in the US. While 
total services as a share of GDP have grown by 5 to 10% 
since1995, shares of KIBS have grown by around 30 to 
40% in the EU, Japan and the US, although it should be 
pointed out that the shares were initially quite low. The 
share of KIBS in GDP now amounts to some 11% in the 
EU, 13% in the US and 8% in Japan.
The importance of KIBS can also be seen by their con-
tribution to the growth of GDP. The total contribution 
of KIBS to GDP growth since 1996 has amounted to 
approximately 17% in the EU, 28% in Japan and 22% in 
the US. The largest contributions to GDP growth, within 
the EU, were recorded in the UK and Belgium where the 
KIBS contribution to growth has exceeded 25% since 
1996.
Integration of KIBS in the value chains of other industries 
has become more important over time, as illustrated by 
the growing share of KIBS products in intermediate con-
sumption. The KIBS share of intermediate consumption 
in high-technology manufacturing amounted to some 
14% in EU-15 and 16% in Japan and the US.
Important technology flows between KIBS and manu-
facturing
The integration of KIBS in the value chains of other 
industries is not limited to intermediate consumption 
of KIBS products. Knowledge produced within KIBS is 
also used in other sectors. Knowledge also flows in the 
other direction, from other sectors to KIBS. In manufac-
turing, imported knowledge flows from other manufac-
turing and KIBS constitute the largest knowledge flows 
in every country, except for the USA and Japan. Foreign 
manufacturing sectors are the main sources of imported 
knowledge inputs for manufacturing in most countries. 
The exception is Ireland, where imports of KIBS for 
intermediate use in manufacturing are more important 
sources of knowledge.
Imported knowledge inputs to KIBS are larger than other 
technology flows from domestic sectors in almost every 
country. Estonia, Slovakia, Romania and Ireland are 
almost completely dominated by imported knowledge 
inputs. The EU-12 is heavily dependent on manufactur-
ing knowledge imported from abroad in this sector.
Analyses show that the backward linkage from KIBS to 
manufacturing is not very strong. The backward linkage 
from manufacturing to KIBS appears to be substantially 
stronger. Conversely, the strength of the forward linkage 
from manufacturing to KIBS is substantially weaker than 
the forward linkage from KIBS to manufacturing. The 
reason is that the size of the KIBS sector is substantially 
smaller than the manufacturing sector as a whole. The 
measures of linkage strengths reflect this size difference.
Convergence of manufacturing and services
Manufacturing firms are increasingly offering services 
along with their traditional physical products. This trend 
is often called “convergence of manufacturing and ser-
vices”. The convergence of manufacturing and services 
is an opportunity for the European manufacturing sector 
to open up new markets, find new sources of revenue 
around their products, and increase competitiveness.
The output of manufacturing still consists of manufac-
tured products to a very large extent. Service output of 
manufacturing, however, is growing quite fast, reaching 
annual growth rates of 5 to 10 % for the period 1995-
2005. Between 2000 and 2005, which is the latest avail-
able year for data1, service output of manufacturing 
grew in all Member States except the Czech Republic. 
Taking into account that the latest recession hit manu-
1  The sources of the data are input-output tables which provide information on 
the structures of economies. Since the structure of the economy changes gradually 
over time, input-output tables are not published frequently, normally only every 
fifth year.24
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facturing industries relatively harder than services, the 
shares of service output of manufacturing are likely to 
have increased further.
The service output of manufacturing firms is related in 
various ways to research, development and innovation. 
Both R&D and complementary service offers are strat-
egies of firms to differentiate their products from the 
products of their competitors. Services are produced 
predominantly by manufacturing industries with high 
and medium-high innovation intensity. KIBS account for 
more than two thirds of the service output of manufac-
turing in half of the Member States. Hence, not only is 
the manufacturing sector a main client of KIBS, it also 
produces KIBS to a considerable degree.
Trade in KIBS and the importance of KIBS for EU exter-
nal competitiveness
EU-15 has on average stronger revealed comparative 
advantages in KIBS exports than in technology-intensive 
merchandise exports. The strongest comparative advan-
tage for the EU-15 is found in R&D services. Also, EU-15 
has also increasingly specialized in computer and infor-
mation services exports, in contrast to the US, which has 
lost this specialization.
The importance of KIBS for the EU’s external competi-
tiveness can be measured both directly and indirectly. 
For both the EU-12 and EU-15, the shares of direct KIBS 
exports have increased over time. Measured directly, 
KIBS activities account for between 4% of EU exports 
for EU-12 and 11% for EU-15. Measured indirectly, KIBS 
exports account for between 9% for EU-12 and 18% for 
EU-15 exports.
4.  European competitiveness 
in space manufacturing and 
operations
Europe has a rich heritage in space, going back a quarter 
of a century for the EU and even longer for several Mem-
ber States as well as for the European Space Agency 
(ESA). The space sector contributes directly to the objec-
tives of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth laid 
down in the Europe 2020 Strategy, which refers to the 
development of an ‘effective space policy to provide the 
tools to address some of the key global challenges and 
in particular to deliver Galileo and GMES’. This reflects 
the shared competence of the EU and its Member States 
stemming from the introduction of Article 189 of the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, man-
dating the EU to draw up a European space policy with 
a view to promoting, among other things, EU competi-
tiveness.
The most striking characteristics of the space sector 
worldwide as well as in the EU are the extent to which 
it is driven by public institutions; the small number of 
actors and Member States involved; the high financial 
and technological risks; and the limited production runs.
Bearing in mind these peculiarities of the space sector, 
the evolution of three manufacturing segments and four 
segments of operation or exploitation is analysed. The 
three manufacturing segments are satellite manufactur-
ing, launcher manufacturing, and ground segment. The 
four operation/exploitation segments are launching 
services, satellite communication, earth observation, 
and satellite navigation. No downstream services or 
applications are included in the sector analysis as they 
are considered to be customers of the space sector, not-
withstanding the fact that they represent the part of the 
value chain with potentially the greatest impact on the 
EU economy.
Strong European position globally, driven by public 
institutions
The space sector in the EU is a driving force for growth 
and innovation, generating employment and market 
opportunities for innovative products and services. 
Together with the US space sector it dominates the 
world market for satellites, launchers, ground segments 
and related operations and exploitation. It depends less 
on the requirements and funds of public institutions 
than in the United States, but even so the EU space sec-
tor is strongly driven by public policy, public procure-
ment and public funding (BIS 2010). The relative impor-
tance of public institutions as customers has however 
decreased slightly in recent years.
Excluding downstream services and applications, the EU 
space sector generates direct sales in excess of EUR 10 
billion per year and employs around 36.000 persons. Its 
direct contribution to EU GDP is relatively small but due 
to its high technology content and high value added, 
productivity is higher than in most other EU sectors. 
Most of the sales and employment are generated in sat-
ellite manufacturing and the operation of communica-
tion satellites. It is however important to note that the 
greatest impact on the EU economy is generated down-
stream by services and applications not covered by this 
report.
Most of the EU space sector is concentrated in a small 
number of locations in a handful of Member States such 
as France, Italy, Germany and the United Kingdom, while 
a number of Member States are hardly participating at 
all. The sector is also highly concentrated in terms of the 
number of manufacturers and operators, notably due to 
the small size of its market as well as high entry barriers: 
costs, infrastructure, know-how, risks. Another conse-25
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quence of the high barriers to entry is that there are few 
SMEs in the sector.
The EU and the United States are the largest exporters 
on the world market, running sizeable trade surpluses 
against the rest of the world in the space sector (in spite 
of strict export control rules in the USA). The EU surplus 
of between half a billion and one billion euro a year is 
generated by exports mainly to the United States, Rus-
sia, Kazakhstan, Brazil, China and Turkey, and imports 
almost exclusively from the United States. There is also 
considerable intra-EU trade.
Importance of skills, R&D and innovation
Some of the expected benefits of space investment 
stem from its impact on innovation, not least indirectly 
in the form of spillover effects, spin-offs and technology 
transfer, including spin-ins. Setting ambitious objectives 
for the EU space sector will stimulate innovation and can 
make a real contribution to the Innovation Union. Those 
objectives can only be attained from a strong techno-
logical base, therefore basic space research needs to 
continue to be carried out in Europe and be properly 
funded by the EU, ESA and their members, which in the 
case of the EU includes the Framework Programme for 
research, technological development and demonstra-
tion activities. It is particularly vital to support research 
into critical and breakthrough technologies (European 
Commission 2011). On the other hand, it is crucial to 
maintain R&D funding for the development of satellite 
communication, given its importance for the space sec-
tor as a whole.
A major challenge facing the global space industry and 
the European space sector in particular is the supply of 
skills in the years ahead. In Europe a generation of space 
engineers and technicians is nearing retirement and it 
is not clear whether the EU education system will be 
able to deliver the skills needed in sufficient numbers 
and on time to replace them. If it is not, an underlying 
problem might be the relatively low attractiveness of 
space careers in comparison with other high-technol-
ogy professions. EU policymakers may need to consider 
how to raise the profile of space in education and how 
to address any structural deficit in the supply of skills to 
the EU space sector.
Regulation
Standardisation improves industrial competitiveness 
and efficiency; together with inter  operability it is essen-
tial for the competitiveness of the EU space sector.
International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) are 
believed to hamper US exports of space products on 
the world market and even if the EU space sector is not 
directly targeted by ITAR, it may prove an obstacle also 
to the EU industry in cases of re-export. On the other 
hand it represents an opportunity for the EU space sec-
tor to offer ‘ITAR-free’ systems.
Natural resources
Space manufacturing requires specific and scarce raw 
materials due to the extreme environment in which the 
components will operate. As discussed elsewhere in 
the Report, the EU possesses some but not all of these 
raw materials of limited availability. The most impor-
tant natural resource for satellite communication is 
radio frequency spectrum which is already becoming 
scarce due to the growth in space applications com-
bined with increasing bandwidth. In the global alloca-
tion of frequencies, the interests of the EU space sector, 
and in particular of satellite communication, must be 
defended.
5.  Access to non-energy 
raw materials and the 
competitiveness of EU 
industry
Non-energy raw materials can be seen as raw materials 
that are mainly used in industrial and manufacturing 
processes, semi-products, products and applications 
and that are not primarily used to generate energy. 
As such industrial minerals and purified elements (e.g. 
feldspar, silica), ores and their metals and metallic by-
products (e.g. copper, iron but also germanium, rhe-
nium, rare earth elements) and construction materials 
are within the scope as well as wood.
Global demand for these raw materials started to 
increase significantly in the last decade, driven by the 
strong growth of emerging economies in particular. 
Additionally, recent trends indicate that also the rapid 
dissemination of emerging technologies is expected to 
boost demand for raw materials. Accordingly, the grow-
ing need for consumer and investment goods in emerg-
ing countries and the spread of new technological appli-
cations will result in a high long-term demand for most 
of the non-energy raw materials. These developments 
are likely to have significant impacts on the European 
manufacturing sector.
Europe is highly dependent on raw materials imported 
from the rest of the world. While the EU has many raw 
material deposits, their exploration and extraction is hin-
dered mainly by a highly regulated environment, high 
investment costs and increasingly competing land uses.26
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Non-energy raw materials inputs and competitiveness 
aspects
Access to and affordability of non-energy raw materials 
is crucial for the competitiveness of the EU industry. For 
sectors such as steel, pulp and paper, chemicals, aero-
space, electronics, automotive or construction it can be 
hampered, directly or indirectly, by a limited or more 
costly supply of these raw materials.
As far as raw materials are concerned, two main com-
petitiveness areas can be distinguished: the effects on 
costs for raw material inputs and the effects on the com-
pany strategies. 
Cost effects
Rising prices for raw material inputs in manufacturing 
production, due to distortion of conditions of access and 
growing global demand, may lead to a deterioration of 
the competitiveness of European industries.
There are several reasons for rising raw materials costs. 
A large share of many raw materials is concentrated in 
a small number of countries, which often apply export 
restrictions, leading to higher prices and an insufficient 
supply of inputs for international producers. At the same 
time, countries imposing export barriers can benefit 
from lower input prices, creating an artificial support for 
domestic industry. Also the oligopolistic nature of several 
non-energy raw materials production has contributed 
to significant price increases. The time lags in the supply 
response to changes in demand, which often lead to price 
increases in the global market for metals and minerals, are 
yet another reason. When an increase in production costs 
is not matched in other regions of the world Europe faces 
a deterioration of its competitiveness position.
Solutions, strategies
The negative effects stemming from the scarcity of raw 
materials are in the form of pressures on the competi-
tiveness of European industries. Companies active in 
the affected sectors have chosen a range of solutions to 
reduce the risks and costs of non-energy raw materials. 
In this regard, R&D and innovation play an important 
role in alleviating the vulnerability of material intensive 
EU industries.
Increasing use of recycled and recovered materials, 
more efficient use of materials and substitute/alternative 
materials are of key importance in improving the com-
petitiveness of European manufacturing industries. Recy-
cling rates vary widely, depending on the materials used 
in the production process. In certain sectors, recycling 
rates are very high (e.g. pulp and paper industry), while 
in others there is still some potential for further improve-
ment (e.g. waste electronics). Some sectors make wide-
spread use of resource efficient technologies (e.g. auto-
motive industry) and substitute materials (e.g. chemical 
industry) in order to reduce their dependency on primary 
raw materials. From the competitiveness point of view, 
development of specific skills, R&D and innovation play 
a central role throughout the entire value chain, includ-
ing extraction, sustainable processing, recycling and 
developing new materials, in addressing the challenges 
posed by the lack of non-energy raw materials.
Companies can use a range of different strategies to 
tackle import dependency even though not all of these 
are beneficial from the point of view of European growth 
and jobs. Vertical integration helps to circumvent the 
risks in the market thereby securing access to raw mate-
rials (for example in the steel industry). Relocation of 
the production processes to countries where the mate-
rials are produced makes it possible to secure access 
under more favourable economic conditions, because 
trade restrictions are avoided (e.g. the chemical indus-
try). However, it is clear that this puts the EU unfairly at 
a disadvantage in relation to those producing countries 
which impose such restrictions. Outsourcing of manufac-
turing can also be seen as one option to secure access to 
certain materials (e.g. the automotive industry).
The role of EU policies to reduce raw material depend-
ency
Access to raw materials can be facilitated by different 
policy tools, such as ensuring a better operational and 
regulatory environment for industries affected by the 
scarcity of raw materials and fostering a global level 
playing field in trade and investment. Encouraging and 
supporting R&D and innovation for substitutes, better 
recycling techniques and sustainable production is of 
key importance in tackling the shortage of non-energy 
raw materials for EU manufacturing in the longer 
term. Furthermore, there is potential to reduce import 
dependency in the case of some of the non-energy raw 
materials of which Europe still has several large depos-
its. However, the non-energy extractive industry has to 
confront a number of challenges, such as competing 
land use. At the same time, innovation in resource effi-
cient and sustainable production technologies can be 
important drivers for future competitiveness of the non-
extractive industries.
6.  EU industry in the 
sustainable growth context
In order to foster economic growth in a sustainable way, 
European industry and policymakers are facing strong 27
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pressures to reduce the negative impacts of economic 
activities on the environment (e.g. climate change, envi-
ronmental degradation, etc.) and to address concerns 
about resource scarcity, security of supply and the EU’s 
reliance on external supplies of energy, raw and criti-
cal materials. The Europe 2020 strategy recognises this 
- in particular with the Flagship initiatives on Industrial 
Policy and Resource Efficiency - by setting out a new 
framework to promote the modernization of the indus-
trial base and the transition to a low carbon, resource 
efficient economy. At the same time, European indus-
try is already moving over to more sustainable methods 
of production, with particularly strong growth being 
achieved in what are known as “eco-industries”. How-
ever, sustainable growth is not exclusive to certain sec-
tors. Rather it represents a re-orientation of the entire 
economic landscape, where resource and eco-efficiency 
and innovation become the key for delivering environ-
mental and other societal goals, whilst simultaneously 
reinforcing competitiveness and providing growth and 
jobs.
Relative decoupling of economic growth and environ-
mental impact has been achieved
Significant progress has already been made on the road 
to a resource efficient and low carbon economy. Overall 
there has been relative decoupling of economic growth 
and environmental impact in the EU over the past two 
decades in terms of energy and resource use, emissions 
and waste generation. However, absolute decoupling 
remains a challenge in some areas and sectors, e.g. 
for households. EU industry overall has improved its 
resource efficiency, carbon and energy intensity dur-
ing the period, being in many instances ahead of the US 
and having closed the gap on Japan – the world leader 
in many aspects of industrial efficiency. However, it is 
difficult to make a clear-cut analysis as to the extent in 
which the overall improvements achieved are the result 
of enhanced industry efficiency. Many of the most posi-
tive aspects of industry’s eco-performance are based on 
improvements in emissions in the energy sector, but 
the evidence points to them being based on broader 
developments or policy interventions in the energy gen-
eration sector, rather than on industry action alone. Not-
withstanding this qualification, the evidence does sup-
port the view that industry has increased its energy and 
resource efficiency over the period and that these trends 
are continuing in most sectors and Member States.
Overall there is broad evidence pointing to relative 
decoupling in industry
By and large, there is strong evidence of at least rela-
tive decoupling across industry, particularly as regards 
energy, greenhouse gas (GHG) and other emissions and 
water use. Relative decoupling is also apparent in mate-
rial consumption, but not to the same extent as other 
areas.
Although total energy use has risen in the EU-27, it has 
increased more slowly than in the US. In fact, the EU has 
improved its energy intensity in recent times and has 
now closed the gap on Japan. However, the US has also 
narrowed its energy intensity gap. Meanwhile, China 
has overtaken the EU in terms of energy use. Although 
total EU energy use has risen, industrial energy use has 
remained broadly stable in the last 15 years. In parallel, 
there has been a decline in energy use in many of the 
EU-15 countries, while EU-12 Member States and oth-
ers that experienced rapid industrial economic growth 
have seen their energy use increase. The EU-12 coun-
tries achieved a significant reduction in their industrial 
energy consumption intensity and also in the gap vis-à-
vis the average industrial energy intensity of the EU-15.
From a sectoral perspective, the iron and steel and 
chemical sectors - the two biggest industrial energy 
users - have seen their energy use and intensity fall 
significantly. Industrial energy intensity has improved 
by 18% since 1995, and although the most significant 
improvements were achieved prior to 2000, the down-
ward trends are continuing.
In the case of GHG emissions there is also strong evi-
dence of decoupling, as overall GHG emissions are fall-
ing while the economy grows. Similar evidence exists 
for industrial emissions. GHG emissions are linked very 
closely to overall energy use and the emissions intensity 
of the energy mix, and these trends are broadly similar. 
The best available calculation of industrial emissions 
intensity reported a 30% decrease in emissions intensity 
for industry, which is slightly better than overall energy 
trends. This illustrates the emissions benefits result-
ing from changes to the energy mix, such as increased 
renewable energy, fuel switching from coal to gas and 
the impacts of policy such as the Large Combustion 
Plant Directive (LCPD).
The fact that EU-27 GHG emissions declined by 5.1% in 
the period where energy consumption rose again points 
to the de-carbonization of energy supply and decou-
pling of impacts. However, emissions reductions are 
generally concentrated in the EU-15, with most EU-12 
Member States seeing overall emissions rise as their 
economies grow. At the sectoral level, the industrial 
(manufacturing and construction) GHG reduction - at 
13% - is higher than the overall emissions reduction. 
In the case of materials there is also some evidence for 
relative decoupling as materials usage has been increas-
ing, but at a slower rate than the economy. Direct mate-
rials consumption (DMC) and direct materials inputs 
(DMI) increased over the period, but by less than over-28
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all or industrial gross value added (GVA) growth. Some 
countries (e.g. Germany, UK, and Italy) achieved reduc-
tions in materials use while industrial GVA was increas-
ing, whereas the trends in EU-12 are pointing towards 
increased materials use.
Materials productivity has increased in the EU-27, albeit 
gradually and unevenly. The indications are that materi-
als productivity is closely related to structural economic 
factors, which control the extent to which improve-
ments can be achieved. This supports the view that 
decoupling is still relative in terms of resource use. The 
generation of waste by industry has declined signifi-
cantly. Evidence also indicates that industry has better 
eco-performance than the wider economy in respect to 
waste.
In the case of water there is some evidence of at least 
a relative decoupling, but is hard to draw any hard and 
fast conclusions as data is sparse. Overall water abstrac-
tion (i.e. the volume of water that is taken from surface 
and ground water sources) is down in the countries for 
which data are available, with a particular improvement 
recorded in Germany. Abstraction by the manufactur-
ing industry is also down and typically the decline in 
manufacturing abstraction tends to be greater than the 
decline in overall abstraction.
As far as other emissions are concerned, there is evidence 
of absolute decoupling – emissions have been falling 
while industry has been growing. Measures of acidifica-
tion and particulate emissions (PM10) were very closely 
related to energy supply. It is therefore likely that a large 
proportion of emissions reductions are a result of policy 
actions to clean up large combustion plants.
Effects of the recent crisis are not yet clear
Many of the fastest and most significant improvements 
in eco-performance occurred in the 1990s, partly in 
response to a number of one-off events and historical 
developments. These events included the transition 
from a ‘planned’ to a market based economy in central 
and eastern Europe, the closure of significant parts of 
heavy industry, a major switch from coal to gas and the 
implementation of the LCPD and associated air-quality 
legislation. 
Achieving levels of progress similar to those seen in the 
1990s, and speeding up the improvements in eco-per-
formance will require effective policies and actions. Cer-
tainly the policy framework in the EU has been strength-
ened significantly over the past decade and it is possible 
that similar large scale changes may come about - for 
example – as result of the widespread deployment of 
renewable energy or the tightening and expansion of 
the EU ETS (Emissions Trading System) emissions caps. 
At the same time there is the possibility that the one-
off benefit of the transition from a ‘planned’ to a market 
based industry may start to erode, as the new Member 
States grow faster while their eco-performance, even 
though rapidly improving, remains weaker than in the 
rest of the EU. This could act as a drag on the eco-perfor-
mance of EU industry in the future.
The majority of the datasets available to analyse the 
eco-performance of industry are only fully updated to 
2007. The recent economic and financial crisis is likely to 
have had a significant impact on both industry and its 
eco-performance. So far, however, it is unclear whether 
these effects are positive or negative.
7.  EU industrial policy and 
global competition: recent 
lessons and the way forward
In 2002, the European Competitiveness report analysed 
the relationships between enterprise and competition 
policies. The complementarity of these policies and 
the potential for further synergies were well estab-
lished at that time. However, the last decade has seen 
several developments which point towards a need to 
shift from a predominantly intra-European focus of the 
two policies towards a global perspective. This calls for 
a renewed assessment of the overlap between indus-
trial policy, competition policy and including also trade 
policy.
Four major developments played a key role in trigger-
ing this shift. The first is the enlargement and the emer-
gence of the EU as the biggest trading bloc, with an 
imperfectly developed single market. The second impor-
tant change is the recent financial and economic crisis 
which had a profound impact on the European econ-
omy. The third aspect is globalisation, which defines the 
agenda for the next decade. Lastly, there is the new EU 
industrial policy.
These changes create real challenges for European 
enterprises. As far as the internal market is concerned, 
there is much unused potential for developing the 
strength of European companies and of enhancing 
their competitiveness. This thinking also underpinned 
the 2010 Industrial Policy Communication. The report 
further makes it clear that the key challenge is to create 
a framework that accompanies firms through all phases 
of their life cycle and provides the right incentives for 
them to increase their competitiveness in a globalised 
environment. The remaining challenges involve refocus-
ing on the needs of the real economy, in particular on its 
access to finance - which has been the key lesson learnt 
during the recent crisis - and creating a global level play-
ing field.29
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After defining the notions of “European company” and 
“European Common Interest”, the analysis focuses on 
situations where such an approach could usefully be 
applied. It concerns companies’ access to resources, be 
they raw materials or finance, and the improvement of 
competitiveness through increased innovation. In this 
context, while the approach of the EU and national 
administrations is to provide complementary solutions, 
more targeted involvement by the EU can be beneficial. 
The new approach concerns the ways in which Euro-
pean companies can optimise their access to foreign 
markets on the basis of permanent reciprocity. It also 
applies to restructuring processes, which reflect the 
constant need of all enterprises and sectors to adjust to 
the changing economic circumstances. There is a need 
to support prompt and adequate reactions in order to 
help companies avoid getting deeper into difficulties. At 
the same time, their exit - where necessary - should not 
be prevented, as this would lead to adverse effects on 
the economy.
8. Conclusions
The analysis in this report shows that the experience of 
the recession varies according to the way in which coun-
tries were involved in the building up of imbalances in 
the pre-crisis period 2000-2007. It also argues that com-
petitive sectors that grew in a balanced manner before 
the crisis will also lead the recovery. In any case, a strong 
and sustained recovery will depend on their capacity 
to create an environment in which firms can thrive and 
innovation is created and taken to the market. Achiev-
ing this aim will require the careful design of public poli-
cies: from basic research in universities to generate ideas 
to a business-friendlier environment for the purpose of 
allowing start-ups to bring innovations to the market.
The importance of services for the economy has 
increased steadily over time in most OECD countries. 
Especially important in this development are knowledge 
intensive business services (KIBS) which have become 
increasingly important over time as sources of innova-
tion, technologies and as inputs for the whole economy. 
The importance of KIBS for the rest of the economy 
has become visible through the tendency of firms to 
develop new services as part of a product package that 
includes physical, tangible goods. This is a prominent 
feature of what has been referred to as a “convergence 
process”. The process encompasses manufacturing 
firms which have also begun to offer services as part of 
a package including both the physical product and ser-
vices. The convergence of manufacturing and services is 
an opportunity for the European manufacturing sector 
to increase its competitiveness. The importance of KIBS 
for the EU’s external competitiveness can be measured 
both directly and indirectly. The shares of direct KIBS 
exports have increased over time for both the EU-12 and 
the EU-15. Measured directly, KIBS for EU-12 account 
for 4% and for EU-15 11% in terms of exports. Meas-
ured indirectly, KIBS activities account for 9% of EU-12 
exports and 18% of EU-15 exports.
The EU space sector enjoys a strong competitive posi-
tion internationally and is the world technology leader 
in certain segments. Together with the United States 
the EU is a major net exporter of space products, but is 
less hampered than its US competitor by export control 
rules. The EU space sector is heavily influenced by pub-
lic policies, funding and procurement, but the share of 
commercial customers is increasing. In order to remain 
competitive the sector needs to secure its supply of skills 
and keep a watchful eye on competition from emerging 
space nations that are eager to build up their own space 
industries and become less dependent on the EU and 
US space sectors.
The accessibility and affordability of non-energy raw 
materials is crucial for ensuring the competitiveness of 
EU industry. Several European industries are affected by 
a limited or more costly supply of certain raw materials. 
Access to raw materials can be facilitated by a range of 
policy tools. Firstly, existing regulations and directives at 
the EU level should be made internally consistent, which 
would promote a better operational and regulatory 
environment for industries affected by the scarcity of 
raw materials. Internal consistency should be in line with 
sustainability objectives and policies. Secondly, promot-
ing a global level playing field in trade and investment is 
essential in order to ensure a fair and sustainable supply 
of non-energy raw materials from international markets. 
Thirdly, intelligent development of the further explora-
tion and exploitation of the European non-energy raw 
materials resources can play an important role in provid-
ing certain materials for production. Finally, encourag-
ing and supporting R&D and innovation for substitutes, 
better recycling techniques and sustainable production 
(material efficiency) are all of key importance in tackling 
the relative shortage of raw materials in the EU manu-
facturing sector.
The transition to a more sustainable, resource efficient, 
low carbon industry is key for the competitiveness of 
the European economy in the future. The overview of 
public policy instruments currently in use has shown 
that, at the EU level, policy attention has recently been 
strongly focused on energy and the control of carbon 
emissions. However, the number of policy initiatives is 
rising, and the emphasis of policy attention is shifting to 
sustainable consumption and production, green public 
procurement and - more recently – resource efficiency. 
Choosing and designing a coherent and effective mix of 
policies (including market based instruments, such as 
taxes, subsidies or trading schemes, environmental reg-
ulations and standards, voluntary agreements, co-regu-30
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lation, communication and information, etc) is crucial as 
a means of improving eco-performance and facilitating 
the simultaneous transformation of industry towards 
more sustainable ways of production and improved 
competitiveness. Aspects such as the whole life cycle of 
the products, interactions between the different stages 
of the supply chains, complementarity with the existing 
national and regional regulatory frameworks, enforce-
ment and monitoring costs, compliance burdens for 
firms and SMEs, market structure and effects on compet-
itiveness of EU industry need to be taken into account in 
the selection and design of these policies.
The analysis confirms that the main findings on the rela-
tionship between enterprise and competition policies 
in the 2002 Competitiveness Report remain valid. This 
applies to the complementarity between these poli-
cies and the scope that still exists for improved use of 
unexploited synergies. At the same time, the existing 
approach needs to be extended and supplemented. In 
particular, as the global focus and global consequences 
of policy action have become more important, trade pol-
icy considerations need to be systematically included. 
Indeed, key developments over the last decade, such 
as enlargement, the financial and economic crisis, the 
rise of new non-EU competitors and the formulation 
of a new EU industrial policy, need to be taken into 
account in policy formulation. Policy should continue to 
focus on the general EU interest, including by facilitating 
the functioning of EU companies in the global economy.31
The period 2008-10 has foreseen a large global reces-
sion. While individual countries had of course expe-
rienced similar recessions in the past, this time was 
unprecedented because of the depth (overall magni-
tude of the downturn) and scope (the number of coun-
tries severely affected).
1.1.  Recovery of output
By the beginning of 2011, fears of a double dip recession 
vanished but recovery proved slow. This is particularly 
true for employment and for the countries most affected 
by speculative bubbles during the 2000-07 period. The 
origins of the recession are imbalances accumulated 
during the boom period, notably the inflation of house 
prices in some Member States and the subsequent 
external imbalance.2 Consequently, not all EU Member 
States have been affected in the same way or with the 
same intensity. On the one hand, countries like Estonia, 
Ireland and Spain were severely affected by a housing 
bubble and are now going through a major correction, 
with considerable downsizing of the construction sec-
tor. It is therefore not surprising that these are also the 
countries with the largest rises in unemployment dur-
ing the recession (see Figure 1.1). On the other hand, 
the economies of countries like Austria, Belgium and 
Germany are largely victims of the readjustment in the 
US and the other Member States — whether because 
their financial system was exposed to loans from bubble 
2  See Chapter 1 “Growing imbalances and European industry,” in European 
Competitiveness Report 2010 (European Commission (2010a)); or the mono-
graph “Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences and Responses,” in 
European Commission (2009b).
CHAPTER 1
CRISIS, RECOVERY AND THE ROLE OF INNOVATION
Box 1.1: Competitiveness
A competitive economy is one that raises living standards sustainably and provides access to jobs for people 
who want to work. At the roots of competitiveness are the institutional and microeconomic policy arrangements 
that create conditions under which businesses can emerge and thrive, and individual creativity and effort are 
rewarded. Other factors that support competitiveness are macroeconomic policies promoting a safe and sta-
ble business environment and the transition to a low-carbon and resource-efficient economy. Ultimately, com-
petitiveness is about stepping up productivity, as this is the only way to achieve sustained growth in per capita 
income — which, in turn, raises living standards.
The notion of living standards encompasses many social aspects, so this broad definition of competitiveness 
comprises elements of all three pillars of the Lisbon Strategy — prosperity, social welfare and environmental 
protection.
In the context of international trade, the (external) competitiveness of a country or sector is an elusive concept. 
Indeed, some indexes aimed at reflecting this notion of competitiveness, such as the real effective exchange rate, 
have to be interpreted with care, because ‘loss of competitiveness’ in an individual industry may well reflect the 
outstanding export performance of other domestic industries. For example, a rise in the value of the euro may 
worsen the competitive position of a given industry, but this may simply reflect strong productivity growth in 
other industries, and hence strong exports and an increasing demand for the euro.32
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countries or because of a drop in international trade. 
The prospects of recovery also vary according to the 
way each country has been involved in this crisis. While 
countries not directly affected by internal imbalances 
can expect a prompt recovery, countries affected by 
the bubble find themselves in a process of deleveraging 
that will slow down the recovery as long as households 
and firms are immersed in their balance sheet correction 
(OECD (2011)).
Table 1.1 gives an idea of magnitude and scope of the 
downturn but also of the differences across EU Mem-
ber States. With the exception of Poland and Slovakia, 
no Member State experienced less than a full year 
recession. Even if by mid-2009 most countries started 
to recover, some Member States like Greece or Roma-
nia were still in recession by the beginning of 2011: 
almost three consecutive years of decreasing income. 
The experience is also mixed when it comes to the 
Figure 1.1:   The recession as a correction: The housing boom and the contraction in employment
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Figure 1.2:   Real GDP in 2010Q3 with peak and trough value (2000 = 100)
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Chapter 1 — Crisis, Recovery and The Role Of Innovation
1.2.  The boom period in the labour market
Some of these growing countries, however, saw large 
increases in their workforce, either through migration 
or because of an increase in the activity rate. In other 
words, increases in output do not necessarily reflect 
increases in productivity.
An extreme case is Spain, where employment increased 
by 32 percent from 2000 to its peak in 2007. (This com-
pares with 10 percent in the EU-27 as a whole). Thus, 
despite a considerable contraction, Spain ends the dec-
ade 20 percent above its initial level (see Table 1.2). This 
expansion is partly explained by large flows of migrants: 
in the boom period, the proportion of foreign work-
ers grew from 2 to 14 percent of Spain’s total active 
workforce.4
In the same Table 1.2 one can also see that, as expected, 
the reaction of employment to the recession appears 
late and lasts longer than that of output. It is note-
worthy, however, that except Romania and Portugal, 
employment increases over the decade despite the 
recent downturn. Other than the Spanish case men-
tioned above, a somewhat surprising feature of the 
labor markets is the stability of the share of foreign 
workers during this strong cycle. With one or two excep-
tions like Estonia and Luxembourg, most European 
countries show a relatively stable share of foreigners in 
their labor force. More strikingly, the recession has not 
changed that share; not even, in some cases, reversed 
the increasing trend; suggesting that foreigners do not 
constitute a disposable work force but workers well-
integrated in the economic tissue of their host countries. 
The same goes for the share of part-time workers in total 
employment, which remained roughly constant, rang-
ing from low values like 4 percent in Hungary and 46 
percent for the Netherlands, with an average 18 percent 
for the EU-27.
4  All figures mentioned in this section come from the Labour Force Survey, 
Eurostat.
depth of the recession. From a tiny one-quarter drop 
in Poland to a 25 percent loss along a more than two 
years recession in Latvia, there are many and diverse 
experiences. In general EU-15 countries can be divided 
among those more affected by a real estate bubble —
Spain, Denmark, United Kingdom or Ireland— with 
drops in real activity up to 14 percent, and the rest of 
countries displaying considerable but more moderate 
contractions. EU-12 Member States, with the excep-
tion of Poland, have all suffered a sharp contraction 
of GDP, on average larger than that observed in the 
EU-15: most EU-12 countries are close or well above 
the double-digit contraction, with the Baltic Republics 
suffering the deepest cuts.
Despite the severity of the recession, however, the 
regression in GDP has not come close to wiping out 
a decade of relatively strong growth. Tables 1.1 and 1.2 
show how all countries grew over the decade despite 
the sharp downturn in 2008-10. Some countries (such 
as Germany or Denmark) have a poor track record over 
the decade, with an annual average growth rate below 
one percent. Most EU countries, however, end the 
decade with significant improvements in real income: 
Spain, Ireland and Sweden grew annually by an aver-
age of more than 2 percent, while some EU-12 countries 
show an average annual growth rate of more than 4 per-
cent, despite the large contraction experienced during 
the recession.3 Two exceptions stand out: Italy and, to 
a lesser extent, Portugal. In Italy, the meagre outcome 
of a decade of weak growth was wiped out by the reces-
sion, so that by the end of the decade real GDP is virtu-
ally at the same level as in 2000.
3  Indeed, the accession triggered an impressive catch-up process with some 
EU-12 Member States displaying rates of growth of productivity above 50 
percent in 2000-07. The downturn was severe but did not get close to com-
pensate accumulated growth in the boom period. For details, see section 1.3 
in European Competitiveness Report 2010 (European Commission (2010a)).36
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is a constant 14 percent but in Spain it reaches a peak in 
34.6 percent in 2006 and then drops to 24 percent.5
5  Here again Spain constitutes an exception. It had by far the larger proportion 
of temporary contracts at the peak of the cycle, 34 percent of its employ-
ment in 2008, and this share dropped to 24 by 2010. This is reflecting the 
dual Spanish labor market, in which youngsters with temporary contracts 
constitute disposable labor in bad times, and is discussed in depth in the 
report Employment in Europe 2010 (European Commission (2010e)).
The behaviour of temporary contracts depends on how 
(and why) such contracts are used. In Germany the share 
Table 1.3: Decomposing changes in real GDP per head, 2000-08 and 2000-10
2000-10 2000-08 2000-08
Country
Real GDP 
per head
Real 
GDP
Population Real GDP 
per head
Real 
GDP
Population Real GDP 
per hour
Average 
hours
Employment 
rate
Activity 
rate
European 
Union
9.8 14.0 3.9 13.2 16.9 3.3 : : : :
Belgium 8.0 14.5 6.0 10.4 15.4 4.5 4.9 1.3 -0.1 4.0
Bulgaria 62.0 49.3 -7.8 68.8 57.2 -6.9 31.8 1.0 11.5 13.8
Czech  
Republic
33.5 36.9 2.6 37.4 39.6 1.5 36.6 -5.0 4.6 1.2
Denmark 3.3 7.2 3.7 7.4 10.5 2.9 4.1 0.7 1.0 1.4
Germany 9.8 9.0 -0.7 10.5 10.4 -0.1 10.8 -3.3 0.2 2.9
Estonia 48.4 44.9 -2.3 68.2 64.4 -2.3 47.6 -2.8 9.3 7.2
Ireland 9.7 29.0 17.6 19.8 39.9 16.8 20.3 -6.0 -2.2 8.3
Greece 20.7 25.9 4.3 30.6 34.4 3.0 19.7 -0.3 4.0 5.3
Spain 7.1 22.6 14.5 12.7 27.6 13.2 7.1 -4.9 -0.5 11.1
France 5.6 12.7 6.7 7.8 13.9 5.6 9.2 -2.0 1.1 -0.4
Italy -3.6 2.5 6.3 1.6 6.8 5.1 -0.3 -3.8 3.6 2.2
Cyprus 13.4 31.3 15.8 16.4 33.0 14.3 10.2 -4.0 1.2 8.7
Latvia 51.4 43.1 -5.5 83.5 75.2 -4.5 61.0 -9.1 7.3 16.8
Lithuania 61.4 51.9 -5.9 84.9 77.4 -4.0 58.3 3.3 12.8 0.3
Luxembourg 16.3 34.6 15.7 21.0 35.4 11.9 6.9 9.4 -2.5 6.1
Hungary 22.7 20.3 -1.9 29.8 27.6 -1.7 35.4 -2.7 -1.7 0.2
Malta 10.8 17.5 6.0 10.1 16.4 5.7 7.9 -3.5 0.9 4.8
Netherlands 9.5 14.2 4.3 13.2 16.9 3.3 13.1 -3.9 0.0 4.1
Austria 11.3 16.5 4.7 14.2 18.8 4.1 12.4 -2.8 -0.3 4.7
Poland 46.3 46.0 -0.2 39.3 38.8 -0.4 28.7 -0.8 10.7 -1.4
Portugal 2.4 6.7 4.1 4.1 8.1 3.9 8.2 -2.3 -3.9 2.5
Romania 55.1 48.1 -4.5 69.6 62.6 -4.1 84.4 1.4 1.4 -10.5
Slovenia 27.8 30.7 2.2 38.1 40.6 1.8 .. .. 2.4 4.4
Slovakia 59.4 59.9 0.3 61.1 61.2 0.1 49.7 -7.0 11.4 3.9
Finland 15.3 19.5 3.7 23.1 26.3 2.7 17.9 -2.5 3.9 3.0
Sweden 15.5 21.8 5.5 17.5 22.5 4.3 16.4 -1.0 -0.7 2.7
United  
Kingdom
9.2 15.4 5.7 14.4 19.3 4.3 15.4 -3.5 -0.3 3.0
Note:    All numbers are accumulated percentage growth rates.
Source:    AMECO database, European Commission; Employment (NETN), Labour force (NLTN), Population (NPTD), GDP at 2000 market 
prices (OVGD)37
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Figure 1.3:   Unemployment rate in 2010Q3 with minimum and maximum value before  
and during the recession
0
5
10
15
20
25
U
K
 
S
K
 
S
I
 
S
E
 
R
O
 
P
T
 
P
L
 
N
L
 
M
T
 
L
V
 
L
U
 
L
T
 
I
T
 
I
E
 
H
U
 
F
R
 
F
I
 
E
S
 
E
L
 
E
E
 
D
K
 
D
E
 
C
Z
 
C
Y
 
B
G
 
B
E
 
A
T
 
E
U
-
2
7
2010Q3 max min
Source: Eurostat, Quarterly LFS statistics for employment, Unemployment - LFS adjusted series,une_rt_q.
Box 1.2: Employment: Conjunctural versus structural readjustment
Countries affected by housing bubbles or other imbalances have seen their unemployment rates soar in com-
parison to other Member States. The reason is to be found in the different prospects faced by firms in these coun-
tries. In bubble countries there are two reasons why unemployment has risen more than the average. First, they 
are undergoing a major structural readjustment, namely the downsizing of their construction sector. Second, as 
mentioned above, households and firms are trying to deleverage, cutting down consumption and increasing sav-
ings. This slows down the recovery and worsens the situation for businesses, which are then reluctant to hire new 
workers. In contrast, in countries not directly affected by these imbalances, the better prospects of a swift recovery 
made possible for employers to hoard labour rather than firing workers. Indeed, if resizing the labour force entails 
adjustment costs, firms will react by hoarding labour to preserve good matches as well as firm-specific human 
capital. In turn, workers kept in employment help maintain internal demand, making these countries’ prospects 
even better by comparison with bubble countries.
It thus appears that labour hoarding is a natural response to a good business outlook in the short-term. The 
government should not force firms to respond in the same way if major structural readjustments are taking place 
because it would just delay an inevitable adjustment. Figure 1.4 takes two of the most obvious cases at both 
extremes of the spectrum and is self-explanatory.38
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Figure 1.4:   Germany and Spain compared: Employment in the construction sector in persons  
and in percentage of total employment
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Notes:    Until 2008Q4 NACE rev.1, thereon NACE rev.2. In both cases construction is epigraph F. Until 2004 German data only available 
one quarter per year: the missing observations are linearly interpolated to build the graph.
Source:  Eurostat, Labour Force Survey, LFS series - Detailed quarterly survey results (lfsq_egana).39
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1.3.  Borrowing, lending and the exit from the 
recession
While there is still some debate on the origin of these 
imbalances, there is already a degree of consensus on 
the role of the euro in their development (see European 
Commission (2010c). The boom years saw a notable 
increase in capital flows in all European countries. The 
way net lending and borrowing (Figure 1.5) behaved 
gives an idea of how countries were affected through-
out this period, and may indicate how they will get out 
of the recession.
There are four types of countries. In the first group 
one finds countries like Belgium or the Netherlands. 
They have traditionally been net lenders and the 
boom period, if anything, intensified this trend. In 
the second group are countries like Germany or Swe-
den that started being borrowers and became major 
lenders. In the case of Sweden this change occurred 
after the financial crisis in the 1990s: in the case of Ger-
many it happened approximately when the euro was 
introduced. A third group comprises those countries 
that have seen their levels of borrowing increase to 
unsustainable levels. They include Greece, which in 
2008 borrowed an amount equivalent to 15 percent 
of its GDP, and Spain which went from being a net 
lender in the late 1990s to borrowing almost 10 per-
cent of its GDP for three consecutive years between 
2006 and 2008. These countries will find it harder to 
recover since they will face substantial sectoral read-
justments in addition to the deleveraging of house-
holds and firms. Greece, Spain and Ireland are showing 
signs of this readjustment in that their net borrowing 
is decreasing very fast, mirroring the decrease in lend-
ing by Germany and Belgium.
Finally, the fourth group comprises Portugal and Italy, 
neither of which had a bubble but both of which show 
weak growth. More intriguingly, neither of them has 
really managed to reduce its dependence on foreign 
capital after the crisis. They differ only in that Italy does 
not have a significant external imbalance while Portugal 
does, and it started twenty years ago.
Figure 1.5:   Net lending (+) / net borrowing (-) for selected EU Member States
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In short, countries like Germany and Sweden will recover 
very fast, France and the UK more slowly. Greece and 
Spain will follow a path of modest growth while delev-
eraging is ongoing; Italy and Portugal are likely to face 
persistent stagnation unless they undertake structural 
reforms.
If Europe is set on a path of recovery, it is a slow one 
compared to the US and even more so when compared 
with emerging economies. Estimates of real growth 
rates for the last three years tend to indicate that the 
EU’s income has not yet returned to its 2007 level while 
its main Asian competitors have seen their income rise 
well above pre-crisis levels (Figure 1.6): South Korea 
10 percent higher, India 23 percent and China 32 per-
cent.6 Note that East Asian economies can be seen as 
victims of the imbalances in the US and the EU: they 
were not affected by internal imbalances; it was a con-
junctural downturn, hence the strength of their recov-
ery is not surprising and it will in turn help the European 
recovery. 
6  Figures for India and China are from the International Monetary Fund, World 
Economic Outlook Database, October 2010. For the strong recovery of 
emerging economies, see again OECD (2011).
1.4.  Restructuring versus conjunctural 
downturn
From Table 1.3 it is clear that there is no obvious con-
nection between the severity of the recession and 
recent productivity developments. To understand this, 
and in connection with all of the above, we need to note 
that different sectors have been affected in very differ-
ent ways. 
As is usual in recessions, consumer durable goods and 
investment are the most sensitive items. Consumers 
postpone purchases of items like cars and household 
appliances while continuing to consume energy and 
non-durable items like food (see Table 1.4). This would 
explain the marked difference in the drop in 2009, which 
for the EU was around 15 percent for durables and 
barely 2.7 percent for non-durables.
More interesting, however, is the large contraction of 
building (not civil engineering). It has dropped more 
than the average and by March 2011 it had not yet 
started to recover; see the Monthly Note March 2011 
(European Commission (2011c). This is a sign of the 
correction taking place after a decade of overinvest-
ment in the housing sector. Indeed, the recession can 
be seen as a correction or readjustment once the prices 
of certain assets are deemed unsustainable. Other sec-
tors not directly related to the construction boom will 
Figure 1.6:   Real GDP in EU-27 and selected economies (2007 = 100)
90
95
100
105
110
115
120
Korea
Russia
Brazil
Japan
US
EU-27
2007 2008 2009 2010
Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1 Q4 Q3 Q2 Q1
Source: OECD Quarterly National Accounts.41
Chapter 1 — Crisis, Recovery and The Role Of Innovation
recover relatively faster. Those more cyclical like Basic 
metal, Motor vehicles, etc., display in table 1.4 double 
digit positive growth since the trough. The way coun-
tries perform, overall, during this recession will depend 
on the relative importance of each of these sectors. But 
high performing sectors, those who performed well 
before the crisis, will in all likelihood do well in the future 
in every Member State. This line of reasoning explains 
the apparent paradox of countries hit hard by the reces-
sion, and yet with an overall reasonable performance 
over the decade (see again Table 1.3). In other words, 
that the construction sector was oversized in 2007 does 
not mean that it was at the expense of other produc-
tive sectors that may be driving growth of productivity, 
maintaining international market shares, and leading 
now the recovery.7
Indeed, the recovery of other sectors, notably manufac-
turing, is already under way, and it is benefiting from the 
steady growth of economic activity in emerging coun-
tries. As noted in the previous section, GDP outside the 
7  For an argumentation along these lines, see EEAG (2011, chapter 4). In the 
previous edition of the European Competitiveness Report 2010, chapter 1 
noted how the evolution of international market shares in 2000-10 bears 
a less than obvious relation with the adjustments suffered during the 2008-
10 crisis.
Figure 1.7:   Cyclical intensity and the drop during the downturn in the EU-27
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EU and the US was not much affected and is now grow-
ing fast, attracting European exports. By January 2011 
the value of EU exports was 33 percent above its level 
a year earlier.
On the finance side, according to the Monthly Note 
March 2011, recovery from the credit squeeze is lagging 
behind the recovery of manufacturing activity but is not 
worsening.8 Less encouraging are the grim prospects 
for European venture capital. According to Coller Capi-
tal (2011), a recent survey of the private equity industry, 
large investors will be moving away from venture capital 
in Europe in the coming years. In the US, 50 percent of 
investors consider venture capital a promising invest-
ment. The corresponding figure in Europe is less than 
10 percent. Hardly anyone who answered the survey 
believes that venture capital will generate consistently 
strong results over the next decade, given its poor per-
formance in the last ten years. As discussed below, this 
may handicap the EU’s ability to bring innovations to 
the market through start-ups.
8  At this point it may be worth noting that there is no consensus in the lit-
erature on the role of tightening credit conditions and the recovery after 
a deep recession. For instance, Hayashi and Prescott (2002) show how bank 
loans remained depressed in Japan long after economic activity, and notably 
investment, started to recover. See the discussion in Claessens, Kose and Ter-
rones (2009).42
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Table 1.4: Recent developments in EU-27 sectors. Percentage changes in value added
NACE Rev.2 Growth 2008 Growth 2009
Last six months Post trough growth Spread last six months
Capital 0 -19.4 9.4 13.8 1.1
  Consumer -2 -4.3 3.7 4.7 -4
  Durable consumer  -5 -15.1 6.3 7.7 -0.7
  Nondurable consumer -1.5 -2.7 3.1 4.4 -4.6
  Intermediate -3.6 -17.8 11 15.1 3.1
B Mining & quarrying -3.6 -11.1 1.2 0.5 -4.9
C Manufacturing -1.9 -14.5 8.1 9 -
C10 Food -0.6 -0.9 1.7 3.8 -6.5
C11 Beverages -1.9 -2.7 -1.6 0.1 -9.5
C12 Tobacco -16.2 -1.9 -5.9 0 -9.6
C13 Textiles -10.1 -16.4 8.9 14.4 4.8
C14 Clothing -3.4 -11 2.4 6 -0.2
C15 Leather and footwear -7.9 -12.4 5.4 8.4 2.4
C16 Wood -8.8 -14 4.2 5 -3
C17 Paper -3.4 -8.9 7.3 9 -0.9
C18 Printing & publishing -2.3 -7.4 0.4 2.5 -6.9
C19 Refined petroleum 3.2 -7.9 1.1 7.9 -6.1
C20 Chemicals -3.3 -10.7 11.3 19.7 2.6
C21 Pharmaceuticals 1.6 3.1 6.9 13.6 -5.3
C22 Rubber & plastics -4.8 -12.9 8 11 -0.3
C23 Non metallic mineral products -6.7 -18.4 4.7 6.3 -2.1
C24 Basic metals -2.8 -25.6 21 42.4 13.7
C25 Metal products -2.4 -21.8 8.9 11.1 1.3
C26 Computers, electronic & optical 2.7 -16.7 10.6 11.5 0.7
C27 Electrical equipment -0.1 -20.2 13.8 14.6 5.7
C28 Machinery n.e.c. 1.4 -25.9 12.2 18 4.7
C29 Motor vehicles -6.1 -21.8 19 48.3 9.6
C30 Other transport eq. 4.3 -5.9 -3.2 2.2 -10.7
C31 Furniture -1.1 -5.9 8.6 1.2 1
C32 Other manufacturing -4.9 -16.5 0 9 -6.2
C33 Repair of machinery 5.5 -8.5 2.3 6.5 -3.4
D Electricity, gas & water 0.3 -4.9 3.7 7.7 -4.8
F Construction -3.7 -9 -2.8 4.8 -10.4
F41 Buildings -4.4 -11.4 -3.4 4.1 -11.2
F42 Civil engineering -1.2 1.8 2.2 7.3 -4.9
Source: European Union Industrial Structure 2011.43
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Table 1.5: Trends in productivity and hours worked. Percentage changes in 1995-2007
per person in employment per hour worked Hours per person in employment
TOT   Total 14.11 18.59 -3.77
AtB   Agriculture 34.67 38.40 -2.69
C    Mining and quarrying 14.54 13.53 0.89
D    Total manufacturing 34.83 40.10 -3.76
15t16  Food, beverages and tobacco 6.02 12.23 -5.53
17t19  Textiles 23.63 26.00 -1.87
20 Wood 33.29 39.99 -4.79
21t22  Pulp, paper and printing 32.27 32.29 -0.02
23 Coke, refined petroleum -11.14 -4.11 -7.33
24 Chemicals 51.39 58.71 -4.62
25 Rubber and plastics 43.27 48.91 -3.79
26 Other non-metallic mineral 26.66 32.03 -4.07
27t28  Basic metals 18.57 20.98 -1.99
29 Machinery, nec 23.56 28.43 -3.79
30t33  Electrical and optical equipment 97.19 106.34 -4.43
34t35  Transport equipment 35.11 46.10 -7.52
36t37  manufacturing nec; recycling 15.23 18.52 -2.78
E    Electricity, gas and water supply 42.90 50.46 -5.02
F    Construction -0.48 -0.80 0.33
G    Wholesale and retail trade 17.69 23.95 -5.05
50 Retail trade of motor vehicles 13.31 19.64 -5.29
51 Wholesale trade; no motor 26.28 31.47 -3.94
52 Retail trade; no motor vehicles 9.98 16.67 -5.73
H    Hotels and restaurants -8.31 -1.01 -7.38
I    Transport, storage, communication 49.18 53.57 -2.86
60t63  Transport and storage 21.74 26.44 -3.72
64 Post and telecommunications 129.81 135.95 -2.60
JtK   Finance, real estate and business services -3.18 -0.80 -2.40
J    Financial intermediation 45.02 48.97 -2.65
70 Real estate activities -9.83 -5.94 -4.14
71t74  Renting of m&eq and other business activities -1.60 0.75 -2.34
LtQ   Community and social services -0.13 2.85 -2.90
L    Public admin and defence 12.20 15.83 -3.14
M    Education -7.95 -8.27 0.35
N    Health and social work 6.09 9.01 -2.68
O    Other community -7.00 -3.42 -3.70
P    Private households -9.85 -4.94 -5.16
Note:    Numbers are percentages. 
Source:  European Union Industrial Structure 2011.44
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1.5.  The role of innovation in the recovery
If the recession is about restructuring some sectors, 
but does not affect the capacity of competitive sectors 
to thrive, the outlook for the medium-term recovery is 
good, and leads to the issue of how to support innova-
tion and productivity growth in the EU. The focus here is 
on R&D, for it is considered an important source of inno-
vation and therefore sustained growth.   
Despite the emphasis on R&D intensity of the Lisbon 
strategy, progress in the past decade has been mod-
est. The Innovation Union Competitiveness Report 
2011 (European Commission (2011b)) reports that 
some countries (Estonia, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and 
Cyprus) have doubled or more their R&D intensity since 
2000 while most countries have increased it by 50% or 
less and a last group (Greece, Belgium and Slovakia) 
has shown no change or a small decrease. Of course, 
the departure point was very different across coun-
tries: the larger Member States are among the slowest 
9  To be precise, the paper notes that physical capital cannot reproduce itself 
indefinitively under the assumption of decreasing returns to capital. There 
has to be some (technical) change that increases returns to capital indefini-
tively.
progressing countries, which explains the limited pro-
gress of the EU aggregate R&D intensity. Hence, albeit 
good progress has been made in several countries, the 
EU as a whole is still far from the target set in the Lisbon 
strategy. 
The crisis will not help either although it is expected 
that R&D expenditures financed by the business sector 
will rebound for they are known to be strongly procy-
clical. In times of crisis firms cut down spending in R&D 
and there is evidence that financial constraints play an 
important role. Indeed, during a recession, most efforts 
are directed to cost-saving innovations. Even without 
financial constraints, it may be optimal from the individ-
ually point of view for R&D expenditures to be procycli-
cal. However, because of positive externalities of R&D it 
may be too procyclical (see the discussion in section 1.4, 
European Competitiveness Report 2009). This would be 
a case for counter-cyclical public funding of R&D, and 
indeed, actual R&D financed by the government appears 
to go counter the cycle in Figure 1.8.
10  See Abraham García (JRC-European Commission), “The importance of mar-
keting expenditures and other tangible assets on firms’ innovation perfor-
mance,” and Anders Sørensen, “Education as a Determinant for Innovation 
and Productivity,” Enterprise and Industry brown-bag seminars, Brussels, 
January 2011 and June 2011 respectively.
Box 1.3: Technical change
In the economic jargon technical change refers to any new process or commodity that allows increasing the value 
of production per unit value of inputs (including factors of production, like capital and labour, and intermedi-
ates). Examples include the refinement of a process that allows reducing the consumption of energy, given the 
level of production, or the introduction of a new good, like mobile phones, that fulfils a consumer demand so far 
unsatisfied.
Robert M. Solow (1956) noted how physical capital (machines) could not reproduce itself indefinitely.9 He then 
concluded that observed sustained growth of income had to be explained by technical change: by the ability to 
add more value sustainably with the same amount of labour. In other words, the importance of innovation stems 
from the fact that, ultimately, it is the only source of long-run growth or productivity, in turn the only source of 
raising living standards.
Indeed, innovation and technical change are two faces of the same phenomenon. Innovations stem from experi-
ence (learning-by-doing), the accumulation of human capital through formal education (learning-or-doing) and 
from research and development (R&D) activities. R&D can be seen as the purposeful allocation of resources (labor, 
capital) to the generation or adaption of innovations: new goods, new processes and new knowledge. From the 
moment in which firms devote resources to R&D, these have to be innovations with (at least) a (potential) com-
mercial value. In turn, if it has a market value one can conclude that R&D induces technical change: the ability to 
produce more value given the inputs. It should be noted, however, that private R&D does not include all forms 
of “purposeful” innovation: it also includes basic research, public R&D, or even other steps in the innovation pro-
cess such as marketing, a key step in taking effectively an innovation to the market and therefore give it in effect 
a commercial value.10 45
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expenditures in R&D.11 This variability, of course, reflects 
patterns of regional specialization that may be optimal 
from the social point of view. If spillovers and other posi-
tive externalities typical of knowledge-intensive activi-
ties apply to R&D, it may pay off to invest more in Silicon 
Valley rather than in Wyoming.12 These numbers also 
illustrate the reason why the EU —the Lisbon strategy 
first and the EU 2020 strategy now— has always set the 
3 percent R&D intensity target for the EU as a whole and 
not for individual Member States.
In any case, a glance at this figure shows that the EU 
and the US are reasonably similar as for geographic pat-
terns: it does not seem that the aggregate differences 
observed correspond to a consistently lower invest-
ment in EU Member States. It does not seem either to be 
related to some environmental factor directly affecting 
RDI: empirical evidence shows that similar firms across 
the Atlantic behave similarly (in the sense of having sim-
ilar RDI, profits, etc.).13
11  Maryland is an outlier in that half of its R&D is public, as opposed to 80 per-
cent of business enterprise R&D expenditures for most R&D intensive states. 
The reason is this state is the home to the National Institutes of Health. See: 
OECD Regions at a Glance: 2009 Edition; and InfoBrief, National Science Foun-
dation, June 2010.
12  For an argumentation along these lines see Dijkstra (2010).
13  See Moncada (2010). Note, however, that this paper refers to the EU Indus-
trial R&D Investment Scoreboard, and hence focuses on large firms active in 
international markets. Smaller firms across the Atlantic focused on domestic 
markets may behave differently.
1.6.  Overview of R&D in Europe
The extent to which a society is committed to innova-
tion can be captured by R&D intensity: the share of R&D 
expenditures in value added. R&D intensity is for innova-
tion what the saving rate represents for physical capital, 
a measure of foregone resources today for a promise of 
a return tomorrow, in this case in the form of new tech-
nologies or goods or services.
If one feature characterizes business R&D intensities 
across countries, it is the large variability observed. Fig-
ure 1.9 illustrates this variability for the manufacturing 
sector; from 0.5 percent in Slovakia to 12.4 in Sweden. 
Furthermore, it is also clear that the US invests signifi-
cantly more in R&D than the EU-14. It should be noted, 
however, that the differences between the US and the 
EU lie in the business enterprise activities: R&D funded 
by the government, typically performed in universities 
and other research organizations as well as by the gov-
ernment itself, is already similar across the Atlantic.
A second remark concerns regional or within-country 
variability. Figure 1.10 shows how US states display 
a similar range of variability to that of EU Member 
States: from the extremely low investment of Wyo-
ming, a scarcely populated rural state, to the extreme 
case of Maryland with close to a 6 percent of GDP of 
Figure 1.8:   Real growth rates for R&D and GDP, OECD area, 1982-2007
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Figure 1.9:   R&D intensity (R&D expenditures over value added) of the manufacturing sector, year 2005
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Figure 1.10:   R&D intensity in US states and EU Member States
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1.7.  Sectoral dimension of innovation
Observed differences in R&D intensities across Member 
States and between the EU and the US may have differ-
ent explanations. One possibility is that EU Member States 
tend to specialize in sectors characterized by a lower R&D 
intensity. Indeed, different sectors will be characterized 
by different intensities because of intrinsic and extrinsic 
characteristics. For example, different sectors of economic 
activity are characterized by different technologies. To 47
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What about the differences between the EU and the 
US? When examining the distribution of R&D expendi-
tures across sectors, the EU Industrial R&D Investment 
Scoreboard (European Commission (2010d)) shows 
that medium-tech sectors are overrepresented in 
R&D expenditures by EU firms compared to US firms. 
This would be consistent with the observation that 
EU economies show some sectoral structure sluggish-
ness compared to the US, a rigidity that would explain 
why in the US investment in high-tech sectors has 
soared in the past 20 years while the distribution of 
expenditures in the EU looks today similar to that of 
the 1980’s.
the extent that these technologies have different degrees 
of codability,14 one should observe different degrees of 
R&D intensity to the extent that R&D is directed towards 
patentable discoveries. This would explain differences in 
levels across sectors. A clear examples of an extrinsic trait 
would be the degree of competition: Laing et al. (1995) 
suggest that the level of market integration (increased 
competition) affects both the incentives to engage in R&D 
and the returns to this investment, but the degree of com-
petition may well be different per sector given the nature 
of the commodities produced and traded. Along the same 
lines, Baily and Laurence (2001) link competitive markets 
to the adoption of information technologies (IT) in the US.
14  In the sense given in Nelson (1980) to codability: the extent to which is pos-
sibly to codify the new technique in order to produce a blueprint that can be 
afterwards used by anyone to reproduce the technique.
Table 1.6: An overview of differences EU-US in R&D
Distribution of R&D 
across sectors, % total
R&D intensity  
(over value added)
EU-14 US EU-14 US
C15T37 MANUFACTURING 81.53 70.30 6.26 9.79
C15T16 Food products, beverages and tobacco 1.76 1.44 1.14 2.04
C17T19 Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 0.59 0.36 1.04 2.02
C23T25 Chemical, rubber, plastics and fuel products 21.72 20.43 9.75 13.61
C26 Other non-metallic mineral products 0.78 0.40 1.31 1.69
C27 Basic metals 1.08 0.28 1.98 1.12
C28 Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 1.12 0.61 0.89 1.11
C29T33 Machinery and equipment 28.78 28.79 9.69 22.33
C30 Office, accounting and computing machinery 1.92 2.19 18.47 24.66
C31 Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.c. 2.96 1.07 5.00 5.24
C32 Radio, television and communication equipment 10.74 13.10 29.67 43.06
C33 Medical, precision and optical instruments 5.08 8.66 11.62 43.68
C34 Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 16.03 7.12 15.44 16.38
C35 Other transport equipment 8.47 8.82 23.33 24.75
C36T37 Manufacturing n.e.c. and recycling 0.56 0.52 1.09 1.13
C40T41 ELECTRICITY GAS AND, WATER SUPPLY 0.58 0.09 0.39 0.09
C45 CONSTRUCTION 0.41 0.56 0.09 0.21
C60T64 TRANSPORT, STORAGE AND COMMUNICATIONS 3.02 1.26 0.58 0.39
C72 Computer and related activities 5.94 13.49 3.99 15.52
C74 Other business activities 2.20 – 0.35 –
C75T99 COMMUNITY, SOCIAL AND PERSONAL SERVICES 0.37 – 0.02 –
C50T99 TOTAL SERVICES 16.42 29.04 0.30 0.68
Notes:    R&D expenditure is ANBERD, i.e.: it includes R&D activities carried out in the business enterprise sector, regardless of the origin 
of funding; EU-14 is the EU-15 minus Luxembourg.
Source:  OECD, STAN indicators 2009.48
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short, differences are to be found rather in the amount 
invested, particularly in high-tech sectors like Radio, 
television and communication equipment or medium-
high-tech sectors like Machinery and equipment.
A more systematic and synthetic look at the differences 
in R&D intensities confirms the intrinsic smaller intensity 
of European sectors (and allows to have a good glance 
at all Member States).
A problem with the scoreboard, however, is that it is 
a sample constituted of the largest R&D investors.15 
Looking at OECD aggregate data (Table 1.6), focus-
ing on R&D performed in a given region by all firms 
regardless their nationality, there is no extraordinary 
difference between the EU and the US as for the distri-
bution of R&D across sectors within manufacturing.16 
Furthermore, these sectors account for similar shares 
of total value added in the economy (Figure 1.11). In 
15  Another important point to mention is that the scoreboard looks at R&D 
investment by companies, whatever the location of the R&D performed. The 
Scoreboard is not about business R&D in the EU versus in the US but it is 
about R&D by EU and US companies. Hence, US companies may in fact main-
tain significant R&D activities in the EU. See chapter 4 “Foreign corporate R&D 
and innovation in the European Union,” in the European Competitiveness 
Report 2010.
16  The relatively larger share of services in the US is due to different statistical cri-
teria that yield larger investments in services sectors in the US vis-à-vis the EU.
Figure 1.11:   Economic sectors: R&D intensity and the weight in total value added 2006
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Source:  OECD, STAN database for structural analysis and STAN indicators 2009.
Box 1.4: Sectoral structure versus individual intensities
Differences in R&D intensities across countries can be attributed to differences in the industrial structure or to 
differences in sectoral intensities. Indeed, on one hand, it could be that one of the countries specializes in sectors 
that are relative more (or less) R&D intensive (the sectoral factor). On the other hand, it may also be that the same 
sectors of economic activity display a different intensity (the intensity factor).
The literature uses a common additive decomposition (e.g., Moncada et al. (2010)) that has the inconvenient of 
assuming that the country of reference has, in a sense, the “right” sectoral intensities. In this section an alternative 
way to decompose aggregate differences into sectoral and intensity differences is applied. This decomposition 
uses the Fisher ideal index. Being defined as the geometric average of the Laspeyres and Paasche index, the sec-
toral intensities of any given two countries or regions are treated symmetrically: no region is assumed to have 
the “right” intensities, and hence the choice of the reference country is unimportant (for the details see Durán 
(2011)). The factorial decomposition is then linearized to obtain the aggregate differences in intensities additively 
decomposed in a sectoral and an intensities component as in Figure 1.12.49
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In general, aggregate intensity in R&D is determined by 
both the sectoral structure, the weight of more inten-
sive sectors in total value added, and the intensities of 
individual sectors, how intensive a given sector is across 
countries. Hence, observed aggregate differences can 
be decomposed into a sectoral structure and an indi-
vidual intensities factor (see Box 1.4). Figure 1.12 shows 
how the bulk of the differences with the US are associ-
ated to higher intensities in given sectors in accordance 
to the preliminary evidence of the previous section.
It also provides in a simple glance a picture of the dif-
ferent ways in which EU Member States depart from the 
EU average. From the intensities perspective, the case of 
Hungary stands out for its extreme decomposition. The 
combination of the “right” sectoral structure (R&D inten-
sive sectors weight a lot in the economy) and the very 
low intensity denotes an assembly economy that indeed 
exports high-tech commodities produced for foreign 
corporations (so that the associated R&D is performed 
somewhere else).
1.8.  The returns to R&D and policy 
considerations
Examining these differences in R&D intensity across 
countries and regions leads to the question of whether 
there is anything to do about it. This is particularly true 
in times of distress with budgetary pressures exacerbat-
ing the tension between the need to support growth 
strategies and the balance of public finances.
As discussed above, R&D is an important source of inno-
vation and therefore sustained growth. Investment in 
R&D is associated with important private returns but 
also with significant spillovers that would justify pub-
lic intervention; McMorrow and Röger (2009) includes 
a comprehensive review of the vast literature on the 
returns to R&D. Indeed, public support to R&D, typically 
in the form of tax relief or direct subsidies, has been 
traditionally justified in terms of spillovers: if the social 
returns are larger than the private ones, there remains 
the possibility that the market underinvests in R&D com-
pared to the social optimum. Furthermore, as noted 
above, private R&D may tend to be excessively volatile, 
again from the social optimal point of view, which moti-
vates increasing public support to R&D in bad times to 
smooth investment over the cycle.
Figure 1.12:   The role of sector intensities and sectoral structure in differences in business R&D intensity 
(with respect to the EU)
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Figure 1.13:   R&D intensity and specialization
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Finally, the variability across Member States can be 
seen either as room for improvement in those regions 
with less R&D intensity or as reflecting a natural pro-
cess of regional specialization. The second interpreta-
tion seems reinforced in regard of the similar variability 
observed across US states. This means that the tradi-
tional support to R&D may help cover the gap between 
private and social returns to R&D but may not help 
close the gap across regions. Indeed, regions with lower 
intensity are not necessarily regions where individual 
firms invest less in R&D because similar firms (in terms 
of size, sector, turnover, etc.) tend to be similar as well 
as regards R&D intensity (see again Moncada (2010)). 
Hence, aggregate differences seem to respond to the 
less frequent observation of R&D intensive firms. More 
intriguing is the fact that differences in R&D intensity 
are not translated into differences in trend growth rates. 
Indeed, despite large differences in R&D intensities, in 
the longer term countries tend to grow on average at 
similar rates. The role of technology adoption and trade 
in technical change diffusion may be the key explana-
tion for this apparent paradox (see, e.g., Guellec and van 
Pottelsberghe (2001)). To illustrate this, consider the 
last decade in Europe: in Figure 1.14(a) we can see that 
there is a connection between R&D expenditures and 
productivity growth; however, the catch-up process of 
the EU-12 Member States is a far stronger driver of tech-
nical change.51
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survival of innovative firms, be it entirely new establish-
ments or spin-offs from universities or corporations.
All these facts together suggest that an important frac-
tion of innovations are vague ideas difficult to transmit 
or codify, and hence posing two problems: they make 
it difficult to finance by nature18 and difficult to protect 
by patents or other means of intellectual protection. 
Indeed, their ambiguity is connected with its incodifica-
bility, difficult to turn into a patent. The only alternative 
18  The key feature of Phelps’ (2006) attempt theory of innovation and growth is 
the (uninsurable) uncertainty (as opposed to insurable risk) inherent to any 
entrepreneurial project. A critical step is that of obtaining finance when fac-
ing uncertainty rather than risk, and hence the importance of “intuition” and 
of long-term relationships between entrepreneurs and financiers.
These pieces of evidence together indicate that besides 
the importance of traditional R&D activities, there are 
other important sources of innovation. The EU Indus-
trial R&D Scoreboard points out that the EU has fewer 
young innovative firms than the US; and that these 
young firms, on average, invest less in R&D than their 
US counterparts. This suggests that part of the observed 
differences in R&D intensity may lie in differences in the 
creation of firms, the intensity of start-ups, the growth 
and the survival of these firms.17 Hence, besides the tra-
ditional support to R&D in incumbent firms, other policy 
instruments could focus in supporting the creation and 
17  See the discussion in box I.5.3 in the Innovation Union Competitiveness 
Report 2011.
Figure 1.14:   RDI, productivity growth and catch-up
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Public support to R&D is a key element of any broad 
innovation policy. If anything, the evidence reviewed 
above calls for a careful choice of the targets. For 
instance, there is evidence that public support to private 
R&D is more effective in small firms, probably because 
they are more likely to be credit-constraint.22 Support 
to small enterprises is even more important in times of 
crisis because small liquidity-constraint firms tend to cut 
expenditures in activities like R&D that have non-imme-
diate returns (see section 1.4 in the ECR 2009 and refer-
ences therein). Furthermore, in light of the discussion 
above, focusing on start-ups and young innovative firms 
may prove to be a more effective way of fostering inno-
vation. Recent examples following this logic is the new 
focus of the Canadian NSERC on small firms partner-
ing with scientists or the focus of the Western Sweden 
region on a “systemic vision of innovation” that favours 
“initiatives targeting public bodies and research insti-
tutions” where private firms are not the main target. 23 
Finally, an important aspect of innovation is education: 
if R&D represents the demand for high-skilled labor, sup-
port to higher education should guarantee that the sup-
ply-side meets the demand from businesses. Conte et 
al. (2009) present evidence that the efficiency of policies 
supporting R&D relies in related education policies.24 In 
that respect it may be worth noting that the EU spends 
significantly less than the US in higher education: 1.1% 
of GDP versus 2.9% respectively; increasing support to 
R&D without education may risk distorting the market 
for scientists and engineers.25
22  Exploiting data from an interesting natural experiment, Bronzini and Iachini 
(2011) conclude that R&D subsidies do not change the investment behaviour 
of large firms, who receive the subsidy as a windfall gain, but they find a posi-
tive effect for smaller firms, the interpretation being that these are more likely 
liquidity- and credit-constrained.
23  In the Canadian case, the president of the NSERC stated “Big firms like Bom-
bardier or Research In Motion can afford to take the long view. But small 
companies are at a demanding stage of their growth,” quoted in Monocle, 
February 2011, page 87. For the Swedish example, see Riché (2011).
24  It should not be regarded as a mere coincidence that those factors are also 
those signaled by Caselli and Coleman (2001) as being determinants explain-
ing the adoption of IT.
25  Goolsbee (1998) finds evidence that public expenditures in R&D harm private 
R&D by raising the wages of scientists and engineers, at least in the short run 
and because of the low elasticity of the supply of high-skilled labour.
is “do it yourself” and be the first mover creating the 
firm. In such case, entrepreneurs turn out to be key inno-
vators bringing new ideas to the market in the form of 
start-ups. But then the key issue when it comes to these 
innovators turns out to be framework conditions and, in 
particular, the easy of doing business. Add the evidence 
mentioned above about the lower R&D intensity of 
young innovators, and the support to start-ups appears 
as a potentially effective policy target.
The protection of these innovators requires as well the 
fine-tuning of intellectual property rights (IPR). The 
importance of the protection and promotion of IPR 
is obvious. IPR is necessary to protect creators of new 
industrial ideas (patents), artists and media (copyrights) 
or the reputation of a company (trademarks). Neverthe-
less, in this field more in not necessarily better: an exces-
sive protection can hamper the creation, development 
and commercialization of new ideas. For instance, the 
European Commission advocates the monitoring of 
competition services to prevent “the abuse of IPR which 
can hamper innovation or exclude new entrants, and 
specially SMEs, from markets.”19 For example, an exces-
sive protection may seriously distort incentives and 
use patents as an offensive device. In a world in which 
physical capital and other inalienable assets are less 
important, patents seem to be one of the main assets 
behind a company’s value (Kaplan et al. (2005)). This 
has the potential to distort the market in two ways. On 
one hand, firm managers have an incentive to patent in 
excess to reduce competition20 and increase the value 
of the firm in the short-term. On the other hand, and for 
the same reasons, managers have incentives to buy out 
other firms just to take control of their patent portfolio 
to hamper the development of outside new ideas that 
may harm their business model and to increase the price 
of shares in the stock exchange.21 Finally, another pos-
sibility, at least in theory, pointed out in Aghion et al. 
(2008) is that we “privatize” research lines sooner than 
it would be optimal from the social point of view in two 
senses: too expensive and preventing potential ideas to 
arise because the kind speculative research that gives 
origin to many breakthroughs is typically not pursued in 
private sector, much more focus on the development of 
commercial applications.
19  European Commission communication “A Single Market for Intellectual 
Property Rights. Boosting creativity and innovation to provide economic 
growth, high quality jobs and first class products and services in Europe,” 
COM (2011) 287.
20  A case in point is that of “patent clusters” in the pharma industry. An “impor-
tant objective of this approach [patent clusters] is to delay or block the mar-
ket entry of generic medicines”; excerpted from the European Commission 
communication summarizing the “Pharmaceutical Sector Inquiry Report.”
21  In a move to purchase Nortel’s patent portfolio, Google’s declared intention 
was to be “[b]ulking up on its patent holdings [to have] a stronger defence 
against such attacks [lawsuits over the software].” See “Google bids $900m 
for Nortel patents,” Financial Times, 4 April 2011. Nortel was finally purchased 
by a consortium for $3500m. See the software patent debate in en.wikipedia.
org/wiki/Software_patent_debate. In the EU software patents were rejected 
by the European Parliament in 2005.53
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2.1. Introduction
The share of knowledge-intensive services and products 
in the total demand and production of both advanced 
and also less advanced or emerging economies has 
steadily increased over time. This is documented in 
a large number of publications studying ‘tertiarisation’ 
(e.g. Peneder et al. 2003, Montresor and Marzetti, 2010), 
especially emphasising the role of knowledge-intensive 
services. Though the rising share of services along with 
a declining share of manufacturing is undisputed, some 
studies raise questions about future developments. Pen-
der et al. (2003), for example, use the term ‘quaternisa-
tion’ stressing the role of knowledge-intensive services 
and their steadily rising importance as sources of innova-
tion and technology and as inputs. As there are still large 
cross-country differences in this process, however, it is 
still too early to conclude that ‘quaternisation’ has yet 
manifested itself in the majority of advanced countries.
The study presented here analyses the roles of knowl-
edge-intensive business services (KIBS) over the more 
recent period and covers a larger set of countries com-
pared to the studies mentioned above. It stresses the 
role of the service output of manufacturing firms, a phe-
nomenon, also termed a ‘convergence process’, which so 
far has not received so much attention in the literature. 
Knowledge-intensive service firms are increasingly devel-
oping new services as a part of a product package that 
includes physical, tangible goods. Firms developing new 
products also offer additional services as part of a pack-
age including both the physical product and the services 
(see Monti, 2010). For example, high-tech products are 
often sold in combination with maintenance services.
These developments give rise to technology and prod-
uct flows between the services and manufacturing sec-
tors, which deepen inter-industry linkages. The study 
also analyses the role of knowledge-intensive business 
services (KIBS) in generating embodied knowledge flows 
and linkages between KIBS and manufacturing sectors. 
This underpins the further growing evidence in the 
literature that services have been playing an increasing 
role in boosting the productivity of manufacturing sec-
tors (e.g. Arnold, Javorcik and Mattoo, 2006, and Javor-
cik, 2004). 
Finally, the analyses in this chapter document that the 
share of such products in total world trade has been 
steadily increasing over time as well. Simultaneously, 
technology flows within and between different firms 
and industries seem to have become more important. 
Due to more intensive international economic inte-
gration, these technology flows have also increased 
between different parts of the world as firms outsource 
and choose to locate parts of their production in loca-
tions according to comparative advantages. These 
trends have led to changes in industrial structure 
worldwide. 
As the definition of KIBS is still not standard across the 
literature, one can find various attempts to describe the 
term (e.g. den Hertog, 2000; Bettencourt et al. 2002). 
On the other hand, the classification often follows the 
NACE classification system, covering the sectors ‘com-
puter and related activities’ (NACE 72), ‘research and 
development’ (73), and ‘other business services’ (NACE 
74). However, whether the sub-sectors of ‘other business 
services’ are included or not is again not uniform across 
studies (compare e.g. Muller and Doloreux, 2007; Euro-
pean Commission, 2009).
Based on this background the study addresses the fol-
lowing issues:
•	 To which extent have services become more impor-
tant over time and how does Europe differ from 
other major economies like the US and Japan in this 
respect? Therein is the specific role of knowledge 
intensive business services (KIBS) addressed.
•	 How important are the direct and indirect flows of 
knowledge between KIBS and manufacturing indus-
tries? How have these developed over time and are 
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•	 What is the role of service activities and output in 
Europe, the US and Japan and what are the trends 
over time? Specifically, the question whether there 
has been some kind of convergence process in struc-
tures across countries is addressed. 
•	 Additional information on the role of services can 
be derived from the EU KLEMS data set. In particular, 
the importance of services in value added growth 
across countries is discussed.
•	 The use of input-output tables further allows for 
analysis of the importance of KIBS industries as 
inputs in the production process of manufacturing 
industries. This will be addressed in this section as 
well in a descriptive manner providing also informa-
tion on linkage indicators between industries. 
2.2.2.  KIBS services and classification
Stehrer et al. (2011) show in the background study that 
the share of services in general increased in all coun-
tries considered over a long period of time. The aim of 
this section is to look more closely at a particular part 
of services, the knowledge intensive business services 
as defined above. Specifically the focus is on the NACE 
rev. 1.1 categories computer and related activities (72), 
research and development (73) and other business 
activities (74). In this overview which is based on the 
EU KLEMS data, also the industry renting of machinery 
and equipment (NACE rev. 1.1 71) is included since it 
is not separable from the other industries for all coun-
tries in the database. For the comparison across coun-
tries the limited data therefore only allows for the use 
of the category 71t74. Table 2.1 provides the respec-
tive shares of value added and employment in the 
total economy. 
there important differences across countries and in 
relation to the US and Japan in particular?
•	 To which extent is there a tendency towards an 
increase in the share of services in the output of 
manufacturing industries and firms? How does this 
relate to firms performance and innovation?
•	 Finally, the study focuses on the importance of trade 
in knowledge intensive manufacturing and services 
(overall and KIBS in particular) regarding the com-
petitiveness of the EU with respect to trade in ser-
vices in general and trade in knowledge intensive 
business services in particular. 
2.2.  The rising importance of service sectors 
in the economy. A comparison of the EU 
with the US and Japan
2.2.1. Introduction
Services industries have grown in importance over the 
last decades both in terms of output and employment. 
Within services, KIBS play an important role and have 
been the main source of job creation in Europe in the 
last decade and also contributed substantially to value 
added growth as pointed out in the literature (see e.g. 
European Commission, 2009). 
This section provides a comparative overview of the 
relevance and trends in these service activities across 
countries and over time. Major advanced non-EU coun-
tries (in particular the US and Japan) are also included 
in the cross-country comparison. The analysis is mainly 
based on the EU KLEMS dataset. This section will in par-
ticular address the following points:
Table 2.1: Share of KIBS (incl. 71) in total economy (in %), 1975-2007
1975 1985 1995 2005 2006 2007
Value added EU25 8.3 11.0 11.1 11.4
EU15 4.7 6.7 8.7 11.5 11.7 12.0
EU10 4.4 5.9 6.1
USA 7.2 9.4 12.9 13.0 13.3
JPN 2.3 4.3 6.1 7.7 7.8
Employment EU25 7.8 11.1 11.4 11.7
EU15 4.0 5.6 8.6 11.9 12.2 12.6
EU10 3.7 6.3 6.6
USA 8.2 11.0 13.2 13.4 13.5
JPN 2.9 4.9 7.1 10.6 10.9
Source: EU KLEMS, Release 2009, own calculations.57
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countries at the lower end which are mostly EU-10 coun-
tries. A possible explanation behind this pattern is the 
relatively lower labour productivity growth rates in KIBS 
which imply increasing employment shares for this sec-
tor. This is slightly different from the pattern emerging 
from the shares of KIBS in business services. Disregard-
ing Cyprus and Estonia, employment shares increased 
more in those countries with lower shares in 1995 which 
again are the EU-10 countries. There is some divergence 
of value added with the countries at the upper part 
gaining shares in relative terms though the picture looks 
more diverse when considering some outlying countries 
like Lithuania, Slovak Republic and Estonia. 
2.2.3.  KIBS contributions to growth
This section discusses the contribution of the KIBS indus-
tries to overall value added growth. The contribution of 
a sector can be calculated by multiplying the respective 
growth rates of value added in constant prices (1995 
prices were used) with the share of the sector’s in the 
economy (the average shares for the time period consid-
ered were used). The results for the groups of countries 
considered are provided in Table 2.2.
The value added share of KIBS increased by about 
7 percentage points in the EU-15 from 4.7 to 12 % 
between 1995 and 2007. In relative terms the increase 
was even larger in Japan, from 2.3 to 8 %. The value 
added share of KIBS in the US was slightly larger in 
1985 compared to the EU-15 (7.2 compared to 6.7 %). 
However the share increased faster in the US to 13.3 % 
in 2007, thus 2 percentage points above the share in 
the EU-15. The value added share of KIBS in the EU-10 
was only 6 % in 2006, starting from a share of 4.4 % in 
1995. The figures are similar for employment patterns 
as well, with Japan showing a stronger increase, reach-
ing about 11 % in 2006. Employment shares in the US 
are about 2 percentage points above those found for 
the EU-15. Again the share for the EU-10 is well below 
that for the EU-15.26
The divergence, w.r.t. to the size of KIBS shares, was 
driven by some countries at the upper end of the dis-
tribution like UK, France, Germany and the Netherlands 
whereas for the other countries the shares increased 
less, cf. Figure 2.1, which shows the share of KIBS in 
the total economy. This is even more evident when 
for employment shares in which case also productivity 
developments play a particular role especially for the 
26  Since the database does not contain data which separates data for the indus-
try renting of machinery and equipment (NACE Rev. 1.1 71), also this industry 
is included in the definition of KIBS in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1:   KIBS shares in total economy (in %), 1995 and 2005
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of market services, including KIBS, and a relatively larger 
share of manufacturing industries. With a relatively lower 
share of high-tech in manufacturing and a lower share of 
skilled labour, the potential for using KIBS is lower. 
The end of the time period is studied in more detail 
across countries below. Figure 2.2 presents the aver-
age share of KIBS and the contribution to growth for the 
EU-25 countries plus USA and Japan.
First, the overall shares of KIBS vary from about 13% 
in the UK, Netherlands and France to less than 5% in 
Greece, Portugal, and Poland. However, the contribution 
to value added growth in all countries with the excep-
tion of Estonia, Czech Republic and Portugal are larger 
than this share would suggest. The contribution of KIBS 
to growth was much larger than the shares of KIBS in 
the UK, Belgium, Japan, Italy, and Austria. The ratios 
of the contributions to growth and the shares of KIBS 
were much lower for Hungary, Ireland, Slovenia, Cyprus, 
Finland, Estonia, Czech Republic, Poland, Portugal and 
Greece. This could be explained by the fact that manu-
facturing, and other sectors, which occupy larger shares 
in most of the latter countries than KIBS, have displayed 
stronger growth. The catching-up effects of manufac-
turing have been larger thus limiting the role of KIBS in 
overall growth.
First, the contribution to growth of the KIBS in all periods 
was much larger than its share in value added at con-
stant prices. In the EU-15 the average share over 1975-
1985 was 6.4% whereas the contribution to growth was 
12.8%. Over the period 1995-2007 the share of KIBS sec-
tors in value added at constant prices was 10% whereas 
the contribution to growth was 18.2%. Thus, though the 
KIBS industries account for about a tenth of value added 
the contribution to growth accounts for about one fifth. 
This can be contrasted with the USA where the contribu-
tion to growth was almost 22% with an average share 
of 11%, not much larger than the one in the EU-15. Over 
time, the contribution to growth was relatively larger in 
the USA compared to the EU-15. The opposite is true for 
Japan where the contribution to growth was relatively 
low with 7.1 and 8.5% in the first two periods, respec-
tively. Only in the last period 1995-2007 the contribution 
peaked to 27.6%. The EU-10 countries are again excep-
tional in the way that on top of the relatively low share 
of KIBS the contribution to growth was also relatively 
low with 7.6% only. The relatively low shares of KIBS and 
their contribution to growth in the EU-10, can at least 
partly be explained by restructuring of the economies 
that have taken place in many of these countries follow-
ing the transformation to market economies and later 
integration into the EU. The industrial structure in the 
EU-10 had and has in comparison a relatively lower share 
Table 2.2: Growth contributions of KIBS, 1975-2007
1975-1985 1986-1995 1996-2007
Share
Contribution 
to growth
Share
Contribution 
to growth
Share
Contribution 
to growth
EU25 8.3 9.5 16.8
EU15 6.4 12.8 8.1 14.9 10.0 18.2
EU10 4.4 5.0 7.6
USA 6.8 14.5 8.9 16.0 11.1 21.9
JPN 4.1 7.1 5.2 8.5 7.7 27.6
Source: EU KLEMS, Release 2009, own calculations.59
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Japan is used.27 The database supplies symmetric indus-
try-by-industry input output tables for the whole econ-
omy, for the domestic economy and for imports. The 
shares of KIBS in total intermediate inputs, in manufac-
turing and in certain high-tech manufacturing sectors for 
the years 1995, 2000 and 2005 are calculated. Data are 
provided only at the 2-digit ISIC rev. 3 (which is compat-
ible to NACE rev.1) level. The following activities are sub-
sumed under the term ‘knowledge-intensive business 
services: computer and related activities (72), research 
and development (73) and other business services (74).
KIBS are important intermediate inputs for the total 
economy (see Figure 2.4.1a): In 2005, KIBS accounted for 
almost 15% of total intermediate consumption in the 
EU-15, but only 9% in the EU-6.28 In Japan, this share was 
about 12%, while in the US it reached 14% in that year 
– slightly below the EU-15 share. Development trends 
differed between Japan and the other countries over 
the last 10-years: While in Japan the share increased sub-
stantially between 1995 and 2000 (though this might be 
due to a methodological change) and fell again until 
2005 according to the data, in the EU and US shares 
increased continuously. However, the share expanded 
slightly more in the US than in the EU-15. There is how-
ever a substantial differentiation across EU economies 
which is documented in detail in the background study 
(Stehrer et al. 2011).
27  The 21 EU countries are EU-15 plus Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia.
28  The EU-6 is here defined as Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Poland, Slova-
kia and Slovenia. This definition, or aggregation of countries, is only used for 
illustrating the share of KIBS in intermediate consumption.
2.2.4.  The role of KIBS as an intermediate input in the 
EU, US and Japan
Services and KIBS in particular play an important and 
growing role as inputs into manufacturing processes. 
The focus in this section is on this important aspect of 
KIBS. For this purpose, the role of KIBS as intermediate 
inputs in the EU is examined compared to that in the 
US and Japan. ‘Knowledge-intensive services’ can be 
described by their knowledge-intensity, relative capital 
intensity and high degree of specialisation (European 
Commission, 2009, p.19). Business services again cover 
a wide range of services, which serve as intermediate 
inputs in value chains of companies. They often comple-
ment or substitute in-house service functions of their 
clients. In this function, they contribute to the com-
petitiveness of companies, stemming from quality and 
innovation gains coming from the interaction between 
suppliers and clients (European Commission, 2009, p.15). 
The questions to be addressed are whether the EU-coun-
tries use more or less KIBS in their economy compared to 
the US and Japan as inputs in other sectors? It is further 
interesting to study how do KIBS shares vary for the total 
economy, for manufacturing and for high-tech sectors.
Input-output tables are used to analyse the importance 
of KIBS sectors as inputs in the total economy and the 
manufacturing sector in particular. Input-output data 
are an appropriate tool for investigating inter-industrial 
relationships and the composition of supply and use of 
goods and services. The OECD Stan Input-Output data-
base-2009 edition covering 21 EU countries, the US and 
Figure 2.2:   Contributions to growth by country, 1995-2007
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period, with the US experiencing a sharp rise between 
1995 and 2005 (see Figure 2.3b). The large increase of 
KIBS in the US in intermediate consumption has come 
around without any significant changes of industry 
structure. Earlier and more intensive outsourcing of cer-
tain activities by the US manufacturing industry com-
pared to the EU and Japanese manufacturing industries 
could explain this pattern.29
29  Even though not explicitly investigating this, the findings of Kakabadse, A. & 
Kakabadse, N. (2002) imply that American firms’ outsourcing strategies are 
more advanced than European firms due to for example more experience. 
Also when only looking at the manufacturing sector, 
KIBS prove to be important inputs: In 2005, the share 
of KIBS used by manufacturing industries amounted to 
9% in the EU-15, 5% in the EU-6, roughly 9% in Japan 
and 10.5% in the US, in this case above the EU-15 level. 
Development trends between 1995 and 2005 resembled 
those in the total economy: In Japan, the share of KIBS 
first increased but then fell again, while in the EU-15, 
the EU-6 and the US shares increased during the whole 
Figure 2.3.a:   Share of KIBS in total intermediate consumption
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Figure 2.3.b:   Share of KIBS in manufacturing intermediate consumption
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Knowledge-intensive business services play a signifi-
cant role especially in the input structure of high-tech 
manufacturing industries, under which NACE rev.1 
categories 30-33 (including office machinery, electri-
cal machinery, communication equipment and medi-
cal & optical instruments) are subsumed. Indeed, these 
industries use a larger share of KIBS than manufactur-
ing on average: In the EU-15, KIBS accounted for 14% 
of all intermediates in high-tech industries, compared 
to only 5% in the EU-6. However, this share was even 
larger in Japan and the US with about 16%. Trends 
between 1995 and 2005 were largely the same as in 
manufacturing; however, the share in the EU-6 coun-
tries slightly decreased between 2000 and 2005 due to 
an increased share of industries which used relatively 
less of KIBS’ products for intermediate consumption 
(see Figure 2.3c). 
Overall, when comparing the KIBS usage between the 
EU-average and the US, it is about the same in the total 
economy, slightly less in manufacturing and somewhat 
lower in high-tech industries. When compared to Japan, 
KIBS usage is higher in the EU in the total economy, 
about the same in manufacturing and somewhat lower 
in high-tech industries in which Japan is more special-
ised. What is more striking than differences between 
these three countries/regions are distinct differences 
within Europe: The difference between EU-15 and EU-6 
is pronounced and takes about 5 percentage points dif-
ference in the share of KIBS in total intermediates and 
in manufacturing intermediates and almost 9% in high-
tech industries’ intermediates. While this difference 
between the EU-15 and the EU-6 seems to have become 
somewhat smaller for the use of KIBS in the total econ-
omy between 2000 and 2005 or at least remained the 
same in manufacturing, the difference increased in 
high-tech manufacturing where the EU-15 is more spe-
cialised in than the EU-6.
2.3.  Embodied and sectoral linkages between 
Manufacturing and the Knowledge-
intensive services
2.3.1. Introduction
The analyses in this section concern direct and indirect 
flows of knowledge between the manufacturing indus-
tries and knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS). 
Flows of knowledge between these two sectors repre-
sent a bilateral learning process or what might be called 
a coproduction of capabilities. KIBS often facilitates the 
innovation process in the manufacturing industries and 
they have considerable potential in creating new knowl-
edge and transforming firms into learning organisations 
(Hauknes, 1998). Statistical evidence, particularly from 
input-output tables, shows that global technological 
and organisational capacity is a function of its use of 
software and other business services.
While manufacturing appears to be an engine of pro-
ductivity growth, this growth depends to a great extent 
on services in general and KIBS in particular. Kaldor 
(1966) and later Cornwall (1977) suggested that manu-
facturing is the main source of new technical knowl-
edge and that this knowledge diffuses from there into 
other sectors, including the service sector. This argu-
ment presumes that the backward and forward link-
age effects from manufacturing to services are strong. 
Hauknes (1998) and Fagerberg and Verspagen (2002), 
however, suggest that manufacturing may no longer be 
Figure 2.3.c:   Share of KIBS in high-tech manufacturing (NACE 30-33) intermediate consumption
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the ‘engine of growth’ and that services have become 
much more important. This argument would imply that 
the direction of the linkage between manufacturing and 
services is the other way around. This chapter shows 
that the interlinkages go both ways and are tending to 
become stronger, which suggests that the distinction 
between manufacturing and services is becoming less 
relevant.
2.3.2.  Inter-industry technology flows
Input-output analysis provides a way to measure the 
interdependence of the manufacturing industries and 
the service sector (Miller and Blair, 2009). By combin-
ing business expenditures on R&D activity with input-
output tables, it is possible to measure inter-industry 
technology flows and linkages. It should be noted that 
public sector expenditures on R%D allocated directly or 
indirectly to the business sector are not included. This 
might give rise to a bias in the analyses below. Some 
sectors may be more likely to receive public funding 
than others and some countries may be more prone to 
use public R%D expenditures to promote the private 
sector. 
Having this reservation in mind, this section makes use 
of the OECD Input-Output and ANBERD Databases to 
measure the total R&D content of an industry and the 
embodied flows between manufacturing and KIBS. 
The analysis covers twenty-two Member States of the 
European Union plus Norway, the United States, Can-
ada, Japan, Korea and China during the year 2005 (see 
Stehrer et al. 2011, for details). 
Product-embodied knowledge resides in intermedi-
ate inputs that originate from both domestic and for-
eign sources, and can flow both directly and indirectly 
through the production of all other commodities. 
The total technology intensity therefore contains five 
components:
•	 sectoral (own) R&D; 
•	 direct R&D flows from all other domestic sectors into 
any recipient industry; 
•	 indirect R&D flows from domestic sectors into 
a recipient industry via one or more intermediate 
sectors; 
•	 direct R&D flows from foreign sectors into any recipi-
ent industry; and 
•	 indirect R&D flows from international sectors. 
Figure 2.4 ranks countries according to total business 
technology intensity and shows that the share of own 
R&D activity of business enterprises is about one-half of 
the total business R&D content in countries with a rela-
tively high level of GDP per capita and below this share 
in countries with lower level of income.30 
30  Papaconstantinou et al. (1998), Knell (2008) and Hauknes and Knell (2009) 
confirm these findings. The background paper to this chapter provides an 
outline of the simple mathematics behind this analysis.63
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frequent use of non-R&D based competences, skills and 
knowledge in these industries. More than 60% of the 
total technology intensity in Japan and Germany has its 
origin in the own R&D performance of the industry, and 
Denmark, USA, Austria, Finland and France depend on 
own R&D performance for more than half its technical 
knowledge. Countries with a low share of R&D activity 
performed within the sector are generally considered 
to be knowledge users. Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania and Slovakia depend on knowledge 
embodied in inter-industry trade for more than 80% of 
the total technology intensity, whereas Japan and the 
USA relied on imported knowledge for only 6% and 12% 
of total knowledge inputs, respectively. The size of the 
country also matters as to whether the embodied tech-
nology comes from domestic or international sources. 
The direct R&D flows from all other domestic source 
sectors into any recipient industry are positively (and 
highly) correlated with R&D performed within an indus-
try.31 Countries with a high share of R&D activity per-
formed within the sector are generally considered to 
be knowledge creators. Hence, the strong correlation 
indicates that major knowledge creating sectors are also 
the major users of knowledge generated in other sec-
tors in the domestic economy. Sectors with weak R&D 
performance, and hence weak knowledge creation, 
are also small users of knowledge from other sectors. 
Rather than suggesting that these sectors are ‘knowl-
edge poor’, it is likely that this is caused by the more 
31  Across the 28 countries the correlation coefficient between the two compo-
nents is as high as about 0.87.
Figure 2.4:   Technology intensity relative to total value added by source, 2005
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for most countries. EU-12 Member States depend heav-
ily on manufacturing knowledge imported from abroad 
in this sector. The KIBS sector in China not only depends 
on imported knowledge from manufacturing, but also 
domestic knowledge from the sector. Ireland and Swe-
den, and perhaps Belgium and the Netherlands appear 
different in that they depend relatively more on knowl-
edge imported through the KIBS sectors. 
2.3.3.  Backward and forward linkages between 
manufacturing and KIBS
This section focuses on the strength of the linkages from 
manufacturing sectors to domestic KIBS sectors and 
from KIBS sectors to domestic manufacturing sectors, 
which Rasmussen (1956) described as backward and 
forward linkages33. Flows within the domestic economy 
are thus distinguished from total flows including tech-
nology flows from foreign sources. However, Rasmus-
sen’s forward and backward linkage measures do not 
adequately take into account the industry-to-industry 
interaction within technology flows, as this may lead 
to double accounting (Hauknes and Knell, 2009)34. The 
backward linkages used here are the intersectoral tech-
nology flows as a share of technology flows into the 
recipient sector, while the forward linkages are the inter-
sectoral technology flows as a share of total technology 
flows out of the source sector. These measures are con-
structed for domestic and total flows, where total flows 
are the sum of domestic and import flows.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 show the backward linkages 
between manufacturing and KIBS, and Figures 2.7 and 
2.8 show the forward linkages. The backward technol-
ogy linkage measures the technology flows from a par-
ticular sector (e.g. manufacturing) into a recipient sec-
tor (e.g. KIBS), relative to total knowledge inputs into 
recipient sector. In other words, it gives the relative size 
of knowledge inputs from this particular sector as meas-
ured from the perspective of recipient sector. And the 
forward technology linkage on the other hand measures 
the technology flows from one sector into another, rela-
tive to total knowledge inputs from the source sector to 
all other sectors. In other words, it gives the relative size 
of knowledge inputs into the recipient sector, as meas-
ured from the perspective of source sector.
The backward linkages shown in Figure 2.5, measured 
in terms of the total technology content of KIBS, are 
rather small in countries on the technology frontier, 
defined as the average R&D intensity of the OECD;35 
10% or less, and with domestic and total backward 
33  See Annex 3.1.
34  See Annex 3.2, which details the modified technology linkage measure used 
in this section.
35  See Annex 2.1 for details.
Germany, Japan and the USA depend more on domestic 
flows of embodied knowledge, whereas Ireland, Esto-
nia and Slovenia depend more on international flows. 
In general, smaller countries depend more on interna-
tional sources of knowledge than larger ones. Countries 
where assembly production looms high in the national 
economic structure, such as most of the east European 
countries and Ireland, have a very high share of knowl-
edge sourced from abroad. Finally, differences in the 
industrial structure and in the way each country create 
and use technical knowledge can also be an important 
factor behind the observed patterns. Countries with 
a relatively higher share of knowledge-intensive indus-
tries are more prone to perform their own R&D than 
countries where the knowledge-intensive industries 
occupy smaller shares.
In manufacturing, imported knowledge flows from 
other manufacturing and KIBS constitute the largest 
share of knowledge flows (direct and indirect domestic 
and imported) in every country, except in the USA and 
Japan.32 For most countries the main source of imported 
knowledge inputs comes from foreign manufacturing 
sectors, except for Ireland, where the imports of KIBS 
to intermediate use in manufacturing are more impor-
tant. There are vast differences across the countries, 
which are explained by differences in the way knowl-
edge is generated in other manufacturing industries 
and sourced abroad. Three observations are made in 
this sector. First, the level of development is impor-
tant in manufacturing. With the possible exception of 
Ireland, the manufacturing technology multiplier is 
highly correlated to GDP per capita, with low income 
countries having a very large multiplier and the high 
income countries having a very low multiplier. Second, 
relatively little knowledge appears to flow from the KIBS 
sector, whether domestic or foreign, to the manufactur-
ing industries, except in Ireland where there appears to 
be a significant flow from abroad. Third, size also deter-
mines whether the embodied technology comes from 
domestic or international sources. Domestic sources 
appear dominantly important in Japan and the United 
States. In all other countries imported flows dominate 
over domestic flows, though domestic flows are more 
important in China than in other countries. International 
sources of knowledge into the manufacturing industries 
are much more important for the new Member States, 
along with Portugal and Greece.
In KIBS, imported knowledge inputs to KIBS dominate 
over technology flows from other domestic sectors in 
almost every country. Estonia, Slovakia, Romania and 
Ireland are almost completely dominated by imported 
knowledge inputs. Imports from manufacturing and 
KIBS abroad are the largest source of knowledge inputs 
32  This is documented in detail in the background study (Stehrer et al., 2011).65
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in a similar vein be explained by Czech KIBS sectors 
being dominated by traditional labour and client inten-
sive consultancy.
Domestic sources of KIBS embodied inputs into manu-
facturing dominate over imported KIBS inputs in most 
countries, as Figure 2.6 illustrates. Ireland is a notable 
exception as they source almost everything interna-
tionally, most probably from other English speaking 
countries. These linkages, measured in terms of the total 
technology content of manufacturing, is rather small 
in almost all countries, and to the lowest order do not 
appear to be dependent on the size of the economy. In 
virtually every country, except Ireland, the total linkage 
is less than 5%. In countries at the global technology 
frontier, including Sweden, the United States, and Japan 
linkages being more or less of the same size. There is 
substantially larger variance between the technology 
using economies, reflecting the higher dependence 
on imported technology flows. The variance between 
domestic and total flow strengths appears to be driven 
by the size of the economy, reflecting the negative cor-
relation between size and openness of countries on the 
technology frontier. This suggests that size and national 
income levels are two main underlying variables. The 
data does not allow pinpointing the explanation of 
why Finland and France lie high up in Figure 2.5, and 
the Czech Republic lies down towards the lower end 
of the figure. However, it is likely that this reflects the 
high technology intensity of ICT-related Finnish and 
French KIBS services, with major inputs of foreign and 
domestic high-tech manufactures. The Czech case can 
Figure 2.5:   Backward linkage of manufacturing embodied inputs into KIBS sectors, domestic  
and imported supply. Ranked by total linkage, 2005
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whether in terms of domestic or total linkages. This sug-
gests that KIBS are knowledge supplying relative to most 
manufacturing industries.36 There is a general tendency 
for the forward linkages between domestic manufac-
turing to KIBS to be small in EU-12 Member States, but 
it also appears to be the case for the Nordic countries. 
The reason for this may be that some of these countries, 
especially Sweden and Finland, rely heavily on the sci-
ence-based industries. Most countries on the technology 
frontier have a fairly even distribution of forward linkages.
36  Hauknes and Knell (2009) show that this applies to manufacturing, except for 
the science-based industries.
the domestic linkages are also marginal, and are more 
evenly distributed between domestic and total back-
ward linkages. The only countries showing a notable 
technology linkage of domestic KIBS are Estonia, Slova-
kia and the Czech Republic.
Forward linkages from manufacturing into KIBS are rela-
tively small, when compared with the other three link-
age measures. Figure 2.7 shows that the linkage never 
exceeds the 3% level for any country, except in Finland, 
Figure 2.6:   Backward linkage of KIBS embodied inputs into manufacturing sectors, domestic  
and total supply. Ranked by total linkage, 2005
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different pattern in Ireland is that embodied knowledge 
R&D services sourced abroad into Irish chemical indus-
tries are particularly high.
The backward linkage from KIBS to manufacturing 
appears weak, while the backward linkage from manu-
facturing to KIBS appears to be substantially stronger. 
Conversely, the strength of the forward linkage from 
manufacturing to KIBS is substantially weaker than the 
forward linkage from KIBS to manufacturing. The reason 
is that the size of the KIBS sector is substantially smaller 
than the manufacturing sector as a whole. The measures 
of linkage strengths reflect this size difference. When 
this is taken this consideration, domestic KIBS inputs 
into manufacturing outweigh domestic manufacturing 
inputs into KIBS in virtually every country, except France. 
Figure 2.8 shows that the forward linkages from KIBS 
to manufacturing appear rather large when compared 
to the opposite forward linkage from manufacturing to 
KIBS. The domestic and total forward linkages are also 
more evenly distributed across all countries. Ireland, 
Finland, and the Netherlands, and possibly Belgium and 
Hungary, are notable exceptions to this pattern, along-
side with Poland and Romania.37 The reason for the 
37  Ireland becomes an outlier because of foreign KIBS inputs into domestic 
manufacturing, and Finland becomes an outlier because of foreign manu-
facturing inputs into KIBS sectors. R&D performed in the R&D sector that was 
not distributed to the other industries may result in an overestimation of 
the impact of KIBS on manufacturing. These problems appear mostly in the 
EU-12, which still rely heavily on the government for performing and fund-
ing R&D activity. Remnants of the old science and technology system remain 
in these countries and appear as active research organizations in the R&D 
sector.
Figure 2.7:   Forward linkage of manufacturing embodied inputs into KIBS sectors, domestic  
and imported supply. Ranked by total linkage, 2005
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2.4.  Services as output of manufacturing
2.4.1. Introduction
Services, in particular knowledge-intensive services, 
have become an important direct and indirect input for 
manufacturing as documented in the previous sections. 
The previous chapter demonstrated that knowledge-
intensive business services (KIBS) are important carriers 
of new knowledge developed in upstream sectors that 
diffuses into manufacturing. Manufacturing increas-
ingly relies on knowledge-intensives services as inputs 
to their production processes. But this is only one aspect 
of the changing relationship between manufacturing 
Total linkages from manufacturing to KIBS are, by far, 
the dominant linkage in Lithuania, Slovenia, Poland and 
Estonia. Romania, China, Hungary and Greece are also 
dominated by manufacturing inputs to KIBS. France 
remains an exception among the high-income econo-
mies, although the balance of total flows suggests that 
the UK, Finland and Norway may also be exceptions. The 
most KIBS-intensive economies are Ireland, Japan and 
the Netherlands.
Figure 2.8:   Forward linkages of KIBS embodied inputs into manufacturing sectors, domestic  
and total supply. Ranked by total linkage, 2005.
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their physical products: A first motive is to gain addi-
tional financial benefits. Services can generate addi-
tional revenues for firms and open up new sources of 
income. This diversification may also help to reduce the 
vulnerability and volatility of cash flows. Moreover, ser-
vices may offer higher margins and have a lower price 
elasticity than physical products, because services are 
often more difficult to compare than physical products. 
A second motive is to gain strategic advantages. The 
provision of services allows firms to differentiate their 
product range from the products of their competitors 
by offering product-service combinations (‘solutions’). 
A higher degree of product differentiation may also 
hamper potential market entrants. Finally, there are 
also marketing benefits from service offers. Comple-
mentary services may generate additional value for 
customers and lead to a higher degree of customer 
satisfaction. Interaction with customers in the provision 
of additional services may help to maintain and foster 
customer relationships. Moreover, complementary ser-
vices may also promote demand for the physical goods 
of the firm.
2.4.3.  Macroeconomic evidence
There is a general trend towards a higher share of 
service products in manufacturing output (service 
content) across countries and over time. The analy-
sis of supply tables taken from input-output statistics 
compiled by EUROSTAT and national statistical offices 
provides compelling evidence that the share of ser-
vices in total manufacturing output has increased in 
most of the EU countries and in the US.39 As shown 
in Figure 2.9, the service output of manufacturing is 
highest in Finland and the Netherlands, Luxembourg, 
Sweden, and the UK. Services constitute around five 
to eight percentage of total manufacturing output40 in 
these countries. In most other EU countries, the service 
share on manufacturing output is around 2%. Coun-
tries with higher service content tend to be small, open 
economies in Western Europe.
The output of manufacturing still consists mostly of 
manufactured products. The service output of manu-
facturing is, however, growing quite fast, displaying 
annual growth rates of five to ten per cent for the years 
between 1995 and 2005. It grew in all countries under 
study between 2000 and 2005. The only exception is 
the Czech Republic. Convergence between manufac-
turing and services is therefore a uniform development 
across countries. It should, however, be noted that the 
39  The analyses in this part utilise Eurostat supply and use tables as input-output 
tables (as provided by Eurostat) do not allow for analyses of the service out-
put of manufacturing sectors for which supply tables (which are of dimension 
product by industry) are necessary.
40  Trade services offered by manufacturing firms are excluded because it is sim-
ply an extension of the firm’s product range by offering third-party products.
and services industries. Manufacturing firms them-
selves more and more offer services along with - or even 
instead of - their traditional physical products. This trend 
is often labelled ‘convergence between manufacturing 
and services’.38 The convergence between manufac-
turing and services is an opportunity for the European 
manufacturing sector to open up new markets, find new 
sources of revenue around their products, and increase 
competitiveness. This opportunity is recognized in pol-
icy debates:
“European industry must move further into the provision of 
services in order to remain competitive at the global level. 
Companies operating in industry sectors and manufactur-
ing need to develop new business opportunities by spur-
ring related services such as maintenance, support, train-
ing and financing. In general, the growth potential of these 
services is much higher than that of the product business 
itself.” (Monti 2010, p. 54)
This section first provides a discussion of the motives 
of manufacturing firms to offer services and then an 
analysis of convergence at the sectoral level with input-
output data. The end of this section provides additional 
evidence of convergence on firm-level.
2.4.2.  Why do manufacturing firms offer services?
Convergence and the phenomenon of manufacturers 
becoming service providers have gained considerable 
attention in the last decade, mainly in the manage-
ment literature. Convergence has been discussed in the 
context of product-related services (e.g. Lalonde and 
Zinszer, 1976; Frambach et al., 1997), product-service 
systems (e.g. Mont, 2002; Tukker and Tischner, 2006), 
integrated solutions (e.g. Brax and Jonsson, 2009; Davis 
et al., 2007; Windahl, 2007; Davies, 2004) or, more gen-
erally, ‘servitisation’ (e.g. Vandermerwe and Rada, 1988; 
Rothenberg, 2007; Neely, 2008; Baines et al., 2009). Up 
to now, there has been neither a common term nor 
a standard definition of convergence in the literature. 
Research on convergence has developed indepen-
dently and mostly in isolation (e.g. Baines et al., 2009; 
Tukker and Tischner, 2006). Lay et al. (2009) identified 
three basic strands in the literature: first, convergence 
has become a topic in the marketing literature; sec-
ond, there is growing attention to convergence in the 
sustainability literature; third, there are various sector-
specific publications that analyse how firms are adding 
services to their range of physical products.
The literature offers three basic explanations or 
motives for firms to introduce services in addition to 
38  See European Commission (2011), ‘Databases from socio-economic research 
project for policymaking’, especially section 1.2 for a thorough discussion of 
the subject.70
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figures from input-output tables reported here are 
most likely a conservative estimate of the service out-
put of European manufacturing industries. Firm-level 
evidence from the European Manufacturing Survey (see 
below) suggests that most revenues from services are 
not invoiced directly, but included in the prices of the 
physical goods of the firm. Firms often charge for a ser-
vice/product package, instead of invoicing services and 
physical products separately. Adding these indirect rev-
enues to the direct revenues yields an amount for the 
service output of manufacturing that is considerably 
higher than the values reported here.
Figure 2.9:   Service share of manufacturing output in various countries, 2005
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Note:    latest available data: the US and the UK until 2002 and 2003, respectively. Services cover CPA 55 to 95 for the EU Member States 
and NAICS 48 to 92 for the US. Data for France is incomplete and covers only CPA 72 to 95. 
Source:  Eurostat and US Bureau of Economic Analysis supply tables; author’s calculations.
Figure 2.10:   Service share of manufacturing output broken down according to innovation intensity, 2005 
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The service output of manufacturing firms is in various 
ways related to research, development (R&D) and inno-
vation. Both, R&D and complementary service offers are 
strategies of firms to differentiate their products from the 
products of their competitors. Moreover, countries with 
high service content – examples are Finland, the Nether-
lands, Luxembourg, Sweden, and the UK - have also high 
R&D expenditures as percentage of GDP. In contrast, the 
countries with the lowest service shares in the figure 
above – Romania, Portugal, Greece, or the Czech Repub-
lic – have also low aggregate R&D intensities. However, 
there are also some countries, for example, Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, France, and Germany, which have 
a lower service share than their R&D intensity would 
suggest. The relationship between R&D, innovation and 
service output is stronger at the sectoral level. Services 
are predominantly produced by manufacturing indus-
tries with high and medium-high innovation intensity41 
(see Figure 2.10). These industries include, for example, 
machinery and equipment (NACE 29), office machinery 
and computers (NACE 30), radio, television and commu-
nication equipment (NACE 32) and other sectors. In Aus-
tria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, and Sweden, more than two thirds of the service 
output of manufacturing comes from high or medium-
high innovation intensive sectors. In a second group of 
countries, including the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece, 
Hungary, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain, high and medium-high 
innovation intense sectors explain approximately 50% 
of the service output. One interpretation of this relation-
ship is that sectors which are more innovation-intensive 
are also more service-intensive, because the knowledge 
base of the sector is cumulative and complex so that 
customers often do not have all necessary knowledge 
available and require additional services.
But also low and medium innovation-intensive indus-
tries produce services. Examples are the UK and Ire-
land, where manufacturing industries with medium-
low innovation intensity account for more than 50 % 
of service output. ‘Publishing, printing and reproduc-
tion of recorded media’ (NACE 22) accounts for a large 
share of total manufacturing service output. Similar 
links between innovation and service output can also 
be found in other industries. In general, manufactur-
ing firms predominantly produce knowledge-intensive 
business services. KIBS account for more than two thirds 
of the service output of manufacturing in 14 of the 24 
countries included in the analysis. Hence, the manufac-
turing sector is not only a main client of KIBS — as dem-
onstrated in the previous section — but also produces 
KIBS to a considerable degree. Evidence from firm-level 
surveys such as the EMS (see below) suggests that most 
such KIBS are related to the physical products of a firm.
41  The classification of innovation intensity follows the sectoral taxonomy of 
Peneder (2010).
In addition, there is also evidence that a consider-
able share of the KIBS produced by manufacturing is 
exported. A study by the Austrian Central Bank (Wal-
ter and Dell’mour, 2009) suggests that manufacturing 
industries accounted for 15 % of total Austrian service 
exports in 2006. This is about the size of service exports 
by the KIBS industries. In this perspective, trade in ser-
vices and trade in KIBS in particular is not only a result of 
higher exports from the service sectors, but also a con-
sequence of the internationalisation of manufacturing 
industries. This may explain why service output is high-
est in small, open economies with a high innovation and 
R&D intensity (see Stehrer et al., 2011, for details).
2.4.4.  Which manufacturing firms offer services?
The input-output analysis above revealed that services 
are predominantly offered by firms in innovation-
intensive sectors. Small countries with a high R&D 
intensity tend to have higher shares of services on 
manufacturing output. In this section, product-related 
services are further analysed with firm-level data from 
the European Manufacturing Survey (EMS). The EMS 
investigates product, process, service and organisa-
tional innovation in the European manufacturing sec-
tors. This section presents results from the last round 
of EMS conducted in 2009.42
Firm-level data allows for testing hypotheses about how 
the share of services on total output of manufacturing 
firms relates to firm size, sector, and the characteristics 
of the main product of the firm. A regression analysis 
is used to explain manufacturing service output. The 
regression analysis is based on 2, 264 observations on 
firm level from the EMS. The sample consists of informa-
tion on manufacturing firms in nine countries.43 Around 
85% of the sample consists of SMEs.44
The dependent variable in the regression analysis, ser-
vice output of the manufacturing companies is meas-
ured as the share of turnover generated with services. 
The following independent variables are assumed to be 
important to explain manufacturing service output.
First of all, it is assumed that firm size has a relevant 
influence on the service output of manufacturing firms. 
The literature on product innovation points out that 
there are different advantages and disadvantages of 
small and large firms in the innovation process, leading 
to a U-shaped relationship between size and innovative-
ness (Kleinknecht 1989; Cohen 1995). Small firms can 
42  EMS is organized by a consortium of research institutes and universities co-
ordinated by the Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research 
(ISI) and takes place every three years.
43  Austria, Croatia, Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, Slovenia, Spain and 
Switzerland.
44  See Annex 2.3 for a description of the population.72
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react very quickly to changes in demand and are often 
focussed on the needs of their clients, while large firms 
can benefit from diversification and economics of scope 
and often have specialized departments for continuous 
innovation and product development. A similar rela-
tionship for manufacturing service output which is also 
a type of innovation is assumed. To operationalize the 
size of the companies, the number of employees (emp) 
and the number of employees squared (emp2) are cho-
sen, both in logarithmic form, to allow for a non-linear 
relationship between employment and service offerings.
Buyers of bespoke customized products, which are man-
ufactured in small batches or even as single products, 
may be more open to complementary services than 
buyers of mass-produced goods. The reason for this can 
be seen in the distribution channels and consequently 
in the customer-producer-relationship. Whilst high-vol-
ume producers often sell their products anonymously 
to end customers, the producers of single units are in 
closer contact to their customers and are consequently 
able to first identify service needs of their customers, 
to customize service offers for them and to promote 
and sell these service concepts to their customers. This 
hypothesis is operationalised by a dummy variable indi-
cating whether the main product of the firm is produced 
in small batches opposed to large batch production 
(sbatch). However, as it is not possible to identify the 
products’ target group merely based on the batch size, 
a variable that indicates if the firm is a supplier for other 
industries or a producer of consumer goods (supply) is 
also included.
The type of products offered is generally seen as 
a potential determinant of service output and ser-
vitization. Concerning product complexity, it can be 
argued that a customer firm that buys a complex prod-
uct which incorporates many parts and offers various 
functionalities may need more training, consulting, and 
maintenance or operation services than a buyer of sim-
ple parts (e. g. Oliva and Kallenberg, 2003). This hypoth-
esis is tested by including a dummy variable indicating 
whether the products are complex (complex) and con-
sist of many parts as opposed to simple products.
Stehrer et al. (2011) observed that younger firms seem 
to be slightly more innovative in terms of services than 
firms formed before 2000, although these younger firms 
are less product innovative. A potential explanation for 
this finding might lie in the innovativeness of younger 
companies mindset and hence their open-mindedness 
towards innovative service offerings. This hypothesis is 
tested by using a variable that indicates if the firm has 
been established after 2005 (newfirm).
The discussion above indicates that there is a relation-
ship between the innovative propensity of manufactur-
ing industries and the share of services of manufacturing 
output in the industries. The hypothesis of innovative-
ness of firms and industries is operationalized by two 
variables. Sectoral dummies that represent sectoral 
innovation intensity according to Peneder (2010) are 
used. For this, the base case is the high-innovation 
intensity sector. However, there is also evidence that 
firms within a sector differ considerably with respect to 
innovativeness. A variable which shows the innovative-
ness on a firm level is therefore included. This additional 
variable for innovativeness at the firm level indicates if 
a company has introduced a new product to the market 
within the last two years (inmar).
In order to control for differences w.r.t. to servitization 
across countries, country dummies are included. The 
base is Germany. 
The table below describes all variables in detail:73
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The dependent variable can only take values between 
0 and 100. The appropriate estimation for this type for 
dependent variable is a generalized linear model (GLM), 
which is basically a more general form of the well-
known ordinary least squares regression (see Papke 
and Wooldridge 1996). The generalized linear model 
allows the linear model to be related to the dependent 
variable, i.e. the variance function describes the rela-
tionship between the variance of the explained variable 
and its mean, which yields a non-biased estimation of 
the variance under non-normal conditions. In this case, 
it is assumed that the dependent variable is distributed 
by a binomial process and that the log of the mean of 
the dependent variable is linearly associated with the 
explanatory variables. Therefore, the normality assump-
tion is violated, revoking the use of least-squares param-
eter estimation.
The model is specified as follows:
sshare = + 1lemp+ 2lemp2+ 3sbatch + 4supply + 5complex + 6newfirm+ 7inmar+
+ 8selow + 9semedlow + 10semed + 11semedhigh + 12 19country + u
Regression results
The Table 2.3 below reports the results of the analy-
sis. For each independent variable, the table gives the 
estimated coefficient sshare = + 1lemp+ 2lemp2+ 3sbatch + 4supply + 5complex + 6newfirm+ 7inmar+
+ 8selow + 9semedlow + 10semed + 11semedhigh + 12 19country + u
, the robust standard error, the 
probability that the coefficient is zero. ***, **, * denote 
statistical significance of the coefficient at the 1%, 5%   
and 10% test level.
Variables Description
Sshare Turnover with services as a fraction of total turnover of the firm
lemp and lemp2 ln of the total number of employees in the reference year 2009 and ln squared
Sbatch
1 if a firm predominantly produces in small batches or single products; 0 if the firm predomi-
nantly produces in large batches
Supply
1 if the firm is predominantly a supplier of other firms; 0 if the firm predominantly supplies 
final demand
Complex
1 if the main product of the firm is a complex product consisting of many parts and offering 
various functionalities; 0 if the main product is simple and consists of few parts
Newfirm 1 if the firm has been established after 2005; 0 otherwise
Inmar 1 if the firm has introduced a new product to the market since 2007; 0 otherwise
se_low
1 if the firm is assigned to the Low innovation sector in Peneder’s taxonomy; 0 if the firm is 
assigned to the High innovation sector 
se_medlow
1 if the firm is assigned to the Medium-low innovation sector in Peneder’s taxonomy; 0 if the 
firm is assigned to the High innovation sector
se_med
1 if the firm is assigned to the Medium innovation sector in Peneder’s taxonomy; 0 if the firm 
is assigned to the High innovation sector
se_medhigh
1 if the firm is assigned to the Medium-high innovation sector in Peneder’s taxonomy; 0 1 if 
the firm is assigned to the High innovation sector
Country 
Country dummies at, ch, nl, fr, dk, hr, es, si for the location of the firm. Reference case is 
Germany
α Is a constant
U Are the residuals74
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Firm size had a large explanatory value in the regression 
analysis. There is a U-shaped relationship between firm 
size and service share on turnover. As discussed above, 
this points to different advantages of small and large 
firms in offering services. It also indicates that, all other 
things equal, service output decreases first with rising 
firm size and then increases again. The small coefficient 
of lemp2, however, indicates that increases can only be 
seen beyond a very high threshold.
The relationship between service output and innovation 
intensity of the sector is confirmed by the regression 
analysis. When holding all other factors constant, firms 
in innovation-intensive sectors are more likely to real-
ize a higher share of turnover with services than firms 
in less innovation-intensive sectors. The sector with low 
innovation intensity is an exception in that the negative 
relationship is not significant. Taking into account that 
this sector only constitutes 1.5% of the sample this result 
Table 2.3: Determinants of the share of services on turnover of manufacturing firms, results from 
a Generalized Linear Model
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P>|z| Sig.
Lemp -0.636 0.109 0.000 ***
lemp2 0.058 0.010 0.000 ***
At -0.108 0.088 0.222
Ch 0.002 0.064 0.966
Nl 0.043 0.115 0.713
Fr -0.551 0.129 0.000 ***
Dk 0.170 0.108 0.116
Hr -0.005 0.165 0.978
Es -0.351 0.182 0.054 *
Si 0.459 0.192 0.016 **
se_low -0.425 0.295 0.151
se_medlow -0.610 0.120 0.000 ***
se_med -0.221 0.063 0.000 ***
se_medhigh -0.327 0.067 0.000 ***
sbatch 0.266 0.056 0.000 ***
supply -0.035 0.051 0.495
complex 0.158 0.054 0.003 ***
newfirm 0.015 0.354 0.965
inmar 0.132 0.052 0.011 **
cons -0.321 0.282 0.261
No. of obs      2264
Residual df 2244
AIC .583887
BIC -17025.24
(1/df) Deviance .1383103
Note: (1/df) deviance measures the fit of the model and measures the actual deviance of the estimated value from the observed value 
of the dependent variable. It should be as small as possible, and zero in the case of a perfect fit. The value of (1/df) Deviance is 0.1383.
Source: EMS 2009, own calculations.75
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patterns and revealed comparative advantage in EU 
merchandise and services trade. A third section assesses 
KIBS intensity with respect to imports of production and 
trade, with the aid of information from input-output 
tables. The imported-service intensities of different sec-
tors across countries are compared and analysed over 
time. Also, the role of imported versus domestically 
produced KIBS is analysed. This section also includes an 
analysis of the value added structure of EU exports.
2.5.2.  Trends in KIBS trade
The present analysis of KIBS trade focuses on cross-
border trade (which includes services sold cross-border 
through local affiliates).47 It compares old EU Member 
States (EU-15) and new EU Member States (EU-12), and 
also both these groups with other markets, in particu-
lar Japan and the US. It looks at total EU trade (meaning 
both extra- and intra-EU trade), as the bulk of trade in 
KIBS is with third countries (80 %–90 % of trade in KIBS) 
— in contrast to total services exports, where the extra-
EU share has been steadily decreasing and was less than 
50 % in 2007. 
As can be seen from Figure 2.11, the EU-15 is the major 
player on the KIBS market — its share in global KIBS 
exports is around 50 %. In global imports, its share is 
slightly lower, but it still is the key importer. The US has 
the second biggest share in KIBS exports (15 %), while 
India is in third place with a 6 % share. The EU-15 is also 
the biggest player in the market for technology-inten-
sive goods. However, its share is much smaller than for 
KIBS — 35 % in 2007. The second biggest exporter in 
this market is China, with a share of 12 % in 2007. The 
US is the third biggest exporter with an 11 % share. 
The EU-12, though having a small share in the market 
for technology-intensive goods, has been increasing 
it quite fast — from 1 % in 1996 to 3.6 % in 2007. The 
EU-15, US and India are net exporters of KIBS, while 
Japan is a net importer. The EU-12 and China have 
approximately equal volumes of exports and imports of 
KIBS. In the market for technology-intensive merchan-
dise goods, the EU-15 is again a net exporter, along with 
Japan, while the US, China and India are net importers. 
The value of KIBS trade is relatively low compared to 
technology-intensive merchandise trade in all the 
regions.48 In 2007, the share of KIBS in global exports of 
technology-intensive goods plus KIBS was only 14 % — 
which is about 7 percentage points lower than the share 
of total services trade in cross-border trade. However, it 
47  In this section, KIBS are also defined as NACE codes 72, 73 and 74, which 
are related to categories 262, 279 and 268-269-279 in the Extended Balance 
of Payments Services Classification (EBOPS). See the background study for 
details.
48  Sectors 29-35 in the ISIC 3 classification are considered to be 
technology-intensive.
is not surprising. Due to the low number of firms in this 
category the variance of the variable is small.45
The relationship between service output and innovation 
intensity is also supported by the significant influence 
of product innovativeness. Firms which have launched 
new products during the last two years are more likely 
to realize higher shares of turnover generated with ser-
vices compared to companies who stated to not have 
introduced new products. Product innovativeness 
seems to reinforce service delivery.
The hypotheses that firms which produce in small batch 
or/and produce complex products are more likely to 
make more turnover with services than firms with large 
batches and/or simple products are also accepted. Both 
coefficients are highly significant, the coefficient for sin-
gle batch production is considerably higher.
The position of the firm in the supply chain does not 
seem to have a significant influence on the service out-
put. Suppliers to industrial users have no higher service 
output than firms which mainly supply consumers. 
Furthermore, the regression provides no evidence that 
newly established firms or firms that are mainly suppli-
ers to industrial clients would have a higher share of ser-
vices on output. This effect may partially be gauged by 
the size variables. The fact that new firms constitute less 
than 1% also affects the result. Since there are a very low 
number of new firms in the sample, the variation of this 
variable is limited.46
The hypothesis that the degree of servitization depends 
on the region of the firms is rejected by the multivari-
ate analysis. The country dummies are not significant at 
a level of at least 95%, except for France and Slovenia.
2.5.  European’s position in trade in 
goods and services and EU’s external 
competitiveness
2.5.1. Introduction
The previous sections showed that there is a relation-
ship between service content, technology intensity and 
openness to trade. It has also been demonstrated that 
KIBS play a vital role in this context. This section takes 
a closer look at the EU’s external competitiveness with 
respect to technology-intensive goods and particu-
larly KIBS trade. It begins with a description of trends 
in KIBS trade and technology-intensive merchandise 
trade over 1996-2007. There follows a section on cross-
country comparisons and examinations of specialisation 
45  See the description of the population in Annex 2.3.
46  See Annex 2.3 for a description of the population.76
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is important to recognise that KIBS activities represent 
a large share of the total cost of production in manu-
facturing. The KIBS intensity of both EU-15 and EU-12 
exports has risen substantially on a value added basis, 
once it is recognised that KIBS are inputs into manufac-
turing and are not only exported directly, but also indi-
rectly through goods.
As Figure 2.12 shows, the fastest average annual growth 
for KIBS exports in 2007 was recorded in India. China 
had the second highest growth rate. The EU-15, US, 
and EU-12 had been increasing their exports of KIBS at 
approximately the same average rate during 1996-2007, 
while Japanese growth had been considerably lower. 
In technology-intensive merchandise exports, trends 
were different — here, China and EU-12 had the highest 
growth rates, while India had the third highest growth 
rate. The EU-15 increased its exports on average by 
8 % per year. Japan again showed the slowest average 
annual growth. The US performed only slightly better 
with 5 % average annual growth.
The fastest growth of KIBS imports during that period 
was recorded in India, the EU-15 and the EU-12 while 
the slowest rate was seen in the US. Japan was more 
active in the KIBS import market as compared to the 
export market, with KIBS imports growing on average 
by 7 % a year. In technology-intensive merchandise 
imports, China, India and the EU-12 again displayed the 
highest growth rates with average annual growth rates 
of 19 %-21 %. In other regions, imports were increasing 
at an average annual rate of 5 %-8 %.
Turning to individual KIBS sectors, in 2007, KIBS exports 
in all the regions were dominated by other business 
services, which accounted for about 70 % of EU-12 and 
EU-15 exports, and more than 80 % of US and Japan 
exports (see Table 2.4). The common trend, though, 
is a decline in the share of other business services in 
exports, the biggest occurring in the EU-12 — 23 per-
centage points — and the smallest in the US — 5 per-
centage points. This is mirrored by increased export 
shares for computer and information services (apart 
from the US) and R&D (apart from the EU-15).
The EU-12 had the highest increase in the share of R&D 
services in KIBS exports — 10 percentage points. As 
a result, in 2007, the EU-12 had the highest share of R&D 
in KIBS exports, the lowest share being held by Japan. 
The structure of KIBS imports for the EU-12 and EU-15 
in 2007 was similar to the structure for exports, and 
had undergone similar transformations. The US, how-
ever, had a very different import structure. The share of 
other business services in imports for the US was only 
49 %, with 31 % in computer and information services 
and 20 % in R&D. For the US, the share of other business 
services also decreased by about 41 percentage points 
during the period 1996-2007. Japan, in contrast, saw 
Figure 2.11:   KIBS and technology-intensive merchandise exports in 2007, USD bn 
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a decrease in the share of computer and information 
services in its KIBS imports — by 4 percentage points. 
The shares of both R&D and other business services 
increased.
The EU-15 is the biggest exporter in all KIBS sectors (see 
Figure 2.13). It accounts for between 55 % and 67 % of 
global exports of other business services, computer and 
information services and R&D. The EU-12 has a very low 
share in global KIBS trade, but has been seeing very fast 
export growth in computer and information services 
Figure 2.12:   Average annual growth of exports and imports of KIBS and technology-intensive 
manufacturing, 1996-2007, %
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Table 2.4: KIBS export and import structure, %
USA Japan EU-15 EU-12
1996 2007 1996 2007 1996 2007 1996 2007
Exports
72 (computer) 9.2 9.9 7.0 16.9 6.6 20.3 3.5 17.0
73 (R&D) 4.3 8.7 0.4 1.7 13.3 8.6 0.6 10.3
74 (other busi-
ness)
86.5 81.4 92.6 81.4 80.1 71.1 95.9 72.7
Imports
72 (computer) 5.5 31.4 15.7 11.3 6.7 20.3 4.0 19.7
73 (R&D) 4.0 19.6 0.8 3.0 11.2 9.7 0.9 5.9
74 (other busi-
ness)
90.5 49.0 83.5 85.8 82.1 70.1 95.1 74.4
Source: TSD, UN COMTRADE.78
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and R&D49. In other business services, the EU-15 outper-
formed the EU-12 in terms of export growth. This is con-
sistent with the EU-12 emphasis on trade in merchan-
dise rather than services in the knowledge-intensive 
sectors.
India had the second largest share of exports in com-
puter and information services (72) in 2007. It also 
increased its exports the fastest — on average by 92 % 
year-on-year. China, though currently a small player in 
this market (3 % market share), has been increasing its 
exports of computer and information services at a rate 
second only to India’s (48 % average annual growth). 
The EU-12 was number three with 31 % average annual 
growth. The average annual growth of computer and 
information services in the EU-15 was on a par with the 
world average (25 %), while other advanced economies 
— the US, Canada, Japan — had much slower growth.
The R&D (73) market is dominated by the EU-15 and the 
US (the latter having an 18 % share of global exports in 
2007). It is worth noting that the EU-12 has been seeing 
the fastest growth of exports in this sector — on aver-
age 46 % per year. On the one hand, this can be par-
tially explained by the low starting base. On the other 
hand, the share of the EU-12 in the global R&D market 
is currently almost on a par with Canada’s, which makes 
it an important player in the world market. In contrast, 
the EU-15 has been seeing relatively sluggish growth in 
R&D exports — on average 8 % per year, which is lower 
than the world average. The US outperformed the EU-15 
on this indicator.
In the market for other business services (74), the US is 
again the second biggest player after the EU-15. The 
market share of the EU-12 is comparable to those of 
India, Korea, and China. China has been establishing 
itself as a serious player in the market, with the fastest 
export growth — during 1996-2007 its annual exports of 
other business services increased at an annual average 
rate of 52 %. India had the second highest growth rate 
— 27 %. The EU-12, along with the advanced economies 
of the EU-15 and the US, showed moderate growth for 
exports in this sector — around 10 %-12 % per year. 
Japan had the most sluggish dynamics in exports of 
other business services — less than 1 % average growth 
per year.
2.5.3.  Patterns of specialisation 
Patterns of specialisation in the EU’s technology-inten-
sive merchandise and KIBS trade are analysed with Bal-
assa’s Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA) index, 
49  See Stehrer, R. et al. (2011) for more details concerning annual growth rates.
also known as an export specialisation index.50 Accord-
ing to the calculated indices (see Figures 2.13, 2.14), the 
EU-15 has on average stronger revealed comparative 
advantages in KIBS exports than in technology-inten-
sive merchandise exports. The strongest comparative 
advantage for the EU-15 is found for R&D. Comparative 
advantages in R&D gradually declined during 1996-
2003, but have picked up after 2004, which might be 
related to efficiency gains brought by EU enlargement. 
Also, the EU-15 has increasingly specialised in computer 
and information services exports, in contrast to the US, 
which has lost this specialisation. At the same time, the 
EU-15 has the weakest comparative advantages in all 
the technology-intensive merchandise sectors as com-
pared with the US and Japan. Only in exports of machin-
ery n.e.c. (NACE 29) and motor vehicles (NACE 34) does 
the EU-15 display strong RCAs. The EU-12, in contrast to 
the EU-15, seems to have more comparative advantages 
in technology-intensive merchandise trade than in KIBS. 
Among the KIBS sectors, it has revealed comparative 
advantages only in R&D, which is a new specialisation 
pattern that has developed since 2004. The conclusion 
that the EU-12 has a higher specialisation in manufactur-
ing than in services is also confirmed by a comparison 
of the dynamics of KIBS and technology-intensive mer-
chandise exports during 1996-2007, which shows that 
KIBS exports grew more dynamically than merchandise 
trade in the old Member States, while in EU-12 the situa-
tion was the reverse. Japan has no RCAs in KIBS exports, 
but has the strongest specialisation of all the regions in 
motor vehicles (34) and radio and television equipment 
(32). Overall, the country tends to specialise in all the 
technology-intensive goods sectors, apart from office 
and computing machinery (30), where it lost export 
specialisation after 2003 — apparently reflecting the 
relocation of computer equipment production to other 
Asian countries. The US has the strongest specialisation 
in other transport equipment (35) and medical instru-
ments (33). The country also appears to have recently 
developed a stronger export specialisation in motor 
vehicles (34), while revealed comparative advantages in 
office and computing equipment (30) and radio and tele-
vision equipment (32) seem to be gradually fading away.
50  The index for country i good j is RCAij = (Xij /Xit)/( Xwj /Xwt), where w=world 
and t=total for all services. The RCA does not show true comparative advan-
tages, but simply compares the composition of exports of one country to 
a certain market with the composition of total exports that are absorbed by 
the market. A region is considered to have a revealed comparative advantage 
in a certain type of services or goods if a value of the RCA index for this sector 
is higher than 1.79
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Figure 2.14:   RCAs in technology-intensive goods
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Figure 2.13:   RCAs in KIBS
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2.5.4.  KIBS intensity of production and trade
KIBS shares in gross production costs accounted for 
between 5 % and 15 % of total direct costs in manufac-
turing in EU-15 in 2007, and from 3 % to 9 % of total 
direct costs in manufacturing in the EU-12. In this con-
text, KIBS are particularly important for competitiveness 
in electrical machinery in the EU-15, and in other trans-
port equipment and paper and printing in the EU-12. A 
notable feature is that KIBS intensity increased in all the 
industries of both regions as compared with 2001. 
While technology-intensive trade is much greater than 
direct KIBS trade as shown above, it is also important 
to recognise that KIBS activities also represent a major 
share of the total cost of production in manufacturing. 
Indeed, in this chapter it is shown that, on a value added 
basis, KIBS are highly important to the competitiveness 
of European manufacturing, and to the overall value 
added embodied in European exports. Indeed, the KIBS 
intensity of both EU-15 and EU-12 exports has risen sub-
stantially on a value added basis, once it is recognised 
that KIBS are inputs into manufacturing, so are exported 
not only directly, but also indirectly through goods.
Cross-border KIBS trade is important in both the EU-15 
and EU-12 in terms of the impact on manufacturing 
costs. In the background study (Stehrer et al., 2011), cost 
shares of 9.8 per cent in the EU-15 and 4.5 per cent in 
the EU-12 are reported.51 As noted earlier, the EU is more 
KIBS-intensive than the US or Japan. Imports account for 
between 5.3 per cent (EU-12) and 5.5 per cent (EU-15) 
of these total costs. Together, the data in this chapter 
point to the importance of KIBS for the competitiveness 
of European manufacturing, especially in comparison to 
the US and Japan. This is particularly true for electrical 
machinery and equipment in the EU-15, though KIBS is 
an important aspect of the cost structure across manu-
facturing. There has been a rapid growth in imports in 
KIBS-intensive service categories. Indeed, the growth in 
the EU has been 12.2 to 12.6 per cent per year from 1996 
to 2007. This is far greater than the KIBS import growth 
rate in Japan and the US, which was only 6.8 per cent 
and 2.8 per cent, respectively. This means the EU has 
become increasingly dependent on imported service 
inputs in order to maintain the cost-competitiveness of 
its KIBS-intensive industry, in comparison to both the US 
and Japan.
The KIBS intensity of trade is also analysed in terms of 
the contribution of KIBS to the value added contained in 
European exports. Focusing on value added emphasises 
the direct contribution made by exports to demand for 
labour and capital in Europe, rather than counting the 
value of imported (extra-EU) inputs in production costs. 
51  Figures in this section are based on GTAP data.
Also, focusing on value added makes it easier to trace 
the indirect linkages between KIBS demand in manufac-
turing and the value added contained in exports.
Figure 2.15 presents the share of KIBS in total EU value 
added contained in exports. Two sets of figures are pre-
sented. The first set of figures presents KIBS as a share of 
direct exports, measured in terms of sector value added 
— see Stehrer et al. (2011) for technical details. This is 
the share of direct value added, following from the value 
added (capital and labour) needed to produce direct EU 
exports in KIBS sectors and ignoring the EU value added 
in intermediates that feed into the sector. However, 
this is not a complete picture. Because, as seen above, 
KIBS are also important inputs to manufacturing, this 
means that the value added in KIBS activities that feed 
into manufacturing is also reflected in the exports of the 
manufacturing sector. Therefore, the second measure 
presented, which reflects forward linkages from KIBS 
production into other downstream sectors, includes not 
only the value added of direct exports but also the KIBS 
value added embodied in other European exports, such 
as machinery and equipment.
On a direct basis, KIBS activities accounted for between 
4.4 per cent (EU-12) and 10.9 per cent (EU-15) of EU 
exports on a value added basis in 2007. This differs from 
gross export shares, because gross exports also reflect 
the cost of intermediate inputs. For both the EU-12 and 
EU-15, these value added shares of direct KIBS exports 
have risen from 2001 levels. Including indirect exports, 
where the KIBS value added is embodied in manufac-
turing exports, the KIBS intensity of EU exports is even 
greater, ranging from 8.8 (EU-12) to 18 per cent (EU-15) 
of the value added contained in European exports in 
2007. Like the direct shares, these values are up from 
2001 levels. These trends underscore the importance 
of KIBS activities for EU competitiveness, in this case as 
measured by exports.
Conclusions
This chapter considered the role of knowledge inten-
sive service sectors in the EU economies as compared to 
other major economies like the US and Japan. This was 
done from different perspectives pointing towards the 
various trajectories the phenomenon of ‘quarternisa-
tion’ (Peneder et al. 2003) might take. Particularly, it was 
outlined that, first, this ‘quarternisation’ process is not 
to be seen as a mere increase of the shares of services 
in the overall economy but that these services play an 
increasingly important role of intermediate inputs into 
manufacturing and into high-tech manufacturing in 
particular. This was documented by studying the over-
all shares of intermediate inputs, the respective back-
ward and forward linkages between KIBS and manu-
facturing and their role in carrying product embodied 
knowledge flows. Second, there is also an important 81
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role of manufacturing industries and firms in the pro-
cess of an increase of the general share of services as 
there is evidence that more and more manufacturing 
firms (in particular firms in high-tech innovation inten-
sive sectors) provide more and more service outputs 
along their manufacturing goods. Finally, the analyses 
pointed towards the increasing role of service trade in 
overall trade, related it to the patterns of trade in high-
tech manufacturing goods and the relative importance 
of imported KIBS services in production costs and the 
increasing share of KIBS in value added exports.
In more detail, the analyses in Section 2 pointed towards 
the increasing importance of KIBS in the EU economies 
and compared these to Japan and the US. Though the 
increasing importance of KIBS for all economies con-
sidered here is clearly seen in terms of rising shares in 
employment and value added, the regions having lower 
shares have not increased them in a particularly faster 
way. The second issue covered in this section was on 
the role of KIBS as inputs into the total economy and 
into high-tech manufacturing in particular. The analy-
ses found some evidence on the growing importance of 
KIBS as inputs in the total economy and particular sub-
sectors, but also a difference between the EU and the US 
with the EU lagging behind in high-tech manufacturing.
Section 3 outlined the structure and strengths of domes-
tic and international inter-industry knowledge flows. 
R&D performed within the sector determines only part 
of the total technology flows in the economy. Technical 
knowledge embedded in intermediate goods, sourced 
both domestically and abroad, makes up an important 
part of the total technology flows, especially in those 
countries attempting to catch-up with the techno-
logical leaders. It is equally important for countries on 
the global technology frontier and considerably more 
important for those countries below it. Product embod-
ied knowledge plays an important role in the catching-
up of economies below the global technology frontier. 
At the frontier, economies rely more on domestic R&D 
performance than on inter industry, domestic or interna-
tional, technology flows, while for the countries below 
the frontier, international embodied technology flows 
are relatively more important. Two dimensions deter-
mine the structure of embodied technology flows and 
their relative importance to intra-industrial R&D perfor-
mance. The first is the openness of the national econ-
omy to international trade, having a strong co-linearity 
with the size of the economy, and the second is the 
national position vis-à-vis the global technology fron-
tier. For the catching-up knowledge users, Kaldor’s argu-
ment that manufacturing is the engine of productivity 
Figure 2.15:   KIBS shares of direct costs in manufacturing, 2007
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
Japan
USA
EU12
EU15
Japan
USA
EU12
EU15
2
0
0
1
2
0
0
7
direct
indirect
KIBS Shares of Value Added in Exports
Source: GTAP.82
European Competitiveness Report 2011
growth remains valid, as shown by downstream links 
from manufacturing to KIBS sectors. Inter-industry tech-
nology flows from abroad are particularly important. 
However, for the knowledge supplying economies at 
the technology frontier, the forward impact of manufac-
turing on KIBS is substantially diminished relative to the 
catching-up economies. KIBS have a stronger forward, 
downstream impact on manufacturing. In these econo-
mies KIBS appears to be a significant source of knowl-
edge into the manufacturing industries, alongside the 
technology generation within these manufacturing 
industries along with their own R&D performance.
The next section, Section 4, then provided evidence 
that European manufacturing firms increasingly offer 
services along with their physical products. The share 
of services in the output of manufacturing industries 
increased in the large majority of countries over time. 
However, service output is still small compared to the 
output of physical products. The service share tends to 
be larger in smaller countries and higher in countries 
with a higher R&D-intensity. EU-12 Member States have 
lower shares of service output compared to the EU-15. 
At the sectoral level, there is a higher service share in 
innovation-intensive sectors, such as the manufacturers 
of electrical and optical equipment, machinery, or the 
chemical and pharmaceutical industry. Service output 
is highest among small and among large firms. Pro-
ducers of complex, customized products tend to have 
a higher share of services in output than producers of 
simple, mass-produced goods. The results clearly show 
the manifold interactions between KIBS and manufac-
turing. KIBS are not only an important input for manu-
facturing, but are also offered by manufacturing firms to 
gain competitiveness, increase profitability, and gener-
ate additional value for customers by offering product-
service combinations. KIBS produced by manufacturing 
firms have a considerable share on total KIBS exports 
and contribute to trade in services.
Finally, in Section 5 the analyses pointed towards the 
increasing importance of trade in services and the par-
ticular role EU countries play in this field. In particular, 
the EU-15 has on average stronger revealed compara-
tive advantages in KIBS exports, than in technology-
intensive merchandise exports. Further the analyses 
pointed towards the increasing importance of imported 
KIBS in the costs structures of manufacturing and the 
KIBS shares of European and other countries value 
added exports. The latter show an increasing tendency 
which points to the particular role KIBS play in EU’s 
external competitiveness.
From a policy perspective this study therefore pointed 
towards the increasing importance of KIBS in various 
respects and that, overall, the EU and particularly the 
EU-15 does not underperform to other major econo-
mies like the US and Japan. However, the study also 
pointed towards the significant differences across EU 
member states and the lack of any kind of convergence 
process which might be expected to take place. Thus, 
the investigated structures and relationships seem to be 
quite persistent thus that one might be allowed to speak 
of a general ‘quarternisation’ process across countries. 
With respect to the EU countries there have been how-
ever significant achievements with respect to the Ser-
vice Directive which has been fully implemented in most 
countries over the last years. There are however differ-
ences as regards the comprehensiveness and quality of 
implementation, and these will need to be thoroughly 
assessed.83
Chapter 2 — Convergence Of Knowledge Intensive Sectors and The EU’s External Competitiveness
European Commission (2011), Databases from socio-eco-
nomic research project for policymaking, Directorate Gen-
eral for Research and Innovation. Office for Official Publi-
cations of the European Communities, Luxembourg.
Fagerberg, J., and Verspagen, B. (2002), ‘Modern capital-
ism in the 1970s and 1980s’, in J. Fagerberg, Technology, 
Growth and Competitiveness, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
Frambach, R.T., Wels-Lips, I. and Gündlach, A. (1997), 
‘Proactive Product Service Strategies — an Application 
in the European Health Market’, Industrial Market Man-
agement, Vol. 26, pp. 341-352. 
Hauknes, J. (1998), ‘Services in Innovation — Innovation 
in Services’, STEP report 13–98, Oslo.
Hauknes, J. and Knell, M. (2009), ‘Embodied Knowledge 
and Sectoral Linkages: An Input–Output Approach 
to the Interaction of High- and Low-tech Industries’, 
Research Policy, Vol. 38, pp. 459–469.
Kakabadse, A. and Kakabadse, N. (2002), ‘Trends in Out-
sourcing: Contrasting USA and Europe ’, European Man-
agement Journal, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 189-198.
Kaldor, N. (1966) Causes of the Slow Rate of Economic 
Growth of the United Kingdom, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge.
Kleinknecht, A. (1989), ‘Firm size and Innovation ’, Small 
Business Economics, Vol. 3, no. 2, pp. 157-158. 
Knell, M. (2008), Product-Embodied Technological Diffu-
sion and Intersectoral Linkages in Europe, Prepared for the 
InnovationWatch—Systematic Project, Europe INNOVA.
Lalonde, B., Zinszer, P.H. (1976), ‘Customer Service: 
Meanings and Measurement’, National Council of Physi-
cal Distribution Management, Chicago.
Lay, G., Schröter, M. and Biege, S. (2009), ‘Service-based 
business concepts: A typology for business-to-business 
markets’, European Management Journal, Vol. 27, No 6, 
pp. 442-455.
Miller, R.E. and Blair, P.D. (2009), Input-Output-Analysis: 
Foundations and Extensions, Englewood Cliffs.
Mont, O. (2002), ‘Clarifying the concept of product-ser-
vice system’, Journal of Cleaner Production, Vol. 10, No 3, 
pp. 237-245.
Monti, M. (2010), ‘A New Strategy for the Single Market: 
At the Service of Europe’s Economy and Society’, Report 
to the President of the European Commission.
References
Arnold, J., Javorcik, B.S. and Mattoo, A. (2006a), ‘Does 
Services Liberalization Benefit Manufacturing Firms?’, 
CEPR Discussion Paper No 5902.
Arnold, J., Javorcik, B.S. and Mattoo, A. (2006b), ‘The Pro-
ductivity Effects of Services Liberalization: Evidence from 
the Czech Republic’, World Bank Working Paper.
Baines, T.S. Lightfoot, H.W. Benedettini, O. and Kay, J.M. 
(2009), ‘The servitization of manufacturing: A review of 
literature and reflection on future challenges’, Journal of 
Manufacturing Technology Management, Vol. 20, No 5, 
pp. 547-567.
Bettencourt, L.A., Ostrom, A.L., Brown, S.W. and 
Roundtree, R.I. (2002), ‘Client Co-Production in Knowl-
edge-Intensive Business Services’, California Manage-
ment Review, Vol. 44, pp. 100-128. 
Brax, S., Jonsson, K. (2009), ‘Developing integrated solu-
tion offerings for remote diagnostics’, International 
Journal of Operations & Production Management, Vol. 29, 
No 5, pp. 539-560.
Cohen, W.M. (1995), ‘Empirical Studies of Innovative 
Activity ’, in: P. Stoneman (ed.), (1995), Handbook of Inno-
vation and Technological Change, pp. 182-264. Oxford: 
Blackwell.
Cornwall, J. (1977), Modern Capitalism: Its Growth and 
Transformation, Armonk: M.E. Sharpe.
Davies, A. (2004), ‘Moving base into high-value inte-
grated solutions: a value stream approach’, Industrial 
and Corporate Change, Vol. 13, No 5, pp. 727-756. 
Davies, A., Brady, T. and Hobday, M. (2007), ‘Organ-
izing for solutions: systems seller vs. systems integra-
tor’, Industrial Marketing Management, Vol. 36, No 2, 
pp. 183-193.
Den Hertog, P. (2000), ‘Knowledge-Intensive Business 
Services as Co-Producers of Innovation’, International 
Journal of Innovation Management, Vol. 4, pp. 491-528.
European Commission (2009), Challenges for EU support 
to innovation in services — Fostering new markets and 
jobs through innovation, Commission Staff Working Doc-
ument, SEC(2009) 1195 of 09.09.2009, PRO INNO Europe 
Paper N. 12.
European Commission (2010), European Competitiveness 
Report 2010, Directorate General Enterprise and Industry. 
Office for Official Publications of the European Commu-
nities, Luxembourg.84
European Competitiveness Report 2011
Muller, E., and Doloreux, D. (2007), ‘The key dimensions 
of knowledge-intensive business services (KIBS) analysis: 
a decade of evolution’, Frauenhofer Working Papers Firms 
and Region No U1/2007.
Montresor, S. and Marzetti, G.V. (2010), ‘The deindustri-
alisation/tertiarisation hypothesis reconsidered: A sub-
system application to the OECD7’, Cambridge Journal of 
Economics, in press.
Neely, A. (2008), ‘Exploring the financial consequences 
of the servitization of manufacturing’, Operations Man-
agement Research, Vol. 1, No 2, pp. 103-118.
Oliva, R. and Kallenberg, R. (2003), ‘Managing the transi-
tion from products to services’, International Journal of 
Service Industry Management, Vol. 14, No. 2, pp. 160-172.
Papaconstantinou, G., Sakurai, N. and Wyckoff, A. (1998), 
‘Domestic and International Product-Embodied R&D Dif-
fusion’, Research Policy, Vol. 27, pp. 301–314.
Peneder, M. (2010), ‘Technological regimes and the vari-
ety of innovation behaviour: Creating integrated tax-
onomies of firms and sectors’, Research Policy, Vol. 39, 
No 3, pp. 323-334.
Peneder, M., Kaniovski S. and Dachs B. (2003), ‘What Fol-
lows Tertiarisation? Structural Change and the Role of 
Knowledge Based Services’, The Service Industries Jour-
nal, Vol. 23, No 2, 47-66.
Rasmussen, P.N. (1957), Studies in Inter-sectoral Relations. 
Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Rothenberg, S. (2007), ‘Sustainability through servi-
cizing’, MIT Sloan Management Review, Vol. 48, No 2, 
pp. 82-91.
Stehrer, R. (coordinator), Biege, S., Borowiecki, M., Dachs, 
B., Francois, J., Hanzl, D., Hauknes, J., Jäger, A., Knell, M., 
Lay, G., Pindyuk, O. and Schartinger D. (2011), ‘Conver-
gence of knowledge intensive sectors and EU’s external 
competitiveness’, Study for DG Enterprise carried out 
within Framework Service Contract No ENTR/2009/033, 
Background Study for the European Competitiveness 
Report 2011.
Tukker, A. and Tischner, U. (2006), ‘Product-services as 
a research field: past, present and future. Reflections 
from a decade of research’, Journal of Cleaner Production, 
Vol. 14, No 17, pp. 1552-1556.
Vandermerwe, S. and Rada, J. (1988), ‘Servitization of 
business: adding value by adding services’, European 
Management Journal, Vol. 6, No 4, pp. 314–324.
Windahl, C. (2007), ‘Integrated solutions in the capital 
goods sector — exploring innovation, service and net-
work perspectives’, Linköping Studies in Science and Tech-
nology, Dissertation No 1098.85
Chapter 2 — Convergence Of Knowledge Intensive Sectors and The EU’s External Competitiveness
Annex 
Measuring direct and indirect flows of R&D activity in 
the Input-Output framework
Input-Output analysis is ideal for measuring the dif-
fusion of product-embodied R&D. The open Leontief 
model is best suited for the task as it considers technol-
ogy and final demand separately. Assuming that the 
economy is composed of n industries, the output vector 
x is either consumed as final demand y or used by other 
industries. In matrix notation, it appears as:
x = Ax + y, 
where A is the technical coefficients matrix. If A is non-
singular, it is possible to obtain the Leontief inverse or 
total requirements matrix B through matrix algebra: 
x = (1 – A)-1y   By,
which shows the input requirements, both direct and 
indirect, for all other producers, generated by one unit 
of output. 
It is assumed that R&D intensity is the vector with 
components ri in each industry i measuring gross R&D 
expenditures over gross output. The intensity vector of 
direct and indirect flows of R&D activity ti into each indus-
try i is obtained as:
t = rB
However, this relationship measures intensity relative 
to final demand, and not to total output. The expres-
sion thus implies a double-counting, when the purpose 
is to estimate the technology intensity of the sector as 
a whole. Both the backward linkages to industry j and 
the forward linkages from industry j determine the 
intensity of product-embodied R&D, before ending up 
in the exogenous final demand categories of industry j 
in this expression. Hauknes and Knell (2009), following 
Miller and Blair (1985), get around this problem by using 
a modified input-output matrix B*:
t* = rB*,
which measures the technology intensity per unit of 
total output rather than per unit of final demand of the 
recipient sector j. The elements of B* are given directly 
by the elements of the ordinary Leontief inverse B, 
but scaled by the diagonal elements of the B matrix 
(Hauknes (2011)). 
Total knowledge flows kj into industry j, measured rela-
tive to total output, are in this study composed of the 
domestic R&D intensity within the industry  k j = rj
d + t j
d + t j
m = (ri
db*ij +ri
fmij
i=1
n
) =
= (ri
d bij
bjj
+ ri
fmij)
i=1
n
, the 
intensity of domestically generated embodied technical 
knowledge  k j = rj
d + t j
d + t j
m = (ri
db*ij +ri
fmij
i=1
n
) =
= (ri
d bij
bjj
+ ri
fmij)
i=1
n
 from other sectors, and the intensity of 
embodied technical knowledge  k j = rj
d + t j
d + t j
m = (ri
db*ij +ri
fmij
i=1
n
) =
= (ri
d bij
bjj
+ ri
fmij)
i=1
n
 contained in 
imported commodities: 
where b*ij and bij are the elements of B* and B, respec-
tively, 
k j = rj
d + t j
d + t j
m = (ri
db*ij +ri
fmij
i=1
n
) =
= (ri
d bij
bjj
+ ri
fmij)
i=1
n
represents the global technology frontier for 
industry i, defined as the average R&D intensity of the 
OECD, and mij is based on imports of inputs from indus-
try i going into industry j. This formulation of the global 
technology frontier contains a small upward bias in 
the estimates of international R&D flows, as about one 
fourth of total trade is with countries below the frontier. 
Value-added intensities can be obtained by dividing the 
individual components of R&D in industry j by yi.
The formulation of the import vector is not obvious. The 
choice of formulation in this study is to let imports be 
multiplied in the importing country, i.e. imported R&D 
flows in the transnational context are treated as similar 
to own R&D in the domestic context. More explicitly
tm = rf (AmBd*x + AmBd* AmBd* AmBd*x + …)
where Am is the matrix of import coefficients relative 
to domestic total output, and Bd* is the domestic B* 
matrix for the importing country. This series expansion 
is rapidly converging; here, just the stated two terms are 
retained.
The analysis also distinguishes between direct and indi-
rect flows of knowledge. Embodied knowledge can flow 
directly from industry i to industry j, or indirectly 
through other intermediate sectors. Direct knowledge 
flows from domestic sources are identified as  
and indirect linkages as the residual: 
. 
Similarly, direct knowledge flows from international 
sources are identified as tm(direct) = rfAmx. Indirect link-
ages appear as a residual: tm(indirect) = tm – tm(direct). The 
total knowledge or technology intensity of any domestic 
sector j, relative to total domestic output of this sector, 
can therefore be written as: 
k j = rj
d + t j
d + t j
m = (ri
db*ij +ri
fmij
i=1
n
) =
= (ri
d bij
bjj
+ ri
fmij)
i=1
n
t j
d(direct) = ri
d aij
bjj
t j
d(indirect) = t j
d t j
d(direct)
k j = rj
d = t j
d(direct)+ t j
d(indirect)+
+ t j
m(direct)+ t j
m(indirect)86
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Scaling the components of the B matrix eliminates 
the double counting that results from the interac-
tion between sectors i and j. The components of the 
matrix B* (see Box 1) make mathematical sense, but do 
not make economic sense, because a sum over rows 
is always assumed to produce a measure of economy-
wide impacts on sector j. The linkage matrix L above, 
however, is economically meaningful at the component 
level, measuring the strength of interaction for the link 
i   j, but not when summed. Sums along rows or col-
umns of L have no direct economic meaning.
Import flows need to be included to close the economy. 
Adding the domestic and import flows together does 
this, which creates a Leontief A matrix of ‘total’ flows. 
Standard procedure generates a total Leontief inverse 
B, which is then used to calculate the total L matrix. Pro-
ducer or backward linkages are calculated on the basis 
of the total connections. Following Jones (1976), the 
analysis uses the domestic linkages for calculating the 
user or forward linkages. This procedure implies that 
imports are treated at the same level as domestic inputs, 
i.e. the input-output flow structure and its accumulation 
of the exporting country by the same structures in the 
importing country is mimicked. The implicit assumption 
is that all countries are structurally similar in a certain 
sense. Though conventional and valuable, this is a rough 
first-order approximation. However, an extension along 
these lines quickly runs into large data and estimation 
challenges, even though it is a fairly straightforward 
extension.
The following modified Rasmussen measures are cre-
ated in order to describe the strength of intersectoral 
technology linkages. The relative forward linkages pa
b 
and backward linkages ua
b between the two industry 
groups a and b (with the trade flow direction a   b) can 
be constructed as:
and
The forward linkage p measures the accumulated tech-
nology volume from a to b as a share of the total tech-
nology deposits emanating from source sector a. The 
backward linkage u measures the same nominator as 
a share of the total economy-wide deposits into the 
recipient sector u.
pa
b =
i a
j b
rili
jx j
i a
k
rib+ i
kxk
ua
b =
i a
j b
rili
jx j
j a
k
r kb+k
jxj
Annex 
Measuring intersectoral forward and backward 
linkages 
Rasmussen (1957) and Hirschman (1958) focus on the 
‘use’ of inputs in a single downstream sector j to meas-
ure backward linkages. They measure the total technol-
ogy intensity of sector j, but do not consider the origi-
nating sector. The backward linkage measure of sector j, 
described in Annex 1, overestimates the pairwise inter-
linkages between a source sector i and a different recipi-
ent sector j of the economy. The measure t* = rB* gives 
the total technology intensity of the downstream recipi-
ent sector j, across all originating upstream sectors i. B* 
gives rise to double counting when the analysis focuses 
on the intersectoral linkage between i and j. This sug-
gests that it is necessary to extract the impact of paths 
that include upstream sectors relative to sector i to cap-
ture the true total inter-linkage of the pair of sectors i 
and j. Given the inter-industrial network structure, the 
Leontief matrix, the task is then to sum up all direct and 
indirect paths between the two sectors that start in the 
source sector and end in the recipient sector, and never 
pass through any of them along the way. From the per-
spective of the upstream industry i, this is the forward 
linkage (in the sense of along the flows of traded goods) 
of this sector into sector j, while from the perspective 
of the (relative) downstream sector j, the same measure 
describes the backward linkage — in the opposite direc-
tion of trade flows — of j into sector i. 
B+ is a matrix very similar to B* and measures the down-
stream impact of R&D performed in any industry i. The 
i-component of the total downstream impact t+ in units 
of total output of sector i is:
The full intersectoral linkage matrix of the economy, 
given the basic input-output matrix A, is described by 
a matrix L, whose matrix elements lij measure the aggre-
gate linkage amplitude l between any two industries i 
and j:  
with bij being as before the matrix elements of the Leon-
tief inverse B of A (see Hauknes, 2011, for derivation). 
The denominator is the determinant of the (i, j) 2 x 2 
submatrix of B:  
ti
+ =
ri
xi
b+ i
kxk =
ri
xi k
bi
k
bi
i xk
k
lij =
bij
biibjj bijbji
B2(i, j) =
bii bij
bji bjj
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Annex 
Description of the dataset used in the regression 
analysis
The tables below show the distribution of the firm-level 
observations across countries, manufacturing industries, 
sizes of the firms and formation of the firms for different 
time periods. A taxonomy of firms in different innova-
tion intensities is also provided. This taxonomy builds 
upon Peneder (2010).
Table A.2 – 1: Population of the data set. 
Distribution across countries
Country
Number of 
observations
Percent
Austria (AT) 188 8.3
Croatia (HR) 63 2.8
Denmark (DK) 154 6.8
Finland (FIN) 0 0.0
France (FR) 93 4.1
Germany (DE) 993 43.9
Netherlands (NL) 186 8.2
Slovenia (SI) 43 1.9
Spain (ES) 56 2.5
Switzerland (CH) 488 21.6
Sum 2,264 100
Table A.2 – 2:Distribution of population over 
industries
NACE  
Rev. 1.1
Sector
Per-
cent
15+16 Food and drink and tobacco 4.8
17-19
Textiles, clothing and leather 
and footwear
3.0
20+36
Wood and wood products 
and furniture
7.5
21+22
Pulp and paper and printing 
and publishing
4.6
23+26+37
Refined petroleum, non-
metallic mineral products 
and recycling
5.3
24 Chemicals 5.1
25 Rubber and plastics 8.0
27+28
Basic metals and metal 
products
21.1
29 Machinery n.e.c. 21.0
30-32
Office machinery, electrical 
machinery and Radio, TV & 
communic. Eq.
8.6
33
Scientific and other instru-
ments
7.9
34+35 Transport equipment 3.1
100.0
Table A.2 – 3: Distribution of population across 
sectoral innovation intensity
Innovation intensity Percent
Low 1.6
Med-low 8.1
Med 26.9
Med-high 25.8
High 37.5
100.088
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Table A.2 – 4: Distribution of population across 
firm sizes
Firm size Percent
up to 49 employees 39.7
50 to 249 employees 46.4
250 and more employees 13.9
100.0
Table A.2 – 5: Distribution of population across 
firm age
Firm age Percent
Formed before 1991 74.9
Formed in 1991 to 2000 18.6
Formed in 2001 to 2001 5.8
Formed in 2006 to 2009 0.8
100.089
3.1. Introduction
Two of the momentous events of 1957 were the signing 
of the Treaty of Rome and, a couple of months later, the 
start of the space age. In other words, the space age and 
the EU are the same age and are both now in their sixth 
decade. It is however only in the last quarter of a cen-
tury that the EU has developed an interest in space poli-
cies, starting with a 1988 communication in which the 
Commission outlined a coherent EU approach to space 
(European Commission 1988). Member States had by 
that time developed their own space policies, as had the 
European Space Agency (ESA) and its predecessors, the 
European Space Research Organisation (ESRO) and the 
European Launch Development Organisation (ELDO), 
both established in 1964.
Following the 1988 communication, a common EU 
approach to space gradually took shape (European 
Commission 1992, 1996, 2000) and the cooperation 
between the EU and ESA intensified, manifesting itself in 
joint task forces, joint preparation of ESA and Commis-
sion documents (e.g. European Commission 2003a), the 
2004 framework agreement on cooperation and coordi-
nation, and the creation of the European Space Council 
drawing together ministers from EU and ESA Member 
States. The Space Council held its first meeting in 2004 
and has since met on six more occasions.
Over the years, as the EU approach to space progres-
sively crystallised there was a growing insight among 
European policymakers about the need to step up space 
cooperation activities and establish a truly European 
space policy (European Commission 2001, 2003a, b). 
This insight should also be seen in the context of the 
decisions by the EU to create large-scale development 
programmes for two flagship projects, Galileo (satel-
lite navigation) and GMES (Earth observation), as well 
as EGNOS (European Geostationary Navigation Overlay 
Service). In 2007, the 4th Space Council gave its politi-
cal blessing to the first European Space Policy (Euro-
pean Commission 2007a). This represented a real step 
change: prior to 2007 the strategic importance of space 
had been expressed in several EU documents, whereas 
the European Space Policy is the first common political 
framework for space activities in Europe. The resolutions 
adopted by the 4th and 5th Space Councils in 2007 and 
2008 formulated priority areas for Europe with respect 
to space. More recently, the new role of the EU in space 
policy is reflected in the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union which gives the European Space Policy 
a legal basis and confers on the EU competence, shared 
with its Member States, to ‘draw up a European space 
policy’ in order to promote, among other things, indus-
trial competitiveness (Article 189 TFEU). The same article 
also mandates the European Parliament and the Council 
to ‘establish the necessary procedures, which may take 
the form of a European space programme’.
Against the backdrop of these developments and with 
a view to the future, this chapter reviews the competi-
tiveness of EU space manufacturing and operations. It 
also identifies the factors that are key to the future com-
petitiveness of the sector, as well as potential obstacles 
to further development.
3.1.1.  Recent developments reflecting the new Treaty 
provisions
In 2011 the Commission adopted a communication tak-
ing stock of the new situation and outlining the way for-
ward. It listed the following objectives of the European 
Space Policy: the promotion of technological and scien-
tific progress; industrial innovation and competitiveness; 
enabling European citizens to reap the benefits of space 
applications; and a higher European profile on the inter-
national stage in the area of space (European Commis-
sion 2011). Moreover, it made the case for a European 
space industrial policy, the main objectives of which 
would be ‘the steady, balanced development of the 
industrial base as a whole, including SMEs, greater com-
petitiveness on the world stage, non-dependence for 
strategic sub-sectors such as launching, which require 
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Other EU policy areas which the European Space Policy 
supports include transport, agriculture, security, crisis 
management and humanitarian aid, telecommunica-
tions, environment and climate change. In these and 
other areas, there is an opportunity for the European 
Space Policy to help achieve policy objectives.
3.1.3.  Defining the EU space sector: space 
manufacturing and operations
Before defining the sector, it is important to underline 
that the atypical character of the space sector means that 
an analysis of its competitiveness will differ from more 
traditional analyses and will need to take into account 
its specificities. The most striking difference is that the 
space sector is to a large degree financed by public funds 
while at the same time many of its customers are pub-
lic institutions. Another distinguishing feature is that 
production series are often very short and sometimes 
a single unique product is required. The technical and 
financial risks in space activities are higher than in most 
other sectors (BIS 2010). Finally, specific and divergent 
procurement policies are in place, in Europe as well as 
globally, and there is a growing trend towards self-suf-
ficiency, notably due to the strategic and dual-use char-
acter of the space sector and the arrival on the interna-
tional stage of emerging space-faring nations.
Notwithstanding the specific characteristics of the EU 
space sector, this chapter will illustrate its performance 
in comparison with its competitors and how it contrib-
utes to EU competitiveness in general.
special attention, and the development of the market 
for space products and services’ (European Commission 
2011).
In response to the Commission communication, the 
Council on 31 May 2011 adopted a set of conclusions in 
which it confirmed as the top EU priority the implemen-
tation of its two flagship programmes: on the one hand 
GMES (Global Monitoring System for Environment and 
Security), on the other EGNOS and Galileo. Security and 
space exploration were also mentioned as priority areas. 
The Council lent its support to the Commission with 
regard to the need for a space industrial policy along the 
lines outlined in the Commission communication. The 
conclusions ended with an invitation to the Commis-
sion to organise broad consultations and discussions on 
the main elements of a possible future European space 
programme.
3.1.2.  Interaction with other EU policies
The European Space Policy is intrinsically linked to other 
EU policies and should be seen in the context of the 
Europe 2020 strategy (European Commission 2010a). 
Two of the flagship initiatives of the strategy are the 
Innovation Union (European Commission 2010c), to 
which the space sector contributes by virtue of its inno-
vative potential, and the new industrial policy for the 
globalisation era (European Commission 2010d) which 
singled out the space sector as a target for sector-spe-
cific initiatives under the new competences conferred 
by Article 189 of the Treaty.
Box 3.1: Definition of the EU space sector
For the purposes of this chapter the EU space sector is defined as three manufacturing segments – satellite, 
launcher, ground segment manufacturers – and four operation or exploitation segments: communication satel-
lites, navigation satellites, Earth observation satellites, launching services. This definition is illustrated below.
The definition excludes upstream suppliers (for instance of electronic components) as well as downstream service 
providers and applications based on space data but operating without space assets of their own. In several previous 
analyses of the space sector, such downstream service providers and application producers have been defined as 
part of the space sector by virtue of their importance in terms of turnover, job creation, etc. In this chapter they are 
defined as customers of the space sector. In other words, the sector definition used in this chapter excludes the part 
of the value chain with possibly the greatest impact on the EU economy: space-enabled services and applications.
Operation and exploitation
of space assets
Satellites
Launchers
Ground segment
Satellites 
- Communication, 
- Navigation, 
- Earth observation
Launching services
Manufacturing91
Chapter 3 — European Competitiveness in Space Manufacturing and Operations
satellite navigation services are much smaller in terms 
of turnover.
Turning specifically to the three manufacturing seg-
ments, for which better data are available than for 
the operation segments, Figure 3.2 illustrates annual 
turnover from 2003 to 2009. Turnover in manufactur-
ing was considerably higher in recent years than in 
2003–2006 (also in volume terms when expressed in 
constant prices) but sales have not yet reached the 
same volumes as the peak in 1999–2001 (not shown 
in Figure 3.2).
The three manufacturing segments make up just over 
half of total sector turnover, the four operation and 
3.2.  Characteristics of the EU space sector
3.2.1. Turnover
In 2009, the consolidated turnover of the EU space sec-
tor as defined in Box 3.1 was EUR 10.3 billion (final sales), 
an increase of 1.9 % from 2008. The breakdown by seg-
ment is illustrated in Figure 3.1. Satellite manufactur-
ing and communication satellite services are the most 
important segments, between them generating more 
than two thirds of total final sales, followed by launcher 
manufacturing and launching services with almost 
a quarter of total final sales between them. Ground seg-
ment manufacturing, Earth observation services and 
Figure 3.1:   Final sales 2009, EU space sector by segment
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Figure 3.2:   Consolidated final sales of the EU space manufacturing segments, 2003–2009
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3.2.3. Employment
The EU space sector as defined in Box 3.1 is estimated 
to have directly employed around 35 730 persons in 
2009 (full-time equivalents). Figure 3.3 illustrates how 
the vast majority are employed in satellite manufactur-
ing, followed by launcher manufacturing. The operation 
and exploitation segments account for a relatively small 
part of employment despite generating nearly half the 
turnover of the sector.
Again concentrating on the three manufacturing seg-
ments, Figure 3.4 illustrates how employment in space 
manufacturing has evolved from 2000 to 2009. Since 
2005, direct employment in space manufacturing is 
increasing again after years of consecutive job cuts, 
but even so the number of jobs in 2009 stood around 
10 per cent lower than at the peak in 2001.
exploitation segments making up slightly less than half. 
In spite of data on the latter four segments not being 
available to produce a graph such as in Figure 3.2, the 
general impression is that sales in those four segments 
have been increasing over time in line with the three 
manufacturing segments depicted in Figure 3.2.
3.2.2. Profitability
No profit margins for the different segments of the EU 
space sector are available, but according to estimates 
the average profit margin (as a percentage of turnover) 
is low, around 3 per cent. This comparatively low level is 
due less to fierce international competition than to the 
structure of the sector, with a large proportion of public 
funding and influence (see 3.4.1 below) resulting in con-
tractual profit agreements.
Figure 3.3:   Direct employment in the EU space sector, 2009
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Figure 3.4:   Direct employment in EU space manufacturing, 2000–2009
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down depending on political decisions and as a con-
sequence of contractual price agreements between 
public institutions.
With these caveats in mind, Figure 3.5 depicts the evolu-
tion of turnover per employee in EU space manufactur-
ing (full-time equivalents) in recent years. It can be seen 
that turnover per employee has increased in all years 
except 2005, when it was unchanged, and 2009, when it 
fell. Falling labour productivity in 2009 is however only 
one of several possible causes for the fall in turnover per 
employee.
Average turnover per employee in EU space manufac-
turing in recent years has been around € 160 000 per 
year. This is comparable with international figures for 
space manufacturing but clearly higher than other sec-
tors of the EU economy, for the reasons outlined above.
3.3.  Policy and regulatory environment of 
the EU space sector and framework 
conditions
3.3.1. Policies
In 1975, the European Space Agency (ESA) succeeded 
the European Space Research Organisation and the Euro-
pean Launch Development Organisation, both with their 
origins in the 1960s. ESA is an intergovernmental organi-
sation providing and promoting cooperation among 
European states in space research and technology and 
their space applications. Since the establishment of ESA, 
European space policy has been successfully developed 
within its framework by its Member States. At the brink 
of the new millennium European leaders recognised 
the need for a more comprehensive and truly European 
From a geographical perspective, employment in space 
manufacturing is relatively concentrated in a few coun-
tries. In 2009, France employed more people in the 
space sector than any other Member State (11 225), fol-
lowed by Germany (5 270) and Italy (4 490).
3.2.4.  Turnover per employee as proxy for labour 
productivity
A major shortcoming of most analysis of the space 
industry, including this chapter, is the lack of data on 
productivity. Because space manufacturing is capital-
intensive rather than labour–intensive, the best measure 
of productivity would be total factor productivity but 
unfortunately data on capital intensities are not avail-
able. Labour productivity therefore is only a small part 
of the picture, but even there data availability is a prob-
lem. Ideally, it ought to be calculated as value added per 
hour worked, but neither is available for the space sec-
tor. Analysts have in the past resorted to using turnover 
per full-time equivalent employee as a proxy for value 
added per hour worked, but as a proxy it has several 
potential shortcomings (apart from ignoring the capital 
intensive-nature of the sector as outlined above):
•	 Turnover in a high-technology sector such as space 
is higher than in other sectors because the value of 
inputs is higher. Any comparison across sectors based 
on turnover per employee is therefore flawed, as is 
any comparison of segments within the space sector.
•	 Turnover encapsulates a multitude of factors unre-
lated to labour productivity such as the business 
cycle, market developments, and competition.
•	 Specifically for a sector driven by public institutions 
such as space (or defence), turnover can go up or 
Figure 3.5:   Turnover per employee (thousand €) in EU space manufacturing, 2003–2009
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•	 Standardisation and interoperability with respect to 
satellite operations. Standardisation improves indus-
trial competitiveness and efficiency and is important 
for all three application sectors of the satellite indus-
try (communication, navigation, Earth observation).
•	 The national space law of the Member States, which 
is not uniform across the EU.
•	 Export control rules, especially concerning dual-use 
goods.
•	 WTO law concerning space goods and services 
(Euroconsult 2010).
•	 Legislation on the transfer of space objects.
•	 Code of conduct for outer space activities (Listner 
2011).
Additionally, procurement policy is an important regula-
tory condition, as the principle of geographical return 
(applied by ESA) has an important impact on the space 
sector, while at the same time current EU procurement 
rules may not be ideally suited for major flagship pro-
grammes such as Galileo and GMES (Hobe et al. 2010).
Finally, the availability of radio frequency spectrum is 
a factor which might hamper the development of satel-
lite communication and satellite navigation. On the one 
hand, there are spectrum shortages in terms of competi-
tion between space users as well as with terrestrial tech-
nologies; on the other hand there is a risk of potential 
overlaps on certain bands used for satellite navigation 
(US National Security Space Strategy 2011).
3.3.3.  Framework conditions
The most relevant framework conditions affecting the 
sector are:
•	 Labour market: the high-technology engineering 
industry depends on the availability of a flexible and 
highly skilled labour force, the supply of which is 
scarce in the EU.
•	 Openness of third markets: main parts of the non-
European market are closed to European manufac-
turers and operators, for instance the satellite and 
launch segments of the market.
•	 Access to finance: a range of financial instruments 
can offer a competitive advantage.
•	 Research, development and innovation are also 
essential for the functioning of the space industry, 
have made the EU industry what it is today, and are 
space policy. In 1999, ministers asked the ESA Executive 
and the Commission to develop a coherent European 
strategy for space (European Commission 2000). The 
strategy was built around three objectives:
•	 Strengthening the foundations for space research
•	 Enhancing scientific knowledge
•	 Reaping benefits for market and society
This was followed by the establishment of a joint Com-
mission-ESA task force to further develop the strategy 
and draw up proposals for its implementation (European 
Commission 2001). The cooperation between ESA and 
the Commission was strengthened through the estab-
lishment of a framework agreement between the two 
parties formalising their cooperation and coordination. 
The agreement entered into force in 2004 and has since 
been extended until 2012. The framework agreement 
defines the roles of ESA and the Commission as follows:
•	 ESA will continue to focus on space launches, sci-
ence, exploration and human space flight.
•	 The Commission will concentrate on space applica-
tions and the overall coordination of the European 
Space Policy.
ESA has made significant research efforts, including in 
the Ariane and ARTES (Advanced Research on Telecom-
munication Satellite Systems) programmes which have 
driven research, development and innovation in the rel-
evant parts of the EU space sector.
The European Space Policy concerns the medium and 
long-term use of space for the benefit of Europe, notably 
in terms of the environment, security and competitive-
ness. In this respect, the development of flagship pro-
grammes such as the satellite navigation system Galileo/
EGNOS and the Global Monitoring System for Environ-
ment and Security (GMES) has been a cornerstone and 
has influenced the EU space sector tremendously, in 
particular through the vast research effort that has gone 
into these two programmes (Alberti 2008). As set out in 
European Commission (2011), the aims of the space pol-
icy are to promote technological and scientific progress, 
stimulate industrial innovation and competitiveness, ena-
ble European citizens to reap the benefits of space appli-
cations, and raise Europe’s profile on the international 
stage in the area of space. In order to achieve these goals, 
Europe needs to ensure independent access to space.
3.3.2.  Regulatory conditions
There are six regulatory conditions with a major impact 
on the European space sector:95
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key to maintaining its position in a competitive envi-
ronment in which emerging space nations with their 
own space industry are trying to gain market shares.
3.4.  Results of the analysis
This section addresses the competitiveness of the EU 
space sector, its industry structure and, in that context, 
customer types and concentration developments in 
the sector. Furthermore, the topic of R&D and innova-
tion in the space sector is reviewed. In addition, the EU 
space sector is benchmarked against its US competitor 
as well as against two reference EU sectors, followed by 
an assessment of its strengths and weaknesses, as well 
as the opportunities and threats facing the sector.
3.4.1.  Largely institutional customer base
The space sector is to a large extent driven by public 
funding and institutional customers, globally more so 
than in the EU. As Figure 3.6 illustrates, half of final sales 
of the space manufacturing industry in 2009 went to 
European institutional customers. However, the share 
of European institutional customers for the European 
space sector as a whole declined from 2003 to 2009. The 
figure shows that as a percentage of total turnover, the 
share of institutional programmes has declined, while 
sales to commercial programmes and exports have 
become more important (sales to non-European institu-
tional customers are included in the export share). That 
only half of final sales go to institutional customers is 
unique by international standards: in other parts of the 
world, the industry depends much more on institutional 
orders.
The operation and exploitation segments of the EU 
space sector are less institutionalised than the manufac-
turing segment. This is due to the satellite communica-
tion industry which serves many commercial customers. 
Earth observation and satellite navigation, on the other 
hand, are characterised more by institutional than com-
mercial demand.
A more detailed look into the composition of final sales 
in 2009, the final year in Figure 3.6, reveals that launch-
ers and communication satellites between them made 
up virtually all sales to commercial customers and 
around a quarter of sales to European institutional cus-
tomers. Earth observation systems made up roughly 
another quarter of institutional sales. Navigation sys-
tems, science systems, ground stations and human 
space infrastructure (notably the International Space 
Station) accounted for most of the remaining half of 
final sales to European institutional customers in 2009.
Of all institutional sales within the EU, roughly two thirds 
were destined for ESA, here again mainly in areas such 
as Earth observation, human space infrastructure, scien-
tific systems and launcher systems.
Unlike its competitors, by far the largest share of sales of 
the European space industry is accounted for by civilian 
Figure 3.6:   EU space manufacturing, final sales by customer category, 2003–2009
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3.4.3.  Strong EU research effort but modest by 
international standards
3.4.3.1.  Research, development and innovation
Due to the innovative nature of the sector, research, 
development and innovation are of crucial importance. 
Total R&D is estimated to account for 10 per cent of 
unconsolidated sales turnover of the EU space sector. 
Internal R&D investments by companies in the sector 
account for roughly one third of the total. In general, 
the industry prefers improving existing products and 
technologies over inventing new groundbreaking tech-
nologies (ESA 2010), possibly due to the large scale of 
space project investments, which could cause compa-
nies to be more risk-averse, but possibly also due to the 
involvement of ESA in technology development. In fact, 
ESA is the source of most of the funding of R&D in the 
EU space sector.
Figure 3.7 illustrates the priorities of ESA as reflected in 
its annual budgets 2003–2010, and in particular how 
its priorities have evolved over time. It shows how the 
budget resources allocated to human space flight have 
been cut in favour of areas such as Earth observation, 
telecommunications and navigation. It is also interesting 
to note that throughout the economic and financial cri-
sis the members of ESA have made sure to maintain ESA 
funding at a higher level than in previous years (Euro-
consult 2010). A similar development has taken place at 
other space agencies around the world in response to 
the crisis.
In parallel with ESA, space continues to be an impor-
tant thematic area in the EU framework programmes on 
research, technological development and demonstra-
tion activities, notably in the thematic area ‘Space’ under 
the current framework programme (FP7). Specifically, 
FP7 provides R&D support to the ‘exploration of space’ 
area as well as research and technological development 
support for facilitating the development of space foun-
dations. Over the entire 2007–2013 period covered by 
FP7, around EUR 670 million will be allocated for services 
systems. Table 3.1 shows that in 2009 military systems 
made up only 12.7 percent of total final sales of nearly 
EUR 5.5 billion. Half of the military systems were pur-
chased by military customers (6 per cent of final sales) 
while the other half (also 6 per cent of final sales) were 
sold to civilian customers.
3.4.2.  High degree of concentration
The EU space sector is dominated by a few large com-
panies, a direct result of the special nature of this niche 
sector with relatively high intensities of technology 
and capital, producing strategically important out-
put with in many cases dual uses, and a high reliance 
on specific technology components along the value 
chain. Consolidation and industry verticalisation have 
been the logical responses to such characteristics – 
over the past decade there have been a high number 
of mergers and acquisitions within the sector, both in 
the manufacturing segments and in operations and 
exploitation. The 30 largest space business units in 
the EU space sector account for 78 per cent of total 
sector employment. A large number of smaller play-
ers employ the remaining 22 per cent. On the whole 
though, the barriers to entry – costs, infrastructure, 
know-how and risks – are very high and this is a sector 
where SMEs are rare, notably due to the small market. 
The sector also has a history of SMEs being acquired 
by and integrated into existing large companies. This 
process of vertical integration is driven by a desire to 
secure permanent access to strategically critical com-
ponents and systems and deprive competitors of such 
access. On several occasions the integration process 
has been guided by EU competition rules.
For much the same reasons, and also for historical rea-
sons, the EU space industry is mainly concentrated in 
a small number of Member States with a long-standing 
commitment to invest in it, notably France, Italy, Ger-
many, the UK, Spain and Belgium. There are several 
Member States with virtually no involvement in the EU 
space sector as defined in Box 3.1.52
52  On a related note, only 17 EU Member States are members of ESA, while 
a number of the remaining EU Member States are ‘European Cooperating 
States’ in ESA terminology.
Table 3.1: Sales of civilian and military systems to civilian and military customers 2009
Final sales (EUR million) Civilian systems Military systems Total
Civilian customers 4766 341 5107
Military customers – 350 350
Total 4766 691 5457
Source: Background study.97
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States in the 1970s but since the end of the Cold War 
extended to apply also to the export of US satellites and 
components.
The EU space sector uses a number of components 
and technologies produced outside Europe, mainly in 
the United States. These include state-of-the-art tech-
nologies that are essential for the optimal performance 
of the space systems produced in the EU. Less-than-
perfect substitutes are occasionally available but com-
promise the overall performance of the systems. There 
is an increasing political awareness in the EU that the 
availability of critical technologies should not be sub-
ject to political or economic decisions beyond EU con-
trol. Although most US technologies are available to EU 
producers, significant delays and (administrative) costs 
can occur, as well as complications if systems contain-
ing ITAR components are re-exported. Such delays and 
complications have given rise to the trend towards EU 
non-dependence, which differs from independence 
in that its aim is for the EU space sector to have free, 
unrestricted access to any needed space technology. 
The purpose is to avoid depending on a single source 
of supplies.
A similar awareness has emerged also in other parts of 
the world, notably as a result of the stricter export con-
trol requirements in the United States. Emerging space 
nations such as China, India, South Korea and Brazil are 
and strengthening space foundations, mainly for GMES 
development. A total of EUR 710 million will be spent on 
improving space infrastructure.
In an international context though, the funding of Euro-
pean R&D pales into insignificance in comparison with 
the US where the 2009 budget of NASA alone was more 
than USD 18 billion and a considerable share of public 
resources for space research comes not from NASA but 
directly from other public agencies. ESA is in second place 
in terms of budget, followed by its Japanese counterpart, 
whose budget was USD 3.7 billion in 2009. The space 
research budgets of China and Russia are not known but 
can be assumed to be of at least the same order of magni-
tude as those of ESA and Japan. India is in sixth place with 
a budget of just over USD 1 billion in 2009.
3.4.3.2.  Technology development and non-dependence
Partly because of a desire to have unrestricted access to 
space and to downstream application markets, partly 
as a result of stricter US export control requirements – 
the USA being the leading space technology producer 
in the world – a growing trend towards non-depend-
ence in space has been observed around the world 
over the last decade. The central piece of legislation in 
this context is the International Traffic in Arms Regula-
tions (ITAR), designed and implemented by the United 
Figure 3.7:   ESA budget, 2003–2010 (million €)
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therefore making great strides to develop their own 
space industries and become independent of the EU 
and US space sectors, until now the main exporters.
In 2008, the Commission, ESA and the European 
Defence Agency (EDA) set up a Joint Task Force with the 
aim of addressing critical space technologies for Euro-
pean strategic non-dependence. The task force drew up 
a list of priorities for critical space technologies for 2009 
and proposed a methodology for a coherent EU-wide 
approach to technology development. For example, JTF 
(2010) lists 25 critical items for which immediate action 
is required. The overall aim of harmonising technology 
development at EU level is to fill strategic gaps and mini-
mise unnecessary duplications, consolidate capabilities 
and arrive at a coordinated European space technology 
roadmap for the future. Given the role of technology 
as a crucial performance factor in the space sector, this 
effort aimed at achieving synergies in R&D investments 
and minimising duplications in technology develop-
ment has consequences for the functioning of the sec-
tor. It underlines the special nature of the sector, driven 
more by political and public considerations and dual-
use aspects than by economic factors, especially with 
regard to hardware development.
While politically such non-dependence efforts may be 
understandable, some might argue from a strictly free-
trade point of view that such efforts lead to consider-
able inefficiencies globally, however from the point of 
view of the involved space-faring nations and regions 
it is rational. Technology development is expensive and 
so is parallel development of state-of-the-art technolo-
gies in several fields in several countries (reversing in 
part the earlier trend of specialisation). Even so, in all 
likelihood the political reality will continue to deter-
mine future developments of critical technologies and 
non-dependence, and the actions of China and the 
United States will influence future developments in this 
area more than any other space-faring nation or interna-
tional organisation.
3.4.3.3. Patents
Patent analysis provides another means of assessing the 
innovative strength of the EU space sector. In particu-
lar, the number of patents filed at the European Patent 
Office (EPO) by country gives an indication of how many 
new successful technologies are brought to the market, 
bearing in mind that not all patents are commercialised. 
Figure 3.8 shows the total volume of patent applications 
filed by geographic location for the patent classification 
B64G, ‘Cosmonautics; Vehicles or equipment therefor’. 
Cosmonautics in this definition encompasses ‘all trans-
port outside the Earth’s atmosphere, and thus includes 
artificial Earth satellites, and interplanetary and interstel-
lar travel’. The scope of this analysis is limited to these 
rather technical products, but because patents are usu-
ally only required for innovative manufactured products, 
a more technically-oriented definition of the space sec-
tor is likely to capture most patent activity.
Japan and the United States filed the most EPO patents 
applications during the period 1999-2009, followed by 
the EU and Russia. This gives an indication of the rela-
tive innovative strength of these three countries and 
the EU in the cosmonautics sector, notwithstanding the 
well-known criticism of patent analysis that the number 
of patent applications does not say anything about the 
value of the innovations protected by the patents.
The contribution of European countries to total EPO pat-
ent applications filed in the industry is relatively small, 
Figure 3.8:   Space patent applications filed at EPO by country of applicant, 1999–2009
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countries from 2001 to 2008. It also shows EU imports, 
worldwide as well as from non-EU countries, for the 
same period. The difference between the two export 
curves can be interpreted as intra-EU exports, while 
the gap between the two import curves shows intra-EU 
imports (and as such should be the same as the distance 
between the two export curves). The distance between 
the two solid lines represents Europe’s trade surplus 
with the rest of the world.
In line with the findings for employment and turnover 
in the sector, the trade flow analysis shows that the EU 
space sector was growing strongly in 2008. Figures 3.10 
and 3.11 below show the main trading partners of the 
EU in 2008. Figure 3.10 shows the countries of origin of 
the space products imported into the EU and indicates 
that apart from intra-EU imports, the only country with 
a significant export value in 2008 was the United States, 
which exported € 146 million worth of space systems 
and components to the EU. The importance of the inter-
nal EU market is highlighted by the fact that EU custom-
ers (final customers or the space industry) imported 
most of their final or intermediate products from other 
Member States (worth € 189 million). The predominance 
of intra-EU over US imports might give credence to com-
plaints from the US space sector that its worsening com-
petitive position is due to the US export control rules 
described in Section 3.4.3. According to the analysis pre-
sented here, EU companies import thirty per cent more 
from companies in other Member States than from the 
United States. Export control rules are however unlikely 
to be the only factor holding back US space exports to 
Europe.
Figure 3.11 shows the main trading partners for EU 
exporters of space systems and components. Out of 
the total EU export value of € 1.6 billion in 2008, most 
went to the United States and Russia. Unlike imports, EU 
exports were destined for a more diverse set of coun-
tries which included fast-developing space nations such 
around 21 per cent. In Europe, German applicants were 
the most active, having applied for 659 patents during 
the period (9.9 % of the world total), followed by France 
(333), Austria (137) and Spain (108). The dominance of 
German patent applications in this sector is somewhat 
surprising as France has the largest space manufactur-
ing industry in Europe and the German space industry is 
relatively more focused on space services.
The share of patent applications emanating from EU 
applicants is surprisingly small, notably in comparison 
with other high-technology sectors such as nanotech-
nology, photonics, micro and nanoelectronics, indus-
trial biotechnology, advanced materials, and advanced 
manu  facturing technologies. As reported in last year’s 
European Competitiveness Report, European researchers 
and institutes were behind between a quarter and half of 
all patent applications at EPO in these six key enabling 
technologies (European Commission 2010e). It would 
therefore be reasonable to expect a similar share of EPO 
patent applications in the space sector, in particular as 
several of the key enabling technologies are directly or 
indirectly linked to space applications (ESPI 2010 b).
Finally, it needs to be borne in mind that although the 
European Patent Office is an internationally renowned 
patent office, there are other patent offices around the 
world with an international catch  ment area, notably the 
USPTO and Japan’s JPO. Due to potential home bias, EPO 
data may actually exaggerate the importance of Euro-
pean applicants on the global market for patents. There-
fore Figure 3.8 may exaggerate the true relative weight 
of Europe in international patenting in the space sector.
3.4.4.  Trade balance of the EU space sector
The EU space sector has a strong export position on the 
world market. Figure 3.9 shows EU exports of space sys-
tems and components worldwide as well as to non-EU 
Figure 3.9:   Total European exports and imports in value (million €), 2001–2008
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and development than the average US firm, but the 
numbers are not strictly comparable. EU space firms 
spend on average 10 per cent of turnover on R&D com-
pared to around 5 percent in the United States; how-
ever, the latter share increases if US (indirect) public 
funding via military projects or from other government 
sources is included.
In absolute terms though, Figure 3.12 shows that more 
than half of all publicly-funded space R&D in the world 
is funded by the United States, while EU public funding 
accounts for around a quarter of international public 
funding of space R&D (OECD 2007).
The USA is also the country with the highest proportion 
of space research in the total composition of publicly-
funded R&D, followed by Belgium, France and Italy as 
shown in Figure 3.13.
As pointed out in Section 3.4.4, US companies claim to 
suffer from stringent export control rules and are only 
moderately optimistic about their future competitive-
ness in the world market. In a study of more than 200 
companies or business units in the US space sector in 
2007, 58 per cent gave US export control rules as the 
most important barrier to entering foreign markets (US 
as Kazakhstan, Brazil, China and Turkey. In addition to 
the six importing countries in Figure 3.11, there were 
also significant exports within the EU (not shown in Fig-
ure 3.11), as discussed in the context of Figure 3.10.
3.4.5.  The EU space sector benchmarked against its US 
competitor
The US space manufacturing and operation sector is the 
world’s largest and most established space industry with 
revenues of close to $ 40 billion in 2006, significantly 
more than the € 10 billion turnover of the EU space sec-
tor. However, the US space sector is heavily supported 
by domestic institutional spending. In 2009, the US 
government injected $ 64 billion into the space indus-
try, almost ten times the $ 6.7 billion from the European 
Space Agency and the EU combined in support of the 
EU space sector. Such funding obviously helps inflate 
turnover of the US space sector, and because only part 
of the global space economy is accessible to European 
space companies, the spillover effects on the EU space 
sector are limited.
Concerning the ratio of R&D to turnover, the EU space 
sector seems to be investing slightly more in research 
Figure 3.10:   Main origins of EU space product imports, 2008 (million €)
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but in other years the United States has had a surplus 
in space products (in 2007, for instance). An analysis of 
the bilateral trade flows shows Europe and the United 
States to import and export more space products than 
any other part of the world, with large fluctuations in 
export and import values from year to year. The fact 
that the two main exporters run large trade surpluses 
with respect to the rest of the world is a signal of their 
importance on the world market. It is likely though that 
the export control requirements in place in the USA 
significantly hamper its export position on the world 
market, especially in satellite manufacturing and for 
Department of Commerce 2007). Even so, the United 
States is the largest exporter of space products in the 
world with a market share in 2004 of 32 per cent (OECD 
2007), followed by France (23 %), Germany (16 %), the 
UK (9 %) and Italy (7 %). The EU as a whole exported 
considerably more than the US space sector and had 
a market share of more than 55 per cent. The EU and the 
United States are the only major exporters in the world, 
with a combined market share of almost 90 per cent.
In 2008, the bilateral trade balance between the EU and 
the USA showed a surplus for European companies, 
Figure 3.12:   Breakdown of total OECD R&D for space, 2004
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Figure 3.13:   Space R&D as a share of government R&D budget in selected OECD countries, 2004
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positions. R&D spending in these two industries is 
however considerably lower than in the defence 
industry.
The EU space and aeronautics sectors exhibit a number 
of similarities in trade patterns. In both sectors the EU 
internal market is of pivotal importance and the United 
States the most important non-EU trading partner. 
Nevertheless, the share of non-EU exports to turnover 
is higher in the aeronautics industry than in the space 
sector. Furthermore, the EU aeronautics industry has 
a slightly higher number of non-EU trading partners 
than the space sector. The EU defence sector imports 
heavily from its US counterpart but exports much less 
to the United States due to strict regulations (European 
Commission 2007 b, Decision-CREST 2009).
The regulatory environment also influences the open-
ness of third markets in the space and aeronautics 
industries, in particular through standardisation and 
technical requirements.
While the financial crisis has had little impact on the 
EU space sector – in fact the ESA budget has increased 
during the crisis – the EU aeronautics industry has been 
severely affected (ESPI 2010a, ECORYS 2009). In the 
defence industry, government expenditure has followed 
a declining trend since the end of the Cold War (Euro-
pean Commission 2007 b); a trend which is set to con-
tinue. R&D expenditure is however considerably higher 
in the defence sector than in the other two industries, 
for example around 20 times higher than in the space 
sector, despite turnover being only five times larger 
(European Commission 2007 b). The R&D intensity is 
consequently several times higher in the EU defence 
industry than in the EU space sector.
certain export destinations. Without these strict require-
ments, it is reasonable to expect that the US position 
in global trade could be stronger. The EU space sector 
has to some extent been able to benefit from the self-
imposed US restrictions by offering ‘ITAR-free’ systems 
and components for export to destinations affected by 
the restrictions. At the same time EU exports have been 
adversely affected by the restrictive rules as the rules 
make it difficult to re-export systems containing ITAR 
components.
3.4.6.  The EU space sector benchmarked against the 
aeronautics and defence sectors
A comparison between three related and in some 
respects similar EU sectors – space, aeronautics, defence 
– reveals that the EU aeronautics industry is the larg-
est of the three in terms of employment and turnover, 
while the space industry as defined in Box 3.1 is the 
smallest:
•	 EU space sector turnover: EUR 10 billion; employ-
ment: 36 000;
•	 EU defence industry turnover: EUR 55 billion; 
employment: 300 000 (European Commission 
2007 b);
•	 EU aeronautics industry turnover: EUR 105 billion; 
employment 467 000 (ECORYS 2009).
The EU space and aeronautics sectors face the same 
challenges of maintaining a highly skilled workforce 
and keeping up with a changing environment in such 
a way as to maintain or enhance their technological 
Figure 3.14:   Space product exports from selected OECD countries in 2004 (export value and share of total)
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3.4.7.  Strengths and weaknesses of the EU space 
sector
The EU space sector is a world technological leader in 
certain segments such as heavy launchers and satellite 
communication services. The sector has a number of 
strengths:
•	 Its strong heavy launching sector offers independent 
access to space, which is key to achieving the objec-
tives of the European Space Policy,
•	 It can offer all types of products and services 
demanded by institutional and commercial 
customers,
•	 Its products are highly advanced,
•	 The strong satellite communication segment influ-
ences other sectors in the value chain,
•	 The sector combines major system integrators and 
innovative SMEs,
•	 The sector is not restricted by EU rules equivalent to 
ITAR.
At the same time the analysis has identified a series of 
weaknesses:
•	 The weak ability of the EU space sector to move from 
research to operational products,
•	 The sector remains dependent on critical compo-
nents from the United States,
•	 The number of European launches each year is on 
the low side: a higher number would benefit the 
strongly linked launch services and launcher manu-
facturing segments,
•	 Other countries with launching capabilities – USA, 
Russia, China, Japan – use mainly their own launch-
ers for institutional missions and are in many cases 
prepared to pay above going commercial rates for 
institutional launches.
Despite its weaknesses, the EU space sector has a num-
ber of opportunities in the future:
•	 Europe (EU, ESA, Member States) has high ambitions 
in space,
•	 New launchers (VEGA, Soyuz) have been added or 
will be added,
•	 The sector has access to financing, including inno-
vative financial arrangements and venture capital, 
but could benefit from further instruments being 
developed,
•	 Demand for satellite communication bandwidth is 
expected to continue growing,
•	 Technological progress in the space sector will con-
tinue to spill over to other sectors, thereby benefit-
ing the EU economy as a whole while at the same 
time providing secondary revenues for the EU space 
sector as well as spin-in opportunities.
There are however a number of challenges and risks for 
the EU space sector to address:
•	 The future supply of highly skilled staff in sufficient 
numbers,
•	 A potential risk of decreasing budgets for space,
•	 Emerging space nations such as China and India, 
with strategic aims for their space sectors,
•	 Technical dependence: on average 60 per cent of 
electronic components on board European satellites 
are imported from the United States,
•	 Radio frequency spectrum is a scarce resource and 
needs to be allocated with care and on a pan-Euro-
pean basis,
•	 Procurement rules differ between institutions and 
are not always ideally suited for large-scale opera-
tional programmes,
•	 The next generation of heavy launchers (succeeding 
Ariane V) needs to be developed,
•	 Communication satellites are the most important 
products but may come under pressure from com-
peting technologies for communication, including 
terrestrial technologies,
•	 The sustainable use of space is not ensured (nota-
bly with respect to space debris and space weather) 
and the EU needs to develop its own space situation 
awareness capability.
3.5.  Conclusions and policy implications
3.5.1. Conclusions
The following conclusions can be drawn on the basis of 
existing literature and the preceding analysis:104
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R&D and innovation: R&D intensity in the EU space sec-
tor as a whole is about 10 per cent (R&D as a percentage 
of total turnover). The launching industry is by far the 
most R&D intense of the different segments. Roughly 
half of R&D funding is corporate funding and half comes 
from public sources (mainly ESA). Public funding for 
the Earth observation (GMES) and navigation (Galileo) 
programmes has increased recently. Although abso-
lute R&D investment by the US is the highest in the 
world and considerably higher than that of the EU, R&D 
intensity is slightly higher in the EU. The share of patent 
applications filed by EU applicants in the space indus-
try in the last ten years is relatively small, 21 per cent. 
The United States, Japan and Russia account for 75 per 
cent of patent applications. Within the EU, most patent 
applications are filed by German applicants, followed by 
France.
Technological non-dependence: Partly due to stricter 
US export control requirements, an increased politi-
cal pressure for non-dependence in space has been 
observed over the last decade. The EU space sector uses 
a number of state-of-the-art components and technolo-
gies produced outside Europe, mainly in the United 
States. As a general rule these US components are avail-
able to EU industry (unlike for China, for instance) but 
with significant delays and (administrative) cost impli-
cations as well as subsequent complications if systems 
containing ITAR components are to be re-exported. In 
reaction to non-dependence considerations, Europe is 
coordinating the development of critical space technol-
ogies more strictly, in particular through the Commis-
sion-ESA-EDA Joint Task Force. The aim of such harmoni-
sation is to fill strategic gaps and minimise duplications, 
consolidate capabilities and achieve a coordinated EU 
space technology roadmap for the future. Such con-
siderations may be sound from a strategic political per-
spective but from a strictly economic perspective some 
might argue that such non-dependence efforts around 
the world lead to considerable inefficiencies due to par-
allel development of expensive state-of-the-art technol-
ogies in several countries. It is likely that US and Chinese 
activities in the political sphere will determine the road 
ahead for the whole world regarding non-dependence.
Trade: The EU runs a significant trade surplus with the 
rest of the world in the space sector. Extra-EU trade is 
larger than intra-EU trade. The United States and Russia 
are the two main export destinations for EU space prod-
ucts. The bilateral trade balance between the EU and the 
United States has been more or less in balance in recent 
years – both have shown bilateral surpluses and deficits 
three times over the past six years. Both the EU and the 
United States run considerable trade surpluses with the 
rest of the world. In relative terms, the export intensity 
of the EU industry (relative to total turnover) is consider-
ably higher than for the US industry, mainly due to strict 
US export control requirements. On the one hand ITAR is 
Turnover and employment: The EU space sector gen-
erates turnover of over EUR 10 billion (2009, consoli-
dated) and directly employs nearly 36 000 persons (full-
time equivalents). The operator services segment (not 
including downstream applications and services) makes 
up about half the turnover and is an important driver 
of the space economy. Turnover generated by manufac-
turing-oriented companies has been relatively stable in 
the past ten years. The contribution of the satellite com-
munication segment (both satellite manufacturing and 
operator services) to total EU space sector turnover is 
important, more than 70 per cent of the total. In terms of 
employment though, satellite manufacturing accounts 
for the largest part, around 60 per cent, followed by 
launcher manufacturing. Operations and exploita-
tion account for a much smaller share of employment. 
After a gradual decline in direct employment in space 
manufacturing between 2001 and 2005, the numbers 
have since been increasing again. Space manufacturing 
employment in the EU is concentrated mostly in France, 
followed by Germany and Italy. With respect to space-
craft produced, the EU is the second largest manufac-
turer in the world after the United States, with Russia 
in the lead as far as launcher production is concerned 
(Soyuz, Proton and other launchers).
Industry structure: The sector is to a large extent driven 
by public funding and institutional clients. However, the 
relative importance of institutional clients for the EU 
space industry has been declining over the past decade 
while its exposure to commercial markets and exports 
has increased. The military market in the EU is relatively 
small. The US industry is more heavily dominated by 
domestic institutional spending, including military 
spending. Commercial sales are concentrated mainly 
in telecommunications systems and launcher systems, 
while Earth observation systems make up a large part of 
institutional sales. The vast majority of EU space product 
exports consist of telecommunication systems. ESA is 
the largest institutional client in Europe, accounting for 
two thirds of institutional spending. Globally as well as 
in the EU, the space sector is characterised by high bar-
riers to entry, considerable opportunities for economies 
of scale regarding technology development and know-
how, and strategically important output with in many 
cases dual uses. Supply is largely dominated by a few 
large companies at the centre of clusters of smaller spe-
cialised suppliers. EADS Astrium, Thales Alenia Space, 
Finmeccanica, OHB, RUAG and Safran together account 
for over 75 per cent of employment in space manufac-
turing. The high entry barriers and a history of acquisi-
tions and integration are reasons why SMEs represent 
only around 8 per cent of sector turnover, even though 
the smaller entities play an important role especially in 
(innovative) space services and software applications. 
Horizontal and vertical integration (concentration) in the 
sector has increased in the past decade, as illustrated by 
the various large mergers and acquisitions.105
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competitive position of Ariane V and Arianespace. The 
ARTES programme also had a positive impact on the 
ability to develop state-of-the-art communication satel-
lites in Europe. In parallel, other European cooperation 
projects resulted in, for example, the establishment of 
Eutelsat, originally set up in 1977 as an intergovernmen-
tal organisation to develop and operate a satellite-based 
telecommunications infrastructure for Europe. These 
days the strong space sector in Europe drives demand 
for communication satellites from European industry 
and subsequent launching capabilities. This in turn ena-
bles the EU satellite manufacturing industry to apply 
part of the knowledge gained from producing commu-
nication satellites (such as knowledge about platforms) 
to the development of Earth observation/GMES and Gal-
ileo. Over the last decade or so, the EU space sector has 
been increasingly influenced by Commission policies, 
notably in the form of major EU flagship programmes 
such as Galileo and GMES but also other programmes 
(e.g. EGNOS).
3.5.3.  Policy implications
Based on the preceding analysis and the conclusions 
on the current competitiveness of the EU space sec-
tor, the following seven factors can be identified as 
key for the future. They are accompanied by six policy 
recommendations.
1.    Satellite communication drives the EU space sector 
along the value chain. The associated services seg-
ment has the highest turnover per employee in the 
EU space sector as well as a strong market position 
worldwide, and a strong demand for satellites and 
launching services. This in turn has enabled the EU 
satellite manufacturing industry to innovate and 
arrive at the qualitatively sound product portfolio 
it now offers and reach a strong worldwide market 
position, while also being able to apply key tech-
nologies in other satellite manufacturing domains. 
This position must not be lost. However, competition 
from outside the EU in the satellite communication 
segment is prominent in manufacturing and service 
provision. Given the critical dependence on state-
of-the-art technology and know-how, insufficient 
investment might harm the sector permanently. 
Temporarily reducing budgets might have long-last-
ing effects on performance; such reductions should 
be avoided or at least considered with caution. In 
order to stay ahead, constant innovation is required, 
hence sufficient R&D funds must be secured to 
ensure that innovative satellite communication 
solutions are found that fulfil the new technological 
needs in the communication satellites sector.
Policy recommendation: secure R&D funding for sat-
ellite communication development in times when 
hampering easy EU access to critical technology compo-
nents made in the United States, on the other hand it is 
likely to give EU firms a relative advantage over their US 
competitors in the supply of specific products (notably 
telecommunication systems) and to specific countries.
3.5.2.  Framework conditions and regulatory 
environment
The main issues relevant for the performance of the EU 
space sector as a result of the framework conditions and 
regulatory environment in which it operates are:
Impact of EU-US regulatory divergence: The global 
space sector is heavily regulated. The relative impact 
and restrictiveness resulting from regulatory divergence 
between the EU and its main competitor and partner 
is high in relation to other sectors (Berden et al. 2009). 
This restrictiveness results mainly from regulations in 
the areas of public procurement, government support 
for R&D activities, and safety and functional standards. 
In the aerospace sector analysed in Berden et al. (2009) 
this could result in considerable deadweight surplus 
losses, which may also be the case in the space sector as 
defined in Box 3.1.
Regulatory conditions with a major impact on the 
EU space sector: (i) Standardisation and interoperabil-
ity with respect to satellite operations; standardisation 
improves industrial competitiveness and efficiency and 
is important for all application segments of the satellite 
industry. (ii) National space law of EU Member States. 
(iii) Export controls. (iv) WTO laws on space goods and 
services (Euroconsult 2010). (v) Legislation on the trans-
fer of space objects. (vi) Procurement policy. (vii) The 
global allocation and management of radio frequency 
spectrum. (viii) The code of conduct for outer space 
activities (Listner 2011).
Framework conditions: Regarding the labour market, 
the high-technology engineering industry depends on 
the availability of a flexible and highly skilled labour 
force, a scarce resource in the EU. The openness of third 
markets is another issue, as main parts of the non-Euro-
pean market are closed to European manufacturers and 
operators. Access to finance is crucial, as are R&D and 
innovation for the functioning of the space industry and 
for keeping its competitive position as emerging space 
nations are in the process of building up their own 
industries.
Policy: Starting from the ESA policy focused on major 
programmes with the aim for Europe to be one of the 
world’s main space players, space policy has always had 
a large influence on the EU space sector. The Ariane pro-
gramme in the 1970s and 1980s was prominent in this 
respect and laid the foundations for the current strong 106
European Competitiveness Report 2011
Policy recommendation: continue reviewing how pro-
curement policies can be optimised in view of the new 
policy responsibilities in terms of realising large opera-
tional programmes such as Galileo and GMES.
6.    The heavy launcher segment is competitive but 
under pressure. As a result of the strong link 
between launch services and launcher manufac-
turing, close to 10 000 employees in the launching 
industry are dependent on a relatively small number 
of launches by Arianespace. One of the prerequisites 
for a competitive launch segment (manufacture as 
well as services) is as many launches as possible. As 
stated in European Commission (2011), independent 
access to space is a key prerequisite for achieving 
the objectives of the European Space Policy. These 
key aspects will be addressed in the space industrial 
policy which the Commission is currently developing 
in close collaboration with Member States and ESA.
7.    There is a general perception in the entire EU space 
sector that it is difficult to attract skilled labour and 
that this will become more difficult in the future. 
Many engineers will retire in the near future and the 
general perception of space engineering is unlikely 
to help trigger a swift influx of new engineers into 
the sector (Space Foundation 2010). This endangers 
the technological development and implementation 
capacity of the EU space sector.
Policy recommendations: initiate and coordinate 
between Member States the development of space 
academies (such as the space academy created in the 
UK); include in future R&D framework programmes dedi-
cated actions in which part of the research must be done 
by PhD candidates. This would enable a certain number 
of annual PhD places in the EU dedicated to space (as is 
currently the case in air traffic management).
government budgets are under pressure and there is 
a tendency to cut down on R&D expenditure.
2.    A weak point of the EU space sector is the transfer 
from the R&D phase to the operational phase and 
providing concrete products. For the communica-
tion satellite segment this concretely means that 
demonstrated flight heritage is required.
Policy recommendation: ensure that new satellite 
communication technology is actually put into orbit 
before reaching the market.
3.    There is increasing demand for communication 
satellite bandwidth following digitisation in the 
TV market (HDTV, 3DTV) as well as growing broad-
band demand. There is also pressure from compet-
ing technologies (IPTV for TV distribution, fibre for 
broadband distribution) as well as competition 
for radio frequency spectrum use from terrestrial 
technologies.
Policy recommendation: increase the efficiency of 
radio spectrum management (European Commission 
2010 b), defending the interests of the EU space sec-
tor as far as possible in compliance with the common 
practice of technology neutrality. For the space sector 
as a whole, communication satellites are an essential 
driver and the interests of communication satellites for 
the competitiveness of the EU space sector need to be 
included in policy discussions on radio frequency spec-
trum management (European Commission 2010 b).
4.    The EU space sector is heavily institutionalised, half 
of its final sales going to European institutional cli-
ents. This concerns especially Earth observation, nav-
igation satellites and related launches. Budgets cuts 
in these areas will reduce the performance of the 
sector significantly. Establishing an ‘anchor tenancy’ 
would represent an important step in the develop-
ment of systems that can be sold outside Europe.
Policy recommendation: review whether it is feasible 
to put in place a stronger anchor tenancy policy, espe-
cially in areas where the EU space sector is weak. This 
would enable the industry to develop competences and 
competitive strengths that could strengthen its position 
on markets outside the EU.
5.  The strong institutional demand for Earth observa-
tion and navigation systems stems from the GMES and 
Galileo flagship programmes. In order to ensure sound 
implementation of these programmes and enable the 
EU space sector to benefit as much as possible, EU and 
ESA procurement policies need to take into account 
from the start the requirements of these large opera-
tional programmes.107
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4.1. Introduction
4.1.1.  Context of the analysis
The accessibility and affordability of non-energy, non-
agricultural raw materials53 is crucial for ensuring the 
competitiveness of EU industry.54 The competitiveness 
of several European sectors such as electronics, cars, 
chemicals or construction can be hampered by a limited 
or more costly supply of certain raw materials. Like the 
US and Japan, the EU is highly dependent on imports 
for many of its raw materials for industrial and manu-
facturing purposes. While the EU has many raw material 
deposits, their exploration and extraction is hindered by 
increased competition for land use and the higher costs 
of safeguarding the environment and human health.
The fast-changing geopolitical and economic context 
affects the supply and demand of these materials. On 
the one hand, the industrialisation and urbanisation 
of emerging economies (e.g. the BRICs) has increased 
global demand for particular industrial raw materials,55 
as these countries have become more important pur-
chasers of such materials on global markets.56 Also the 
fast diffusion of emerging technologies is expected 
to raise global demand.57 On the other hand, the min-
ing and production of certain raw materials is concen-
trated in a few countries, and the free and transparent 
53  In the Report, the term of “raw materials” is understood as non-energy, non-
agricultural raw materials used for industrial and manufacturing purposes 
and that are not primarily used to generate energy. For a more detailed defi-
nition of raw materials discussed in this chapter, see section 4.1.3.
54  See European Commission (2008a), e.g. Angerer G. et al. (2009), and Öko-
Institut e.V., (2009).
55  For example, trade in base metals increased by 21.6 % yearly on the global 
market over the period 2004-2008.
56  However this should not be taken too far since in 2005 for instance China had 
import dependency rates ranging from 70-100 % for cobalt, copper, man-
ganese, nickel, and titanium, see Hveem (2010). The European Commission 
(2009) also pointed out that countries generally considered resource-rich 
(like China, Canada, Russia, India, or Australia) can be dependent on imports 
of some raw materials.
57  See for example Fraunhofer ISI, IZT (2009).
operation of global markets in these raw materials is 
not ensured. In many cases, distorting measures such 
as export taxes, quotas, import subsidies, and restrictive 
investment rules hamper access for EU industry.
Recent sectoral studies have highlighted a number of 
problems: i) high volatility of world market prices; ii) 
increased use of short-term supply contracts (e.g. sup-
ply of iron ore); iii) monopolisation of supply for certain 
‘high-tech’ materials in certain countries; iv) growing 
competition and demand from emerging economies 
and increased concentration of suppliers of raw materi-
als, leading to a more difficult price negotiation position, 
especially for SMEs.
The European Commission has launched a number of 
policy initiatives to address the challenges regarding 
access (conditions) to raw materials. In particular, the 
Raw Materials Initiative has highlighted the importance 
of access to non-energy, non-agricultural raw materials 
for the competitiveness of crucial industries in the EU-27 
economy.58 The document set out a three-pillar approach 
towards an integrated strategy. These pillars are:
•	 Fair and sustainable supply of raw materials from 
global markets;
•	 Fostering a sustainable supply of raw materials 
within the EU;
•	 Boosting resource efficiency and promoting 
recycling.
This was later followed up by the identification of 14 
critical raw materials.59 Their critical nature is based 
on the fact that they are entirely produced in a lim-
ited number of countries outside the EU, and have low 
58  European Commission (2008a).
59  European Commission (2010a and 2010b). These materials are antimony, 
beryllium, cobalt, fluorspar, gallium, germanium, graphite, indium, magne-
sium, niobium, platinum, rare earths, tantalum, and tungsten.
CHAPTER 4
ACCESS TO NON-ENERGY RAW MATERIALS  
AND THE COMPETITIVENESS OF EU INDUSTRY110
European Competitiveness Report 2011
•	 The role of the EU extracting and recycling industries 
in reducing the vulnerability of EU industries with 
respect to access raw materials.
•	 Potential public policies concerning access to raw 
materials, e.g. measures to promote resource effi-
ciency, undistorted access to raw materials in third 
countries, measures to promote sustainable sup-
ply from domestic sources (mining plus recycling), 
and other aspects such as globalisation and trade in 
waste streams.
In terms of geographical coverage the focus is on a com-
parison of the EU as a whole with the rest of the world 
(e.g. the main emerging international players, such as 
China).
The analysis is qualitative in nature, comprising an inde-
pendent and systematic analytical exercise based mainly 
on interviews with industry stakeholders, and on rele-
vant literature and data.
4.1.3.  Defining non-energy, non-agricultural raw 
materials
Non-energy, non-agricultural raw materials can be 
defined as raw materials that are mainly used in indus-
trial and manufacturing processes, semi-products, 
products and applications and are not primarily used 
to generate energy. As such, industrial minerals and 
purified elements (e.g. feldspar, silica), ores and their 
metals and metallic by-products (e.g. copper, iron but 
also germanium, rhenium, rare earth elements) and 
construction materials (e.g. sand gravel, aggregates) 
are within the scope, but it also includes materials 
such as wood and natural rubber. Furthermore, crude 
oil and gas can be also considered as raw materials for 
industrial production 64. 
This chapter focuses mainly on unprocessed non-
energy, non-agricultural raw materials. However, such 
raw materials are processed into various products and 
components used by sectors further up the product 
value chain. These sectors are thus affected indirectly by 
the same raw materials issues.
4.1.4.  Analytical approach: a framework for 
interpretation
Figure 4.1 depicts the relationship between raw mate-
rials and competitiveness, in the context of the supply 
64  Although raw materials are commonly associated with minerals and metals, 
in particular the list of 14 critical raw materials identified by the Commis-
sion, the concept used in this chapter is wider. Although the latter two are 
typically used for energy production, they are the main raw materials in the 
chemical industry. Wood is considered as ‘forestry materials’.
substitutability and recycling rates. The Communica-
tion of February 2011 on ‘Tackling the challenges in 
commodity markets and on raw materials’ examined 
the problems in the wider context of commodity trade 
and emphasised the role of commodity derivatives and 
the link between physical and financial markets.60 The 
overarching flagship initiative under the Europe 2020 
Strategy for a resource-efficient Europe,61 considers the 
problem of non-energy industrial raw materials in the 
wider context of a resource-efficient Europe in a global 
setting and in relation to related issues such as climate 
change, biodiversity, land use, deforestation, sustainable 
consumption and competitiveness. In March 2011 the 
Council of the European Union endorsed the three-pil-
lar approach and the accompanying actions.62 The Com-
munication on Trade, Growth and World Affairs (2010) 
also addressed the strategic importance of access to an 
undistorted supply of raw materials to ensure the com-
petitiveness of the EU economy63. The upcoming Com-
munication on the European Innovation Partnership on 
Raw Materials will address the role of R&D and innova-
tion in tackling the scarcity of raw materials.
4.1.2.  The goal of the analysis
The main objective of this chapter is to analyse the 
nature and degree of vulnerability of the EU industry 
in terms of access to raw materials in a systematic and 
qualitative way. The focus is on the competitiveness 
effects for certain industries, taking into account the 
supply constraints on non-energy, non-agricultural raw 
materials from a sectoral point of view. ‘Access’ to raw 
materials is understood in a wider sense, meaning also 
the access conditions. 
As part of this overall objective, this chapter looks into:
•	 Recent trends in global demand, the EU’s supply and 
trade in raw materials, as well as the role of second-
ary raw materials and recycling in Europe.
•	 The competitiveness effects of a set of selected sec-
tors for which raw materials are a critical factor in 
their relative global competitiveness. It examines 
supply-related issues regarding raw materials, e.g. 
price volatility, location of crucial materials, changes 
in contracting terms, etc., and the responses at com-
pany level to these challenges, including improving 
material efficiency, recycling, use of substitute mate-
rials, and organisational strategies.
60  European Commission (2011a).
61  European Commission (2011b).
62  Council of the European Union (2011).
63  European Commission (2010c).111
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that are often associated with lower energy processing 
costs.
The bottom part indicates the related risks. While prob-
lems such as increasing material prices and price vola-
tility as well as monopolisation of supply for certain 
materials and trade restriction measures can be classi-
fied as supply risks, the problem of growing competi-
tion and consumption in emerging markets concerns 
the demand side of the product market. Also, risks and 
(technological) challenges can be identified at the recy-
cling stage can be identified. These risk factors can be 
further refined, such as increased demand due to the 
development of emerging technologies, changes in 
consumer preferences, etc.
chain. It will serve as the backbone for the various parts 
of the analysis.
The top part of the figure indicates four layers of com-
petitiveness that can be distinguished at sectoral level: 
inputs, structure, processes and outcomes. These are 
related to the product market, in which both producers 
and consumers (or businesses in the case of intermedi-
ate consumption) operate.
The middle part of the figure shows the raw material 
flows throughout the production process, going from 
raw material to waste. An important aspect is the recy-
cling of raw materials, leading to secondary material 
flows that reduce the import dependency and on top of 
Figure 4.1:   Raw material use in the production process and the value chain: analytical framework
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4.2.1.  Global demand and the EU
The key factors driving the demand for raw materials 
are global economic and population growth and new 
technological applications. In particular, the growing 
appetite of the emerging economies for raw materials is 
seen as major force driving global demand.65 The influ-
ence of China and, increasingly, India is commonly seen 
as dominant in this context. This is both a reflection of 
the scale of their economies and their current economic 
dynamism. Since the 1990s, developing countries have 
significantly increased their consumption of raw mate-
rials to help fuel their economies, and are now among 
the leading consumers and high long-term demand is 
expected.66
Figure 4.2 shows the GDP of major countries in the 
world in 2010 and estimates for 2015. The EU-27 and 
the US are the main economic blocks, both in 2010 and 
in the near future. Yet for other countries, in particular 
the BRIC countries, relatively significant changes are 
anticipated. According to IMF forecasts, India, Russia 
and Brazil will have economies of similar sizes as those 
of France, Italy and the UK.
65  See European Commission (2010a).
66  OECD (2010b).
4.2.  Contextual data
This section presents data portraying the EU in its wider 
global economic context with respect to non-energy, 
non-agricultural raw materials. The data revolve around 
five themes: 
•	 Demand: GDP growth of major economic blocks in 
the world, indicating where increasing demand for 
raw materials is expected to come.
•	 Price: changes in the prices of particular raw materi-
als e.g. copper, zinc, aluminium.
•	 Supply: location of major deposits in the world and 
the EU’s position. 
•	 Trade: major raw material trade flows in terms 
of value and quantities, indicating that the EU is 
a major importer.
•	 Secondary raw materials and recycling: estimated 
waste stream recovery potential.
Figure 4.2:   GDP and GDP evolution of major world countries
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4.2.2.  Long-term price evolutions
Demand from emerging economies has pushed up 
prices for important metals and minerals.68 China’s 
economic dynamism is described as a major factor in 
commodity market developments. China currently con-
sumes about 30% of the world’s base metals, against 
about 5% in the early 1980s. Increasing demand from 
emerging economies ‘appears to represent a longer-
term structural shift in consumption’ and not just 
a ‘cyclical movement’69. The literature also suggests that 
global markets for metals and minerals tend to be vola-
tile, partly due to time lags in the response of supply to 
changes in demand, but technological change in prod-
ucts also often changes the demand for strategic metals 
and minerals, contributing to high price volatility.70 Fur-
thermore, the export restriction measures often applied, 
such as quotas and minimum export prices have also 
contributed to soaring raw materials prices.
From 1990 onwards, prices had been relatively sta-
ble up to the year 2002. From 2003, the prices of the 
materials considered here generally started to increase, 
sometimes gradually (aluminium, cement, iron ore) and 
68  See for example OECD (2010b), European Commission (2011a).
69  J.P. Morgan (2010).
70  OECD (2010a).
In 2010, China passed Japan as the world’s second 
largest producer of goods and services. Japan is fol-
lowed by the major European countries Germany, 
France, the UK and Italy. For the time being, the United 
States’ GDP amounts to two and a half times the GDP 
of China. The combined GDP of the EU-27 is about 10% 
higher than the GDP of the US. According to the IMF’s 
forecasts for the near future, this world order will not 
change substantially by 2015. However, it is expected 
that China’s GDP will be more than half of US GDP 
by 2015.
According to other forecasts67 the economic world 
order is expected to change substantially by 2030 (see 
Figure 4.3). China will likely have surpassed the United 
States to top the GDP rankings, with India third. By 
2050, the traditional large economies such as Japan, 
UK, Germany and France are expected to fall further 
back in the global GDP rankings. Of course, one has 
to bear in mind that long-term forecasts are by their 
nature very speculative. Yet they point to a certain eco-
nomic growth pattern that will also have an impact on 
global demand for non-energy, non-agricultural raw 
materials.
67  See Goldman Sachs (2008).
Figure 4.3:   Top-10 countries by GDP in 2050
0
10 000
20 000
30 000
40 000
50 000
60 000
70 000
80 000
2050 2030 2010
F
r
a
n
c
e
N
i
g
e
r
i
a
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
U
K
J
a
p
a
n
I
n
d
o
n
e
s
i
a
R
u
s
s
i
a
M
e
x
i
c
o
B
r
a
z
i
l
I
n
d
i
a
U
S
C
h
i
n
a
Note:    The vertical scale is expressed in billion USD.
Source:    Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper, n 170, ‘The expanding Middle: The Exploding World Middle Class and Falling Global 
Inequality’, July 2008.114
European Competitiveness Report 2011
4.2.3.  The EU’s supply from a global perspective 
The supply of non-energy, non-agricultural raw mate-
rials is described as relatively inelastic in the literature. 
This is mainly the result of long lead-times in the min-
ing and recycling industry. Investments in the extractive 
industries are associated with high capital intensity and 
a long-term payback characteristic, often involving sub-
stantial risk.71 Furthermore, investments are very often 
influenced by environmental considerations and politi-
cal decisions. This is one of the reasons why supply does 
not immediately respond to changes in demand, since 
weak price signals can leave a ‘legacy of underinvest-
ment’ reaching years into the future.72 The resulting lag 
in the response to growing demand can translate into 
temporary supply gaps.
The second pillar of the EU’s Raw Material Initiative 
focuses on fostering sustainable supply within the EU. 
Figure 4.5 indicates the share of the EU-27 in world min-
ing production for a set of minerals and metals. 
71  UNCTAD (2007), p. 83.
72  J.P. Morgan (2010).
sometimes sharply (copper, zinc, iron and steel scrap). 
Much of the increase in prices from 2003 to 2008 can 
be explained by the strength of the demand and the 
lagged response of the supplying industry (Humphreys, 
2009). In the case of copper, prices stabilised again 
from 2006 onwards, while in the case of zinc, prices fell 
sharply again. The prices of iron ore and steel scrap con-
tinued to increase vigorously up to 2008.
When prices are measured against their year 2000 
levels, one can observe that prices for zinc, bauxite, 
aluminium and cement rose at a gentle pace, with 
increases of between 20% and 60% during 2000-2008 
(See Figure 4.4). On the other hand, prices for iron ore 
almost tripled during the same period. Prices for iron 
and steel scrap and copper more than tripled, with an 
average yearly increase of 17% during this period. While 
the economic crisis of 2008/9 had a significant impact 
on the prices of metals, some metal prices, such as cop-
per and iron ore – have recovered to near pre-crisis 
levels.
Figure 4.4:   Price indexes of selected raw materials (2000=100)
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4.2.4.  Trade flows
The literature on trade and global supply chains high-
lights the highly uneven distribution of metal and mineral 
reserves across countries as a key contextual factor (see 
for example OECD 2010a). Large shares of important raw 
materials are concentrated in a relatively small number 
of countries and other economies have limited domes-
tic supplies and therefore depend on imports. Some of 
the major producers and exporters of raw materials are 
located in developing economies. The global supply 
chains for essential raw materials have become increas-
ingly complex and interdependent, which leaves supply 
relatively vulnerable. The vulnerability of industry can be 
assumed to be greatest in sectors unable to replace scarce 
and expensive raw materials with more abundant and 
cheaper materials with similar properties (Angerer et al., 
2009). The unequal distribution of raw material reserves is 
also considered to be an important source of trade friction.
4.2.4.1.  Trade data
The trade balance for raw materials in the EU-27 leans 
strongly to the import side (see Figure 4.6 and 4.7.). For 
the main raw materials, unagglomerate regards the most 
important materials, such as unagglomerated iron ore 
and copper ore, imports surpassed USD 5 billion and USD 
4 billion in 2009, respectively. Imports of agglomerated 
For most mining materials, the EU-27 only accounts for 
a small share of world mining production. Only for salt 
and potash is mining production in EU-27 on a global 
scale, with shares of 20% and 13% of world production, 
respectively. For some critical raw materials, EU-27 share 
is below 5% (tungsten) or even non-existent (antimony, 
manganese, platinum). Due to price increases, the return 
on investment of recovery and recycling of certain mate-
rials has changed over recent years, especially in Europe 
and North America.73
Within the EU, several countries are quite significant 
producers, yet in terms of global supply the amounts 
produced are relatively small. Austria was estimated to 
have been the fourth biggest tungsten producer in the 
world in 2009. Portugal is also a significant producer of 
tungsten. Poland is the EU’s biggest producer of silver, 
and also quite active in producing of copper, zinc and 
lead. Ireland is the EU’s largest producer of zinc. Sweden 
has a variety of raw materials. It is the leading producer 
of iron ore in the EU, and also processes lead, gold and 
zinc, too. Bulgaria and Spain are also quite significant 
producers of gold. Within the EU, Germany produces 
most of the potash and the largest amount of ammonia 
and salt.
73  A good example is platinum: global recovery from car catalysts has risen by 
more than 10 % every year since 2006, with 39 % of this secondary platinum 
produced in Europe in 2009.
Figure 4.5:   Share of EU-27 in world mining production
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surpassing USD 300 million in 2009, are ores from alu-
minium, molybdenum and titanium ores.
iron ore and precious metals each amounted to more 
than USD 1 billion in 2009. Other important imports, 
Figure 4.6:   Exports and imports of raw materials in the EU-27, 2009 – part 1
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Figure 4.7:   Exports and imports of raw materials in the EU-27, 2009 – part 2
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hand, net imports decreased for certain materials - 
roasted molybdenum concentrates and waste of 
iron, - and certain ores - zirconium, chromium, zinc and 
manganese.
Figure 4.10 presents the largest changes in absolute net 
imports were seen evolution the case of copper with an 
increase of more than USD 1 billion, and in the case of 
iron with a decrease of more than USD 1 billion (both 
agglomerated and unagglomerated) decreased in the 
same value.74 Net imports of most materials decreased 
between 2005 and 2009, by USD 600 million for zinc 
ores and by USD 500 million for molybdenum ores.
74  The significant increase in copper imports during this period can be partly 
explained by the boom in the construction sector, which is the largest user of 
copper in Europe. The substantial decrease in iron ore imports can be linked 
to the falling demand for raw materials in the manufacturing industry, espe-
cially in the automotive sector, during the crisis.
Within the EU-27 some materials have a positive export 
balance. However, these balances are much smaller than 
the positive import balances. Silver has a positive export 
balance amounting to USD 80 million. Other materials 
with a positive balance sheet are tungsten and some 
slag and ash materials (Figure 4.8).
Over time, it is worth noting that between 2005 and 
2009, net imports of some materials into the EU-27 
increased strongly (Figure 4.9). This was the case for 
‘niobium, tantalum and vanadium ores’, and for some 
ash and slag materials. Net imports of lead ores, cop-
per ores and nickel ores also increased. On the other 
Figure 4.8:   Exports and imports of raw materials in the EU-27, 2009 – part 3
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Figure 4.9:   Relative evolution of imports-exports in the EU-27 between 2005 and 2009
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Figure 4.10:   Absolute evolution of imports-exports in the EU-27 between 2005 and 2009
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The above overview of certain selected critical raw mate-
rials (see Figure 4.12) shows the high dependency of 
European industrial countries on other countries, very 
often third world countries or emerging economies. By 
far, the most resource-rich country in this respect is China. 
This country is the world’s top exporter of rare earths, 
graphite, magnesium, antimony and fluorspar. Moreover, 
it has the largest reserves of rare earths, tungsten, graph-
ite and antimony. Other important countries for these 
resources are Russia, DR Congo, South Africa, Brazil and 
Mexico. European dependency can be observed in the 
import column: very often, the most industrialised coun-
tries (Germany, France, Spain, Italy, UK, the Netherlands, 
Austria and Belgium) are among the top 15 importers.
Recent trends often show a similar picture. Following 
the economic downturn, demand for these critical raw 
materials fell on a global scale. In 2010, global demand 
started to increase again, driven by emerging countries, 
resulting in price increases in general. Combined with 
the fact that technological evolution is further pushing 
4.2.4.2.  Trade of iron ore, critical raw materials and rare earths
Iron ore, critical raw materials and rare earths are espe-
cially important for the sound functioning of European 
industry. It is worth taking a closer look at global trade 
in these materials.
Iron /steel is a very important metal being used widely 
many sectors. The major flows of iron ore are from the 
two major production regions (South America, notably 
Brazil, and Australia) to the major consuming region 
(Asia, notably China, Japan and Korea) (see Figure 4.11). 
The two producing regions export a large share of their 
production. Another important producer, India, only 
exports half of its iron ore production, being an impor-
tant consumer too. Europe, with a very low production 
rate (see Figure 4.4), imports mainly from South America 
and the Russian Federation. China, as an important pro-
ducer, has no substantial exports of its iron ores. In fact, 
China needs to import iron ores from Russia, Australia, 
India and South America.
Figure 4.11:   Major trade flows of iron ore, 2009
Source:    adapted from www.bhpbilliton.com.120
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supply if current trends continue. To meet this demand, 
production and supply by the rest of the world should 
further increase during the following years.
4.2.5.  Import dependency: evidence from material 
flow data from Germany and the UK
A natural question to ask after having discussed the lim-
ited supply of non-energy, non-agricultural raw materi-
als in Europe, its relatively large net import rates, and 
the EU’s recovery prospects is to what degree can the 
EU´s material requirements be covered by own supply. 
It is clear from the analysis in previous sections that the 
answer in general is relatively little. However, a more 
precise answer can be given on the basis of material 
flow data. These data are shown for two major econo-
mies in the EU: Germany and the UK.
Material flow data from Germany and the UK show 
a 100% import dependency for a range of raw mate-
rials, such as bauxite, alumina, nickel, copper, lead, 
zinc, tin and iron ores, as there is virtually no domestic 
demand for some of these critical raw materials (graph-
ite, rare earths), prices for 2011 are expected to soar to 
levels far above those before the economic downturn. 
Mining projects are (re)starting production and new 
mining opportunities are being explored worldwide 
(magnesium, fluorspar, cobalt, antimony). Only in the 
case of cobalt is production likely to outpace demand, 
possibly resulting in lower prices.
Rare earth elements75 are widely used in a variety of 
applications that are growing on a global scale, such 
as cell phones, computers, electric and hybrid vehicle 
motors, wind turbines etc. Rare earth elements are rela-
tively plentiful in the earth’s crust;. However, it is difficult 
to find them in sufficient concentration in places where 
they can be profitably mined and processed. China, with 
the most abundant resources in the world, dominates 
the world market and exports the largest amounts of 
rare earth compounds and metals, followed by Austria, 
Japan, Russia and the USA. In recent years, the biggest 
importers of rare earth have been Japan, USA, Ger-
many, France and Austria. Figure 4.13 shows that global 
demand for rare earth is expected to outpace Chinese 
75  Rare earth elements are a collection of 17 chemically similar metallic ele-
ments. The term ‘rare earth’ is a misnomer arising from the rarity of the min-
erals from which they were originally isolated.
Figure 4.12:   Production concentration of critical raw mineral materials, 2006
Source:    Press release by European Commission MEMO/10/263 on 17/06/2010.121
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manufacturing purposes. At the same time, the quan-
tity of waste produced has risen, so the potential to 
use more secondary raw materials as inputs has also 
increased. As the previous section reports, although the 
EU’s global position is relatively modest as a supplier of 
primary raw materials, in terms of secondary raw materi-
als, there is still substantial potential. 
Recycling has often been identified as an important 
component of improved and sustainable resource man-
agement. Together with the development of substitute 
materials, recycling and improved resource manage-
ment may reduce the current global population’s cur-
rent resource footprint, implying a decoupling of eco-
nomic growth and environmental impact. 
As regards the recovery and reuse of raw materials good 
waste management is a crucial point. The EU has seen 
a significant change in waste management in general, 
driven by EU and national legislation77 and supported 
by rising prices for both energy and non-energy raw 
materials. 
Birnstengel and Hoffmeister (2010) estimated that 
in 2006, 23 % of the EU’s total waste stream could be 
77  For example: the setting of targets for recycling, landfill taxes and restrictions 
etc.
extraction that can be used in domestic industries. Ger-
many imports substantially higher shares from inside 
the EU-27 in comparison with the United Kingdom.76
For certain materials, domestic extraction has to be sup-
plemented by imports. In Germany, this is the case for 
marble and granite, chalk and slate. In Germany, domes-
tic extraction fills up the domestic needs for limestone, 
salt, sand and gravel and certain non-metallic minerals, 
while there is an extraction overabundance that can be 
exported for wood and certain clays.
In the UK, however, significant amounts of fertiliser 
materials, wood and biomass are available from domes-
tic sources, though additional imports are needed. 
Domestic extraction meets domestic demand for chalk 
and limestone. Small surpluses can be exported in the 
cases of salt, sand and gravel, certain clays and slate.
4.2.6.  Secondary raw materials and recycling
A substantial increase in world output has boosted 
the demand for raw materials used for industrial and 
76  However, it should be noted that these intra-EU-27 imports may be re-
exports from EU countries. The recorded exports of Germany and the UK of 
these materials are also re-exports.
Figure 4.13:   Supply and demand for rare earths, assuming current trends continue
Source:    Industrial Minerals Cooperation, http://www.industrialmineralscorp.com.au/ accessed on 2nd February 2011.122
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Figure 4.14:   Domestic extraction used, exports and imports as a percentage of domestic material input, 
Germany 2007
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Figure 4.15:   Domestic extraction used, exports and imports as a percentage of domestic material input, 
United Kingdom 2007
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One may conclude that for certain metals and minerals 
there is still substantial untapped potential within the 
EU as a whole for the recovery of non-energy raw mate-
rials.78 Conversely, for other materials such as copper, 
aluminium, lead, zinc as well as ‘other metals’, recovery 
is gradually reaching its full potential.
4.3.  Qualitative analysis results
The following section complements the statistical evi-
dence with qualitative information from expert inter-
views for a selection of industries. They were selected 
through an iterative process, starting with a literature 
review, followed by inquiries among experts for an 
independent view and subsequently discussions with 
industry representatives.79 In this section, the posi-
tions of the selected sectors in the value chain are first 
identified, then the main competitiveness issues with 
respect to raw materials shortages are discussed. Fol-
lowing this, policies related to each sector and the role 
and challenges of the European non-energy extrac-
tive industry are illustrated, since the industry plays an 
78  For recycling rates for metals, various recycling metrics and current estimates 
on global end-of-life recycling rates, recycled content, and old scrap ratios, 
see UNEP (2011).
79  For the list of interviewed persons see References.
recovered as secondary raw materials, amounting to 
675 million tonnes. Somewhat more than half was actu-
ally being recovered for energy and material, leaving 45 
% of the potential still largely unused, mainly dumped 
as landfill or incinerated without energy recovery. Figure 
4.16 indicates the EU’s recycling potential for each of the 
17 identified waste streams for 2006 and projections for 
2020. It is evident that the potential differs across waste 
streams. The biggest potential is found for paper, plas-
tics, bio-waste and wood, but also for iron and for ashes 
and slag. 
To a certain degree, the potential depends inversely 
on the actual EU recovery rate. However, the variance 
across Member States also plays a role. Ceteris paribus, 
the higher the variance, the higher the potential. Figure 
4.17 shows the EU recovery rate per material and the 
range of recovery rates across Member States. One can 
observe that for the major raw materials (rubber and 
tyres, iron and steel, copper, lead, paper and cardboard, 
aluminium, solvents, zinc, glass and ashes) the recov-
ery rates are more than 60 % for the EU as a whole. For 
other metals, plastics and textiles, recovery is still on the 
low side. 
Figure 4.16:   Estimated waste stream recovery potential in the EU in 2006 and 2020
Source:    Birnstengel and Hoffmeister (2010).124
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might have bigger weights in the economy, it is char-
acteristic for EU economies that these activities account 
for relatively small shares in overall GDP.
In order to present a picture closer to the situation of 
the EU-27 and to the selected sectors discussed later, 
Figure 4.19 shows the % share in GDP for the EU-27 as 
a whole. In general, one can observe a similar pattern 
for the EU-27 as for its largest economy, in terms of rela-
tive position. Yet there are a few important differences. 
The German economy has relatively higher shares for 
most of the selected sectors. The share of machinery and 
equipment is much lower for the EU as a whole than for 
its main economy. Based on the economic importance 
of the manufacturing sectors and their high raw mate-
rial intensity, the impacts of shortages of raw materials 
on the steel, non-ferrous metal, automotive, chemical as 
well as paper and pulp industries will be investigated in 
the next section.
increasing role in reducing dependency on imports of 
raw materials.
4.3.1.  Interrelation of the selected industries in the 
value chain
An important aspect is the interrelation of the raw mate-
rial intensive industries and the way in which raw mate-
rials risks and consequences pass through the value 
chain. To give an example, the Figure 4.18 for Germany 
presents the share of the selected industries to GDP and 
their position in the value chain. The latter is calculated 
as the percentage of output produced for final use.80 
An important observation is that industries higher up 
in the value chain contribute to a larger degree to the 
economy’s GDP. While in certain EU Member States such 
as Sweden, metal ores and other mining and quarrying 
80  Since no input-output table is available for the whole of the EU-27 (or even 
part of it) the results for the largest industrialised economy are presented.
Figure 4.17:   Average recycling rates for the EU-27 by waste stream in 2006
Note:    the yellow whisker plots indicate the ranges over the Member States. The green bars indicate recovery rates for the EU-27 as 
a whole.
Source:    Birnstengel and Hoffmeister (2010), p. 4.125
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Figure 4.18:   Location of the selected industries in the value chain – Germany 2007
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Figure 4.19:   Share of selected industries in the EU-27 GDP, 2006
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domestic and international prices provides an artificial 
cost advantage for domestic consumers82.
Third, Europe faces a competitive disadvantage in terms 
of transport and trade costs for raw materials whose 
sources are concentrated in other continents, e.g. in 
Asia, Africa or South America.
Finally, the oligopolistic nature of production for many 
raw materials, as well as changing contract terms, also 
affects prices. Due to the relatively strong bargain-
ing position of suppliers, the duration of contracts has 
been switched from long-term to short term, and nego-
tiations take place more frequently. This leads to price 
volatility, and in many cases, price increases.
All of these dimensions may raise production costs 
directly or indirectly. When this increase is not equalled 
in other regions of the world, Europe’s competitive 
position deteriorates. The more raw material-intensive 
an industry is, the stronger the effects on competitive-
ness are likely to be. The impacts of issues concerning 
raw materials can differ depending on their place in 
the value chain. Process industries such as non-ferrous 
metal industry are directly affected, while industries 
active further down the value chain, such as the car 
industry, undergo knock-on effects from the same raw 
material issues. The market structure and power rela-
tions between industries along the value chain deter-
mine the extent to which a shortage of raw materials is 
transmitted to downstream industries and, ultimately, to 
the final consumer. Below, selected sectors are given as 
examples to illustrate the related cost competitiveness 
effects.
•	 Steel industry
As one of the key sectors in the EU, the steel industry 
is a good example to illustrate the channels through 
which prices for the main input material for production 
have been escalating for the main input material. This 
puts additional competitive pressure on producers if 
costs to downstream industries and consumers can not 
be passed on. Rising costs for raw material in this sec-
tor stem from different sources such as the oligopolistic 
structure of the iron ore market, trade costs and unfair 
trade conditions.
The steel sector is very dependent on the supply of raw 
materials. In 2010, costs of raw materials accounted for 
roughly 70% of total costs, and iron ore83 for more than 
40%. Even though the EU produces iron ore, a significant 
portion of iron ore needs (84%) is imported from over-
seas. Accordingly, costs of raw material have a consid-
82  OECD (2010a).
83  Iron ore is the main input for steel industry. Other important raw materials 
used in steel production are coal, coke.
4.3.2.  Raw materials insufficiency and related 
competitiveness issues
The competitiveness effects of non-energy raw materi-
als on the selected European industries are illustrated 
in this section. Two main competitiveness issues can be 
identified in terms of raw materials shortages. The first 
concerns cost competitiveness effects on essential raw 
material inputs for production, stemming from different 
sources, such as increasing global demand, trade restric-
tions, transportation costs etc. The second issue con-
cerns the solutions and strategies that industries tend 
to adopt to tackle the relative shortage of raw materials, 
including increasing material efficiency, using recycled 
and substitute materials, as well as choosing various 
organisational strategies. Finally, the policy implications 
relevant to each industry are presented.
4.3.2.1.  Cost competitiveness effects
The input effects resulting from shortages of raw materi-
als differ across industries, not only in terms of subject, 
but also in terms of weight. The price increase in glob-
ally-traded raw materials has hit most industries, rang-
ing from steel and non-ferrous metals, to sectors such as 
car manufacturing. There are several reasons for rising 
input costs for raw materials. Those most important for 
the sectors selected will be illustrated here.
First, prices for most raw materials have been escalat-
ing over the last decade (see section 4.2.2). Prices of 
raw materials depend mainly on the time lag with 
which supply follows demand. Increasing demand from 
emerging countries has been a major factor accounting 
for the rise in prices. Clearly, these lagged adjustments 
have an important effect on price levels and there 
volatility.
Second, besides supply scarcity and adjustments, sup-
ply concentration is also a factor in determining prices. 
A large share of many raw materials is concentrated 
in a small number of countries, which often apply 
export restriction measures.81 Export restrictions lead 
to a decrease in export volumes, thus affecting global 
competition and supply chains. Export restrictions con-
tribute to pushing up international raw material prices 
due to curbs on supply to the global market, while 
domestic consumers of raw materials enjoy lower input 
costs for production. Certain countries often support 
their domestic industries by offering them lower prices 
for raw materials (and energy). So the gap between 
81  According to WTO, export restrictions are “a border measure that takes the 
form of a government law or regulation which expressly limits the quantity 
of exports or places explicit conditions on the circumstances under which 
exports are permitted, or that takes the form of a government-imposed fee 
or tax on exports of the products calculated to limit the quantity of exports.”127
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countries can range from between 5-20% for iron ore 
and 10-35% for scrap, pushing up international prices 
significantly. Additionally, emerging countries produc-
ing steel are also imposing export restrictions on the 
export of scrap, giving an unfair cost advantage to the 
local industry.
The combination of the above factors, basically pushed 
by the increasing demand from industrialising econo-
mies, has resulted in serious price increases for both iron 
ore and scrap. The cost structure of steel production has 
gone through a significant change. In 2005, the cost of 
iron ore in the production process for Western Europe 
accounted for slightly above 20% against an estimated 
40% in 2010.88 The extra costs and risks (because of diffi-
cult planning and hedging) are also problematic for the 
steel industry’s customers, as costs are passed on down 
the supply chain as far as possible.
•	 Non-ferrous metals industry
The non-ferrous metals89 industry can be character-
ised by competitiveness issues similar to those the 
steel industry faces. Trade restrictions and subsidies 
are often applied by countries producing raw materi-
als. The industry incorporates a range of activities along 
the value chain, including mining, smelting, recycling 
and refinery upstream, and second processing and fab-
rication intermediaries further downstream. The prod-
ucts of the industry, non-ferrous metals, are important 
inputs for a range of economic activities, such as trans-
port, mechanical engineering, aerospace, construction, 
packaging, electricity and energy, consumer electronics, 
medical devices etc.
The inputs needed by the non-ferrous metal sec-
tor include virgin metal ores and concentrates and 
recyclates. The European non-ferrous metal industry 
is highly dependent on the imports of these metals, 
including ores, concentrates and refined metals and 
scrap. Raw material costs can range from 49% to 85% of 
total production costs in the industry, depending on the 
subsectors and type of products. The balance of supply 
and demand determines the price of the metals on the 
exchanges.
The non-ferrous metal industry, like the steel industry 
is very often targeted by trade distortion measures, 
in the form of export restrictions, trade subsidies and 
state support in non-EU countries.90 These measures, 
coupled with increasing global demand, have resulted 
in prices hikes and volatility on the global market. They 
result in relatively higher input costs and higher levels of 
88  AT Kearney (2010).
89  Non-ferrous metals cover common metals (mainly aluminium, copper, zinc, 
lead, nickel and tin) and precious metals (gold, silver, platinum, and palla-
dium) and minor metals (e.g. tungsten, tantalum, cobalt, and germanium).
90  Ecorys (2011a).
erable impact on profitability and strategic investment 
decisions.
Following a strong increase in market concentration 
over the last decade, three big suppliers84 control the 
market for the supply of iron ore. Over a third of the 
world supply of iron ore and 67% of world seaborne iron 
ore are concentrated in the hands of these three major 
exporters. One of the consequences of this oligopolistic 
structure is that iron ore prices have outpaced mining 
costs significantly. Prices for iron ore are now about four 
times the cost of production (about USD 30.00/tonne) 
at main mines85. Producers’ market power has increased 
significantly, resulting for example in the introduction of 
short-term contracts which transfer the price hikes, and 
associated risks, more easily further downstream in the 
supply chain. Since 2010, after a tradition that lasted 40 
years, contract prices are set on a quarterly basis, reflect-
ing a switch of power from the steel industry to the min-
ing industry. As well as higher prices, the steel industry 
also faces price uncertainty. This affects the its ability 
companies to hedge against the risk of higher prices 
in future make forward-looking business plans, more 
generally.
As prices of iron ore are set globally, increased input 
prices would not necessarily create an advantage for 
countries with better access to iron ore. However, pro-
ducers in regions with abundant reserves usually enjoy 
a strategic cost advantage over steel producers that 
need to import iron ore from abroad. The cost of raw 
materials in production has been highest for Western 
Europe, while Russia, India, South Africa and Brazil are 
among the most competitive steel producers in the 
world, partly due to local access to iron ore resulting in 
lower raw material costs.86
The competitiveness of the European steel industry is 
also affected by high transport costs for imported iron 
ore and other raw materials. According to Eurofer87, 
transport costs represent up to 15% of the production 
costs. It is clear that countries with better access to raw 
materials have a competitive advantage because of 
lower transport costs. 
Export restrictions are partly responsible for the lim-
ited supply of iron ore available or for higher prices on 
the global market. The forms of export restriction most 
often applied are export taxes and quotas, which have 
contributed to raising international prices for iron ore 
and scrap. Export taxes imposed mainly by emerging 
84  Rio Tinto, BHP and Vale.
85  Oxford Analytica (2011).
86  Russia has benefited from material cost advantages from all fronts, due to 
abundance of iron ore, coal/coke, scrap and energy. (SteelConsult Interna-
tional (2005)).
87  European Confederation of Iron and Steel Industries http://www.eurofer.org/
index.php/eng/Issues-Positions/Transport, accessed on 14.07.2011.128
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•	 Chemicals industry
The competitiveness of the European chemicals indus-
try is affected by rising prices for raw materials, and 
the emergence of newcomers better placed to benefit 
from control of advantaged feedstocks. The European 
chemicals industry is a significant supplier to other sec-
tors and its competitiveness is highly dependent on 
imported raw materials, as these costs account for some 
34% of manufacturing costs, while energy accounts for 
2%. Oil and gas are the main inputs for the industry, so 
new players from oil-and gas- producing countries and 
emerging economies, especially China and India create 
challenges for the European chemical industry. The Mid-
dle East increasingly uses its favourable feedstock avail-
ability to develop its own integrated chemicals produc-
tion chain, thereby strengthening its position in a wider 
range of basic petrochemicals. The European chemicals 
industry is gearing up to face the emergence of com-
panies in the Middle East and Asia, where proximity of 
feedstock is considered is an advantage for chemicals 
producers, while developed countries try to leverage 
their traditional strength in technology and expertise.94
Trade barriers and unfair trade practices imposed by 
non-EU countries such as export restrictions, export 
taxes for ethylene feedstock, gas, palm oil, and key min-
erals (e.g. fluorspar), also create a substantial burden for 
the European chemicals industry.95
•	 Pulp and paper industry 
The pulp and paper industry also faces challenges stem-
ming from a shortage of raw materials, even though 
wood, the primary raw material for the industry, is 
widely available in Europe, especially in Finland and 
Sweden. The competition for raw materials in this sec-
tor is not primarily due to non-EU countries protecting 
their resources nor to the depletion of the materials. 
For wood, the challenge is due to the bio-energy indus-
try competing for access to the material, facilitated by 
European environmental regulations, and by the diffi-
cult mobilisation of wood due to the small ownership 
structure of forests, biodiversity protection and varying 
efficiency levels in Member States’ action plans. Further-
more, the rise in exports of recovered paper to non-EU 
countries creates an additional pressure on the indus-
try. Industry representatives estimate that the supply of 
wood will not be able to meet demand for both indus-
tries (biomass and paper) at current rates.96
Raw materials consumption in the last two decades 
went through a significant change in the European pulp 
94  KPMG (2011).
95  Cefic (The European Chemical Industry Council) http://www.cefic.org/Policy-
Centre/Industry-Policy/Access-to-Raw-Materials/, accessed on 05.07.2011.
96  Mantau U. et al. (2008).
uncertainty for the European non-ferrous metal indus-
try. Several metal-producing countries, such as China, 
Russia, and Ukraine have applied trade restrictions on 
exports of many non-ferrous metals and their scrap, 
such as aluminium, copper, nickel and tungsten91. Export 
quotas and bans reduced export VAT rebates have often 
been placed on these materials. Export taxes on them 
typically range between 5 and 30%, depending on the 
producing country and the type of raw material.
One of the most debated trade restriction issues has 
recently been the export quotas, export taxes and VAT 
refund imposed on rare earth exports from China. Rare 
earths are not non-ferrous metals, though they are 
sometimes used as inputs for non-ferrous metal produc-
tion. World prices in these raw materials are currently 
typically 20-40% higher than Chinese domestic prices.92
In addition, indirect or direct subsidies, such as provid-
ing access to lower-cost energy for export-oriented 
smelters, or stimulus packages, ensure competitiveness 
advantages for the raw material producing countries, 
notably Russia and China.
•	 Automotive industry
The automotive industry, as a downstream industry, 
feels the indirect effects of limited access to raw mate-
rials. Due to rising raw material input costs in the steel 
and non-ferrous metals industry, it faces serious chal-
lenges, since cars are complex products consisting 
largely of steel, non-ferrous metals, as well as polymers, 
rubber and glass. The industry is also affected by the 
risk associated with the use of critical raw materials. As 
a result of the future developments in car-design, the 
demand for critical raw materials is expected to increase. 
Environmental standards and requirements and cus-
tomer convenience play an especially crucial role here. 
According to the European Automobile Manufacturers 
Association (2010), the demand for rare earths and lith-
ium will rise, due to more use of advanced electronics, 
magnetic materials, new surface treatment systems and 
alternative propulsion technologies. 
Rising prices of raw materials may have a significant 
negative impact on the materials input costs of the sec-
tor, so customers are expected to face higher prices for 
end-products. A study on resource productivity93 points 
out that if the prices of more raw materials inputs used 
in the car production go up, the product price for the 
final customer would also go up significantly.
91  European Commission (2008a).
92  OECD (2010d).
93  European Commission (2007a).129
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competitiveness of European manufacturing industries. 
All of these dimensions are supported by the European 
Commission through initiatives such as the Factories of 
the Future Research Programme, Sustainable Process 
Industry Public Private Partnership, and European Green 
Cars Initiative, etc.
Insufficient supply and rising prices of materials force 
companies to invest in more efficient modes of pro-
duction, which can reduce waste. Another increasingly 
used method, recycling has often been identified as an 
important component of a better, sustainable resource 
management. The European recycling industry is the 
most competitive in international comparison. There 
is considerable potential to increase the share of recy-
clates in European manufacturing sectors. However in 
the sectors selected, the use of secondary raw materials 
is relatively high compared to third countries. Recycled 
and recovered material has also been widely used in 
the EU steel industry, car manufacturing, and pulp and 
paper. The chemicals industry is different in the sense 
that the recovered and recycled chemicals and espe-
cially polymers (plastics) cannot be used to replace vir-
gin raw materials. Focusing more on R&D efforts, substi-
tute/alternative materials are being increasingly used in 
some downstream industries.
Various organisational strategies can ensure the supply 
of sufficient raw materials. These include integration 
along the value chain, relocation of production or out-
sourcing. The most common examples will be illustrated 
in the relevant sectors.
Below, these different responses to shortages of the raw 
materials are discussed in more detail.
•	 Steel industry
Resource efficiency and increased use of scrap could be 
a solution for problems arising from supply of raw mate-
rials for the steel industry. Steel is 100% recyclable Due 
to the long life of steel products, approximately 45% 
of steel produced in the EU comes from steel scrap. In 
comparison, Chinese recycled scrap steel accounts for 
only 8% of total steel production, while for the U.S., the 
total is 33%.99. Increasing use of scrap steel in the sector 
makes it possible to reduce dependency on imported 
iron ore and contributes to sustainable production. 
However, the steel industry has to contend with the 
increasing export of scrap from the EU-27, while non-
EU countries impose export restrictions on it. According 
to the criteria of the “End of Waste Regulation”, scrap 
metal is treated as a waste product, so there are no 
export restrictions. EU-27 exports of ferrous waste and 
scrap more than doubled during the last decade, gen-
99  Ecorys (2011b).
and paper industry. Use of wood pulp decreased more 
than 10 percentage points during this period, and was 
practically replaced by the use of recovered paper. In 
2009 some 88% of wood came from EU sources (plus 
Norway and Switzerland), the remainder originating 
mainly from Russia. CEPI sees a gap of more than 200 
million m3 between supply and demand of wood by 
2020 due to an increase both in traditional demand (e.g. 
paper and construction) and non-traditional demand 
(bio-energy).
4.3.2.2.  Responses to shortages of raw material at industry 
level
Companies in different sectors have developed various 
strategies to reduce import dependency and to mitigate 
the costs and risks related to shortages of raw materials. 
These include more efficient use of materials, increased 
use of recovered and recycled raw materials, and use of 
substitute/alternative materials as well as organisational 
strategies such as outsourcing or relocation of the pro-
duction process. From the long-term sustainability point 
of view, the first group of solutions are beneficial, while 
the others may have rather negative effects on Europe-
an’s growth and employment.
Resource efficiency, including raw material efficiency, 
is one of the most important challenges for European 
industry. Sustainable production has become an inte-
grated part of EU industries’ competitiveness strategy, 
albeit to various degrees, depending on the technologi-
cal possibilities and the markets in which the industries 
are operating (see Chapter 5).
Improving material efficiency is a constant objective 
for companies, since it leads to cost reduction and 
increased competitiveness. Material efficiency can be 
improved in the four main steps of product manufac-
turing, i.e. production of raw materials (e.g. exploration 
and extraction of raw materials); product manufacturing 
(streamlining different stages of production, using new 
production methods); use; and end-of-life97.
Use of recycled materials can contribute to reducing 
dependency on primary raw materials, depending on 
the sector and products. Many raw materials in process 
industries can be replaced by others. This is especially 
important for critical raw materials, where abundant 
materials can be a substitute for potentially scarce and 
critical ones (e.g. indium for zinc).98 Minimising losses 
of raw material, increasing the use of recycled and 
recovered materials, and substitute/alternative mate-
rials are of key importance in reducing primary raw 
material import dependency, thereby improving the 
97  European Commission (2010a) p.52.
98  European Commission (2010a).130
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•	 Non-ferrous metal industry 
Non-ferrous metals are infinitely recyclable. However, 
primary resources are essential to cover total demand 
and produce high-quality products. Recovery and recy-
cling rates within the EU are among the highest in the 
world. Secondary raw material use in the sector has 
increased substantially. The two main sources of non-
ferrous metal scrap for recycling are industrial waste 
streams and end-of-life scrap. While industrial waste is 
used efficiently, as regards the latter there is still much 
potential to increase use of end-life scrap. Regarding the 
most important raw materials in this industry, more than 
70% of EU refined lead production stems from scrap 
metal, along with, nearly 60% of aluminium and over 
40% of refined copper.
Recycling of scrap metal is essential to maintain the 
competitiveness of the EU non-ferrous metal indus-
try. However valuable resources have been shipped to 
developing and emerging countries. This is one of the 
biggest problems the sector is facing. For example the 
EU has lost a significant amount of its own copper scrap 
resources, almost 1.2 million tonnes in 2009, of which 
nearly 80% has ended up in China. Rising demand for 
aluminium scrap is even more striking. In 2000, the 
EU was a small net importer, while in 2009, more than 
1.1 million tonnes of aluminium scrap were exported. It 
is thus important to improve the Waste Shipment Regu-
lation to reduce exports of non-ferrous scrap metal, par-
ticularly aluminium and copper.
R&D and innovation have an important role in improv-
ing material efficiency, developing new production 
processes and substitutions in the non-ferrous metal 
industry. The industry is constantly looking for cheaper 
substitutes with the same or better qualities than the 
originals. The European Aluminium Technology Plat-
form, set up in 2005, is a key tool to ensure cost, eco- 
and material efficiency to support the competitiveness 
and sustainability of the largest subsector in the non-
ferrous metal industry.
•	 Automotive industry
Since cars consist of numerous different parts, the auto-
motive industry is one of the best examples to illustrate 
how soaring prices for raw material, along with lack of 
supplies and environmental regulations, have led to 
more efficiency and more use of non-primary raw mate-
rials. Resource-efficient technologies and the use of 
recyclates and substitutes are the two main strategies 
the automotive industry is deploying to reduce depend-
ency on raw materials.
The industry is one of the most innovative sectors in 
Europe. According to ACEA, the sector spent more than 
EUR 26 billion or 5% of their turnover on R&D in 2009 
erating a significant loss of resources for the European 
steel industry.
There are several initiatives to increase resource effi-
ciency (including material efficiency) in the steel indus-
try. The European Steel Technology Platform (ESTEP), 
which brings together research and other institutions, 
the European Commission and Member States, was 
set up with the aim to give new impetus to European 
research into materials and processes. One of the aims 
of the ESTEP Research Agenda is to ensure more sustain-
able and profitable steel production in Europe through 
innovation and new technologies.
New production methods with electric arc furnaces 
(EAF) can use up to 100% scrap as input for steel. How-
ever, as scrap is scarce, partly due to European exports, 
its use is still quite low and the possibility of boosting 
the amount of steel produced with EAFs is limited. At 
present, research is being carried out into making use 
of secondary powder material (resulting from primary 
steel making) as a raw material alternative in EAF steel-
making. The breakthrough technology project of the 
steel sector (ULCOS) receives funding from Research 
Fund for Coal and Steel (RFCS) and the EU 6th framework 
programme.
Regarding organisational strategies to mitigate the 
effects of the oligopoly in the iron ore market, vertical 
integration is a possibility for steel makers to help tackle 
raw material scarcity. Traditionally, control over min-
ing activities has often been led by smelters, and there 
appears to be a trend towards higher levels of vertical 
downstream integration between the mining and refin-
ing stages of production.100 Backward vertical integra-
tion, investing in new mines or buying up existing ones, 
is often observed in the steel industry outside the EU as 
a strategy to ensure better access to raw materials and 
lower transaction costs.101 Chinese steel companies, for 
instance, have been actively investing abroad in iron ore 
mining to secure supplies.102 This international presence 
is increasingly facilitated by state support. But EU-based 
producers have also started to take initiatives for vertical 
integration, e.g. Arcelor-Mittal, the world’s leading steel 
company, has secured in-house supply of almost half 
the company’s iron-ore needs. For the EU steel indus-
try, it is strategically important to ensure future access 
to raw materials through increasing vertical integration 
through acquisitions, mergers and joint ventures/part-
nerships. However, this option is possible only for global 
players with the financial resources and the geological 
expertise to make such investments. 
100  UNCTAD (2007).
101  Ecorys (2008).
102  According to the National Bureau of Statistics of China, at the end of 2008 
Chinese outward FDI in the mining sector (including other than iron ore min-
ing as well) accounted for 12% of its total overseas FDI stock.131
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The recycling of scrap cars is of key importance, which is 
adequately regulated by the End-of-Life Vehicle Direc-
tive.104 The Directive on Reusability, Recyclability and 
Recoverability of motor vehicles105set new requirements 
for vehicle recycling. In 2008 total reuse, recovery and 
recycling rates varied between 79.8-92.9% in the Mem-
ber States, with Germany having the highest rate in 
Europe.
A technical approach to finding substitutions is at the 
core of the automobile manufacturing industry’s R&D 
agenda.106 ACEA estimates that the first significant 
volumes for recycling of electrical vehicles, which con-
tain rare earths, cobalt and lithium, will come around 
2025-2030 at the earliest. Demand for these materials 
is expected to boom around 2015-2020, so the indus-
try hopes to have a new generation of batteries based 
on other materials by 2025-2030. To meet environmen-
tal, safety and price demands, the use of light, smart 
and innovative materials, such as composites, and the 
104  ELV Directive 2000/53/EC, for an assessment of the ELV Directive see Chapter 
5, Box 4.4.
105  Directive 2005/64/EC on the type-approval of motor vehicles with regard to 
their reusability, recyclability and recoverability and amending Council Direc-
tive 70/156/EEC.
106  The automotive industry is a prime sector in driving new technological devel-
opments. Because of its high R&D expenses, this industry is determining the 
directions of research in several area’s’, see Fraunhofer ISI (2003).
and accounted for more than 50% of the global patent 
applications in the automotive sector. The industry files 
around 6,300 new patents each year in the following 
fields: materials technology, recycling, ICT and telem-
atics, energy and fuels, drive-train development, aero-
dynamics and ergonomics. German auto manufactur-
ers, a vital part of the European automotive industry, 
spent almost 10% of their total turnover on innovation 
purposes in 2009. Most of this was spent on improving 
product quality and developing new technological solu-
tions. According to statistics, only 6.8% of the expendi-
tures on innovation led to cost reduction103.
Resource-efficient technologies are increasingly being 
used in the automotive industry. Thanks to efforts by 
manufacturers to reduce waste in the period between 
2005 and 2009 the total waste per unit produced 
(excluding scrap metal) went down by 9.9% (see Figure 
4.20). The total waste in the sector decreased, by 22.6% 
over the same period.
103  ZEW (2011a).
Figure 4.20:   Waste: excluding scrap metal
Note:    Data refer to passenger cars.
Source:   ACEA,  2009.132
European Competitiveness Report 2011
As regards organisational strategies responding to raw 
material challenges, outsourcing of manufacturing cars 
or car parts can be seen as an option to secure access 
to raw materials. This concerns not only rare-earths, but 
also aluminium where China has recently turned from net 
exporter to net importer.108 Setting up part of the produc-
tion in China and South-East Asia may enable access to 
raw materials at better prices. The European car manu-
facturers have increased production capacities in these 
emerging countries, which could enable access to input 
materials at a lower cost by avoiding export restrictions.
•	 Chemicals industry
Decreasing availability of raw material and increasing 
prices require raw materials efficiency in the chemical 
industry too. From economic and sustainability reasons, 
a decrease in raw material intensity is unavoidable.109 
R&D and innovation play a significant role. In general, 
the chemical sector is the most innovative industry. Its 
share of all EU manufacturing patent applications was 
16% in 2007.
108  McKinsey&Company (2004).
109  In Germany, for example, raw material intensity in the chemical industry 
decreased by 26% between 1994 and 2007, and a target was set to reduce it 
by a further 32% by 2020.
efficient use of high value-added metals will be inevita-
ble in car manufacturing. Research activity focuses on 
materials such as carbon fibres, natural/glass fibres, high 
strength steel/aluminium, magnesium technologies, 
and hybrid materials.107
The European automotive industry is involved in a wide 
range of collaborative European research and develop-
ment projects. The European Council for Automotive 
R&D (EUCAR) plays an important role and provides auto-
motive manufacturers with a platform for identifying 
common pre-competitive European R&D. Some innova-
tive projects in the field of materials and manufacturing 
are worth mentioning, see Box 4.1.
However, from a general sector perspective, current 
critical raw materials might be substituted for various 
raw materials before they can be recycled. Yet the same 
materials might be in great demand for applications 
in other industries, which will then definitely require 
adequate recycling technologies as a valuable option to 
sustain future access to critical raw materials.
107  Ecorys (2011b).
Box 4.1: EUCAR Projects in the field of materials and manufacturing
Multi-level protection of materials for vehicles by smart nanocontainers The aim of the project is to develop new 
active multi-level protective systems for future vehicle materials. A multi-level self-healing approach will combine 
several damage prevention and reparation mechanisms within one system. These will be activated depending on 
the type and intensity of the environmental impact. 
Multi-functional materials and related production technologies integrated into future industries: This project, 
which closed last year, aimed to introduce new materials and processes, to reduce cost and development time 
and increase customisation possibilities. The following achievements have been reported:
•	 weight reduction of 18% through flange reduction for laser welding of mass flow meter (MFMs);
•	 single part roof bow by stretch bending to achieve scability and re-use;
•	 44% increase of MFMs utilisation rate;
•	 2.7 kg weight reduction with nano-composites for the rear spare wheel well;
•	 20% increase of frontal passive safety through integration of APM foam into rails
MyCar Project enables an ultimate degree of customisation, which could allow every customer to purchase 
a unique vehicle. The project will further develop and integrate technologies that enable the vehicle assembly pro-
cess to become self-adaptive to any kind of market variation, capable of producing cars with an extended degree 
of personalisation. MyCar aspires to integrate the customer into the automotive industry’s assembly processes.
Adaptive Control for Metal Cutting project: This project aims to develop a generic modular adaptive control plat-
form that will allow metal cutting processes to respond to changing circumstances. The main goals are: 
•	 Robust production processes by optimizing the performance of machining processes;
•	 Reconfigurable production enabled at process level;
•	 Development of Adaptive Machining Systems for difficult metal cutting operations;
•	 Achievement of an online quality control system for mass customisation and small batch production.
Source:   EUCAR, http://www.eucar.be/projects-and-working-groups/projects-and-working-groups, accessed on 06.07.2011.133
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68.9% in 2010114 and has risen substantially over the last 
15 years. Recycling is thus relatively high in Europe com-
pared to third countries (see Figure 4.21). Today, recov-
ered paper accounts for 44% of total raw materials used 
in papermaking. This means a rise of over 16 percentage 
points, as compared to 2000. However, as is the case for 
scrap metal, paper recovered in Europe is increasingly 
exported, notably to China, where demand for pulp and 
recovered paper has been growing and the industry 
is subsidised. About 20% of the recovered papers go 
outside Europe per year, creating a significant loss for 
the European industry. The industry plans to increase 
the use of the recycled inputs within Europe instead of 
exporting these for use in the rest of the world.
Further improvement is now sought in the eco-design of 
end products to improve the efficiency of the recycling 
process. The Forest Based Sector Technology Platform 
was set up to assist the forest-based sector, including 
the pulp and paper industry and its shareholders in ful-
filling their future research, development and innova-
tion needs. For example, new technologies are being 
developed to improve the material and energy effi-
ciency of recycling operations.
4.3.2.3.  Policy implications at industry level
The selected European industries are facing serious 
competitiveness challenges due to raw materials scar-
city. They are affected by the distorted global raw mate-
rials market and/or by EU legislation and policy.
As regards the steel industry, challenges for European 
policy in the near future are to make the structure of 
iron ore supply more competitive, eliminate trade dis-
tortions in the supply of raw materials, and create break-
through technologies towards low-carbon production. 
It is important that competition policy, including merger 
control, continue to be enforced in the iron ore supply 
market where the degree of concentration is already 
high. Continuing negotiations with resource-rich coun-
tries in FTA and WTO may lead to a more balanced trade 
situation. Furthermore, the EU should continue to pro-
mote recycling and to address obstacles to the devel-
opment of recycling industries. Finally, it is advisable to 
continue and strengthen the support for investments in 
research through e.g. RFCS, Research Framework Pro-
gramme or other funding instruments.
One of the two main issues considered as important for 
the non-ferrous metal sector is the quality of recycling, 
in terms of the processes to ensure optimum output. 
Despite increased recycling, another issue for the sector 
is access to primary materials (ores and concentrates) so 
114  Recovered Paper Council (2011).
The industry is largely based on oil and natural gas, but 
due to material and cost efficiency concerns, the share 
of renewable raw materials110 used in the manufactur-
ing process has increased substantially. A broader use 
of renewable raw materials also contributes to reduce 
environmental impacts of the use of fossil fuels. How-
ever, using renewable raw materials means a challenge 
as regards competition for land use, due to increasing 
demand worldwide for biomass, food, fodder and bioen-
ergy.111 The chemical industry was estimated to account 
for around 8% of total feedstock use in the industry. 
There is still significant potential to increase the share of 
renewable raw materials in the medium and long term. 
Nonetheless, this process is dependent on develop-
ments regarding the overall availability of these renew-
able raw materials and the degree of economic viabil-
ity of new production technologies. New processes in 
the industry, such as chemical leasing (see Chapter 5) 
or other new materials, such as CO2 and other uncon-
ventional carbon sources open up new possibilities for 
the sustainable production of fine chemicals.112 Further-
more, the European Technology Platform for Sustain-
able Chemistry supports chemistry biotechnology and 
chemical engineering R&D and innovation in Europe.
As regards organisational strategies the chemical indus-
try can provide interesting examples. Resource-seeking 
FDI, securing raw material inputs at lower costs (though 
often coupled with other investment motives) is often 
applied by raw material intensive industries. Constraints 
for the further development of the chemical industry in 
Europe include existing trade barriers and unfair trade 
practices. These barriers may in certain cases prompt the 
relocation of activities from Europe to other parts of the 
world. This strategy provides access to materials under 
similar economic conditions to those enjoyed by he 
main global competitors.113 Obviously relocation can be 
profitable for companies, yet is sub-optimal from a Euro-
pean growth and job perspective.
•	 Pulp and paper industry
Raw materials efficiency is one of the key drivers for the 
competitiveness of the EU paper and pulp industry. The 
European paper industry is the leader in collection, sort-
ing and recycling of paper. The industry’s recycling was 
110  Plant, animal and microbial biomass which are based on the photosynthetic 
primary production and are used by man outside the food and feed area for 
material or energy consumption. These include materials such as plant oils, 
animal fats, sugar, cellulose fibres, wood etc. (ETC/SCP 2010).
111  ETC/SCP (2010).
112  For instance, the FP7 NMP Work programme 2012 provides sources for 
research on production of fine chemicals from CO2 directly or indirectly.
113  For instance, due to current high import duties on bio-ethanol, the chemi-
cal industry finds it less expensive to produce bio-ethanol based chemical 
products outside Europe (e.g. Brazil) and export them to Europe with lower 
import duties due to the tariff harmonization agreement concluded in the 
Uruguay Round, even though bio-ethanol is the most important production 
cost factor.134
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promotion of general WTO rules to address trade prob-
lems related to the discriminatory supply of raw materi-
als. At bilateral level, the EU should continue to address 
the issues of unfair trade practices that cause imbalances 
in access to raw materials and world markets. It is desir-
able to continue to support the R&D, innovation and the 
further expansion of infrastructure in order to maintain 
and promote the technological advantage of the Euro-
pean chemicals industry. In particular support should 
go in particular towards increasing energy and resource 
efficiency, reducing CO2 emissions and expanding the 
use of renewables. Although it is too early to envisage 
considerable substitution of fossil-based feedstock by 
renewables, it is desirable to support market develop-
ments towards renewable raw materials with the focus 
on the sustainability of the markets for both inputs and 
outputs. Steps should be taken to define standards and 
criteria for products, including sustainability criteria.
Given the competing use of wood and land by other 
industries and for other purposes, it is advisable to 
stimulate integrated and prioritised land use policies at 
Member States level. At EU level, a balanced approach 
embracing different policy themes (waste, recycling, 
competitiveness and trade, raw materials and man-
agement of natural resources) should be considered in 
order to prioritise on objectives where overlaps occur 
that can respond to increasing demand and provide the 
required quality. For recycling, turnover time plays an 
important role. Policies that promote the collection and 
treatment of scrap and end-of-life goods are welcomed 
in this respect.
In a complex industry such as car manufacturing, the com-
petitiveness issues are driven by a number of different 
factors. In the short term a greater and more immediate 
effect can be achieved by policies to stimulate, increased 
resource efficiency by improving production organisation 
and by promoting equal opportunity access to critical raw 
materials on international markets. Depending on the 
effectiveness of negotiations, trade policy can bear fruit 
as well in the relatively short term. In the long term the 
competitive position of European car manufacturing can 
best be promoted by supporting research and develop-
ment efforts to achieve more extensive and more effective 
use of substitutes for critical raw materials and a greater 
general material efficiency in general. Policies promoting 
the recycling of critical raw materials can achieve a posi-
tive impact not only in terms of import substitution but 
also in terms of improving energy efficiency and limiting 
the environmental impact of the industry.
The EU chemical industry would benefit from further 
global tariffs dismantling and continued support and 
Figure 4.21:   European paper recycling
Source:    Adapted from European Recovered Paper Council, Monitoring Report 2010, accessed on 29.06.2011.135
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A number of concerns regarding the competitiveness 
of the non-energy extractive industry are emphasised 
by the industry and the European Commission.118 These 
issues include the need for a more detailed and sys-
tematic monitoring of raw materials in Europe. Geo-
logical surveys are carried out at Member State level, 
yet mutual consistency, as well as the introduction of 
advanced techniques at EU level, such as GMES,119 are 
essential for prioritising and defining further actions 
and would facilitate a co-ordinated joint knowledge 
base. Another challenge is the competing land use, 
mostly related to stringent environmental regulations, 
such as Natura 2000. Start-up costs are relatively higher 
compared to non-EU countries, due to relatively higher 
insurance requirements, more administrative regula-
tions, and administrative fragmentation. The industry 
indicated that the EU financial sector is less inclined to 
invest in mining projects than counterparts in e.g. the 
U.S., Australia and Canada, where more financial exper-
tise and capital is available.
4.3.3.2.  The role of innovation in the future of the non-energy 
extractive industry
The non-energy extractive industry has viewed inno-
vation in resource-efficient and sustainable produc-
tion technologies as an important driver for its future 
competitiveness in Europe. There have already been 
important policy initiatives have already been taken 
such as the European Technology Platform on Sustain-
able Mineral Resources, which aims to modernise and 
reshape the European mineral industry to secure the 
future supply of/access to raw materials. It plans to do 
this by supporting the revival of exploration of Europe’s 
mineral potential; developing innovative and sustain-
able production technologies; implementing best prac-
tices; reuse, recovery and recycling as well as new prod-
uct applications; and creating European added value 
through RTD-based technology leadership, education 
and training.
New technology innovations help to overcome environ-
mental and social objections to non-energy materials 
extraction in the EU. For example, through subsea min-
ing exploitation of raw materials located deep offshore 
would contribute to solving the complex worldwide 
equation linking security of supply, sustainable devel-
opment and industrial competitiveness. Intelligent Deep 
Mine provides eco-innovative and intelligent explora-
tion and extraction. Optimising extraction and pro-
cessing of resources throughout their lifecycle or using 
mines for geothermal energy production at the end of 
118  European Commission (2007b).
119  GMES: Global Monitoring for Environment and Security, the EU’s earth obser-
vation programme.
and to clarify this towards all actors involved, e.g. by 
defining a cascading order of use. The European Com-
mission has launched initiatives on these matters in the 
recent past. With respect to exports of recovered paper, 
waste paper should be recycled close to the place of 
consumption, keeping secondary materials within Euro-
pean borders.
4.3.3.  The role of the non-energy extractive industry
The main company strategies and possible policy 
responses to tackle the scarcity of raw materials have 
been discussed in the previous section. Besides these, 
as the second pillar of the Raw Materials Initiative points 
out, the non-energy extractive industry has great poten-
tial to mitigate import dependency on several raw mate-
rials. It is therefore it is worth mentioning its role and the 
challenges it is faces in more detail.
The non-energy extractive industry can be divided into 
three main sub-sectors, according to the different physi-
cal and chemical characteristics of the minerals pro-
duced and on the downstream industries they supply:115
•	 construction minerals and aggregates 
•	 industrial minerals, and 
•	 metallic minerals 
4.3.3.1.  Challenges in the non-energy extractive industry
The micro-economic analysis116 revealed that the current 
EU non-energy extractive industry is in a relatively good 
competitive position in comparison to the rest of the 
world. Overall its apparent productivity is higher and in 
contrast to most of the other industries, its profitability is 
comparable. This suggests that the EU companies in this 
sector provide a viable basis for further development 
and as such an avenue for alleviating some of the raw 
materials pressure for the downstream industries.
It is estimated that Europe still has significant extract-
ing potential for non-energy raw materials.117 In the past, 
given the low prices of raw materials, it was sometimes 
more profitable to import these than to extract them. 
That is why there are still several large deposits, and 
there is potential to benefit from these. However, the 
EU cannot expect to be self-sufficient in providing for its 
material resource needs.
115 See e.g.: http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/sectors/metals-minerals/non-energy-
extractive-industries/index_en.htm.
116  IDEA Consult (2011): Background report on the “Access to non-energy raw 
materials and the competitiveness of EU industry”.
117  European Commission (2010a).136
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system of one-stop shop system, for example, could be 
elaborated in all Member States.121
Insurance requirements are another concern. Aligning 
these with the actual size of the mine or quarry, rather 
than the eventual full size, to be reached only in the 
future, would considerably reduce capital requirements 
upon start-up.
Finally, promoting for R&D and innovation for sustain-
able extraction is crucial for this industry’s (future) 
competitiveness.
4.4.  Conclusions and policy discussion
The goal of this chapter was to gain a better insight into 
five aspects of access to non-energy, non-agricultural 
raw materials and the challenges involved:
1.  global demand and supply.
2.  the competitiveness effects in the selected industries
3.    the responses given at industry level to raw materials 
challenges (including the role   of recycling, R&D and 
organisational strategies)
4.    the EU policies that can be developed
5.    the role of the EU non-energy extracting indus-
try in alleviating the EU industry’s raw materials 
vulnerability.
The approach in the original research was mainly quali-
tative in nature, drawing on existing literature and data, 
and using inquiries among representatives of a selected 
set of EU sectors for which competitiveness effects 
were identified. The selection of the sectors was based 
on insights from the literature review, experts in the 
field and from the overarching EU association Business 
Europe. In contrast with existing studies, the specific 
focus of the present study was on the sectoral and com-
petitiveness angle.
4.4.1.  Competitiveness effects
The analysis made clear that the prices of raw materials 
have been increasing significantly over the long term 
with a dip during the financial crisis. For the industries 
surveyed, the share of virgin raw materials was signifi-
cant ranging from one third in the steel sector to more 
than two thirds in the paper and pulp industry, chemi-
cals and car manufacturing. Here, non-energy raw 
121  University of Leoben (2004).
their life are all expected to contribute to sustainable 
raw materials extraction.
4.3.3.3.  Policy implications
One of the major policy issues is working towards an 
integrated policy vision on developing of the EU non-
energy extracting industry, to make it consistent with 
land use and environmental policies. The industry would 
expect this to improve the investment climate, espe-
cially since investments are typically long-term.
Much of the authority on mining and land use lies with 
the Member States. This is a barrier to the creation of 
a common policy on these matters. A clear European 
vision could steer Member States in their own policy 
choices in a coherent manner. That is why the European 
Commission sees its current role as a facilitator for the 
exchange of best practices.120 A European Commission 
report entitled, ‘Exchange of best practices in land use 
planning and permitting’ (2010) presented best prac-
tices in the field of land use planning policies for min-
erals, the geological knowledge base and networking, 
and integrating subsurface information in GMES. In this 
respect, three practices are considered important in pro-
moting investment in extractive industries:
•	 Defining a national minerals policy, to ensure that 
mineral resources are exploited in an economically 
viable way, harmonised with other national poli-
cies, based on sustainable development principles 
and accompanied by a commitment to provide an 
appropriate legal and information framework; 
•	 Setting up a land use planning policy for minerals 
comprising a digital geological knowledge base, 
a transparent methodology for identifying mineral 
resources, long term estimates for regional and local 
demand and identifying and safeguarding of min-
eral resources (taking into account other land uses), 
including their protection from the effects of natural 
disasters;
•	 Putting in place a process to authorise mineral 
exploration and extraction which is clear and under-
standable, provides certainty and helps to stream-
line the administrative process (e.g. the introduction 
of lead times, permit applications in parallel, and 
one-stop-shops).
On the operational side of mining, the “time to per-
mit” is a hindering factor. Continued dialogue between 
Member States to align the permitting process accord-
ing to best practices in other countries is necessary. The 
120  European Commission (2011).137
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certain minerals. This is because the materials are not 
available in the EU or not in the specific grades required 
for product quality process efficiency.
4.4.2.  The potential of recycling and innovation 
In the investigated industrial sectors two main driv-
ers for reducing dependence on primary raw materials 
can be identified. The first driver is purely economical, 
related to economic gains from material efficiency, 
reuse of recycled materials (such as in the steel, non-
ferrous metals, pulp and paper and the car manufactur-
ing industries) and use of cheaper substitute materials. 
The second driver originates in requirements imposed 
by safety and environmental regulations, which primar-
ily stimulate recycling activities and resource efficiency, 
particularly in the chemicals and in the automotive 
industries.
When the industries described in this report are consid-
ered in terms of their relative performance in recycling, 
the steel, non-ferrous metals and paper and pulp indus-
tries are clear leaders. This is mainly due to two facts. 
First, metals and paper are highly recyclable products, 
where the quality and utility of the recycled material 
is almost the same as that of the virgin raw materials. 
Second, one should note the relative upstream position 
of these industries in the whole production value chain. 
There are a number of other downstream industrial sec-
tors (such as car manufacturing, electronics, printing and 
publishing, etc.) whose end products are subsequently 
recycled. In the automobile industry, for example, the 
high degree of reuse and recycling is mainly driven by 
the high recycling capabilities of the upstream steel and 
non-ferrous metals industries.123
A more complicated situation with recycling is observed 
in the chemical industry. It possesses quite substantial 
chemical processing capabilities, which should allow 
it to perform many of the operations required for the 
recycling of chemicals. Nonetheless, the intensity of 
recycling in this industry is primarily driven by safety 
and environmental regulations, rather than by reuse and 
cost-saving factors.
What is the potential of the EU recycling industry in 
alleviating EU industry’s raw materials vulnerability? 
Looking at the current situation with recycling in the 
EU, economic gains from raw materials recycling are 
relatively high in most of the industries considered. 
The additional efforts currently undertaken in Europe 
to expand the recycling activities are primarily driven 
123  However, not all upstream industries have a high recycling potential. The 
mining and extraction industry is situated at the very top of the value chain, 
which is precisely why the concept of recycling does not really apply in these 
industries. Recycling requires the presence of certain processing capabilities, 
which the extraction industry does not have.
materials include not only metals and minerals, but also 
crude oil, gas and wood. 
In comparison with the rest of the world, the micro-
economic analysis122 indicated that steel, non-ferrous 
metals and chemicals in the EU typically have higher 
productivity levels, yet end up with lower profitability 
rates. The trends along the (global) business cycle were 
usually similar. This suggests that EU companies on 
average face with relatively higher costs, which makes 
the issue of increased raw materials prices particularly 
sensitive. For other sectors such as the EU paper and 
pulp industry and EU car manufacturing, the profit-
ability, patterns were more complex. In both sectors, 
a positive productivity gap with the rest of the world 
could be observed. Yet the EU paper and pulp industry 
showed a gradual decline in profitability while the EU 
car industry improved its profitability over time, unlike 
the companies in the rest of the world. In the car indus-
try, raw materials issue has a different impact than in the 
paper and pulp industry. A potential explanation might 
be that there is more scope for the EU car industry to 
invest in R&D and innovation in trying to find substitutes 
for expensive raw material inputs. Moreover, the com-
petitive use of wood by less regulated sectors (e.g. waste 
incineration) and the ‘export leakage’ of recovered 
paper due to high demand in the BRIC countries indi-
rectly add to the costs of the paper and pulp industry.
Sector interviews confirmed that market concentration 
on the supply side contributed significantly to the price 
increase in raw materials, especially in the case of com-
modities such as iron ore, copper, zinc and lead. In the 
case of iron ore, one can observe an increased market 
power of the global mining companies. This is reflected 
in their imposition of short-term supply contracts on the 
steel mills, which in turn try to pass the resulting risks 
and price increases through to their customers, some 
of which are large players, such as car manufacturers, 
though the others are mostly small players, such as the 
metal working industry. The effects of market concen-
tration can nonetheless be bypassed through company 
strategies such as vertical integration. Yet such a strat-
egy that is not feasible for all companies in the EU, and 
certainly not for most SMEs.
An important aspect for the competitiveness for all 
selected sectors is the absence of a global level play-
ing field in trade. Virtually all manufacturing sectors 
surveyed depend to a large extent on imported raw 
materials. Export restrictions on certain materials in 
BRIC countries, implicit subsidies, and soft loans place 
EU companies at a relative cost disadvantage. However, 
a switch to EU raw materials is often not possible, even 
though the EU is a global leader in the production of 
122  IDEA Consult (2011).138
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Secondly, in line with the first pillar of the Raw Materials 
Initiative, fostering a global level playing field in trade 
and investment is essential in order to ensure the fair 
and sustainable supply of raw materials from interna-
tional markets through strategic partnerships and pol-
icy dialogues. Developing strategic partnerships, such 
as the Africa-EU Joint Strategy Union, can contribute 
to the sustainable supply of raw materials from third 
countries while at the same time assisting these coun-
tries in reaching development goals. The EU can play 
a crucial role in creating win-win situations where both 
developing and developed economies benefit from 
the sustainable supply of raw materials. Alongside the 
European Commission, the European Investment Bank 
and other European development financing institutions 
will continue to support creating better conditions (e.g. 
infrastructure).
Pursuing policy dialogues as well as strengthening ongo-
ing debates in pluri – and multilateral fora (e.g. G20, 
UNCTAD, WTO, OECD) is of key importance in order to 
tackle existing trade barriers. It is crucial to include raw 
materials issues, such as export restrictions and invest-
ments aspects, in ongoing and future trade negotiations. 
Speeding up the establishment of a mechanism for mon-
itoring export restrictions and raw materials strategies in 
other countries outside the EU is essential. In particular, 
increased state intervention in former centrally planned 
economies, most notably China and Russia, is a con-
cern. Here, industry interests are pursued at the level of 
diplomacy, rather than at company level on the market. 
European industry representatives therefore often call 
for a ‘raw materials diplomacy’ at the level of the EU, or 
the Member States. On the other hand however, fears are 
also expressed about overregulation and the side effects 
of policy intervention on the internal EU market.
Thirdly, regarding the second pillar of the Raw Materi-
als Initiative, intelligent development of the further 
exploration and exploitation of European raw material 
resources can play an important role in obtaining certain 
materials for production. In this connection, building an 
innovative knowledge base of European resources and 
standardising geological data are of key importance. 
In the short term, it is feasible to increase synergies 
between national geological surveys. In the medium 
term, such synergies will help improve the European raw 
materials knowledge base. Furthermore, basing national 
mineral policies, based on sustainable development 
principles and an appropriate legal framework will facili-
tate access to European reserves. The exchange of best 
practices in land use planning policy, national mineral 
policy and mineral exploration and extraction authorisa-
tion processes is expected to contribute to the sustain-
able supply of raw materials within the EU.
Regarding the third pillar of the Raw Materials Initiative, 
encouraging and supporting R&D and innovation for 
by the environmental and safety concerns. Additional 
stimuli for recycling are created by regulations to reduce 
the CO2 and improve efficiency.
The untapped potential seems to lie more in improv-
ing framework conditions, which are linked with policy, 
and in applying the latest methods and techniques to 
increase resource efficiency. Examples are materials 
recovery from municipal solid waste, self-disassembling 
joints, and specialised plants for complex recycling. Also, 
promoting the use of product-service systems improves 
material efficiency and recycling performance as well as 
reuse. Another interesting avenue for achieving sustain-
able production is the organisation of local production 
activities within a setting of industrial symbiosis.
Regarding the potential of the EU recycling industry 
to reduce vulnerability with respect to raw materials 
likely promising developments may come from adjust-
ing production technologies to ensure greater reuse 
and recyclability of raw materials, especially rare earths 
and energy-intensive materials. It is also worth stress-
ing once again the importance of R&D and innovation, 
which play an important role in the future develop-
ment of efficient production processes, recycling pro-
cesses and substitute materials. Substitute materials are 
increasingly used in many sectors, such as the chemicals 
and car industries, and further development is expected, 
partly due to various research programmes.
One observation is the apparent dichotomy between 
the solutions presented in the, mostly academic, litera-
ture about sustainable production and the implemen-
tation and perceptions of industry. Close interaction 
between industry and research laboratories is therefore 
very important. However, case studies can be found on 
successful pilot projects for sustainable raw material use, 
there is still a wide gap between research findings and 
concepts and profitable implementation in a market 
economy/business context.
4.4.3.  Policy discussion
Access to non-energy, non-agricultural raw materials 
can be facilitated by different policy tools. Based on the 
analysis and EU policy documents on the topic, some 
important policy conclusions can be identified.
Firstly, the internal consistency of existing regulations 
and directives at EU level should be ensured. This would 
promote better operational and regulatory environment 
for industries affected by the scarcity of non-energy raw 
materials. Otherwise pursuing one policy goal might 
hinder reaching another one. Internal consistency 
should be in line with sustainability objectives and poli-
cies, e.g. competing uses of materials or waste incinera-
tion versus recycling.139
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5.1. Introduction
The eco-performance of the EU economy is increasingly 
at the forefront of policy discussion. On the one hand, 
this reflects the impact of economic activities on the 
environment (e.g. climate change, environmental deg-
radation, etc.). On the other, it mirrors deep concerns 
about resource scarcity, coupled with the EU’s reliance 
on external supplies of energy and of raw and critical 
materials. In this context, policy-makers – along with 
industry and citizens – face the dual challenge of deliv-
ering economic growth and ever mounting demands 
to improve energy and resource-utilisation efficiency 
within the economy, on both the production and con-
sumption sides.
This chapter examines the progress made on moving 
EU industry towards a more sustainable growth path 
by analysing economic and environment performance 
trends in industry over the last 10 to 20 years. Particu-
lar attention is paid to developments in resource effi-
ciency and in carbon and energy intensity over recent 
years at country and sector level, to the extent to which 
economic growth is being decoupled from resources 
used and environmental impacts and to the potential 
of the different public policy instruments and industry 
initiatives to facilitate sustainable growth and promote 
a strong industrial base in Europe.
This chapter is organised as follows: section 2 provides 
a brief overview of the policy context and the economic 
performance of EU industry in the last 10 to 15 years. 
Against this general background, section 3 presents 
a general assessment of the advances made in the eco-
performance of European industry relative to the trends 
and developments in its economic performance. This 
empirical analysis is illustrated by selected case stud-
ies, with the aim of obtaining a more detailed under-
standing of the motives, drivers and effects of particular 
policy initiatives. Section 4 examines evidence of the 
levels of investment made in environmental protection 
and eco-innovation as an indicator of mitigation efforts 
by industry and future decoupling. A few examples of 
new ‘green business’ models are highlighted. Finally, the 
conclusions are presented in section 5, focusing on the 
relative strengths and weaknesses of the policy instru-
ments available and the general lessons learned about 
the optimal design of sustainable growth policies. 
5.2.  Policy and economic context
5.2.1.  EU policy context
The European policy debate has evolved over the last 
ten years. Initially, the 2000 Lisbon Strategy (relabelled 
in 2005 as the Growth and Jobs Strategy) and the 2001 
Gothenburg Strategy (relabelled in 2005 as the EU Sus-
tainable Development Strategy) continued to move 
along parallel tracks. Although both these EU policy 
frameworks aimed to be all-embracing and compre-
hensive, they allowed some room for interpretation 
in the balance between economic and environmental 
performance.
Since 2007, increasing attention has been paid to further 
development of EU energy policies with the aim of reduc-
ing dependence on external fossil fuel resources and 
promoting energy efficiency and renewables. The cor-
nerstone of this policy is the Industrial Emissions (Inte-
grated Pollution Prevention and Control – IPPC – recast) 
Directive (EC, 2010) and the EU Emission Trading System 
(EU ETS) (EC, 2003). Recent amendments to the EU ETS 
(EC, 2009a) and Directives on carbon capture and stor-
age (CCS) (EC, 2009b) and on renewable energy sources 
(EC, 2009c) are all part of a wider package of reforms 
directed towards meeting the EU’s target of reducing 
its overall emissions to 20% below 1990 levels by 2020 
and increasing the share of renewable energy to 20%. 
Other important initiatives in the energy domain are 
the National Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy 
Action Plans (NEEAPs and REAPs), which Member States 
are required to submit under EU directives.
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efficiency (European Commission, 2010b). The flagship 
initiative on the Innovation Union is also aligned with 
these goals: it states that stricter environmental targets 
and standards establish challenging objectives but 
ensure long-term predictability, thus providing a boost 
to eco-innovation (European Commission, 2010c).
Even more recently, the flagship initiative on a Resource-
Efficient Europe aims to create a framework for policies 
to support the shift towards a resource-efficient and 
low-carbon economy which will help to ‘boost eco-
nomic performance while reducing resource use; iden-
tify and create new opportunities for economic growth 
and greater innovation and boost the EU’s competitive-
ness; ensure security of supply of essential resources; 
and fight against climate change and limit the environ-
mental impacts of resource use’ (European Commission, 
2011b, p.3). This flagship initiative aims to make use of 
regulatory, voluntary, communication and information 
instruments. It also takes account of public investment, 
by aligning this initiative with the proposed reforms on 
the future of the EU’s own major spending programmes, 
including the Common Agricultural Policy, the Common 
Fisheries Policy, Cohesion Policy, energy grids and trans-
European electricity transport networks.
In conclusion, building on the earlier partial success of 
previous policy frameworks, EU-wide policies relevant to 
economic and environmental performance can be seen 
to have evolved in at least three directions over the last 
ten years. EU-level policies:
•	 tend increasingly to treat economic and environ-
mental performance as dual objectives (intrinsi-
cally linked through e.g. ‘green growth’, ‘green’ skills 
and jobs, eco-innovation); the latest Europe 2020 
framework appears to have provided greater clarity, 
reducing the degree of room for interpretation in 
the balance between economic and environmental 
objectives, that emerged over time during imple-
mentation of the Lisbon and Gothenburg Strategies;
•	 make use of an increasing array of policy instru-
ments, recognising that a policy mix of all instruments 
available is needed in order to achieve the objectives 
set. This includes not only regulatory, voluntary, com-
munication and information but also public invest-
ment instruments. This is a clear evolution from the 
earlier Lisbon and Gothenburg Strategies, with the 
Community policy pillar and country surveillance of 
the Europe 2020 Strategy clearly more based on quan-
titative objectives and having more binding elements;
•	 recognise increasingly the role of other govern-
ance layers and players, notably Member States, 
but also regional and local authorities, businesses, 
social partners and civil society, plus the global level 
(e.g. via the WTO and G20). This is particularly impor-
At EU-level, progress has been partial in a broad range of 
areas. The Progress Report on the EU Sustainable Devel-
opment Strategy pointed to limited improvements in 
the area of sustainable transport – at least in the years 
2000-2007. Beyond that, a lack of direction was seen in 
the area of sustainable consumption and production 
(European Commission, 2007, p.32).
In 2008, the Communication from the Commission on 
the Sustainable Consumption and Production and Sus-
tainable Industrial Policy Action (European Commis-
sion, 2008) was published. It provided a framework for 
improving the energy and environmental performance 
of products and fostering their take-up by consum-
ers. The Communication highlighted the challenge 
of improving the overall environmental performance 
of products throughout their life-cycle, of stimulating 
demand for better products and production technolo-
gies and of helping consumers to make better choices 
with the aid of labelling (specific examples of regulatory-
driven and voluntary eco-labelling schemes are pre-
sented in Boxes 5.2 and 5.6, respectively). Further action 
was launched to promote cleaner and leaner production 
and to address international aspects of the production 
process. The 2008 Sustainable Consumption Action 
Plan on Green Public Procurement includes references 
to various regulatory initiatives, such as extension of 
the Energy Labelling Directive, the Eco-design Directive 
and the Eco-label Regulation – the later of these being 
voluntary. Other green public procurement (GPP) meas-
ures were also voluntary, as were aspects of the Open 
Method of Coordination such as cooperation between 
Member States on common GPP criteria for products 
and services and on preparation of national action plans. 
A separate Communication on green public procure-
ment gave fuller details of these measures.
The Europe 2020 Strategy presents a new all-embracing 
policy framework promoting a strategy for smart, sus-
tainable and inclusive growth. Sustainable growth is 
understood to mean ‘building a resource-efficient, sus-
tainable and competitive economy, exploiting Europe’s 
leadership in the race to develop new processes and 
technologies, including green technologies, accelerating 
the roll-out of smart grids using ICT, exploiting EU-scale 
networks and reinforcing the competitive advantages of 
our businesses, particularly in manufacturing and within 
our SMEs as well as through assisting consumers to value 
resource efficiency’ (European Commission, 2010a, p.14).
This concept of sustainable growth has been further 
translated into a number of ‘flagship initiatives’. The 
most relevant are found under the heading ‘Sustainable 
Growth’. They include the Sustainable Industrial Compet-
itiveness and the Resource Efficiency flagships. The Sus-
tainable Industrial Competitiveness flagship addresses 
issues such as industrial innovation, access to raw mate-
rials and critical products or resource, energy and carbon 151
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and continuous growth. Overall, industrial GVA was 
increasing in every country, although at a slower rate 
than GVA for the whole economy, reflecting a decline in 
the relative importance of industry (for the purposes of 
this chapter, defined, wherever possible, as sectors A to 
F under NACE revision 1.1, see Annex). 
Figure 5.1 depicts industrial GVA trends at constant 
prices for the EU, the USA and Japan from 1995 to 2007. 
Industrial GVA in the EU-25 increased by 22.1% over this 
period, ahead of the 10.2% increase in Japan in the same 
period, but behind the 31.6% increase in the US.
Figure 5.2 shows contrasting industrial GVA trends 
across different Member States over the years 1995-
2000, 2000-2007 and 2007-2009. In the period 1995-
2000, Ireland recorded total growth of over 50%, sup-
ported to a large extent by attracting industrial FDI.
In the period 2000-2007, only Portugal and Malta suf-
fered a decline in industrial GVA: in the case of Portugal 
this was due mainly to a significant (-15.3%) decline in 
construction. The Baltic states, together with Slovakia, 
reported the highest growth in this period, each with 
125  GVA has been indexed to 1995 constant prices using industry and member 
state specific price deflators, also contained in the EU KLEMS dataset – this 
process has been used for all GVA and intensity calculations to present the 
real economic changes as far as possible.
tant as such a ‘multi-governance’ approach allows 
alignment of goals at all levels and mobilisation of 
all policy instruments and resources – thus adding 
to the effectiveness of policies. Another reason why 
this approach is important is that policies promoting 
economic and environmental performance are not 
always clearly aligned between governance layers.
Finally, building upon the points set out above, before 
shifting attention to the Member State level, it is impor-
tant to recognise the difference between the level at 
which policy decisions are taken and the level where 
they are implemented. As will be seen later, a grow-
ing range of policy measures – though implemented 
at Member State or sub-national level - are directly or 
indirectly induced by the above mentioned EU policy 
frameworks and action plans. 
5.2.2.  Economic context: industry gross value added 
(GVA) and employment 
The overall economic trend over the last 10 to 20 years, 
until the recent financial crisis, had been one of steady 
124  EU-27 less Bulgaria and Romania, as EU KLEMS data were unfortunately una-
vailable for these countries – the use of EU-25 from this point forward refers 
to this definition.
Figure 5.1:   Industrial GVA in the EU-25124, USA and Japan, 1995-2007 (indexed at 1995 prices125)
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moment, which could only be partially redeemed for 
some countries for the years 2008 and 2009 with data 
from the OECD STAN database. Figure 5.2 shows that 
every country for which data are available suffered 
a decline in industrial GVA. In total, these 12 Member 
States reported an 11.5% decline in industrial GVA in this 
period, with the situation contrasting from one Member 
State to another. Slovakia, Slovenia and Greece saw the 
smallest declines, of less than 5%, whereas the biggest, 
of more than 10%, were in Finland, Sweden, Austria, 
Germany and Italy (see Box 5.1).
The decline in the relative importance of industry was 
matched by a decline in industrial employment across 
the developed world, both in total employment in 
industry and also as a proportion of total employment.
Figure 5.3 relates changes in industrial GVA to changes 
in industrial employment in the period 1995-2007. 
Industrial employment increased in this period in 
only eight of the countries selected. Ireland and Spain 
total growth over 60%. Other Central and Eastern Euro-
pean Member States also recorded faster and above-
average industrial growth, seizing the opportunities 
brought by EU membership and access to the single 
market.
Many EU-15 Member States – including the ones with 
the largest industrial GVA, i.e. Germany, France, Italy and 
the UK – achieved relatively modest total growth over 
the full period. Notable exceptions were Finland and 
Sweden where industrial GVA grew by over 20% in both 
periods (i.e. 1995-2000 and 2000-2007). The expansion 
of the telecoms sector and the innovative success of 
these two economies played a leading role in this (the 
GVA data show increases in the electrical and optical 
sectors [NACE rev.1.1 – codes 30-33] of over 750% in 
both countries over the whole period).
The recent recession following the financial crisis has 
had a significant impact on EU industry. However, the 
EU KLEMS datasets are only partially available at the 
Figure 5.2:   Total % changes in industrial GVA EU-25, 1995-2009
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related to relatively mature industrial sectors and labour 
market differences (e.g. stronger employment protec-
tion overall). On the other hand, the EU-10 (EU-12 minus 
Bulgaria and Romania) reported a sharper decline in 
employment (-14.1%) but a much higher increase in 
industrial GVA (+74.6%).
Changes in GVA and employment also varied signifi-
cantly across sectors. Figure 5.4 presents the changes 
for the EU-25 sector by sector. The biggest GVA growth 
was achieved in the electrical and optical sector, almost 
doubling over the period. Transport equipment also 
recorded significant growth. The figure shows that, 
among the sectors where employment declined, tex-
tiles and mining and quarrying saw the biggest falls, los-
ing over 40% of employment between 1995 and 2007. 
Falls of approximately 13 to 14% were recorded in agri-
culture, pulp and paper, electricity gas and water and 
other non-metallic minerals. In other sectors employ-
ment declined by between 3 and 10%. The construc-
tion sector, due to its labour-intensive nature, made 
by far the biggest contribution to employment growth 
and remained much closer to a one-to-one relationship 
between employment and GVA growth.
Significant increases in productivity per worker have 
been achieved for the generality of countries and 
sectors (as reflected by the decline in employment 
recorded the biggest expansion in employment, driven 
primarily by rapid expansion of the construction sector. 
Finland and, to a lesser extent, Sweden saw strong GVA 
and employment growth fuelled by expansion of their 
electrical and optical sectors. Germany, Japan and the 
UK all suffered a significant decline in industrial employ-
ment and among the lowest rates of GVA growth. In 
Germany this was caused by a decline in mining, tex-
tiles and construction. In the UK it was attributable to 
a general decline in manufacturing and a particularly 
severe contraction in the textiles industry. In Poland, 
Slovakia and the Czech Republic, although GVA growth 
was much more vigorous, there was also a significant 
decline in industrial employment, mostly concentrated 
in agriculture and the mining and extractive industries 
but also including manufacturing.
Within the EU as a whole a decline in industrial employ-
ment of 5.7% was seen, at the same time as industrial 
GVA grew by 22.1%. Similar proportions were reported 
by the USA and Japan, but Korea was able to secure 
greater industrial GVA growth, despite a higher decline 
in employment (-11.1%), while Australia saw a signifi-
cant expansion in industrial employment (+16.6%), con-
centrated, as with growth, in construction and mining.
The EU-15 recorded a lower decline in employment 
(-2.4%) than the EU-25 but also lower GVA growth, 
Figure 5.3:   Change in industrial employment and industrial GVA, 1995-2007
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The potential for sustainable growth and direct and 
indirect job creation can be particularly significant in 
specific sectors and areas. The EU is a market leader in 
the so-called ‘eco-industries’, a set of eco-related sec-
tors and activities that have been expanding rapidly in 
the recent years, growing to become a sector equiva-
lent (in terms of employment) to chemicals or electrical 
and optical equipment in the EU. Annual employment 
growth in ‘eco-industries’ averaged approximately 179 
000 jobs per year between 1999 and 2008, equal to over 
7% annual growth. In 2008 ‘eco-industries’ employed 
an estimated 3.4 million people across the EU (Ecorys 
et al. 2009, see also GHK et al. 2007). However, sustain-
able growth is not the exclusive domain of certain sec-
tors. Rather, it has the potential to create new jobs and 
increase efficiency and productivity in every firm and 
sector across the whole economy.
5.3.  Eco-performance of the EU Industry
This section analyses the main summaries of eco-per-
formance and tries to draw the main findings together 
to form a coherent picture of EU industry’s move to 
sustainability. Eco-performance and sustainability are 
assessed on the basis of the evidence available in the 
key areas of energy, greenhouse gas emissions, other 
and GVA growth). They are the result of factors such 
as the technological progress in interaction with the 
increased globalisation, associated market develop-
ments, increasing specialisation by EU industry in high-
value products and value-chain segments, increasing 
levels of innovation, production automation and tech-
nological intensity, etc. 
At the same time as productivity and specialisation has 
increased, increases in industrial GVA are being achieved 
in tandem with proportionally higher increases in the 
consumption of intermediate inputs. This is particularly 
evident in the manufacture of transport equipment. This 
point to lower marginal added value per unit of output, 
reflecting longer and more complex value chains often 
involving greater global competition and a complex 
blend of inputs needed to meet consumer demands. 
Only two sectors -electrical and optical equipment and 
agriculture- run counter this trend, and then by only 
a small amount.
The structural change taking place in traditional indus-
try is particularly noticeable in terms of employment, 
with an average of almost 250 000 jobs per year being 
lost. At the same time, eco-innovation efforts and the 
transition to a more sustainable economy and industry 
can offset part of the general industrial relative decline. 
Figure 5.4:   Change in industrial employment and GVA per sector in the EU-25, 1995-2007
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5.3.1.  Energy consumption and intensity
Whole economy
Figure 5.5 displays the overall final energy consumption 
for the major international economies. As can be seen, 
since 1990 there has been huge growth in energy con-
sumption in China, particularly since 2001. The USA and 
India have also exhibited strong growth, whereas in the 
EU-27 energy consumption has grown slowly over the 
same period. Analysis shows that the main source of 
growth in energy use in the EU-27 over this period has 
been in the transport sector, with overall energy con-
sumption in industry decreasing. 
Energy intensity trends (final energy consumption in toe 
relative to GDP at constant prices, see Annex) show that 
in recent years the EU-27 has closed the gap with Japan, 
emissions, resource use and water (see Annex for the 
full list and a description of the indicators used). Sus-
tainability is most closely associated with decoupling of 
production (and to a lesser extent consumption) from 
environmental impact. Two forms of decoupling, as lev-
els of eco-performance, can be identified:
•	 Relative decoupling of resource utilisation (or pro-
duction of harmful outputs) from economic activity: 
while overall utilisation of resources may increase, 
the intensity of use falls relative to the quantity of 
output produced. 
•	 Absolute decoupling of resource utilisation (or pro-
duction of harmful outputs) from economic activity: 
the intensity of use of resources falls relative to out-
put along with a reduction in the overall quantity of 
resources used.
Box 5.1: The impact of the recent financial and economic crisis
The latest recession was unusually severe, provoking dramatic falls in industrial production and employment. 
Industries producing durable consumer goods were hit harder: capital goods and intermediate goods suffered 
most with production losses of around 26% relative to EU pre-recession peaks (European Union Industrial Struc-
ture 2011). The sharp fall in industrial activity has led to deep job cuts. The reduction in GVA and employment 
has been particularly evident in the two biggest industrial sectors -manufacturing and construction. For example, 
manufacturing registered a drop of 15% in GVA and 4% in employment over the period 2007-2009 (for a set of 
11 EU Member States for which figures are available, accounting for around half of total industrial employment in 
the EU-25). Patterns of employment decline appear consistent across sectors but are uneven between countries. 
Member States affected by housing bubbles or other macroeconomic imbalances suffered most in terms of out-
put and, in particular, job losses (see chapter 1 of this report).
The incomplete data currently available show that declines in industrial GVA began to be felt in 2008 in most sec-
tors, though growth was still seen in manufacturing of electrical and optical equipment, chemicals, rubber and 
plastics and machinery not elsewhere classified (NEC). In 2009 the impact of the crisis on industry was more sig-
nificant, with declines gaining pace in most sectors. They were particularly sharp in industrial GVA in the electrical 
and optical equipment, basic and fabricated metals, machinery NEC, transport equipment and other non-metallic 
mineral sectors. These changes are evidence of both consumer and business purchases of equipment being post-
poned (electrical and optical, machinery NEC and transport sectors) and of the drying-up of demand from industry 
as a whole and the construction sector (basic and fabricated metals and non-metallic minerals). In the case of the 
transport sector, the reaction is instructive as in many Member States there was a strong focus on scrapping and 
other schemes to support vehicle purchases.
In addition, many governments, both European and non-European, have emphasised the importance of a ‘green 
recovery’ by investing in, for example, renewables and energy efficiency in their recovery packages (OECD, 2009). 
The total ‘green’ part has been estimated to represent 10% of the EU’s economic recovery plans (HSBC, 2010, see 
table 6 in annex for an overview of the stimulus plans adopted in the EU, USA, Japan, South Korea and China, their 
estimated ‘green component’ and thematic focus). However, this percentage is highly sensitive to how ‘green 
investments’ in, for example, infrastructure, are defined and is difficult to interpret in terms of environmental 
impact (European Commission, 2009a). The aggregate spending on and stage of implementation of the ‘green’ 
elements in European Recovery Packages are currently under review by the European Commission. However, 
some examples of mid-term evaluations exist. Car scrapping schemes, for example, were carried out in 13 Member 
States to boost car sales and take fuel-inefficient vehicles off the roads. The total injection of capital adds up to 
7.9 billion Euros and significant environmental benefits are expected, e.g. removing 1.06 million tones of CO2 and 
pulling down average emissions from the whole market to 145 g/km (IHS Global Insight, 2010).156
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Large differences in performance were observed 
between Member States, with Poland, for example, 
achieving 88% growth in industrial GVA and a 22% 
reduction in FEC, but Ireland recorded 157% growth 
in GVA and a 37% increase in FEC. In countries such 
as Ireland and Spain, the large increase in final energy 
consumption is mostly due to the rapid growth of 
energy-intensive industries, across manufacturing and 
including construction. The Baltic region – plus Slovakia 
– achieved the largest increase in GVA without substan-
tially increasing final energy consumption and, in the 
case of Estonia, even decreasing it.
The data at Member State level point to a decoupling of 
energy use by industry from GVA growth in every Mem-
ber State except Italy. In ten Member States (AT, ES, IE, 
FI, SI, LT, SK, LV, EL and PT) this decoupling was relative, 
with GVA increasing faster than FEC. In the remaining 
twelve (DE, UK, NL, FR, BE, DK, LU, CZ, PL, HU, SE and EE) 
an absolute decoupling of FEC from GVA growth was 
evident.
Energy intensity improved within most of the individ-
ual industrial sectors (see figure 5.7). Overall, the pic-
ture was favourable and some of the sectors with the 
highest initial energy intensity achieved some of the 
largest improvements. The basic and fabricated met-
als sector (i.e. the iron and steel and non-ferrous metals 
industries) saw an improvement of 22.2% from 1990 to 
2008, with the downward trend continuing until 2007-
2008 when a significant fall in GVA led to an increase 
the leading (i.e. least energy-intensive) major economy. 
The USA and other countries such as Australia have 
been able to narrow the gap on the EU-27, but remain 
significantly more energy-intensive. In particular, look-
ing at the relative improvement in percentage terms, 
the EU-27 outperforms these countries.
Industry
Energy is a critical input for industry. Changes in energy 
consumption, both headline and relative to output, 
are therefore important measures of eco-performance. 
The industrial energy intensity data presented in fig-
ure 5.6126 show that final energy consumption (FEC) by 
industry in the EU-23127 as a whole increased by 2.1%, 
while industrial GVA increased by 24.4%. The increase 
in FEC was higher in the EU-15, for a lower increase in 
GVA. An overall decline in FEC was recorded in the EU-
12(-4)128, whereas industrial GVA increased by 95%. This 
reflects a ‘catch-up process’, specifically the shift to more 
energy-efficient processes and less energy-intensive 
sectors in these countries.
126  This figure should be interpreted as follows: a high GVA growth in combina-
tion with low or negative growth in energy use can be considered efficient. 
Hence, further to the left along the horizontal axis and further up along 
the vertical axis is better in various terms. The 45 degree line marks the no 
change in energy intensity locus. The vertical distance from a given point 
to the 45 degree line gives an approximation to the percentage change in 
energy intensity (the exact percentage change is equal to this distance/ (1 + 
% change in GVA)).
127  EU-27 – minus BG, RO, CY and MT, due to incomplete datasets.
128  EU-12 – minus BG, RO, CY and MT, due to incomplete datasets.
Figure 5.5:   Change in final energy consumption in million toe from 1990 to 2008
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Changes in energy use and efficiency across sectors 
and their impact are affected by the fuel or energy mix 
used, choices of fuels and, within any given energy mix, 
by many factors, including local resource availability, 
energy prices and public policies. Public policies can 
promote energy efficiency and sustainable growth by 
means of a broad range of instruments (such as energy 
taxes and subsidies, regulations and standards, eco-
designs, eco-labels, see section 5.5). Box 5.2 describes 
the specific case of mandatory energy labels for light 
bulbs in the EU which has produced significant eco-
nomic and environmental benefits.
in energy intensity. The chemical industry recorded 
a 25.7% improvement over the whole period, which 
has levelled off somewhat in recent years. The biggest 
improvement over the period, (38%), was achieved 
by the ‘other non-classified industries’ (i.e. electrical 
and optical equipment and wood products), again 
a product of rapid increases in GVA. GVA stands out 
as the dominant variable in intensity trends, with the 
increases in intensity recorded in 2007-2008 a result 
of falls in GVA greater than the decline in energy 
consumption. 
Figure 5.6:   Energy intensity of EU industry (manufacturing and construction, % change in final energy 
consumption versus % change in GVA), 1995 and 2007
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Figure 5.7:   Energy intensity sector by sector (final energy consumption (in toe)/GVA in million euros 
(1995 constant prices)), 1995-2008
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Box 5.2:   Energy labelling for light bulbs: linking sustainable consumption, production and eco-
innovation 
Energy labelling is a mandatory requirement for light bulbs, cars, and most electronic appliances in the EU. These 
EU initiatives illustrate how consumer-oriented approaches to improve sustainable consumption and production 
can have far-reaching implications for the economic and eco-performance of industry. The regulatory energy-effi-
ciency labelling scheme for light bulbs is an example of a labelling scheme with clear positive effects on both eco-
performance (energy-efficiency improvements) and economic performance (higher value-added products and 
stimulating innovation). The labelling scheme has been primarily a regulatory initiative with the aim of informing 
consumers and supported and anticipated by industry.
The mandatory energy labelling scheme for light bulbs (under Energy Labelling Directive 92/75/
EEC and Implementing Directive 98/11/EC on household lamps) is an example of a compulsory 
method for informing consumers and setting minimum thresholds the level of eco-performance of 
consumer products. Since December 2008, minimum energy-efficiency requirements for light 
bulbs are in force with the goal of phasing out incandescent bulbs by 2012. The energy label for 
light bulbs shows their energy efficiency level on a scale from G to A+++ plus the number of lumen 
and watts used, indicating the power of the light and the energy consumption per second. Com-
pared with incandescent bulbs (levels E to G), compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs) (level A) can save 
up to 80% of energy for the same light output and have a service life six to fifteen times longer. 
The development and market penetration of compact fluorescent lamps (CFLs) – the main sustainable alterna-
tive to incandescent light bulbs – has kept partly ahead of regulation. Sales of CFLs increased by 340% from 2003 
to 2007 (Bertoldi and Atanasiu, 2009). Industry has taken on a proactive role in developing and marketing more 
sustainable lighting alternatives.159
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global GHG emissions since 1990 has been China (see 
figure 5.8) which has surpassed the EU-27, and now also 
by most estimates the USA too, to become the world’s 
biggest emitter. For both the EU and USA, the trends in 
total GHG emissions differ from final energy consump-
tion, with the EU-27 recording a decrease in emissions 
while FEC was increasing and the USA also recording 
lower increases in emissions than FEC. This is a result of 
measures in these economies to promote use of renew-
able energy sources and energy efficient processes and 
to switch the fuel mix away from coal, the most carbon-
intensive energy source.
Analysing overall GHG trends within the EU-27, a marked 
difference emerges over time. In the early part of the 
period 1995-2000, significant reductions in GHG emis-
sions were reported across the EU-12 countries, again 
tied to economic transition. The picture in the EU-15 
at the same time was more mixed, with most countries 
decreasing emissions as more renewables came online 
and fuel mixes switched from coal to gas, but rapid 
economic expansion meaning that in countries such 
as Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Greece, GHG emissions 
also increased rapidly in this period. From 2001 on, this 
situation was reversed, with most of the EU-15 countries 
reducing emissions. At the same time, rapid economic 
growth in the EU-12 Member States increased their total 
emissions by 1.2% from 2001 to 2008. This increase was 
not universal, with Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slo-
vakia managing to continue reducing their emissions.
Figure 5.9 presents GHG emissions at whole economy 
level against GVA changes in the same period. It reveals 
a variety of interesting findings: firstly, that the variation 
Energy prices and policies or market conditions affect-
ing their level or volatility, (such as taxes, subsidies, lib-
eralised markets and competition) can also induce sig-
nificant changes in industrial energy use and efficiency. 
For example, the relatively higher increase in gas prices 
against electricity prices over the last decade has been 
reflected by a shift in the relative industrial energy mix, 
from gas to electricity, in the majority of Member States.
The way changes in energy use make an environmental 
impact is also affected by the energy mix in the coun-
try or industry concerned. Low-carbon (i.e. nuclear and 
renewable) energy sources play a leading role in this, 
as do factors such as fuel switching. The proportion of 
renewable energy in the energy mix in the EU increased 
from 13.8% in 2000 to 15.6% in 2008 (EEA, 2010, page 
36) with improvements evident across almost every 
Member State, in line with policy goals on climate 
change. The EU as a whole remains ahead of Japan, the 
USA and many other countries on the use of renew-
able energy but countries such as China are also rapidly 
developing their technology and capacity. 
5.3.2.  Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and intensity
Whole economy
The environmental impact of changes in the energy mix 
is better reflected by changes in emissions. Mirroring 
changes in energy consumption, the biggest mover in 
129  See references for the list of interviews conducted.
Nonetheless, there seems to be consensus among policy makers, industry and consumer organisations that simi-
lar levels of energy efficiency would not have been achieved without these regulatory schemes, e.g. if the scheme 
had been voluntary129. This is mainly because consumers are concerned foremost about the quality (colour) of 
the light and price of the bulb and do not believe that they can make a bigger impact by buying energy-efficient 
appliances.
In general, awareness and willingness to act as a ‘sustainable consumer’ are increasing in the EU; more than 
80% of Europeans believe that a product’s environmental impact in general is a significant factor when decid-
ing which product to buy (Eurobarometer, European Commission 2009b). However, when making a purchasing 
decision, a large majority of consumers consider quality and price more important than environmental impact. 
EU consumers see minimising waste and recycling as the ways in which they can have most influence on solving 
environmental problems, more so than by purchasing energy-efficient appliances or products that were produced 
using environmentally sustainable methods. Differences in consumer attitudes exist between Member States; for 
example, eco-labels play a larger role in purchasing decisions by consumers in Malta, Austria, Portugal and Italy 
than in the Czech Republic, Hungary, Estonia, Slovakia and Bulgaria.
Even though the general level of consumer recognition of the A-G energy label is high across Europe, rang-
ing from 81% in Poland to 95% in the Netherlands, France and Denmark (Ipsos MORI, 2008), this can mainly be 
explained by the mandatory nature of the scheme. Consumer awareness of ‘cost of ownership’ arguments – i.e. 
that over the entire lifetime of the light bulb, energy saving costs can outweigh the initial higher purchasing 
price– is still assessed relatively low.160
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biggest proportional reductions and, similarly to energy 
intensity, is closing the gap on Japan. The USA and Aus-
tralia lag behind in comparison. Since 1995 the EU has 
gained on Japan, while the USA and Australia have also 
closed on the EU.
Industrial emissions
Focusing solely on the role of industry is difficult, as the 
emissions data reported to the UNFCCC are not directly 
aligned with the standard NACE industrial classifica-
tions and, consequently, GVA. This study matched the 
closest sectoral definition for industry in the emissions 
data – Manufacturing and construction emissions – to 
the appropriate economic sectors to form an analysis, 
but the match between the data sources is not perfect. 
Figure 5.10 presents the trends in industrial GHG emis-
sions for individual Member States against changes in 
GVA. This shows little clear correlation between changes 
in GVA and emissions from manufacturing and construc-
tion. GVA growth over the period was positive in every 
Member State, with 17 of the 23 for which data is avail-
able, achieving absolute decoupling of emissions from 
GVA. At the same time, six Member States – Spain, Ire-
land, Austria, Greece, Estonia and Portugal - saw emis-
sions increase in this period. One conclusion is that 
the construction bubble in some of these six countries 
from the average trend is significant, demonstrating 
that there appears to be no strong correlation between 
changes in emissions and changes in GVA. While 
changes in GVA are likely to be a factor in emissions, the 
energy mix and transport both play a significant role at 
whole economy level. 
Secondly, 12 EU economies achieved an absolute 
decoupling of GHG emissions from GVA growth during 
this period. This is interesting, as it includes both EU-15 
and EU-10 Member States, showing that EU-10 Member 
States are capable of a more sustainable economic tran-
sition in terms of emissions.
Thirdly, every country in the analysis achieved at least 
relative decoupling of economic growth from GHG emis-
sions growth over the period. Various factors lie behind 
this, including improved efficiency, cleaner power gen-
eration and more renewables in the energy mix. A fur-
ther factor is the exporting or ‘offshoring’ of emissions: 
as heavy manufacturing is relocated outside these 
countries, domestic emissions decline, but the products, 
despite being produced offshore in places such as the 
BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries, are still 
consumed in the EU and the developed world.
Finally, related to this, an international comparison of 
GHG emission intensity shows that the EU achieved the 
Figure 5.8:   Total GHG emissions in million Gg of CO2 equivalent, 1990-2008
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contributed disproportionately to emission increases 
per percentage point of growth. However, looking at 
GVA growth in just the construction sector, Lithuania 
(+146.1%), Slovakia (+99.2%) and Latvia (+293.9%) show 
growth rates at least as high as in these six countries and 
Portugal recorded only 6.5% growth in construction in 
this period. The construction sector is, therefore, unlikely 
to be the only explanatory factor. 
The figure also gives an indication of the relative trends 
in emission intensity internationally. These show that 
over the full period the average EU emission reductions 
exceed those achieved in all non-EU countries. The USA 
has achieved absolute decoupling of emissions, but not 
to the same extent as in the EU. This reflects a long-term 
trend over the period for the USA to close the gap on 
the EU, although this is more a result of faster increases 
in industrial GVA than of emission reductions. 
Figure 5.9:   Change in EU GHG emissions and GVA – Whole economy, i.e. all NACE rev. 1.1 sectors  
(GHG emissions (Gg CO2 equivalent)/GVA (in million EUR at 1995 constant prices), 1995-2007
% change in total GHG emissions
%
 
c
h
a
n
g
e
 
i
n
 
G
V
A
 
1
9
9
5
-
2
0
0
7
Spain
Australia
EL
MT
LU SI PL
SK
SE
UK
BE
HU
Lithuania
Finland
USA
PT
AT
EU-15
EU-25
EU-10
Italy
JPN
Ireland
Estonia
-20 % -10 % 0 % 10 % 20 % 30 % 40 % 50 %
160 %
180 %
140 %
120 %
100 %
80 %
60 %
40 %
20 % GER
DK
FR
NL CZ
LV
Note:    Bubble size relative to 2007 emissions, except for EU aggregates, US and Japan, which are set to uniform size for visual reasons.
Source:  Ecorys based on UNFCCC and EU KLEMS data.162
European Competitiveness Report 2011
Figure 5.10:   Change in GHG emissions from manufacturing and construction (UNFCCC)  
and GVA in the EU-23 (NACE rev. 1.1 D + F), 1995-2007
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Box 5.3: Sectoral emissions in the EU based on the CITL database
It is possible to form a more nuanced view of sectoral emissions in the EU by drawing on data from the CITL 
database, compiled as part of the EU emission trading scheme (ETS). This records and verifies emissions from the 
largest energy-generating and industrial installations across the EU, which generate around 40% of total EU-27 
emissions. Data are available from 2005 to 2010, with 2009 and 2010 data still showing some variability in the 
quality in the data for specific sectors. Generally, the CITL data show a decline in emissions of 1% across all instal-
lations covered by the EU ETS between 2005 and 2008. At the same time, a 3.6% decline in overall EU-25 emissions 
was reported to the UNFCCC.
Going beyond 2007, the data from the CITL show that between 2007 and 2010 emissions declined by around 
14% across the EU (see Figure 5.11), with particularly significant declines in Spain, Portugal and Romania. This 
is consistent with expectations, based on the impact of the financial crisis and contraction in economic activity 
in 2008 and 2009 in most Member States. Yet the decline was not felt everywhere, with three Member States – 
Sweden, the Netherlands and Lithuania – seeing emissions increase in this period. In Sweden the increase was 
tied to problems in the energy sector, with the shutdown of nuclear reactors increasing the demand for energy 
from gas-fuelled plants, combined with increased emissions from large chemical facilities and metal smelters. In 
Lithuania and the Netherlands the increases are a result of increased emissions from existing and new chemical 
installations and fuel refineries.163
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The CITL data also allow a more comprehensive examination of sectoral emissions over the same period, as shown 
in figure 5.12. This shows that EU industry under the ETS was able to achieve a 19% total reduction in emissions 
between 2007 and 2010, although a significant portion of this is likely to be related to the fall in economic activ-
ity. The biggest emitter by far is the electricity, gas and water supply sector, accounting for around 65% of all 
emissions under the EU ETS. The 19.6 % decline in emissions from this sector is therefore a major contributor to 
the overall decline in emissions. The move to partial auctioning of EU ETS permits for the energy sector and con-
tinuing expansion of renewable energy are among the factors at work. Two sectors saw emissions increase in this 
period: mining and quarrying (+3.4%) and manufacture of transport equipment (+6.3%). Together these account 
for only 1.9% of total emissions. Increases in emissions are centred on the oil and gas extraction industries and 
a significant increase from a major German vehicle manufacturer.
Figure 5.11:   Change in EU-25 Member States’ industrial GHG emissions, 2007-2010
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Source:    Ecorys based on CITL data (2009 and 2010 data provisional).164
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in classifications130 between the two indicators means 
the comparison might not be exact. Differences due to 
this could change the position as regards decoupling in 
these four countries. Five countries achieved only rela-
tive decoupling of industrial energy consumption from 
industrial emissions: Ireland, Spain, Portugal, Greece and 
Austria.
In summary, by most measures of performance with 
regard to emissions the EU outperforms the USA and 
is closing the gap on Japan. Emissions show a marked 
trend towards decoupling from GVA growth. In around 
half of the countries this trend is heading towards 
absolute decoupling. This trend is evident for emis-
sions for the whole economy but also holds when the 
best available evidence for emissions from industry, 
manufacturing and construction, is considered. The 
best performers come from across the EU, with EU-12 
Member States performing particularly well. Indeed, 
130  The NACE rev 1.1. sector scope of both GHG emissions and FEC is not clearly 
defined, particularly in respect of FEC-related construction emissions.
The role of the energy generation mix in determining 
emission levels and changes in emissions was mentioned 
earlier. Figure 5.13 presents the change in GHG emis-
sions from industry against the changes in final energy 
consumption (FEC) by industry for the period 1995-2007. 
This demonstrates that in the EU-25 (EU-27 excluding 
CY, MT) FEC by industry remained largely unchanged, 
whereas emissions declined by 14%. This indicates an 
overall decarbonisation of the energy consumed by 
industry.
All but four Member States – Denmark, The Netherlands, 
Romania and Estonia – are below the 45 degree line, 
indicating that most Member States were able to decou-
ple industrial energy consumption from industrial emis-
sions. In these four Member States, the recent changes 
suggest that the energy mix has become higher car-
bon, due to retirement of low-emission nuclear capac-
ity and expansion of coal -or gas- fired plants. Equally, 
the nature of the data and the potential for differences 
Figure 5.12:   Change in industrial GHG emissions in the EU-25, 2007-2010
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reductions of up to 20% combined with GVA growth 
rates of up to 40%.
the weakest performers are found in the EU-15. The 
other EU-15 Member States generally report emission 
Figure 5.13:   Change in industrial GHG emissions (manufacturing and construction) and final energy 
consumption by industry in the EU-25, 1995-2007
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Figure 5.14:   Domestic material consumption (DMC) in the EU-27 by components (in million tonnes)
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how in terms of material consumption, six economies - 
Italy, Germany, the UK, the Netherlands, Luxembourg 
and Hungary - all achieved what may be regarded, to 
some extent, as absolute decoupling, by reducing mate-
rial consumption while increasing industrial GVA. Eleven 
other – France, Poland, Czech Republic, Sweden, Aus-
tria, Belgium, Slovakia, Finland, Lithuania, Latvia, Slove-
nia –demonstrated what could be regarded as relative 
decoupling, with industrial GVA increasing faster than 
DMC in this period. In the other Member States below 
the 45 degree line – Spain, Greece, Denmark, Ireland, 
Estonia, Cyprus, Portugal and Malta – DMC grew faster 
than GVA, pointing to a reliance on resource use to fuel 
economic growth. In Spain and Ireland this is under-
stood to be consistent with expansion in the construc-
tion sector with its high material needs (see figure 5.18).
Figure 5.16 presents DMC over the four main categories 
of material: fossil energy (carrier) materials, biomass, 
non-metallic minerals and metal ores. It shows that con-
sumption of biomass declined by 0.4%, but metal ore 
consumption increased by over 10% and non-metallic 
mineral consumption by 13.9%. Fossil fuel consumption 
grew by 3.2%, in keeping with overall growth in FEC in 
the EU-27 over this period.
Developing this further, Figure 5.17 presents the mate-
rial productivity for each Member State in 2007 as a fac-
tor of euros of GVA from industry, at 1995 constant 
5.3.3  Material flows and resource efficiency
The way in which industries use and dispose of raw 
materials is a critical component of their environmental 
impact and performance. It is important to consider the 
impact of material flows in all lifecycle stages, namely: 
how raw materials are extracted (as this places environ-
mental pressure on the locations from which they are 
sourced); how they are used (resource efficiency); how 
resources or materials are finally disposed of or reused.
Domestic material consumption (DMC) is a measure of 
the volume (in tonnes) of materials directly consumed 
in an economy. It is the sum of all materials extracted 
domestically plus the materials in physical imports, 
minus the materials in physical exports. As a volume 
measure, DMC does not differentiate between the type 
of material consumed, although it is important to note 
the differences between, for example, consuming one 
tonne of wood versus one tonne of mercury, as they 
obviously differ in mass density and the potential envi-
ronmental implications of the latter are far more serious. 
Figure 5.14 shows that within the EU-27, DMC increased 
by 7.9% between 2000 and 2007.
Figure 5.15 presents an analysis of the change in DMC 
against the change in industrial GVA over the same 
period, though due to data limitations DMC is for the 
whole economy and not just industry. The figure shows, 
Figure 5.15:   Change in DMC and industrial GVA by Member State, 2000-2007
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the period), came in Luxembourg, Italy, Slovakia, Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland, illustrating the catching 
up process in some of the EU10 countries.
5.3.4.  Waste generation and treatment
The production process in industry creates waste at 
various stages. Examining trends in the volume of waste 
generated by industry provides insights into changes in 
the absolute and, by relating back to GVA, the relative 
impact of industry. The coverage and quality of waste 
data restrict the extent to which analysis is possible, 
as so far data have been collected for only 2004, 2006 
and 2008 and are not directly comparable between 
industries.131
Total waste generation data for industry132 in the EU-27 
are presented in figure 5.18. This shows clearly that the 
two sectors that appear to generate the largest amount 
of waste are construction and mining and quarrying. The 
overall trend is interesting, with a 4.8% rise in the total 
131  The data are compiled on a NACE rev. 2 sectoral basis, which is not directly 
comparable with other data, such as GVA data from EU KLEMS, compiled on 
a NACE rev. 1.1 basis.
132  This is for NACE rev.2 categories A to F. While the category headers are similar 
to NACE rev.1.1, there are differences in their composition. Focusing solely on 
industrial sectors A to F covers 93 to 94% of waste generated across all NACE 
categories and 83.8% to 86.3% of all NACE category and household waste 
generated in this period across the whole EU27.
prices, per tonne of DMC for the whole economy. Mate-
rial productivity for the EU-25 was 0.32 euros of indus-
trial GVA per tonne of DMC and improved by EUR 0.02 
or 5.2% from 2000 to 2007. This small improvement pro-
vides evidence of a limited relative decoupling of indus-
trial GVA from material use.
A distinct difference is evident between the EU-15 and 
EU-10 economies, with material productivity more than 
three times higher in the EU-15 (0.36) than in the EU-10 
(0.10). The countries with the highest material produc-
tivity levels are Luxembourg, the Netherlands and Ger-
many, broadly consistent with the data on DMC. Spain 
and Ireland rank among the countries with the lowest 
levels, again reflecting the role of the relatively high 
material consumption of the construction sector.
Eight Member States recorded a decline in material 
productivity – Malta, Denmark, Spain, Ireland, Greece, 
Portugal, Cyprus and Estonia – mainly a trend in the 
Member States with strong expansion in the construc-
tion sector, rather than a divide along EU-15 and EU-10 
lines, as was evident in the changes in Figure 5.15. The 
change in the EU-10 marked a relatively bigger increase 
in material productivity than that achieved in the EU-15. 
The biggest absolute increase in material productiv-
ity came in Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, 
Italy, Sweden and Slovakia, each recording increases of 
0.05 EUR or more over the period. The biggest relative 
increases in material productivity (greater than 20% over 
Figure 5.16:   Domestic material consumption in the EU-27 by main material categories, 2000-2007
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in these sectors. There is no clear explanation for the 
increase in waste generation in these sectors. Box 5.4 
presents a brief assessment of the impact of the End-of-
Life Vehicles Directive (which imposed binding targets 
for reuse, recovery and recycling) on the eco-perfor-
mance of the automobile industry in the EU.
Waste can have a significant environmental impact, par-
ticularly if it is hazardous or otherwise contaminated, 
but even simple biological waste can also be a signifi-
cant source of GHG when disposed of in landfills. It is 
becoming increasingly important to view waste as 
a potential resource stream, rather than a problem that 
needs to be disposed of in the cheapest way possible.
Figure 5.20 illustrates the most recent trends in waste 
treatment across the EU-27, giving details of the pro-
cess used to dispose of the waste. In keeping with the 
waste hierarchy of reduce, re-use, recycle, recover or dis-
pose (in that order of preference), the waste treatment 
methods span the last three stages. Recovery other than 
energy recovery means recycling or other more envi-
ronmentally friendly treatment of waste. Energy recov-
ery means using waste to produce energy, typically by 
means of incineration, but also via other processes. The 
three other categories cover forms of disposal, from 
incineration without energy recovery to disposal of 
waste on land (landfill) or into water.
from 2004 to 2006, fuelled by an increase in waste gener-
ation from the electricity, gas and water sector (+42.7%) 
and construction (+7.9%). Over the same period there 
were decreases in the volume of waste generated from 
mining and quarrying (-14.1%) and manufacturing 
(-5.2%). According to the same data source, from 2006 to 
2008 there was a significant decline (-11%) in the volume 
of waste generated, with the biggest arising in agricul-
ture (-41.4%) and electricity, gas and water (-20.8%).
Figure 5.19 presents the change in waste generation by 
sector, against the change in GVA over the period 2004-
2006.133 This demonstrates an absolute decoupling of 
waste generation from GVA growth in this period for all 
sectors in the upper left quadrant, including manufac-
turing as a whole and electrical, optical and transport 
equipment, basic and fabricated metals, food, bever-
ages and tobacco (FBT), chemicals and wood and wood 
products (WWP).
Relative decoupling, with generation of waste increasing 
at a slower rate than GVA, is evident in all but four of the 
other sectors. The four sectors that counter the trend are 
construction, agriculture, electricity, gas and water and 
paper and publishing. In each case the change in GVA 
was exceeded by the change in waste generated, appar-
ently pointing to negative trends in eco-performance 
133  GVA data are not yet available for 2008.
Figure 5.17:   Change in material productivity 2000-2007
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Figure 5.18:   Total waste generation by industry in the EU-27 (NACE rev.2 A-F), 2004-2008
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Figure 5.19:   Change in total waste generation by industry (NACE rev. 2 A-F) and GVA in the EU-27, 2004-2006
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Box 5.4:   Measures to support sustainable performance in the EU automobile industry:  
an assessment of the ELV Directive
The End-of-Life Vehicles (ELV) Directive (EC, 2000a) was introduced in 2000 in order to achieve a number of envi-
ronmental benefits (and is thus based on Article 192 of the Lisbon Treaty). It covers the whole lifecycle of a vehi-
cle, including the design, re-use and recycling stages. Above all, it regulates a major sector of European industry 
that is facing considerable competition from around the world. This is perhaps why the Directive has attracted 
considerable attention, and at times criticism, from the different industries involved in the product chain. 
The headline provisions of the Directive are its binding targets for re-use, recovery and recycling of ELVs. By 2006, 
85% of the weight of each vehicle had to be either reused or recovered (e.g. bumpers, tyres, etc.) and 80% had 
to be reused or recycled. Moreover, these targets will rise to 95% and 85% respectively by 2015. Before the ELV 
Directive some countries had already managed to achieve high levels of reuse, recovery and recycling thanks to 
effective voluntary agreements with industry (for example, in Sweden and the Netherlands). However, this was 
not the case throughout the EU, which was one of the reasons for introducing the Directive. 
The 2006 targets have been reached in nineteen Member States, though reporting has been problematic because 
of the different methods employed by the national authorities (EP, 2010). There is, however, some concern that 
the 2015 targets cannot be achieved because of the extra proportion that needs to be recovered or recycled, as 
every additional percentage point becomes more difficult. A large proportion of each ELV has significant value, 
which is why dismantling cars has long been a profitable business all over Europe. However, the parts of an ELV 
with less value make reuse and recycling less commercially attractive. By way of illustration, the average value of 
the ferrous metals in an ELV (steel and iron) is €128, whereas the plastic is worth only €1 (ARN Recycling).
The different industries in the automobile supply chain have been forced to make considerable changes in order 
to meet the requirements of the Directive. Significantly, the principle of extended producer responsibility has been 
introduced whereby manufacturers assume responsibility for the final use of their products, which had previously 
not been considered part of an industry’s core business (Gerrard and Kandlikar, 2007). Some of the specific chal-
lenges which the EU industry has had to face are described below:
•	 Vehicles now need to be designed for recycling in addition to normal commercial considerations. Use of plas-
tics is problematic, because of their low value and mixture of types, which makes them difficult, and therefore 
more expensive, to recycle. However, changing the design of a vehicle for recycling purposes can increase 
its weight which has a negative impact on energy efficiency and emission reduction efforts. In this regard 
the increasing use of aluminium is encouraging, since it is a light material with a high end value. Although it 
is expensive, use of aluminium could help to reinforce Europe’s tradition of making quality cars. Even closer 
coordination between suppliers and manufacturers and the recycling industry is needed to make sure that the 
whole life cycle of the vehicle is taken into account. Some interesting and useful research was conducted with 
these different partners in the EU-funded LIRECAR (‘Light and recyclable cars’) project just after the Directive 
was introduced. More investment in similar research is needed to ensure that vehicles are designed for both 
the environment and recycling, while remaining competitive on price.
•	 Manufacturers and, consequently, their suppliers have also had to stop using four heavy metals (lead, cad-
mium, mercury and hexavalent chromium) which are damaging the environment. The industry has largely 
achieved this (ÖKO Institut, 2010) but at a considerable financial cost. These heavy metals were being gradu-
ally phased out by industry but future vehicles such as battery-powered or hydrogen cars will need other 
raw materials (European Commission, 2010e). To remain competitive, more resources have to be invested in 
research for the future (e.g. into long-term substitutes that do not rely on access to critical raw materials; see 
the previous chapter of this report), which should be given equal priority to regulation of cars designed today.
•	 The recycling industry has had to innovate in order to meet the targets set by the Directive, notably in use of 
post shredding technology (PST) that separates materials even further so that they can then be recycled or 
used for energy production. ARN Recycling recently completed a large plant in Tiel (Netherlands) with support 
from the automobile industry and new facilities have also been opened in Austria and Germany. Volkswagen, 
in partnership with the recycling company Sicon, has produced the first car that meets the recycling targets 
set in the Directive, mainly by means of investment in PST.171
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category, which increased its share of waste treatment 
from 41.7% to 45.7% between 2004 and 2008. At the 
same time, disposal of waste via landfill or ‘deposit 
onto or into land’ decreased from 51.9% to 47.3%. An 
increase in energy recovery from 3.1% to 3.4% was 
also recorded (see also chapter 4 of this report on 
waste stream recovery and recycling of non-energy 
materials).
The total quantity of waste treated increased from 
2004 to 2006 before falling from 2006 to 2008. Over-
all, from 2004 to 2008 the total volume of waste sent 
for treatment increased by 1.6% from 2 353 million 
tonnes to 2 391 million tonnes. Changes between the 
main treatment and disposal methods over the period 
were limited primarily to a move towards greater 
recycling in the ‘recovery other than energy recovery’ 
However, overall, industry has been expressing some concerns about whether imposing headline targets is the 
best strategy to create sustainable growth. This is illustrated by its much larger investment in R&D on emission 
reduction, fuel efficiency and energy consumption technologies (Gerrard and Kandlikar, 2007). The environmen-
tal benefits of the Directive have to be weighed against the costs and the need to concentrate on the future of 
a rapidly changing industry. Greater understanding of the different stages of the supply chain helps to ensure 
that the whole lifecycle of the product is taken into account. Legislation certainly has a role to play in this, but so 
do research and intra-industry cooperation. Consequently, the right combination and the establishment of well 
functioning markets for recycled materials are needed in order to create the conditions for sustainable growth.
Figure 5.20:   Total waste treatment in the EU-27, 2004-2008
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5.3.5. Water
Europe has abundant water resources, but they are not 
distributed evenly. In some regions water is becoming 
an increasingly precious and scarce resource. There-
fore, efficient use and management of (waste)-water 
resources is important to prevent and/or adapt to water 
scarcity. The Water Framework Directive was designed 
to safeguard a sufficient supply of good-quality fresh 
surface water and groundwater within a sustainable, 
balanced and equitable water use scheme in each Mem-
ber State (EC, 2000b).
The efficiency with which industry uses water is impor-
tant, although agriculture and residential users are the 
largest sources of demand. Water is crucial to many 
industrial processes. It is therefore important to bal-
ance industrial needs against agricultural and domestic 
requirements, knowing that losses of water in the supply 
network are often substantial, particularly in Member 
States with severe water scarcity, as in southern Europe. 
Water has a number of other environmental impacts, 
including indirectly via the energy used in processing, 
supplying and treating it.
It is hard to draw robust conclusions on the eco-per-
formance of industry in terms of water use (both as 
input and as destination for its emissions) as the data 
are weak and incomplete on a yearly and Member State 
basis. Comparing total water abstraction with abstrac-
tion for industry, the latter has fallen faster than total 
abstraction over the same period. Figure 5.21 provides 
some evidence of an absolute decoupling of industrial 
water abstraction from industrial GVA growth. A particu-
lar improvement is evident in Germany over the whole 
period. The one exception according to the available 
data is Austria, where water abstraction increased over 
the period. As regards water as destination for industrial 
emissions, see Box 5.5.
The waste treatment data do not allow sectoral analysis. 
Nevertheless, it is clear that the way in which waste can 
eventually be treated is a factor in how industrial pro-
cesses enable or restrict the options by which products 
can be recycled or disposed of safely. If targets are to be 
met and the environmental impact reduced, it is impor-
tant for industry to design products with cradle-to-cra-
dle life-cycle processes in mind. Although not evident 
at macro level, several initiatives have been launched to 
increase resource efficiency, but they are still not wide-
spread among all industry. Collection systems’ bottle-
necks and the lack of incentives to use recycled mate-
rial are major barriers to enhancing the waste recycling 
markets.
The overall eco-performance of industry in terms of mate-
rial and resource use is more mixed than for other envi-
ronmental variables. With material consumption increas-
ing as a whole, but at a slower rate than GVA growth, 
there is evidence of relative decoupling of the impact for 
the EU as a whole. At Member State level the picture is 
more mixed with only a few countries providing strong 
evidence of absolute decoupling of economic growth 
from material and resource use - Germany, Italy, the 
Netherlands and, to a lesser extent, the UK, Hungary and 
Luxembourg. A more worrying trend is that nine Member 
States (Spain, Greece, Denmark, Ireland, Slovenia, Esto-
nia, Cyprus, Portugal and Malta) exhibit no decoupling of 
resource consumption from GVA growth, demonstrating 
that, in some Member States at least, efficient and sus-
tainable resource use is some distance away.
Within industry there were more positive trends in most 
sectors, with waste generation being decoupled from 
GVA growth to some extent in all but three. Manufactur-
ing as a whole and many of its sub-sectors exhibit abso-
lute decoupling. Notably, there was relative decoupling 
in the construction sector, the biggest waste generator. 
The second biggest waste-generating sector, mining and 
quarrying, was among the poorest relative performers.
Positive eco-performance trends were exhibited in 
waste treatment in general, with energy recovery and 
recycling slowly displacing disposal to landfill. The 
role of policy in initiating this change should not be 
underestimated.173
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Figure 5.21:   Water abstraction by EU manufacturing industry by Member State, 1995-2007
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Box 5.5: Eco-expenditures on waste-water management 
Wastewater management is a major item in industrial environmental protection expenditures (EPE), which is pre-
sented in section 5.4.3. In 2006, wastewater management accounted for 17% of public EPE. Figure 5.22 presents 
an analysis of the extent to which increased EPE on wastewater by manufacturing industry could lead to decreases 
in industrial water abstraction. It demonstrates that the correlation between the two variables could be weak: 
in general, EPE on wastewater has been increasing faster than water abstraction. In addition, aside from Poland 
and Lithuania, the five other Member States where EPE on wastewater by manufacturing industry increased, also 
saw their water abstraction for manufacturing decline. Austria saw the biggest increase in water abstraction. This 
was due to above-average growth in water intensive manufacturing sectors such as food, drink and tobacco and 
chemicals.174
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5.3.6.  Summary and tentative discussion on the impact 
of the recent crisis 
The overall picture emerging of the eco-performance of 
EU industry is one of significant progress towards decou-
pling economic growth from environmental impact 
over the last two decades. The specific role played by 
industry within this setting is not always clear from the 
data, as it is not always possible to separate out which 
part of the changes is the result of growing efficiency 
in industry and which is due to other improvements. A 
case in point is that many of the most positive aspects 
of industry’s eco-performance stem from improvements 
in emissions from the energy sector. However, the evi-
dence points to these improvements being based on 
wider policy intervention in the energy generation sec-
tor, rather than on action taken by industry. While not all 
the improvement could be claimed by industry for these 
reasons, the evidence does support the view that on the 
whole industry has improved its eco-performance over 
the period covered and that these trends are continuing 
in most sectors and Member States. Policy has played 
There are various other aspects affecting the sustainabil-
ity of industry including its impact on land use, biodiver-
sity and air pollution (see also subsection 5.4.3 and Box 
5.8 below on environmental protection expenditures). 
Measures of these are of mixed quality. For air pollution 
there has been a significant improvement in industrial 
emissions in the last 10-20 years, closely following the 
trends in energy and GHG emissions as the emission 
source points are often the same. Since 1995 there have 
been falls of around 50% in particulates (PM10), which 
are responsible for human respiratory problems, and 
over 50% falls in nitrogen oxide (NOx), ammonia (NH4) 
and Sulphur dioxide (SO2), the main pollutants respon-
sible for acid rain (Ecorys et al. 2011). Reductions in these 
emissions are continuing, although they have slowed 
since the early impetus given by EU air pollution legisla-
tion (see also Commission 2002).
As shown by Figure 5.23 in general there appears to be a correlation between increased industrial GVA and 
increased industrial EPE on wastewater. This is strongest in newer Member States in Central and Eastern Europe, 
as a result of lower relative starting points than in Member States such as Germany and Sweden
Figure 5.22:   Change in EPE on wastewater and in water abstraction by manufacturing industry  
in selected Member States, 2003-2007
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resource use in the short-term (European Commission, 
2010e). Early estimates from the EEA (EEA, 2010) point 
to a:
•	 5.5% drop in fossil fuel consumption (oil, coal and 
natural gas); 
•	 6.8% drop in GHG emissions compared with 2008, 
which implies a 17.3% reduction from 1990s levels; 
•	 12.7% drop in coal use;
•	 8.3% increase in use of renewables.
On a global scale, however, the drop in GHG emissions 
was limited to 1.3%, which is significantly less than pre-
dicted at the dawn of the crisis (Friedlingstein et al., 
2010). 
There is a growing body of evidence showing a short-
term (beneficial) impact on some of the indicators for 
sustainable growth. The medium and long-term impact 
is more difficult to estimate. As economies rebound 
emissions are expected to increase. Friedlingstein et 
al. (2010) suggests that if global GDP increases by 4.8% 
(as projected by the IMF in 2010) then carbon emis-
sions would follow with a 3% increase, assuming that 
improvement trends for carbon intensity remain stable. 
a prominent role in many of these developments, partic-
ularly in improvements in emissions to air and in waste 
and resource efficiency.
Overall, there remains strong evidence of, at least, rela-
tive decoupling of GVA from environmental impact 
across the majority of industry, particularly in respect 
the cases of energy, GHG or other emissions and water 
use. Relative decoupling is also apparent in material 
consumption, but not to the same extent as in the other 
aspects. The evidence suggests that absolute decou-
pling is also taking place, with eco-performance improv-
ing in absolute terms, not just proportionally, while 
economic performance is also improving. This is most 
visible in the cases of energy use and emissions, but, as 
noted above, any absolute decoupling is the product of 
a variety of factors to which actions by industry alone 
makes only a small contribution.
Throughout the text references are made to the recent 
economic crisis. Unfortunately, however, 2007 is the 
latest year for which most indicators of industrial eco-
performance are available. Nevertheless, whenever 
more recent observations are available, a steep decline 
in the eco-indicators over the last two years tends to be 
observed. These drops are likely to have been influenced 
by the dramatic fall in economic activity. The crisis is also 
the probable reason for the reductions in emissions and 
Figure 5.23:   Change in EPE on wastewater and GVA in industry in selected Member States, 2003-2007
% change in industrial wastewater EPE 2003-2007
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Community Innovation Survey (CIS 2008) and a Euro-
barometer study based on a survey of managers of 
European SMEs (‘Attitude of European entrepreneurs 
towards eco-innovation’, Flash Eurobarometer 315). CIS 
2008 provides some insight into whether innovation 
generally leads to environmental benefits for firms, in 
addition to the perceived economic benefits. 
Table 1 presents an overview of the environmental ben-
efits reported by firms with innovation activities in CIS 
2008. There are marked differences between countries 
but, overall, lower energy use is the most commonly 
reported benefit. This might be related to the fact that 
it is a general target relevant to every enterprise in every 
sector. Other prominent environmental benefits include 
‘Recycled waste, water or materials’ and ‘Reduced mate-
rial use per unit of output’.
There clearly appear to be big differences between 
some countries. The countries with the highest percent-
age of innovating companies reporting environmental 
benefits are Ireland, Germany and Portugal. Environ-
mental benefits are clearly less present in Bulgaria, 
Cyprus and Czech Republic. Up to two thirds of the Irish 
innovating companies report recycled waste, water or 
materials, whereas only 15% of the Bulgarian innovat-
ing companies report reduced energy use per unit of 
output in the form of production of goods or services. 
One notable finding is that the three best and three 
worst performing countries are each spread across the 
innovation typology groupings (innovation “leaders”, 
“followers”, “moderate innovators” and “catching-up 
countries”, see the Innovation Union Scoreboard 2010). 
This provides some evidence that typologies for overall 
innovation may not be as appropriate for the analysis 
in terms of environmental benefits of innovation. Look-
ing at the underlying data, generally speaking, industry 
reports more environmental benefits than services.
These findings are consistent with the analysis of eco-
innovation in Flash Eurobarometer 315. According to 
Eurobarometer, about 42% of the enterprises that had 
introduced at least one type of eco-innovation in the 
last two years said that such innovations had led to 
a reduction in material use. Furthermore, comparing CIS 
data with Flash Eurobarometer 315, no direct correlation 
can be established between eco-innovation and report-
ing an environmental benefit, as the countries reporting 
the highest environmental benefits are not especially 
the ones reporting high investment in eco-innovation 
investments. According to Flash Eurobarometer 315, 
‘there are only six countries where more than 20 % of 
respondents estimated that 30 % of their innovation invest-
ments were eco-related (Sweden, Greece, Austria, Cyprus, 
Luxembourg and Poland’). This list of countries clearly 
does not coincide with the countries reporting high 
percentages of environmental benefits (mainly Ireland, 
Germany and Portugal).
With the recovery of the European economy (which 
experienced an uneven and fragile economic growth 
of 1.8% in 2010 and is projected to maintain the same 
growth rate in  2011, EC, 2011a), GHG emissions from 
the power sector and industry appear to have increased 
by 3.5% in 2010, as indicated by preliminary figures (DG 
CLIMA, 2011).
The scattered evidence and data presented in the pre-
vious paragraphs can provide a starting point for ana-
lysing the effects of the economic crisis on sustainable 
growth. Comprehensive analysis will, however, have 
to wait until data are published for 2008-2010 and the 
effects of the economic recovery are better known.
5.4.  Eco-expenditure and eco-innovation
This section analyses the evidence on the levels of 
investment made in environmental protection and eco-
innovation as a marker of mitigation efforts by industry 
and future decoupling. New “green” business models 
are also briefly discussed. 
5.4.1. Eco-innovation
Eco-innovation is often regarded as pivotal for achiev-
ing sustainable growth (see, for example, Aghion et al. 
2009a). According to the Eco-Innovation Observatory 
(EIO, 2010), ‘eco-innovation is the introduction of any 
new or significantly improved product (good or service), 
process, organisational change or marketing solution that 
reduces the use of natural resources (including materials, 
energy, water and land) and decreases the release of harm-
ful substances across the whole lifecycle’. 
Data on eco-innovation are relatively poor and research-
ers rely heavily on patent statistics (see e.g. Oltra et 
al., 2008, Dechezleprêtre et al., 2011, Johnstone et al., 
2010), single case studies (Technopolis Group, 2008) or 
scattered surveys (Kemp, 2008). Using survey, patent 
and venture capital data, Aghion et al., (2009b) argue 
that the speed of eco-innovation in technologies is 
slow compared with other emerging technologies. The 
authors see some momentum but claim that support 
from tax rates on energy, the ETS and public spending 
on R&D is still too low and/or fragmented. Patent data 
are also used in case studies on the state of eco-inno-
vation in particular countries. Dechezlêprete and Mar-
tin (2010), for example, look at how the UK performs in 
terms of eco-innovation by identifying 19 technologies 
they claim are ‘clean’. The study singles out certain tech-
nologies (such as marine technologies) where the UK 
holds a comparative advantage.
This section examines the environmental benefits of 
innovation using micro-level and firm data from the 177
Chapter 5 — EU Industry in a Sustainable Growth Context
T
a
b
l
e
 
5
.
1
:
 
P
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
i
n
n
o
v
a
t
i
o
n
 
a
c
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
i
n
g
 
a
n
 
e
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
b
e
n
e
fi
t
,
 
2
0
0
8
 
–
 
I
n
d
u
s
t
r
y
 
(
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
 
c
o
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
i
o
n
)
 
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
b
e
n
e
fi
t
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
g
o
o
d
s
 
o
r
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
 
w
i
t
h
i
n
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
E
n
v
i
r
o
n
m
e
n
t
a
l
 
b
e
n
e
fi
t
s
 
f
r
o
m
 
a
f
t
e
r
-
s
a
l
e
 
u
s
e
 
o
f
 
 
g
o
o
d
s
 
o
r
 
s
e
r
v
i
c
e
s
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
d
-
u
s
e
r
 
R
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
 
u
s
e
 
p
e
r
 
u
n
i
t
 
o
f
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
R
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
e
n
e
r
g
y
 
u
s
e
 
p
e
r
 
u
n
i
t
 
o
f
 
o
u
t
p
u
t
R
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
C
O
2
 
‘
f
o
o
t
p
r
i
n
t
’
 
(
t
o
t
a
l
 
C
O
2
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
i
o
n
)
 
b
y
 
y
o
u
r
 
e
n
t
e
r
p
r
i
s
e
R
e
p
l
a
c
e
d
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
l
e
s
s
 
p
o
l
l
u
t
i
n
g
 
o
r
 
h
a
z
a
r
d
o
u
s
 
s
u
b
s
t
i
t
u
t
e
s
R
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
s
o
i
l
,
 
w
a
t
e
r
,
 
n
o
i
s
e
 
o
r
 
a
i
r
 
p
o
l
l
u
t
i
o
n
R
e
c
y
c
l
e
d
 
w
a
s
t
e
,
 
w
a
t
e
r
 
o
r
 
m
a
t
e
r
i
a
l
s
E
n
d
-
u
s
e
r
 
b
e
n
e
fi
t
s
,
 
r
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
e
n
e
r
g
y
 
u
s
e
E
n
d
-
u
s
e
r
 
b
e
n
e
fi
t
s
,
 
r
e
d
u
c
e
d
 
a
i
r
,
 
w
a
t
e
r
,
 
s
o
i
l
 
o
r
 
n
o
i
s
e
 
p
o
l
l
u
t
i
o
n
E
n
d
-
u
s
e
r
 
b
e
n
e
fi
t
s
,
 
i
m
p
r
o
v
e
d
 
r
e
c
y
c
l
i
n
g
 
o
f
 
p
r
o
d
u
c
t
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
u
s
e
A
u
s
t
r
i
a
3
7
 
%
3
9
 
%
2
9
 
%
3
4
 
%
3
9
 
%
3
2
 
%
3
4
 
%
2
6
 
%
2
2
 
%
B
e
l
g
i
u
m
3
3
 
%
4
0
 
%
3
1
 
%
3
0
 
%
3
7
 
%
4
4
 
%
2
8
 
%
2
3
 
%
2
6
 
%
B
u
l
g
a
r
i
a
1
3
 
%
1
5
 
%
6
 
%
1
0
 
%
1
2
 
%
9
 
%
8
 
%
8
 
%
6
 
%
C
y
p
r
u
s
1
6
 
%
2
1
 
%
1
3
 
%
1
2
 
%
2
1
 
%
1
9
 
%
8
 
%
9
 
%
8
 
%
C
z
e
c
h
 
R
e
p
u
b
l
i
c
3
7
 
%
4
1
 
%
2
0
 
%
2
4
 
%
3
2
 
%
4
5
 
%
3
4
 
%
3
1
 
%
3
0
 
%
E
s
t
o
n
i
a
2
6
 
%
9
 
%
1
4
 
%
2
2
 
%
9
 
%
1
3
 
%
1
8
 
%
1
4
 
%
1
3
 
%
F
i
n
l
a
n
d
4
1
 
%
3
8
 
%
2
8
 
%
2
9
 
%
2
8
 
%
4
0
 
%
3
4
 
%
2
3
 
%
2
5
 
%
F
r
a
n
c
e
3
0
 
%
2
8
 
%
1
8
 
%
3
3
 
%
2
9
 
%
4
3
 
%
2
3
 
%
1
9
 
%
2
3
 
%
G
e
r
m
a
n
y
4
6
 
%
5
4
 
%
3
9
 
%
3
1
 
%
4
7
 
%
4
8
 
%
4
7
 
%
3
7
 
%
3
4
 
%
H
u
n
g
a
r
y
3
9
 
%
4
4
 
%
2
0
 
%
3
7
 
%
3
6
 
%
2
9
 
%
2
1
 
%
2
0
 
%
1
4
 
%
I
r
e
l
a
n
d
3
7
 
%
4
3
 
%
3
9
 
%
4
0
 
%
3
8
 
%
6
6
 
%
3
8
 
%
2
9
 
%
4
2
 
%
I
t
a
l
y
1
6
 
%
1
9
 
%
1
5
 
%
1
6
 
%
2
8
 
%
2
8
 
%
2
4
 
%
2
5
 
%
2
4
 
%
L
a
t
v
i
a
2
1
 
%
2
7
 
%
1
0
 
%
2
5
 
%
3
6
 
%
1
7
 
%
2
4
 
%
3
4
 
%
1
1
 
%
L
i
t
h
u
a
n
i
a
4
0
 
%
4
2
 
%
2
5
 
%
3
3
 
%
2
9
 
%
2
6
 
%
2
7
 
%
2
1
 
%
2
1
 
%
L
u
x
e
m
b
o
u
r
g
3
5
 
%
3
9
 
%
3
8
 
%
3
8
 
%
4
1
 
%
6
1
 
%
2
9
 
%
2
9
 
%
3
3
 
%
M
a
l
t
a
3
2
 
%
3
3
 
%
1
4
 
%
2
6
 
%
2
2
 
%
3
1
 
%
1
8
 
%
5
 
%
1
4
 
%
N
e
t
h
e
r
l
a
n
d
s
2
5
 
%
2
9
 
%
1
8
 
%
3
0
 
%
2
7
 
%
3
1
 
%
2
5
 
%
2
0
 
%
1
8
 
%
P
o
l
a
n
d
3
1
 
%
3
3
 
%
1
9
 
%
3
0
 
%
3
5
 
%
2
8
 
%
2
8
 
%
3
0
 
%
1
9
 
%
P
o
r
t
u
g
a
l
4
2
 
%
4
6
 
%
3
3
 
%
4
6
 
%
5
4
 
%
6
4
 
%
4
0
 
%
4
3
 
%
4
5
 
%
R
o
m
a
n
i
a
4
0
 
%
4
1
 
%
2
6
 
%
2
6
 
%
3
7
 
%
3
7
 
%
3
3
 
%
3
3
 
%
2
2
 
%
S
l
o
v
a
k
i
a
2
7
 
%
3
4
 
%
1
2
 
%
2
4
 
%
2
9
 
%
3
3
 
%
3
1
 
%
2
6
 
%
2
5
 
%
S
w
e
d
e
n
3
2
 
%
3
5
 
%
2
4
 
%
2
9
 
%
2
7
 
%
2
7
 
%
3
0
 
%
2
4
 
%
2
0
 
%
S
o
u
r
c
e
:
 
C
I
S
 
2
0
0
8
 
(
I
D
E
A
 
C
o
n
s
u
l
t
)
.178
European Competitiveness Report 2011
evidence to support this latter point, stating that ‘barri-
ers related to financing and funds were very or somewhat 
serious barriers to an accelerated development and uptake 
of eco-innovation. For example, insufficient access to exist-
ing subsidies and fiscal incentives was considered a barrier 
by 6 in 10 respondents.’
Figure 5.24 also reveals that in Belgium, Finland, Lux-
embourg and Portugal, companies tend to be relatively 
more proactive, introducing environmental innovations 
in response to current or expected market demand and 
because of voluntary agreements within their sector. 
This contrasts with other Member States (such as the 
Czech Republic, Lithuania, Malta, Romania and Slovakia) 
Figure 5.24 presents the CIS results on the motives for 
eco-innovation. These are instructive, as they show that 
firms’ expenditure on environmental protection is pri-
marily driven by compliance and regulation and that in 
every case grants, subsidies and financial incentives were 
the weakest motivation for environmental innovation.
Some reasons can be put forward to explain why gov-
ernment grants play a rather limited role in triggering 
environmental innovation: firstly, that the available 
grants do not provide a big enough incentive for Euro-
pean companies to invest in eco-innovation or, sec-
ondly, that companies are unable to gain easy access 
to these grants. The Eurobarometer survey found some 
Figure 5.24:   Motives for environmental innovation (percentage of enterprises with innovation activity), 
2008 - Industry (without construction)
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
Voluntary codes or agreements for environmental good practice within your sector
Current or expected market demand from your customers for environmental innovations
Availability of government grants, subsidies or other ￿nancial incentives for environmental innovation
Environmental regulations or taxes that you expected to be introduced in the future
Existing environmental regulations or taxes on pollution
Belgium
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovakia
Sweden
Source:  CIS 2008 (IDEA Consult).179
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eco-innovation, with firms unwilling to take a lead in 
market demand and voluntary agreements.
A detailed sectoral analysis reveals that firms in some 
sectors tend to be more responsive to one or even all 
the motives suggested for introducing an eco-innova-
tion (such as electricity, gas, steam, air conditioning, 
water supply or waste management), but that, overall, 
existing regulation is the preponderant factor. See boxes 
5.6 and 5.7 for two sectoral case studies.
where firms report they mainly react to regulation (exist-
ing or expected). This may still reflect the implementa-
tion of the acquis as a driving force for innovation. The 
remaining countries have mixed profiles, with no clear 
dominant motive for environmental innovation. The 
Eurobarometer survey also corroborates these find-
ings for SMEs. About two thirds of managers said that 
uncertain market demand was a barrier to faster take-
up of eco-innovation in their company. This uncertainty 
would definitely play a role in defensive behaviour in 
Box 5.6: Industrial initiatives: the Marine Stewardship Council sustainable fishing labelling scheme
One example of a voluntary labelling scheme is the Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) sustainable fishing labelling 
scheme, which certifies and promotes well-managed marine wild-capture fisheries. MSC certification is based on 
third-party assessment of sustainable use of resources and the environmental effects of the activities from capture 
up until delivery on land. To date, 105 fisheries around the world have been MSC-certified, of which 39 are in Europe. 
Since the MSC label was introduced in 2004, take-up has been strong. The total number 
of MSC-labelled seafood products available increased from an estimated 1 000 in Janu-
ary 2008 to 7 362 in September 2010 and approximately 8 200 in January 2011. The 
largest range of MSC-labelled fish products available is in Germany (2 018 products), the 
UK (791) and the Netherlands (727). In the Netherlands for example, MSC-labelled prod-
ucts are estimated to have a share of 19% of total wild-caught seafood products now 
available at retailers. In this case, consumers also consider various other factors (fresh-
ness, health benefits and price) to be more important than environmental impact (World Business Council for 
Sustainable Development, 2008 and Seafood Choices Alliance, 2007). Nonetheless, consumer willingness to buy 
sustainable products seems to be slightly higher for food and fish than for other products.
Consumers have, however, not been the main drivers of take-up of the MSC label. Looking at the fisheries value 
chain, industry, civil society and retailers all play a central part. In 1997, the MSC was set up by a joint engagement 
of a food brand (Unilever) and a civil society organisation (WWF), in response to concerns about depletion of fish 
stocks (whether for reasons of environmental protection or as a company response to input supply insecurity). 
Retailers, although not the primary initiators, have been fast to take it up. Operating in a responsive, fast-moving 
segment in close interaction with consumers, retailers play a central role in the MSC scheme. Along the value 
chain of the fisheries, there has been more resistance to the MSC labelling scheme. For the fisheries economic con-
siderations are the dominant driving factor and the label has been perceived by some as an additional cost bur-
den (on top of fishery policies like quotas that influence this part of the value chain more directly) – even though, 
for some fisheries, more sustainable fishing methods have given rise to cost savings and economic benefits. For 
example, in a small fishery in the Netherlands, a switch to sustainable practices led to a saving of up to 70% in fuel 
expenses while catching higher quality fish and reducing the by-catch and debris. Nonetheless, in general, fisher-
ies’ move to MSC certification has been pushed primarily by the next links along the value chain, where brands 
have created demand for certified fish from the fisheries. More recently, fisheries that claimed to have been using 
sustainable practices before they receive certification have been using the MSC label as a way to increase their 
exposure to the markets and legitimise their good-quality practices (Potts, T. et al., 2011).
In short, both voluntary and mandatory (see Box 5.2) labelling schemes can be seen as successful examples of 
enhancing economic and environmental performance. In general, consumer awareness and responsiveness to 
eco-labels is increasing in the EU (see Box 5.2), even though price and quality remain the main factors in con-
sumers’ purchasing decisions. Consumers tend to associate fish products (food) more closely with sustainability 
than light bulbs (consumer electronics), possibly as a result of their more direct perception of scarcity and of the 
finite nature of natural resources. The voluntary MSC label has attained a high take-up rate, especially in some 
perceptive countries. The main drivers behind the high take-up rates for MSC have been food processors and 
food brands, along with retailers. Industry plays a crucial role as a driver for successful labelling and sustainable 
consumption and production. From the specific cases analysed, consumers seem to accept rather than drive more 
sustainable consumption and production.180
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Box 5.7: Industrial initiatives and new more sustainable business models: chemical leasing
This case study takes the perspective of the chemicals industry in the search for sustainable business models – 
models that can simultaneously have a positive impact on the competitive position of a sector or company (e.g. 
by means of ‘green’ brand positioning and /or cost reductions) and on the use of natural resources.
The considerable move by EU industry towards more sustainable chemistry over recent years has been mostly 
from within the chemical industry, driven by considerations such as resource efficiency, costs and the avail-
ability of raw materials. A strong focus has been placed on a substitution approach, i.e. replacing substances 
by other less hazardous substances that achieve the same or better results and/or diminish resource input 
requirements. In addition to this trend of substitution and resource efficiency, a second (partly overlapping) 
line can be observed with a stronger focus on processes, i.e. a stronger (risk) management approach to chemi-
cals, taking a more service-oriented approach to management of chemicals all along value chains and focusing 
on process optimisation. Chemicals suppliers have been induced to do so partly by regulatory requirements 
(such as REACH), partly by the need to regain market power on what have become buyers’ markets. Users 
of chemicals are motivated by the increase in regulatory requirements, no longer fully matched by in house 
expertise, seeking to improve the performance of their production processes by having chemicals inputs more 
finely tuned to their technical requirements. This service-oriented approach, often encountered, either implic-
itly or under the name of outsourcing, is a new more sustainable way of manufacturing together with offering 
service packages for regular clients, application of lifecycle and supply chain assessments, resource efficiency, 
reduced waste, etc.
Chemical leasing (CL) is one clear example of such a service-oriented risk management approach. Broadly, CL is 
a concept in which a firm (the customer) that uses chemicals in its production process no longer purchases the 
chemicals, including taking responsibility for how they are handled, but purchases from the ‘chemical operator’ 
a service limited to the functions (performed by the chemicals) that are needed for the customer’s production pro-
cess. The ownership and associated responsibilities during the life cycle of the chemical remain with the chemical 
operator, i.e. the leasing company. This model shifts the producer’s previous focus on increasing sales volume to 
increasing value-added and the per-unit performance of the chemical (see the following schematic representation 
of the incentives under CL).
Incentives under chemical leasing
CL is mainly a B2B (business to business) model suitable for specific applications. Typical applications in which 
this model is applied include: powder coating, solvents for cleaning, galvanisation, food processing, pest con-
trol, anti-fouling services, detergents for water purification and electroplating or lubricants for sugar produc-
tion. Some of the ideas underlying the concept of CL have been applied for longer, or implicitly, for example in 
paint applications for the automobile industry. In the 1980s, General Motors (GM) was one of the first compa-
nies to recognise the opportunities offered by forming partnerships with chemicals suppliers. By transferring 
overall management of the chemicals to the supplier, GM cut its costs by 30% (Stoughton, M. and Votta, T., 
2002). Since 2004, CL has been actively promoted, mainly by UNIDO, which established a definition of CL and 
a set of quality criteria.
Traditional relationship
Con￿icting incentives
Chemical
consumption
Supplier
wants to
increase
Buyer
wants to
decrease
Traditional relationship
Aligned incentives
Chemical
consumption
Service
provider
wants to
increase
Buyer
wants to
decrease181
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the development of many of these technologies (e.g. 
renewable energy generation, see for instance Box 3.2 
in European Commission 2010f). This report does not 
focus on the economic case for financing these R&D 
projects. Studies analysing this problem are available 
(Conte et al., 2010).
Limited data are available on total “green” R&D expend-
iture. However, the International Energy Agency 
(IEA) provides data on public support to all types of 
energy-related R&D for a number of countries includ-
ing the EU-15 and Hungary. Figure 5.25 clearly shows 
the increase in the relative share of public support 
allocated to “green” R&D into energy technology: from 
22% in 1990 up to 48% in 2009. This was mainly at the 
expense of nuclear fission and fusion R&D. It should 
be taken into account that, according to the IEA defi-
nitions, research into fossil fuels covers all research 
conducted in the domain of CO2 capture and storage 
which, since 2003, accounts for about 10% of total fos-
sil fuels research. Another notable feature is the higher 
share of public funding that hydrogen and fuel cells 
have secured since the European Initiatives for Growth 
were adopted in 2003 and the Fuel Cells and Hydrogen 
Joint Technology Initiative in 2008, both by the Euro-
pean Commission as part of the 7th Framework Pro-
gramme (EC, 2008b).
The drivers behind and barriers standing in the way of 
eco-innovation and specific policy measures to pro-
mote it have been analysed and proposed in the litera-
ture (see, for example, EIO, 2010). Aghion et al. (2009b) 
suggested combining a carbon price with high initial 
subsidies for R&D into clean-innovation. In a modelling 
exercise, Conte et al. (2010) addressed the market fail-
ure of low carbon prices to act as an incentive for eco-
innovation, investigating different policy mixes and the 
design of policies which reallocate revenue from the car-
bon market to target “green” R&D in the short run and 
labour market support.
5.4.2.  Eco-innovation and R&D on energy 
Policy measures in the field of eco-innovation consist 
not only of regulating or encouraging adoption of 
existing technologies, as regards e.g. increasing energy 
efficiency or waste reduction. Discovery and develop-
ment of new technologies are the cornerstone of sus-
tained “green” growth, including future improvement 
of eco-performance in industry. Innovative technolo-
gies are costly in terms of investment, and often cre-
ate new markets for their products, with all the uncer-
tainties attached. Public support is therefore essential 
both for development of existing “green” technologies 
such as renewable energy technologies and to sup-
port new-born cutting-edge technologies such as 
hydrogen and fuel cells. The EU is a market leader in 
In instances where CL is suitable, the improvements in economic and environmental performance can be 
considerable. Several applications suggest that the model can in some cases reduce the total chemicals input 
by 40 to 80% (Safechem, 2005). The optimisation of production and reduction of ‘spoilage’ may consider-
ably reduce not only the environmental impact but also costs. The CL model ‘divides’ these gains between 
the players primarily involved: the chemical service supplier and the (business) customer. For example, a cus-
tomer that ‘outsources’ high-performance cleaning for medical devices now pays per unit cleaned instead of 
for the chemicals and equipment to clean them. The total cost of cleaning the same number of devices for 
the customer becomes lower while, due to the more efficient resource input, the supplier now also obtains 
a higher price per unit of chemicals used. In practice, the value added by unit of chemicals used for cleaning 
has increased and this benefit is shared. Often, the equipment is also provided and managed by the lessor 
(chemical operator), thereby transferring the associated investment costs and financial risks for the customer 
and including them in the overall service.
The main drivers behind sustainable chemistry and the trend to make chemical-related business processes more 
sustainable, including CL, are reduction of use of resources and the associated costs and input supply risks. How-
ever, the CL model has been limited to specific sectors and applications. Some companies have mentioned that 
issues regarding information transfer have complicated application (trust is an essential part of the CL model as 
the purchaser of the services needs to transfer information to the supplier so that the service can be performed). 
Its impact on the chemical industry as a whole is therefore (as yet) small. The model should nonetheless be seen 
as one positive example within a much broader range heading towards sustainable chemistry that illustrate indus-
try’s search for substitution and/or risk management models that fit companies striving to move to more sustain-
able business practices.182
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spending). Again, in the USA the Recovery Act was the 
single cause for the doubling of funds. With respect 
to industrial energy efficiency, disaggregated data 
are available for only a subset of countries (labelled 
as EU-10), which account for 70% of public funding of 
total R&D on energy efficiency.
Box 5.1 above mentioned the importance that many 
governments put in “green” growth as a way out of the 
economic crisis. Figures 5.26 and 5.27 give a clear hint 
(for two sub-fields of research) of the considerable effort 
put in by the US in green recovery, leading to a notice-
able change of pace concerning public support to green 
R&D; all of this as a part of a wider stimulus plan. How-
ever, it is not a coincidence that also many other major 
economies had stimuli plan that included a considerable 
“green” components (see Table A-5.7 in annex for an 
overview of the stimulus measures adopted in the EU, 
USA, Japan, South Korea and China). 
5.4.3.  Environmental protection expenditures
Another key indicator of current endeavours to reduce 
the long-term environmental impact is environmental 
protection expenditures (EPE) by industries, which is the 
A comparison at international level can be made with 
other major players on the “green” R&D scene. The 
EU has always played a leading role in public fund-
ing of renewable energy research: in order to meet 
the 2020 targets for the shares of renewable energy in 
final energy consumption, substantial resources have 
been invested in further developing existing technolo-
gies. Looking at Figure 5.26 public support for renew-
able energy R&D increased more than twofold between 
2000 and 2009. However, the data do not include EU FP7 
related spending, nor the part of the Emission Trading 
System allowances allocated to innovative renewables 
The USA doubled its funding in only one year, under the 
2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act. It is not 
yet clear whether this increase is sustained by a long-
term commitment, as it evidently appears to be in the 
case of the EU.
Major eco-innovation can be achieved not only by 
conducting research into technologies based on 
renewable sources, but also by increasing the energy 
efficiency and environmental impact of existing tech-
nologies, production processes and techniques. Figure 
5.27 shows that R&D on energy efficiency is also heavily 
funded in the EU, with a more than twofold increase 
between 2005 and 2009 (not counting FP7 related 
Figure 5.25:   Relative share of public support to sub-fields of energy R&D in the EU-16
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Figure 5.26:   Public support for R&D into renewable energy resources, international comparison  
(2009 prices and exchange rates)
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Figure 5.27:   Public support of energy efficiency (not only industrial) R&D  
(2009 prices and exchange rates)
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EPE fell from 2.8% in 2001 to less than 2.5% in 2006 
(Eurostat, 2010).
Data fragmentation issues similar as those mentioned 
for water abstraction also arise with EPE, which limits the 
ability to draw robust conclusions on eco-performance. 
Figure 5.28 shows positive trends in EPE at EU-27 level 
in the most recent years for which data are available, 
particularly in EU-12 states. The decoupling trends seen 
in many EU-12 states could potentially be related to 
increased EPE, though the actual links to EPE are unclear. 
One final conclusion to be drawn from the data is that 
EPE expenditure by industry is highly variable, changing 
significantly from one year to the next.
sum of investment and current expenditure on preven-
tion, reduction and elimination of pollution resulting 
from production processes. Expenditure on environ-
mental protection by industry within a Member State 
can give some insight into the level of consideration 
given to eco-performance (although, strictly speaking, 
not on the relative efficiency of these expenditures). As 
a proxy for sustainability, it encapsulates all industry’s 
efforts to protect the environment, including pollution 
prevention, sustainable supply chains and biodiversity 
protection. In 2006, the combined EPE of all industries 
in the EU-25 added up to 50 billion euros, a 1% decrease 
compared with 2001, with a trough of 8 billion euros in 
between. However, as a percentage of GVA, industrial 
Figure 5.28:   Total environmental protection expenditure by industry (NACE A-E, excluding construction) 
in selected Member States, 2001-2006
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changes for the Member States for which data are avail-
able. It shows a weak overall trend to increase indus-
trial EPE as GVA increases, lending some support to the 
idea of a Kuznets curve for industrial EPE. The biggest 
increases in EPE were found in Member States in the 
Baltic region and Central Europe (CZ, SK and PL). Rela-
tive to GVA seven Member States (IT, HU, LT, FI, CZ, EE, 
and LV) increased their EPE by more than their industrial 
By restricting the Member States taken into considera-
tion to those that reported in both 2003 and 2007,134 it is 
possible to draw a more detailed picture of the changes 
that have taken place in industrial EPE and to relate 
them back to changes in GVA. Figure 5.30 presents these 
134  These years were selected as they were the years when most Member States 
reported EPE data. They were chosen to maximise coverage and relevance.
Box 5.8: Public-sector environmental protection expenditure
One proxy for identifying the amount of public investment in the environment is the ‘public environmental pro-
tection expenditure’ figure collected by Eurostat. 
In the EU-25, most of this expenditure in 2007 went towards providing waste management services or to activities 
related to soil, biodiversity and landscape protection, protection against radiation and research and development. 
Spending was mostly related to current costs, rather than investments or subsidies/transfers. 
In most European countries, in 2007 the public sector spent between 0.4 and 0.8 % of GDP on environmental 
protection investments and current expenditure. In 2007, the Netherlands earmarked almost 1.6% of its GDP for 
this, but Latvia only 0.06 %.
Figure 5.29:   Public-sector EPE investment and current expenditure by Member State  
(% of GDP, 2007 unless otherwise indicated)
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more easily sustained, environmental problems dealt 
with more efficiently and European firms may fully and 
more easily exploit new business opportunities and 
improve their competitiveness. This section discusses 
briefly the available mix of policy instruments in the 
light of their economic rationale and past experience.
5.5.1.  Policy instruments for sustainable growth
Looking at the public policy instruments135 currently 
in use to raise eco-performance and, at the same time, 
facilitate industry’s transformation towards more sus-
tainable methods of production and greater competi-
tiveness shows that, at EU level, policy has, in the last 
decade or more, been focused on energy and on con-
trolling GHG emissions. The findings in section 3 illus-
trate that these policies have contributed to an increase 
in energy efficiency and a significant reduction of both 
GHG and other emissions from energy generation.
To date there has been less focus on policies with 
an impact on resource efficiency and use of natural 
135  For a more detailed account of these policy instruments see the background 
report to this study (ECORYS, 2011a).
GVA increased. Member States known for having strong 
EPE records (DE, AT and SE) saw their EPE remain largely 
stable over the period.
These relationships hold broadly across the main indus-
trial sectors (NACE rev. 1.1 A to E), with the exception of 
agriculture, forestry and fishing, where there appears to 
be no clear correlation between EPE and GVA, though 
this is likely to be a result of incomplete data.
5.5.  Conclusions and policy implications
The analysis of major trends and developments has 
shown significant improvements in the eco-perfor-
mance of European industry. However, there are also 
signs that efficiency increases slow down, as the higher 
the initial efficiency levels already are the more difficult 
it becomes to achieve further improvements. Adopt-
ing the right mix of policies, including the right meas-
ures and conditions to foster green R&D, eco-technol-
ogies and eco-innovation, is of paramount importance 
in this regard. Eco-performance improvements will be 
Figure 5.30:   Change in industrial EPE and industrial GVA (NACE A-E, excluding construction)  
in selected Member States, 2003-2007
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there is also mixed evidence about the effectiveness of 
market-based instruments in the context of sustainable 
growth and eco-performance. Here a distinction can 
be made between subsidies, tenders and grants (‘bonus 
incentives’) on the one hand and taxes, penalties and 
trading schemes (‘malus incentives’) on the other hand.
‘Bonus incentives’ such as subsidies, tenders and grants 
may be necessary to induce industry learning curves, 
albeit they typically entail heavy budgetary costs. How-
ever, practical experience has been mixed. As regards 
subsidies supporting innovation the evidence suggests 
that grants and subsidies were among the least power-
ful motivators for adopting environmental innovations. 
At the same time, subsidy systems based on feed-in 
tariffs have proved very successful for deployment of 
onshore wind energy and photovoltaic energy, yet they 
are typically also expensive. Many feed-in tariff schemes 
have been scaled down in the light of the financial crisis 
and resulting pressures on public finances and the costs 
imposed on firms and households. 
In principle, subsidies should be time-limited, address-
ing temporary rather than structural market failures. 
This time-horizon issue is also important for EU indus-
try and long-term planning. EU industry urgent needs 
a stable long-term policy framework, to provide greater 
certainty for firms considering expensive long-term 
capital investment in technology. The time horizon of 
many public policy initiatives - especially subsidies and 
grants - is often too short and prone to fluctuations in 
terms of continuity, eligibility or funding. Investments in 
eco-innovation and clean energy technologies require 
longer time spans, in order to recoup such investments 
over periods of 10 to 20 years.
‘Malus incentives’ like taxes, penalties and trading 
schemes offer an alternative to ‘bonus incentives’. They 
send a direct signal that works through prices to influ-
ence market conditions and bring about the desired 
changes. By working through prices, tax instruments 
have an impact on both supply and demand, which 
can be an advantage over regulation. Taxes can have 
negative implications for competitiveness, but consum-
ers and firms retain the flexibility on how to respond to 
increased prices and costs. Hence, from a welfare and 
environmental perspective, if targeted correctly, taxes 
can work in accordance with the polluter pays principle 
and to the overall benefit of society. Judging the level 
at which to set a tax is a complex matter and must take 
into account relative tax systems in other economies.
Sometimes an argument is raised that tax or tariff 
mechanisms are needed for imports produced in econ-
omies with weaker eco-performance. It is argued that 
it would have an effect equivalent to internalising the 
negative environmental externalities of these imports, 
thus levelling the playing field for EU-27 producers in 
resources such as water and land. This has been chang-
ing in recent years, with an increase in the number of pol-
icy initiatives in this area and attention shifting towards 
sustainable consumption and production, “green” pub-
lic procurement and, more recently, resource efficiency. 
The overall policy framework is currently weaker than 
for energy and related emissions and the performance 
on resource use appears to be much more mixed. The 
efforts to develop a stronger policy framework in this 
area should draw on the lessons learned from the imple-
mented in the area of energy and emissions and their 
performance against expectations and theory.
The policy instruments available differ by government 
level: at EU level regulatory instruments are widespread 
and powerful; fiscal instruments are strongest at Mem-
ber State level while subsidies are widespread at both 
Member State and subnational (regional and local) 
level. Each instrument has its advantages and disadvan-
tages in relation to sustainable industrial growth and 
eco-performance.
Regulation
Overall, EU industry has shown that it tends to respond 
well to regulatory policy measures, when these are care-
fully designed and take a long-term perspective. Regula-
tion tends to work well when it comes to performance 
targets, once these are anticipated and gradually intro-
duced. The introduction of regulations on energy-effi-
cient and incandescent light bulbs is one example of suc-
cessful regulation of this type. However, standards which 
are over-ambitious and/or introduced too early run the 
risk of being counterproductive, as they sometimes 
induce disruptions. Furthermore, implementation can 
be unequal across the EU-27, thus affecting industry in 
one part of the EU more or earlier than in other locations.
Regulation is one of the primary drivers of eco-innova-
tion activities in firms. In certain cases regulation can be 
the most cost-effective solution, particularly when care-
fully designed and enforced, allowing e.g. for a suitable 
level of freedom for business to innovate and in finding 
the best way to achieve given targets. Most EU firms, 
particularly SMEs, remain compliance driven rather than 
pro-active in pursuing eco-innovation.
However, direct regulation can be considered to be often 
less cost-effective than market-based instruments, as it 
tends to impose uniform rules, targets or constraints that 
do not necessarily take full account of the settings and 
competitive environment of industry. This has been a key 
factor in the growing use of market based instruments.
Market-based instruments
While there are concerns about the cost-effectiveness 
and competitiveness effects of regulatory measures 188
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drawback of voluntary approaches is that their effec-
tiveness in addressing environmental concerns will 
depend on the perceived benefits to the companies 
concerned. They could also reduce competition. Its 
effectiveness can also suffer from information asym-
metries between governments and firms. Voluntary 
schemes can therefore be an effective instrument in 
certain circumstances where policy has been unable to 
act effectively and/or provides a framework for industry 
to go beyond compliance.
Information and communication can be useful in situa-
tions where information problems exist (e.g. in house-
hold energy consumption) or where enforcement costs 
are disproportionately high (e.g. small-scale emissions 
creating air pollution). This area is particularly important 
for consumer demand and consumer action to support 
improvements in eco-performance. The evidence clearly 
shows that price and performance (quality) remain the 
primary demands of consumers. Products offering 
higher eco-performance need to compete on these two 
fronts too and to offer something more.
As regards influencing consumer behaviour, it is impor-
tant for the choice of instrument to take account of their 
understanding of the environmental benefit in question. 
Voluntary schemes relying on consumer action appear 
less effective when the environmental benefits are more 
abstract, as in the case of energy and emission reductions. 
However, the successful take-up of the MSC scheme and 
improvements in recycling efforts are examples where 
the physical link to the environment is clear for consum-
ers and of how this has supported success in these areas. 
In these cases it is important that other instruments, such 
as regulation or taxes, are also employed.
5.5.2.  Policy design and implementation
As regards policy design and implementation, a number 
of important factors must be considered and the find-
ings of this work have significant implications. Whilst 
developing such policies, there is a need for compre-
hensive and robust impact assessments, covering both 
economic and environmental aspects as well as admin-
istrative costs and burdens.
The EU’s growing practice of impact assessment could 
be echoed more clearly in policy development at the 
level of Member States, regions and local authorities. 
This is particularly important for the competitiveness 
of EU industry, to ensure long-term predictability and 
that policy action remains proportionate to the envi-
ronmental benefits that result. Absolute bans and limits 
can place significant burdens on producers, occasion-
ally with high marginal costs for only small environ-
mental gains, after most reductions have already been 
achieved. Duplication is also an issue: if industry is hit 
their domestic markets, by imposing equivalent costs 
on all producers. Such a tariff would need to be gradu-
ated, depending on the eco-performance of indus-
tries or firms in the country of production. However, 
the practical and political feasibility of such a scheme 
is debatable, as is its compatibility with international 
trade agreements. Without a clear evidence base, it 
could open the door to unwarranted protectionism 
in international trade. It cannot be excluded as part of 
a wider package in case substantial ‘leakage’ effects 
from EU environmental policies are to be expected. 
‘Softer’ alternatives to this involve international nego-
tiations and persuasion and pressure to align environ-
mental policies of the EU and other countries in view of 
adopting and implementing more sustainable produc-
tion behaviour.
Permit trading schemes are favoured in some situations 
as the most economically efficient way of achieving eco-
performance gains and for making the total environ-
mental benefits known in advance, as caps are chosen 
by policy-makers. They can maximise the competitive 
benefits to firms that invest most heavily in sustain-
able practices, providing clear and continuing incen-
tives to improve performance over time. Permit trad-
ing schemes are most effective for sustainability when 
the environmental impact can be easily monitored and 
verified, when firms can adequately bear the transaction 
costs, when a viable market can be created and when 
a move is made towards full auctioning of permits. 
Where this is not the case, taxation and regulation may 
be better alternatives to permits.136
Voluntary agreements and information
Voluntary agreements (i.e. self-regulation) can be effec-
tive for both industry and policymakers. By anticipat-
ing changes in consumer demand industry can stay at 
the cutting edge and also mitigate the need for policy 
action and the associated costs and burdens. Experi-
ence from the MSC scheme suggests that such schemes 
tend to be used more widely when larger companies 
are involved, but can be more difficult to implement 
when many SMEs are concerned. Furthermore, they 
appear to be more effective for final product groups, 
where the interface with consumers is strong. One 
136  The EU ETS is the prime example of this type of instrument in the EU. The 
performance of the ETS has been mixed and has illustrated both the pros and 
cons of a trading permit scheme. It has been successful in bringing the largest 
emitters of GHG into a compliance and reduction scheme, creating a viable 
market for permits and contributing to overall emission reductions. Yet the 
costs to firms of participating, i.e. the transaction costs, have been high, as 
they have learned to adapt to the market. This is a big barrier to introducing 
permit trading schemes that will have an impact on SMEs and large numbers 
of operators. There has also been contention about the over-allocation and 
free allocation of permits, creating both a weak cap and a weak market price 
and handing free income to polluters, a perverse incentive. To reap the full 
efficiency benefits of a permit trading system, it is essential to move towards 
a larger share of permits auctioned. With the ETS phase 2 and plans for phase 
3 moving in this direction, this should become less of an issue.189
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Establishing this link between economic benefits and 
eco-performance is difficult, as the impact of policy 
is uneven across industry. For the industry directly 
affected, policy-imposed changes are initially felt 
to be negative. However, in many cases regulatory 
approaches can help creating a market for new eco-
friendly products. The light bulbs (Box 5.2) is such an 
example, illustrating the engagement in the develop-
ment of products with significant environmental ben-
efits, whose purchase by consumers was facilitated by 
the energy labelling scheme. Overall, the case studies 
demonstrated that considering the effects on industry 
along the entire value chain is vital to securing competi-
tive and sustainable industries.
by multiple regulations on a single product or input 
material, this adds to the complexity and burdens of 
compliance, particularly for SMEs (Calogirou et al. 2010). 
Consideration must be given to how a particular policy 
fits into the wider framework and how compliance pro-
cedures could be integrated more effectively.
Ex-post evaluation and monitoring of policies and meas-
ures that promote economic and environmental perfor-
mance are vital in order to learn lessons that can lead 
to design improvements during the policy lifetime and 
can also inform further developments. Particular atten-
tion needs to be paid to the mechanisms by which such 
policies influence EU industry and whether such policies 
are effectively doing what they intend to.
Complementarity and enforcement
Similar trends to those in EU policy are also found at 
Member State level in terms of the issues addressed, 
with over half of all the major policy initiatives identified 
at Member State level focusing on energy efficiency and 
climate change. The policy instruments used by Member 
States tend to include market-based instruments (taxes 
and subsidies) along with public investment and regula-
tion and self-regulation. Analysis of the cross-section of 
policies at EU and other levels clearly showed that there 
are often tight links and complementarities between the 
policies on various levels both within the EU and also 
across Member States’. Care needs to be taken to ensure 
that policy measures are not duplicated, that overlaps 
and uneven implementation are minimised and that 
the scope for learning and sharing of best practice are 
exploited wherever possible to reduce the compliance 
burdens on EU industry.
The effectiveness of policy implementation is closely 
related to enforcement. Implementation of regula-
tions matters for containing the general administrative 
burden. Evidence from the case studies found that lax 
enforcement can have a negative economic impact on 
companies that have complied with the regulation, cre-
ating undue competitive advantages for non-compliant 
firms, either from within or outside the EU.
Policy as a supporting framework
As a final point, policy should provide a predictable ena-
bling framework for industry itself, creating the condi-
tions for and supporting moves by industry towards 
eco-performance benefits. The examples of voluntary 
labelling schemes and chemical leasing (Boxes 5.6 and 
5.7) show how industry initiatives can create significant 
incentives for resource-efficient behaviour, improving 
eco-performance. They illustrate the link between eco-
nomic competitiveness and eco-performance. The cur-
rent limited scope of these types of arrangements points 
to wider potential to deliver benefits in this way.190
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•	 Material flows and resource efficiency are essen-
tial components of environmental impact, both in 
the extractive (or harvesting) process and when it 
comes to their eventual disposal as waste. Indicators 
of these are vital to understand how process and 
product efficiency has changed and are especially 
important to the issue of decoupling. Various indica-
tors relating to material consumption, use of inputs, 
productivity and waste treatment are reviewed.
•	 Water use is also considered as water is a key 
resource used during industrial production pro-
cesses (e.g. as cooling water) and is also coming 
under increasing scrutiny as pressures on it mount 
from population growth and expected reductions in 
supply from rainfall due to climate change. Indica-
tors on water abstraction are presented.
•	 Environmental protection expenditure (EPE) gives 
an indication of investment and expenditure on 
resource, energy and carbon efficiency and, as such, 
is a useful indicator to measure eco-performance.
Annex
DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS
Indicators of eco-performance
•	 Energy consumption is one of the key areas for 
measuring the environmental impact of indus-
try, though the impact itself is often indirect and 
based on the emissions into the air and water by 
energy generators. Energy efficiency is an important 
policy goal and route to decoupling. Final energy 
consumption and energy intensity indicators are 
reviewed to provide both a nominal and marginal 
view on eco-performance in this area. 
•	 Greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions are the primary cli-
mate change impact associated with industry. They 
are closely related to energy use. Decoupling emis-
sions from economic growth is among the most 
pressing drivers of sustainable production. The cumu-
lative and global nature of emissions makes the total 
level of emissions important, but as it is not always 
clear if emissions have simply ‘leaked’ outside the EU 
it is important to consider emission intensity too. 
•	 Other emissions into the air and water from industry 
can also have a significant environmental impact. 
This study considers the performance in terms of 
acidification potential – as a contributor to acid rain 
– and also of particulate emissions to the air (PM10) 
which can damage human health. 
Table A.5 - 1: NACE rev. 1.1 classifications used in this report
Category Sub-category
A and B – Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing
C – Mining and quarrying
D – Manufacturing
15-16 – Food, beverages and tobacco
17-19 – Textiles, leather and footwear
20 – Wood and products of wood and cork
21-22 – Pulp, paper, printing and publishing
23-25 – Chemicals, rubber, plastics and fuel
26 – Other non-metallic minerals
27-28 – Basic metals and other fabrication of metal
29 – Machinery not elsewhere classified
30-33 – Electrical and optical equipment
34-35 – Transport equipment
36-37 – Manufacturing not elsewhere classified and recycling
E – Electricity, gas and water
F – Construction194
European Competitiveness Report 2011
•	 Eco-innovation provides insight into investments 
and “green” R&D with the objective of improving 
eco-performance. This is important as an indicator 
of industrial investment in current, but also towards 
future, eco-performance. It is a new and complex 
area to define and the relevant section reviews the 
major discussions around such an indicator before 
presenting findings. Each of the indicators listed 
above has been analysed on three different levels, 
determined by the data available. This approach has 
been used to capture the relevant effects at each 
level to help explain the changes observed. The 
first level taken into account is the international and 
EU-27 level, since an understanding of overall eco-
nomic performance and eco-performance is needed 
in order to comment on the relative position and 
developments of the EU-27 against its international 
trade partners, between the Member States them-
selves and also intra-industry - between sectors.195
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Chapter 5 — EU Industry in a Sustainable Growth Context
Table A.5 - 6 – Green components in economic stimulus packages, 2009
Country Stimulus package
Total amount pack-
age, (period)
Amount green component, 
(%)
Focus themes
USA American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act, 2008;
Emergency Economic 
Stabilization Act 2008;
Green allocation in US Budget 
2010.
USD 787 bln  
(10 years);
USD 185 bln  
(10 years);
USD 94.1 bln (12%);
USD 18.2 bln (10%);
USD 4.9 bln
Renewables; Building 
energy efficiency
China NDRC stimulus package 2008;
Budget 2009.
USD 586 bln  
(2009-2010);
USD 61.4 bln (2009);
USD 201 bln (34%);
USD 15.6 bln (25%)
Energy efficiency  
(rail, grid);  
Waste & water
Japan Measures to Support People’s 
Daily Lives 2008; second 
stimulus plan 2009.
USD 486 bln  
(2009 onwards);
USD 154 bln  
(2009 onwards).
USD 12.4 bln (3%);
USD 23.6 bln (15%)
Building energy  
efficiency
South Korea Green New Deal 2009 and 
subsequent Five Year Plan for 
Green Growth 2009
USD 76 bln bln 
(2009-2013);
USD 60 bln (79%); Water & waste; Building 
energy efficiency
EU Sum of stimulus packages from 
EU Member States and direct 
EU contribution.
USD 537 bln (mostly 
2009-2010, some 
packages beyond)
USD 53.4 bln (10%) Energy efficiency  
(building, rail, grid);  
Low carbon power (CCS)
Source: HSBC (2009), A Climate for Recovery – the colour of stimulus goes green, Feb 2009; and HSBC (2009), Building green recovery – 
governments allocate USD470bln – and counting…, May 2009 and HSBC (2010), Overview of global green stimulus spending, Feb 2010.201
6.1. Introduction
The EU economy faces long-term structural challenges 
that necessitate a strategic response in order to meet 
the targets set out in the Europe 2020 strategy. Improv-
ing the performance of the EU economy, in particu-
lar maintaining and reinforcing the competitiveness 
of European industry (competitiveness is defined in 
Chapter 1, Box 1.1), forms an indispensible part of this 
response and requires close integration of all relevant 
policies. This applies first and foremost to the core EU 
policies that shape industrial competitiveness and their 
respective toolkits.
Nearly a decade ago, a European Commission report 
pointed to ‘new challenges that emerge at an acceler-
ating rate: new markets, new ways of doing business, 
new drivers of growth and of dynamic competition.’137 
Since then, the speed at which these challenges have 
materialised and their extent have exceeded all expecta-
tions. In essence, the macroeconomic trends reshaping 
the global economy have forced the EU to move away 
from an inward-looking focus on the Single Market to 
a broader and more global, resource-oriented perspec-
tive. The old order, in which the EU determined the pace 
and pattern of global growth and trade together with 
the US and Japan, has been irreversibly overturned by 
the emergence of an as yet unfinished power patchwork 
involving ever more players.
In addition, the economic and financial crisis has trig-
gered a debate about the strength and sustainability 
of the institutional pillars on which the Western socio-
economic model rests. While it is by now clear that this 
crisis has only temporarily exacerbated weaknesses that 
already existed in the real economy, recent positive 
economic signals are no reason to return to business 
as usual. On the contrary, identifying these weaknesses 
and proposing practical solutions embedded within 
137  European Commission (2002), 2002 European Competitiveness Report, Com-
mission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2002) 528, p. 93.
the EU’s competitiveness policies is essential in order to 
ensure long-term industrial competitiveness.
In this context, not only industrial and competition 
policies but also trade, Single Market and other policies 
are indispensible. In fact, in parallel to the shift in focus 
towards external developments, the EU has undergone 
its biggest enlargement ever, resulting in an internal 
market of 500 million citizens. As a consequence, the 
Lisbon Treaty, which entered into force in December 
2009, was designed to provide the enlarged EU-27 with 
a workable governance structure. It also reinforced the 
role of industrial policy at European level and prompted, 
in the context of the Europe 2020 strategy, a new indus-
trial policy for the globalisation era (cf. section 6.3.2). 
These changes are of particular importance for the EU’s 
competitiveness.
This chapter assesses the synergies between industrial 
policy and other competitiveness policies, in particular 
competition policy, building on an earlier analysis in 
2002.138 As such, the chapter is intended to contribute to 
the debate on the way ahead for the Europe 2020 strat-
egy. In order to remain concrete and concise, it largely 
focuses on manufacturing industry.
Section 6.2 revisits the major developments over the 
last decade and explains the main challenges for the 
EU. Section 6.3 summarises the institutional and policy 
toolkit so far available to address these challenges. Sec-
tion 6.4 then explores how the identified challenges 
result in practical problems for European industry at 
different stages of their production value chain. Sec-
tion 6.5 suggests relevant solutions in the context of EU 
policy making, based on the existing legal framework 
and a reassessment of how it relates to the issues raised. 
Some concluding remarks in section 6.6 highlight the 
merits of a more integrated policy approach and com-
plete the chapter.
138  Cf. European Commission (2002), 2002 European Competitiveness Report, 
Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2002) 528.
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the freedom of movement of goods, persons, services 
and capital. Little by little, economic integration has pro-
vided companies in Europe with a domestic market that 
goes beyond national boundaries and a stimulating and 
competitive environment conducive to innovation and 
increased productivity.
However, despite all past successes, the shortcomings 
within the internal market and its unexploited oppor-
tunities remain major challenges holding back the 
EU’s competitiveness. The smooth continuation of the 
integration process cannot be taken for granted and 
remains a formidable task, the more so in the face of 
future enlargements. It is a task that has not been made 
easier by the emergence of external challenges, in par-
ticular the recent economic and financial crisis and the 
pressures of globalisation, both of which will be dis-
cussed further below.
In order to exploit the full potential of the internal mar-
ket, the Commission adopted on 13 April 2011 the Sin-
gle Market Act. This proposes 12 levers to strengthen 
confidence, each featuring one key priority action and 
a number of additional actions to be implemented by 
the end of 2012, in time for the 20th anniversary of the 
Single Market. Actions include tasks particularly impor-
tant from an industrial competitiveness perspective, 
such as ensuring access to finance for SMEs, improving 
the framework governing Intellectual Property Rights 
(IPRs), reforming standardisation policy, extending high-
performance European infrastructure networks and 
modernising the rules governing public procurement.
Moreover, the challenge ahead is not limited to con-
solidating and deepening the integration of the inter-
nal market. While this is a prerequisite for improving 
competitiveness, addressing global challenges cannot 
be achieved by merely extrapolating intra-EU policies 
beyond Europe. Instead, all EU policies — and notably 
any attempt to preserve and enhance competitiveness 
— need to take into account that not all trade partners 
are market economies. Only a policy approach that takes 
into account the economic realities faced by European 
companies outside the EU can establish a powerful link 
between the Single Market and the rest of the world.
6.2.2.  Creating a global level playing field with non-EU 
competitors
‘Europe is the right level for thinking and action in terms of 
globalisation. Markets are global: Europe must defend its 
interests and values with greater confidence, in a spirit of 
reciprocity and mutual benefit. European policies must aim 
6.2.  Key challenges for the competitiveness 
of the EU economy
Three major developments have marked the last dec-
ade, each resulting in specific challenges for EU industry: 
enlargement to form the EU-27, globalisation with the 
resulting relative rise in importance of some EU trade 
partners, and the recent economic and financial crisis. 
Overall, their effects overlap and create a dynamically 
changing economic environment that forms the back-
ground for this chapter.
6.2.1.  Exploiting the full potential of the enlarged 
internal market
The historically unprecedented enlargement from the 
EU-15 to first the EU-25 in 2004 and then the EU-27 in 
2007 has triggered the most fundamental and visible 
change in the EU since the start of the millennium. It has 
enabled the new Member States to complete the adjust-
ments they had already starting making to their politi-
cal and economic systems and has resulted in a mas-
sive extension of the EU internal market. The EU now 
embraces about 500 million citizens and forms one of 
the most powerful economic blocs in the world.
The resulting dynamics have created new business 
opportunities and growth potential that is far from fully 
exploited. The old Member States have benefited from 
increased trade with and investment in the new Mem-
ber States.139 In turn, the new Member States have expe-
rienced significant growth financed by private invest-
ment and access to EU cohesion funds. Overall, trade 
integration has triggered a more efficient allocation of 
productive resources, had a positive effect on employ-
ment in the EU-27 and significantly improved the global 
competitiveness of European companies.
The relationship between the enlarged internal market 
and European industry is a mutually beneficial one. This 
was recently highlighted when the Commission pre-
sented its new industrial policy in 2010:
‘Now more than ever, Europe needs industry and industry 
needs Europe. The Single Market, with 500 million con-
sumers, 220 million workers and 20 million entrepreneurs, 
is a key instrument in achieving a competitive industrial 
Europe’. 140
In the past, the internal market has been the main driv-
ing force behind European economic growth, based on 
139  European Commission (2009), Five years of an enlarged EU – Economic achieve-
ments and challenges, Communication from the Commission, COM(2009) 79, 
p. 2.
140  European Commission (2010), An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisa-
tion Era Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage, Communi-
cation from the Commission, COM(2010) 614.203
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nies to move up the quality and innovation ladder.146 
Some EU industries have retrenched to niches of 
their former markets, while others have outsourced 
much of their production outside the EU. Examples 
include the textile/clothing industry, shipbuilding, 
and consumer electronics, joined over the last dec-
ade by the clean technology and semi-conductor 
industries.
•	 European companies face increasing competition 
for energy resources and non-energy raw materials 
(cf. Chapter 4.). China’s imports of fuels and non-fuel 
commodities have both increased by 500 % over 
the last decade.147 Prices of most raw materials have 
risen significantly, e.g. the UNCTAD composite price 
index for minerals, ores and metals has more than 
doubled since 2000. Key sectors in high technology 
are dependent on relatively rare raw materials (e.g. 
lithium for batteries or neodymium for wind turbines 
and electric cars) only mined outside the EU.148
One of the most important consequences of these 
developments has been a trend towards internationally 
ever more specialised and fragmented value chains.149 
In the last decade, imports of intermediate goods in 
the EU (as a proxy for value chain fragmentation) have 
increased by more than 80 %150 and now amount to 
about 40 % of world trade in manufactured non-fuel 
products.151 Formerly vertically integrated companies 
are concentrating on specific steps of the value chain 
and are outsourcing many other activities. Making use 
of efficiency gains stemming from specialisation along 
value chains is an important factor for the competitive-
ness of European businesses but can create significant 
risks as well, linked to security of supplies.
The last decade also saw increasing FDI between the 
EU and the emerging countries. While European FDI 
in the developing world has continued to grow, there 
is a recent trend for increased FDI to flow in the other 
direction. This is partly the result of the revenues from 
the huge trade surpluses built up over the last years by 
certain countries, most importantly China. Furthermore, 
146  Notably China has recently moved into the manufacturing of high-tech 
goods as well. India is particular strong in services such as IT or customer care.
147 UNCTADstat.
148  European Commission (2011), Tackling the Challenges in Commodity Markets 
and on Raw Materials, Communication from the Commission, COM(2011) 25.
149  Cf. European Commission (2010), An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globali-
sation Era Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage, Commu-
nication from the Commission, COM(2010) 614; and European Commission 
(2010), European Competitiveness Report 2010, Commission Staff Working 
Document SEC(2010) 1276, Accompanying Document to the Communication 
from the Commission, An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era 
Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage, COM(2010) 614.
150  European Commission (2010), European Competitiveness Report 2010, Com-
mission Staff Working Document SEC(2010) 1276, Accompanying Document 
to the Communication from the Commission, An Integrated Industrial Policy 
for the Globalisation Era Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre 
Stage, COM(2010) 614, p. 81; data are available for the period 1999 to 2008.
151  Figure for 2008; source: WTO International Trade Statistics 2009.
to ensure the greater convergence of rules and standards at 
international level.’141
Progressing at an accelerating speed over the last 
decade, globalisation has been reshaping the world 
economy. Newly emerging economies, spearheaded 
by the BRICs,142 have established themselves as major 
economic powers. The main drivers behind this process 
include economic liberalisation inside these countries, 
the dismantling of regulatory and tariff barriers to trade 
between countries, and falling transport and commu-
nication costs resulting from better logistics and use of 
ICT.
The emerging countries have significantly increased 
their share of output, raw material consumption, trade 
and capital stocks. The share in world GDP held by 
China, India and the ASEAN countries, for example, has 
risen by more than 60 % over the last decade. Their 
share in world trade has increased by more than 50 % 
and in world foreign direct investment (FDI) stocks by 
more than 15 %.143 China overtook Japan as the world’s 
second largest economy in 2010, and is expected by 
many observers to become the largest economy within 
the next 20 years.144
Globalisation and the economic rise of Asia have led 
to important changes to the business context in which 
European companies operate, notably in the manufac-
turing sector:
•	 The newly emerging economies present ever more 
important markets for European products and 
thereby new business opportunities. European 
imports from and exports to newly emerging econo-
mies in Asia have doubled since 2000.
•	 Access to these markets, including access to public 
procurement, is crucial for the current and future 
world market position and profitability of European 
companies, including SMEs,145 but remains difficult 
and often subject to restrictions unacceptable in and 
for market economies.
•	 The structure of European industry has changed pro-
foundly. Competition especially from Asian compa-
nies has put intense pressure on European compa-
141  European Commission (2010), Towards a Single Market Act, For a highly com-
petitive social market economy, 50 proposals for improving our work, business 
and exchanges with one another, Communication from the Commission, 
COM(2010) 608.
142  Brazil, Russia, India and China.
143  All data are from UNCTADstat. The period is 2000 to 2009; the GDP share 
in constant prices/exchange rates (2000). The term ‘world trade’ combines 
imports and exports.
144  The BRIC countries are expected to account for 60 % of world GDP by 2030 
(EIM study on internationalisation of SMEs).
145  European Commission (2011), Review of the ‘Small Business Act’ for Europe, 
Communication from the Commission, COM(2011) 78.204
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or straightforward subsidies have risen to the forefront 
over the last decade.154
In this context, and in order to guide the subsequent 
discussion in this chapter of the more detailed issues 
involved, a number of fundamental observations apply:
First, creating a level playing field implies a realistic 
assessment and monitoring of distortions. It can also 
require bilateral or multilateral negotiations with eco-
nomic policy makers in the countries concerned. Fur-
ther, case-by-case interventions may be required to help 
European businesses as much as possible to overcome 
specific distortions.155 This applies to the activities of EU 
companies abroad but also to the activities of non-EU 
companies within Europe.
Second, creating a global level playing field implies nei-
ther ‘tit for tat’ acts of protectionism nor subsidy races 
between countries. Consumers and tax payers would 
immediately lose from such an approach, and any short-
term benefits for enterprises would be rapidly cancelled 
out by the longer-term loss of growth opportunities. A 
global level playing field can therefore only be built on 
the principle that distortions are minimised.
Third, creating a global level playing field also does not 
imply a lowering of safety, labour or environmental 
standards. Societal demand for such standards rises with 
income, and differences in current levels are primarily 
a function of different income levels, not of differing 
154  European Commission (2011), Trade and Investment Barriers Report 2011, 
Engaging our strategic economic partners on improved market access: Priorities 
for action on breaking down barriers to trade, Communication from the Com-
mission, COM(2011) 114.
155  The EU maintains for example 30 ‘Market Access Teams’ in its key export mar-
kets and also provides help for European companies that face IPR problems 
in China.
some companies from these countries have emerged 
as globally active multi-nationals and have started to 
acquire assets all over the world, including European 
companies.
Looking ahead, it seems fair to state that improving the 
ability of European enterprises to fully capitalise on the 
business opportunities offered by globalisation is one 
of the most fundamental challenges ahead, if not the 
most important. As the EU has recognised the need to 
maintain a strong, diversified and competitive industrial 
base,152 it must ensure that its enterprises maintain and 
reinforce their international competitiveness. A particu-
larly important element for achieving this objective is 
the creation of a global level playing field,153 on which 
companies from around the world are able to compete 
on their respective commercial merits. This includes all 
dimensions of economic activity, be it access to inputs 
and markets, IPR protection, availability of business ser-
vices or choice of an optimal distribution network.
A continuing challenge to the creation of such a global 
level playing field results from the fact that some of the 
new economic powers are emerging from a planned 
economy model and have started liberalising their inter-
nal and external economic activities rather recently. The 
role of the state in these countries differs substantially 
from the role of the state in Europe and other mature 
economies. This may bring about distortions due to 
strategic macro-economic policy choices, such as fixed 
exchange rates, or interventionist economic policy strat-
egies. Moreover, distortions other than classical tariffs 
152  European Commission (2010), An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisa-
tion Era Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage, Communi-
cation from the Commission, COM(2010) 614.
153  European Commission (2010), EUROPE 2020, A strategy for smart, sustain-
able and inclusive growth, Communication from the Commission, COM(2010) 
2020 p. 21; European Commission (2011), Review of the ‘Small Business Act’ for 
Europe, Communication from the Commission, COM(2011) 78, p. 14.
Box 6.1: Offsets and forced technology transfers
Offsets, notably in the form of forced technology transfers, are a particular interesting example of a non-classical 
distortion of the global level playing field. Offsets are a price a company is requested to pay to enter a foreign 
market or obtain a lucrative contract. The price can consist for example in the transfer of technology to a local 
partner. It can also be more indirect, such as an obligation to use a specific percentage of local inputs or to help 
local companies in selling a predetermined amount of goods within a specific timeframe. Designed to make up 
an economic shortfall for local firms and compensate for the backwardness of a developing country, they form 
part of firms’ bids, and their impact on the competitiveness of the European firms concerned can but need not 
always be negative.
However, such offsets can present a policy dilemma. While the individual company may be willing to pay the 
price, a negative externality can arise for the sector as a whole, and there may be negative repercussions for policy 
objectives based on the European interest. The increased use of offsets in an ever greater number of different sec-
tors could call for assessment of the need for a legal framework to govern them.205
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In the face of the economic crisis originating in the 
United States, the EU took timely and coordinated pol-
icy action to maintain the stability of financial markets in 
Europe and to avoid a credit crunch by ensuring contin-
ued access to finance for the real economy. A Temporary 
Framework for State Aid was adopted in October 2008 
(Box 6.2). The Commission subsequently adopted the 
European Economic Recovery Plan in November 2008 
to coordinate a pan-European fiscal stimulus of about 
2 % of EU GDP in order to boost demand and structural 
change towards sustainable growth.
Due to the heavy reliance of European enterprises on 
bank credit and bank intermediation of savings, insta-
bility and lack of trust in the banking sector had an 
immediate impact on the financing of the real economy 
and on the level of consumption.156 Credit restraints and 
reduced business and household demand had a particu-
larly negative impact on those sectors already in need of 
156  Posen, A., Véron, N., (2009), A Solution for Europe’s Banking Problem, Bruegel 
Policy Brief 2009/03. It also had an indirect impact on the valuation of the 
European corporate landscape, with banks representing 24 % of the aggre-
gate market value of European listed companies among the world’s 500 larg-
est in mid-2007 and only 12 % in March 2009.
preferences. The economic growth observed in signifi-
cant parts of the developing world therefore goes hand 
in hand with rising environmental, safety and labour 
standards. Efforts to create a global level playing field 
are facilitated by this trend. This is compatible with com-
petition between regulatory regimes in terms of cost-
effectiveness (and not lowest standards).
Finally, the role of EU policy makers is enhanced in this 
global environment. Creating a regulatory framework, 
in the EU and globally, to address the changed reality 
of a globalised economy requires significant resources 
and resourcefulness on the part of policy makers. Rules 
must fit the needs of globally active businesses and 
their stakeholders, and also take into account the ever 
increasing interdependence of companies working 
in global value chains. Policy makers can also have an 
important role in facilitating adaptation by enterprises 
and societies to the substantial economic realignments 
caused by globalisation.
6.2.3.  Boosting the real economy in times of financial 
trouble and fiscal constraints
The recent economic and financial crisis was the most 
severe macroeconomic shock since the Great Depres-
sion in the 1930s and has had a significant long-term 
impact on the competitiveness of EU industry.
Box 6.2: State aid during the crisis
The Commission approved specific crisis-related national state aid measures under exceptional temporary rules 
adopted in October 2008 in accordance with Article 107(3)(b) TFEU, with a view to remedying a ‘serious distur-
bance in the economy of a Member State’.
1) Support for financial institutions
Between 1 October 2008 and 1 October 2010, the Commission adopted approximately 200 decisions on state aid 
measures for the financial sector, authorising, amending or prolonging 41 schemes and addressing with individual 
decisions the situation in more than 40 financial institutions, affecting 22 Member States.
In 2009, total state aid granted to the financial sector represented € 351.7 billion, or 2.98 % of EU27 GDP. However, 
not all of the approved aid has been used by the Member States concerned.
2) Support for the real economy
Between 17 December 2008 and 1 October 2010 the Commission approved 73 schemes under the Temporary 
Framework and 4 ad hoc aid measures, amounting to a total of € 82.5 billion (0.7 % of EU-27 GDP). The schemes 
comprised aid of up to € 500 000 per company, subsidised guarantee measures, schemes for subsidised loan 
interest, schemes offering reduced-interest loans to businesses investing in the production of green products, risk 
capital schemes and export credit schemes.
In 2009, the Commission approved measures under the Temporary Framework amounting to approximately 
€ 81.3 billion, including aid estimated at € 2.2 billion, which represents 0.018 % of EU27 GDP.
Source:   State Aid Scoreboard — Report on State aid granted by the EU Member States- Autumn 2010 Update — 01.12.2010.206
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a strong recovery in Europe, especially for industrial out-
put. However, output remains below its former peak. 
Employment has also fallen significantly and manufac-
turing employment is on average some 10 % below its 
peak (see Figure 6.1).
While the current economic outlook for production 
and growth is now positive, the real economy remains 
exposed to structural problems with access to finance, 
which has not returned to normal. The continued high 
risk aversion of financial institutions, the current uncer-
tainties on the financial markets, the embryonic European 
venture capital market and ever tighter fiscal constraints 
structural adjustments, as for them access to finance had 
already been a bottleneck before the crisis.
By the end of 2008, production, demand, investment 
and trade inside the EU had decreased drastically, with 
manufacturing output falling by some 20 %. EU real 
GDP shrank by 4.2 % in 2009, the sharpest contraction 
in its history.157 The crisis also had an immediate impact 
on the level of employment and bankruptcies, with 
social difficulties aggravating the economic downturn 
and negatively affecting private domestic demand. 
Since mid-2009, the EU economy has started to emerge 
from the recession.158 Short-term economic data show 
157  European Commission (2009), Economic Crisis in Europe: Causes, Consequences 
and Responses, European Economy 2009-7, DG Economic and Financial 
Affairs.
158  European Commission (2010) Monthly Note on Economic Recovery in Manu-
facturing, Construction and Services Industries, March 2010, DG Enterprise & 
Industry.
Figure 6.1:   Sectoral manufacturing output and employment developments
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Overall, exposure of the European economy to lasting 
problems of access to finance forms one of the main 
challenges in the post-crisis context. The key task ahead 
is thus to restore trust and stability in the financial sec-
tor. A move towards more stability and responsibility in 
the financial system is already ongoing, through a series 
of important European initiatives to reform financial 
markets (e.g. corporate governance crisis resolution sys-
tem, supervision of institutions, strengthening of capital 
requirements). These are indispensible for improving 
the system as a whole, as is the balanced restructuring 
of distressed banks.
A stable and business-oriented financing market is 
essential not only for daily operations but also for 
the longer-term investment needed for ‘modernis-
ing Europe’s industrial base and the infrastructure on 
which it relies’. This also implies ‘more private capital 
for productive investments, in particular through ven-
ture capital markets’ and, more generally, ‘more resilient 
and efficient financial markets ensuring that they have 
the right incentives to finance the real economy and 
investment.’159
159  European Commission (2010), An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisa-
tion Era Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage, Communi-
cation from the Commission, COM(2010) 614, point 3.2.
together constitute a potentially lasting damaging con-
sequence of the crisis on the EU’s economic performance. 
Credit supply is in fact expected to be further affected by 
the introduction of the CRD IV guidelines.
The crisis has in particular revealed the need for further 
restructuring and better supervision of the banking sec-
tor. The increasingly narrower scope for financial state 
intervention due to fiscal constraints adds to the prob-
lem. As a result, many companies in the real economy 
have been weakened by the crisis — not because they 
were uncompetitive, but because of the failure of finan-
cial service providers to play their supportive role. Some 
companies have thus reduced or delayed necessary 
investment or R&D&I expenditure, while others are barely 
able to survive due to lack of financing, making them vul-
nerable to any further cyclical change or take-overs. This 
will have a negative effect on both competition and the 
strength of Europe’s industrial fabric. In particular, non-
financial corporations, especially SMEs, are still facing dif-
ficulties. New loans to enterprises in the euro zone have 
continued to fall over the past months, and euro zone 
banks are still reporting a tightening of their credit stand-
ards for loans to enterprises (cf. Figure 6.2 and Figure 6.3).
Figure 6.2:   Change in new loans below and above EUR 1 m — year-on-year change
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6.3.1.  The Lisbon Treaty and competitiveness
The enlargement of the EU required a new treaty to 
render governance of the EU-27 more operational. 
Decision-taking would otherwise have become increas-
ingly difficult. In order to achieve better coordination, 
a clearer institutional structure and more effective gov-
ernance, the Lisbon Treaty was signed on 13 Decem-
ber 2007 and entered into force on 1 December 2009 
(Box 6.3).161
All legal provisions relevant for competitiveness poli-
cies are contained in the TFEU. Industrial policy is a field 
where action at EU level serves to support, coordinate or 
supplement Member State actions, whereas establishing 
the competition rules necessary for the functioning of 
the internal market is an exclusive competence of the 
EU. Although there are three short references elsewhere 
in the TFEU,162 the issue of competitiveness is essen-
tially covered by Article 173 TFEU on industry, which 
161  Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty 
establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007, 
Official Journal C 306 of 17 December 2007.
162  Article 151 TFEU on social policy, Article 189 TFEU on space policy and Article 
195 TFEU on tourism, cf. the consolidated versions of the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official 
Journal C 83 of 30.03.2010.
It is moreover essential to continue structural reforms 
in Member States, e.g. adjusting labour or pension sys-
tems, and to create ‘incentive mechanisms encourag-
ing all forms of sustainable investment or investment 
supporting a long-term strategy.’160 Facing these short- 
to medium-term challenges will require innovative 
approaches, especially to address the fiscal situation 
of many Member States, characterised by large struc-
tural deficits and high levels of public debt. The search 
for better efficiency in all policies will thus need to be 
placed high on the agenda.
6.3.  Fostering strategic European interests
The challenges identified above have important impli-
cations for the EU policy framework. This is reflected in 
the modernisation of the EU’s industrial policy with the 
specific objective of gaining leverage for global compe-
tition. The following section discusses the institutional 
framework where relevant from a competitiveness 
perspective.
160  European Commission (2010), Towards a Single Market Act, For a highly com-
petitive social market economy, 50 proposals for improving our work, business 
and exchanges with one another, Communication from the Commission, 
COM(2010) 608, point 1.4.
Figure 6.3:   Changes in credit standards applied to the approval of loans or credit lines to enterprises (net 
percentage of banks reporting tightening credit standards)
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periodic monitoring and evaluation.165 The conclusions 
adopted by the Competitiveness Council on 1 March 
2010 reconfirm this widened room for manoeuvre.166 
Much of the subsequent discussion in this chapter 
serves to explain in greater detail how this opportunity 
can be grasped in practical terms.
With a view to other policies, Article 3(c) TFEU refers to 
competition policy as one of the EU’s exclusive compe-
tences, to the extent necessary for the functioning of 
the internal market. Competition policy thus remains 
a vital element of any competitiveness policy strategy. 
As regards trade policy, the Lisbon Treaty introduced 
two major changes: a clarification of the EU’s exclusive 
competence on all key aspects of trade policy and an 
increase in the European Parliament’s powers vis-à-vis 
the Council. Concerning the EU’s exclusive powers, the 
Lisbon Treaty explicitly refers not only to trade in goods 
but also to trade in services, trade-related IPRs and 
FDI.167 By extending the competence for FDI without 
explicitly mentioning investment liberalisation or pro-
tection, the Lisbon Treaty has granted the EU an exclu-
sive competence for investment protection. Any new 
policy is therefore not confined to granting access to 
trade partners and ensuring access for European com-
panies to the markets of third countries, but can also 
ensure that these investments are duly protected. Mul-
tilateral fora and bilateral trade agreements could serve 
to advance this approach further.
6.3.2.  A new industrial policy for the globalisation era
In the wake of the 1992 Single Market Programme, 
the EU pursued a horizontal168 industrial policy aimed 
at improving the framework conditions necessary to 
ensure the flourishing of the newly constructed internal 
market. Strong competition policy was used to break 
down remaining barriers. Interventionist economic poli-
cies were explicitly avoided as likely to be incompatible 
with the internal market.
165  Priollaud, F-X., Siritzky, D., (2010) Le Traité de Lisbonne: commentaire, article 
par article, des nouveaux traits européens (TUE-TFUE), Paris, Documentation 
française, p. 284.
166  Council of the European Union (2010), Council conclusions on the need for 
a new industrial policy, 2999th Competitiveness Council meeting, Brussels, 1 
March 2010, point 9.
167  De Gucht, K., The implications of the Lisbon Treaty for EU Trade policy, S&D 
seminar on EU Trade Policy, Oporto, 8 October 2010.
168  As opposed to vertical policies that target specific sectors.
establishes industrial policy as the main pillar of the EU’s 
competitiveness policy.
Article 173 keeps the main elements of its predecessor, 
Article 157 EC.163 In particular, it maintains the overall 
objective that
‘[t]he Union and the Member States shall ensure that the 
conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the Union’s 
industry exist.’
The article then lists more detailed industrial policy 
objectives, such as:
•	 speeding up the adjustment of industry to structural 
changes;
•	 creating a favourable business environment, particu-
larly for SMEs; and
•	 fostering better exploitation of the ‘industrial poten-
tial of policies of innovation, research and techno-
logical development’.
Any action by the EU and the Member States must be in 
accordance with a system of open and competitive mar-
kets. Moreover, Article 173 emphasises that industrial 
competitiveness has various dimensions. This has broad 
implications for the positioning of industrial policy in 
conjunction with other policies, such as R&D, innova-
tion, competition and trade. It also implies that indus-
trial policy is multifaceted, so that a single indicator will 
not suffice to measure competitiveness in a comprehen-
sive and operational manner.164
In addition, Article 173 TFEU includes novel aspects that 
strengthen its relevance compared with Article 157 EC. 
Most importantly, Article 173(2) gives the Commission 
more scope to coordinate between EU level and Mem-
ber States, for example by establishing guidelines and 
indicators, exchanging best practice or performing 
163  Cf. also European Commission (2002), 2002 European Competitiveness Report, 
Commission Staff Working Paper, SEC(2002) 528, p. 82.
164  European Commission (2010), Member States competitiveness performance 
and policies, Commission Staff Working Document SEC(2010) 1272, Accompa-
nying Document to the Communication from the Commission, An Integrated 
Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era Putting Competitiveness and Sustain-
ability at Centre Stage, COM(2010) 614.
Box 6.3: The Lisbon Treaty
The Treaty of Lisbon amended the EU’s two core treaties, the Treaty on European Union (i.e. the ‘Maastricht 
Treaty’) and the Treaty establishing the European Community (i.e. the ‘Treaty of Rome’). The latter was renamed 
the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). In addition, several Protocols and Declarations were 
attached to the Treaty.210
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to help ensure consistency between all other policies 
targeting enterprises.
While it is built on past experience and continues some 
existing initiatives, this new industrial policy contains 
some novel elements that strengthen the Commis-
sion’s role as the coordinator of national policies. On 
substance, emphasis is placed on the whole value chain, 
from access to raw materials to after-sales service, in 
recognition that any focus on solely one part of this 
chain is detrimental to enhancing the competitiveness 
of not only firms but the EU economy as a whole. At the 
same time, the EU has set itself a new strategic objec-
tive: maintaining a strong, competitive and diversified 
industrial base in Europe. In particular, it aims to provide 
‘a strategic framework for a new integrated industrial 
policy that will stimulate economic recovery and jobs 
by ensuring a thriving world-class industrial base in 
the EU’.173
In order to promote a successful industrial policy, the 
new strategy requires that industrial policy is under-
stood in a wider sense, focusing on all policies that have 
an impact on the cost, price and innovative competitive-
ness of industry and individual sectors, such as stand-
ardisation, innovation policies or policies targeting e.g. 
the innovation performance of individual sectors. It also 
entails consideration of the competitiveness effects of 
all other policy initiatives.
The key challenge ahead is to create a framework that 
accompanies firms through all phases of their life cycle 
and all stages of their activity. The framework is also 
intended to provide the right incentives for them to 
increase their competitiveness (this notion is further 
discussed in section 6.4). The primary responsibility for 
doing this rests on industry itself. Nonetheless, a mod-
ern industrial policy offers a toolbox that combines the 
rigour and consistency of horizontal principles with the 
flexibility of priority setting according to the specific 
needs of sectors.
In addition to these priorities, the Commission has 
started reporting on EU and Member State competitive-
ness, industrial policies and performance on an annual 
basis as part of the new TFEU provision for it to coordi-
nate competitiveness policies.174.
173  European Commission (2010), An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisa-
tion Era Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage, Communi-
cation from the Commission, COM(2010) 614.
174  European Commission (2010), Member States competitiveness perfor-
mance and policies — 2010 edition, Commission Staff Working Document, 
SEC(2010) 1272.
As the Single Market has become an established real-
ity, the importance of manufacturing industry in the 
EU economy has been increasingly recognised. In 2002, 
with a view to the upcoming enlargement, the Commis-
sion published a Communication on Industrial Policy in 
an Enlarged Europe,169 which examined the future of EU 
industrial policy. It underlined the role of a competitive 
industry and emphasised three key factors influencing 
industrial competitiveness: knowledge, innovation and 
entrepreneurship. Two further Communications fol-
lowed in 2003 and 2004.170 171
In the context of the revised Lisbon Strategy,172 the 
Communication on industrial policy in 2005 confirmed 
industrial policy as a key policy at EU level. The docu-
ment set out an integrated approach to industrial policy, 
maintaining a horizontal non-interventionist approach 
to industrial policy that took full account of sectoral spe-
cificities. A detailed set of horizontal and sectoral poli-
cies were set out based upon a systematic screening of 
the opportunities and challenges facing 27 individual 
sectors of EU manufacturing industry. Key initiatives 
included a legislative simplification initiative, work on 
energy and environmental issues, international market 
access, and intellectual property enforcement, together 
with a series of High Level Groups, including CARS21 
and LeaderSHIP, to review the future of certain sectors. 
A mid-term review in 2007 further extended and elab-
orated this policy approach, including working more 
closely with Member States. Overall, the new policy 
framework has served the EU well.
When the global business environment changed radi-
cally, as described above, the Commission designated 
industrial policy as one of the key flagship initiatives 
under the Europe 2020 Strategy, and adopted on 28 
October 2010 a new Communication on ‘An Integrated 
Industrial Policy for the Globalisation Era — Putting 
Competitiveness and Sustainability at the Centre Stage’ 
(Box 6.4). Taking into account in particular the les-
sons learnt from the crisis, the Commission agreed on 
a fresh approach to industrial policy, which is to put EU 
economy on a dynamic growth path by strengthening 
EU competitiveness, providing growth and jobs, and 
enabling the transition to a low-carbon and resource-
efficient economy. Most importantly, the Communica-
tion recognised the need for an outward-looking global 
perspective with competitiveness as the central element 
169  European Commission (2002), Industrial Policy in an Enlarged Europe, Com-
munication from the Commission, COM(2002) 714.
170  European Commission (2003), Some Key Issues in Europe’s Competitiveness 
— Towards an Integrated Approach, Communication from the Commission, 
COM(2003) 704.
171  European Commission (2004), Fostering structural change: an industrial policy 
for an enlarged Europe, Communication from the Commission, COM(2004) 
274.
172  European Commission (2005), Common Actions for Growth and Employment: 
The Community Lisbon Programme, Communication from the Commission, 
COM(2005) 330.211
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•	 Globalisation affects all Member States, and the stra-
tegic response to it is a task with clear economies of 
scale. In the face of non-EU competitors with swiftly 
expanding home markets of a potential size much 
larger than that of any EU Member State, political 
and economic leverage can be higher at European 
level.
•	 There is a strong need to maintain the Single Mar-
ket across an enlarged EU-27, a much less homog-
enous economic bloc than the earlier, smaller EU. In 
a number of sectors, manufacturing is concentrated 
in a minority of Member States, whereas resources, 
suppliers and markets encompass all of them. Main-
taining and extending the Single Market benefits all 
businesses and consumers.
•	 Limited state finances in the wake of the economic 
and financial crisis call for pan-European solutions, 
including new ways of financing large-scale demon-
6.3.3.  A European policy approach to serve strategic 
European interests 
In line with the principle of subsidiarity, the appropriate 
level to design policy is the lowest that can effectively 
provide a solution for the problem at hand. Action at 
EU level is thus only justified where the target of such 
action comprises a significant part of the EU and where 
a response only at a lower level would create risks of 
fragmentation, underperformance or inconsistency. 
These conditions are met for a policy response towards 
the challenges discussed above:
175  European Commission (2011), Trade and Investment Barriers Report 2011, 
Report from the Commission to the European Council, COM(2011) 114.
176  European Commission (2011), Tackling the challenges in commodities markets 
and on raw materials, Communication from the Commission, COM(2011) 25.
Box 6.4: The five key priorities of the October 2010 Industrial Policy Communication
Firstly, the Communication emphasises the need to deliver the right framework conditions for industry and ensure 
that EU policies all work together in the same direction. To achieve this, all important policy proposals impacting 
on industry — for example, new regulations for financial markets, environmental standards or new Single Market 
and competition legislation — should undergo a detailed assessment of their overall impact on industrial and 
sectoral competitiveness before implementation. This should guarantee a genuinely integrated industrial policy 
approach at EU level.
Secondly, the Communication stresses the role that the Single Market plays in fostering industry’s competitive-
ness and the need to address its shortcomings. For example, the efficiency of the Single Market crucially depends 
on the quality and efficiency of the energy, transport and communications infrastructure. The related policies 
should therefore be considered integral parts of an integrated industrial policy approach. Also, the provision of 
business services is becoming ever more crucial for modern industry, and the Single Market needs to be modern-
ised in this area.
Thirdly, as Europe needs to improve its ability to turn ideas into marketable goods and services, the Communica-
tion puts forward a new industrial innovation policy, to ensure that EU firms are first onto the market. In particular, 
it emphasises the role that Key Enabling Technologies (KETs) can play in ensuring continuing technological lead-
ership by EU industry in both mature and emerging markets.
Fourthly, the Communication insists that European industry must take advantage of the new markets opened up 
by globalisation, and that it will only be able to do so if put on an equal footing with its global competitors. This 
requires greater efforts to identify and combat trade and investment barriers175 and also beyond-the-border prac-
tices, such as subsidies in specific sectors. As access to raw materials is an increasingly strategic issue for Europe, 
the Communication announced a comprehensive strategy, subsequently presented by the Commission,176 with 
a strong external dimension to ensure, in particular, that access is genuinely market-driven and that restrictions 
and constraints in third countries are removed.
Finally, industry must be accompanied in its transition to a low carbon resource efficient economy. Indeed, com-
bating climate change and increasing resource efficiency should not be seen exclusively as a burden on com-
panies, but also as an opportunity for sustainable growth and gaining competitive advantage. This implies in 
particular initiatives targeting energy-intensive industries – such as metals, chemicals, and paper and pulp – so 
that new low-carbon technologies can be developed and disseminated.212
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infrastructures. It can be extended to large research 
infrastructure projects, e.g. the ITER fusion energy 
demonstration project in Cadarache.
From the perspective of industrial competitiveness policy, 
a legitimate European interest could be assumed to exist 
where an action would benefit industrial competitiveness 
across national borders without its benefits being either 
limited to one Member State or the Member States imple-
menting it or confined to the industry directly concerned, 
or where the implementation of a project or policy at 
Member State level would result in wasteful duplica-
tion of efforts (i.e. inefficient use of resources), would act 
against similar efforts in other Member States, or would 
not happen at all. Reasons for the latter include costs that 
exceed benefits at national level due to externalities, too 
large a project size or myopic behaviour, all of which is 
aggravated in the face of tighter fiscal constraints.
Factual developments underpin the need to rapidly 
fill the notion of European interest in the competitive-
ness context with content. The evolution of cross-
border industry value chains is one of them. This was 
prominently highlighted in the 2010 Industrial Policy 
Communication:
‘Delivering the new industrial policy calls for more effective 
European governance. The concepts of national sectors 
and national industries with little interaction with other 
sectors or the rest of the world are becoming less relevant. 
It is now increasingly important to identify strategic Euro-
pean industrial interests, and uncoordinated national 
policy responses must give way to coordinated, European 
policy responses.’178
The ongoing changes in the global configuration of 
industries and countries add a new dimension to the 
notion of European interest in the field of competitive-
ness policy. In some areas where the level playing field 
for all companies is distorted, and where Europe 2020 
aims to ‘maintain a strong, competitive and diversified 
industrial base’, defining the European interest with 
regard to non-European trade partners could be done 
in a more pro-active way.
6.3.3.2.  Strategic nature of such interests
The paragraphs above, including the quotation, refer 
to the concept of ‘strategic’ interests. Of course, a sec-
tor, company or activity is never strategic per se but 
can only be so in specific circumstances. Such circum-
stances can change over time. This explains why lists of 
strategic actors or activities differ, depending on their 
178  European Commission (2010), An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisa-
tion Era Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage, Communi-
cation from the Commission, COM(2010) 614.
stration projects (as exemplified by Carbon Capture 
and Storage or KETs) and supporting infrastructure.
The Europe 2020 strategy provides the basis to imple-
ment such a European approach. As discussed in section 
6.3.1, the TFEU provides new tools for the ‘integrated 
industrial policy for the globalisation era’ flagship to 
enhance competitiveness, for instance by strengthen-
ing the Commission’s role as coordinator of national 
efforts. In this context, it is important as a starting point 
to clarify some concepts, notably ‘European interest’, 
‘strategic’ at European level, and ‘European company’, 
to the extent relevant for an industrial policy context.
6.3.3.1.  European interest
The notion of European interest figures in the TFEU only 
once, in Article 107(3)(b) on state aid. Financial support 
measures by Member States ‘may be considered to be 
compatible with the internal market’ if they constitute
‘aid to promote the execution of an important project of 
common European interest or to remedy a serious distur-
bance in the economy of a Member State’.
However, the related term ‘common interest’ appears 
ten times. In particular, two subsequent provisions 
on state aid, Articles 107(3)(c) and (d), state that other 
forms of aid must not distort trade (and competition) to 
an extent ‘contrary to the common interest’. A common 
European interest is thus recognised in the TFEU itself.
Beyond these references, the European interest also fig-
ures in secondary law:
•	 In the competition context, the conditions for con-
sidering ‘[a]id for R&D&I to promote the execution of 
an important project of common European interest’ 
as compatible with the internal market are laid down 
in the 2006 R&D&I state aid framework.
•	 In another field, the notion already exists as well. In 
trade policy,177 the ‘Community interest’ is defined 
on the basis of various interests taken as a whole, 
including the interests of domestic industry, users 
and consumers. It thus serves to combine diverse — 
and sometimes opposed — specific interests to 
arrive at the common good.
•	 The notion of European interest is used in EU trans-
port or energy policy for establishing the right 
framework conditions and financial means to ensure 
the building or operating of efficient trans-border 
177  Council Regulation (EC) No 597/2009, of 11 June 2009 on protection against 
subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Commu-
nity.213
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When one considers these examples in greater detail, 
similarities become visible. Much of this looks unspec-
tacular, and the companies concerned may in fact be 
small — and few. They can be prone to weaknesses, 
including the financial issues that SMEs often face, and 
can therefore be vulnerable to takeovers. Neverthe-
less, their strategic value far exceeds their absolute size 
because of their bottleneck function, not only for pro-
duction as such but for public policy needs that depend 
on such production.
If the European interest is to enhance competitiveness, 
as outlined above, a systemic analysis of how to achieve 
this must continue to focus on the most strategic ele-
ments within the industrial fabric, including both large 
and small enterprises, whose removal from the mar-
ket-driven economic system the EU promotes would 
have an appreciable effect on competitiveness across 
national borders.180 This is the notion of ‘strategic’ pur-
sued in the following sections.
6.3.3.3.  European companies
These considerations lead to the third element of the EU 
competitiveness paradigm: European companies. While 
references to European companies abound and are per-
tinent in many industrial contexts, notably strategic con-
texts at national level (for instance in defence), a clear 
definition proves particularly difficult. Similar exercises 
in other countries, such as the US two decades ago, have 
proven equally difficult, but have ultimately contributed 
to a better understanding of how companies, regardless 
of their origin, can help to add value to specific regions 
of the world. The exercise here has to be understood in 
a similar vein as a starting point for discussion.
Despite these definitional ambiguities a more pragmatic 
approach would be to say that a company founded in 
Europe that has its R&D department, production sites 
and headquarters in Europe is obviously European, 
180  As such, the concept obviously includes not only existing and fully active 
firms but new entrants.
origin. Furthermore, many EU Member States have 
defined strategic sectors at national level, e.g. relating 
to national security, which have then received specific 
support. This need not be in contradiction with EU law, 
notably on the free movement of capital.179 However, 
such definitions can differ profoundly across the EU.
However, a European interest deemed to be strategic 
must be so at European and not national or sectoral 
level. The focus should be on criteria that are objective 
while flexible enough to cope with the relative nature 
of what is strategic at a given moment in a given con-
text. Accordingly, two such criteria can be singled out: 
public policy relevance and indispensability for specific 
economic activities.
1.    An activity and its driver — in many cases firms — 
are the more strategic the more they are indispensi-
ble to achieve an acknowledged public policy objec-
tive. An example is road safety. If the objective is to 
reduce the number of fatal accidents in passenger 
transport, on-board safety systems are essential. If it 
turns out that the number of producers of state-of-
the-art technologies is very limited, any of them is 
strategically important — not per se, but in this spe-
cific context.
2.    Many economic activities rely on specific inputs 
produced by innovative firms with cutting-edge 
technology and/or on time by highly specialised 
producers. Indispensible inputs, such as certain raw 
materials found in few countries, are another exam-
ple. The less they can be substituted and the more 
disruptive for global, fine-tuned value chains their 
temporary non-availability would be, the more they 
are strategic. Examples here include lightweight, 
high-resistance materials or electric batteries in road 
transport or energy-saving propulsion systems in 
maritime transport.
179  Cf. Bertoncini and de Beaufort (2009).
Box 6.5: European companies
Many attempts to define a European enterprise have been made, leading so far to inconclusive results. It has 
sometimes been defined as a transnational group, in contrast with national companies from Member States or in 
contrast with third countries. The criteria used to define a European enterprise in economic terms have also been 
widely discussed: European shareholding, dominant market in Europe, added value created in Europe, headquar-
ters, main production sites, R&D or jobs located in Europe. Some criteria used are identified in sociological terms, 
such as methods of governance, relations between shareholders and management, importance of employee par-
ticipation in management, closeness to legal and institutional framework, etc. Debates are still ongoing but seem 
to add little value to the discussion in this chapter.214
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base this response on the EU’s strategic interests. As noted 
above, these strategic interests depend on the context. 
In what follows, in order to place the discussion within 
a more practical context, such interests are exemplified for 
different stages of the production value chain: access to 
resources, innovation, access to markets, and restructur-
ing. Each stage is affected differently by the challenges, 
and each requires a different form of response. Overall, 
however, all these responses need to be coherent to opti-
mise policy leverage at European level.
6.4.1.  Access to resources
European companies can only thrive on the global mar-
ket if they have reliable access to essential inputs. This 
particularly applies to raw materials, some of which are 
subject to trade restrictions, concentrated in few non-EU 
countries and prone to becoming the subject of strate-
gic leveraging. As the 2010 Industrial Policy Communi-
cation put it, ‘secure, affordable, reliable and undistorted 
access to raw materials is essential for industrial compet-
itiveness, innovation, and jobs.’ However, fluctuations in 
both quantities and prices render such access difficult. 
Increased prices for raw materials in principle reflect 
increased demand and signal relative scarcity. This is 
a normal and useful incentive in a market environment 
to search for alternatives and to increase efficiency (See 
Chapter 4.). At the same time, such price increases can 
be partly due to government intervention for strategic 
reasons, e.g. to give preference to domestic producers.
The response to this is threefold, as identified in the 
recent Raw Materials Communication:182
First, the availability of intra-EU resources should be 
stepped up. This starts with better knowledge and iden-
tification of the EU’s indigenous resources, the devel-
opment of technologies for intelligent mining, and the 
increased exchange of best practices between Member 
States in the area of land use planning and permitting of 
exploration and extraction.
Second, respect for multilateral rules should be 
enhanced through increased cooperation in global 
fora, such as the WTO, to address external supply prob-
lems, tackling trade barriers through dialogue but also 
through judicial action, where appropriate. Action at 
multilateral or bilateral level can also be taken in the 
development field in order to diversify access to raw 
materials by creating win-win situations.
Third, recycling (e.g. through ‘urban mining’) and 
technological substitution can reduce the pressure on 
access to a certain extent. In both cases, the concept of 
182  European Commission (2011), Tackling the Challenges in Commodity Markets 
and on Raw Materials, Communication from the Commission, COM(2011) 25.
whereas a company where none of this applies equally 
clearly is not. The usual market reality lies in between 
and need not be further described in many (if not most) 
cases. For example, whether a producer of final products 
in a homogenous global market with low transport costs 
and no capacity constraints is European or not is at best 
of academic but not practical relevance.
At the same time, this would be an example of a firm 
that neither merits nor deserves public policy attention. 
The market reality is usually different. The more a com-
pany adds value to the European economy, the more 
it is entwined with European policies and the more it 
can become a vehicle for such policies. This is obvious 
in some contexts, such as employment. In fact, a widely 
recognised definition of ‘competitiveness’ includes 
jobs181 and thus stresses this particular dimension of 
economic activity.
Even if one were to challenge the significance job crea-
tion might have for core competitiveness, companies that 
are strongly rooted in the European economy may pro-
duce a series of other beneficial effects in Europe. They 
often form part of innovation systems within Europe, in 
which proximity and local or regional spillovers are cru-
cial and where distance matters when it comes to the 
success or not of such systems. Furthermore, they may be 
more familiar with the legal and socioeconomic system 
and the culture in Europe, which may reduce frictions 
and make it simpler for them to operate and for others 
to deal with them. Again, this is a success factor not to be 
underestimated, and is one which is too often absent in 
investors purely operating from outside the EU.
The objective of any definition of European companies 
is recognition of the simple fact that the policy of any 
jurisdiction is primarily targeted at the economic sub-
jects living and operating in it. At the same time, there is 
a European interest in maintaining a strong presence of 
companies with strong roots in the European economy 
in a variety of strategic contexts, as industries or com-
panies that exit the European market cannot return at 
short notice and without significant cost. In fact, both 
the time and cost are often prohibitive, and exacer-
bated by the loss of knowledge and support factors 
within the system.
6.4.  Industrial competitiveness throughout 
the production value chain
The challenges defined in section 6.2 necessitate the 
design of a European response that takes into account 
the institutional framework and the policy principles pre-
sented in section 6.3. It is of paramount importance to 
181  See Box 1.1 in Chapter 1 of this report.215
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depends upon an appropriately designed research and 
innovation policy. In particular, a pro-active industrial 
innovation policy is a key driver for efficiency gains in 
production processes and services, improved perfor-
mance of products and the creation of new markets.183
Such a policy should take into account the specific 
research and innovation profile of each Member State 
and focus on their respective weaknesses. This would 
also promote convergence between the innovation 
performances of Member States. All new Member States 
are currently below the average EU innovation perfor-
mance.184 The difficulty of this situation has been com-
pounded by the crisis, which has had a ‘disproportionate 
impact on some less performing regions. Europe must 
avoid an “innovation divide” between the strongest 
innovating regions and the others’.185 More efficient use 
of the Structural Funds and a more targeted approach, 
focused on the relative strengths of each region (the so-
called ‘smart specialisation approach’), together with 
cluster initiatives, could contribute to this objective.
More generally, the crisis has imposed tight fiscal con-
straints on national budgets, including those supporting 
research and innovation. This problem calls for a much 
better aligned effort from Member States and the Com-
mission to pool resources and coordinate actions in 
order to optimise efficiency. Such a coordination or 
pooling strategy would also contribute to addressing 
the recent changes in global conditions and the com-
petition from non-EU competitors, which are following 
a similar innovation path and which in many instances 
have already implemented a coherent research and 
innovation strategy.
In this context, a fundamental challenge for Europe is 
fragmentation. Research and innovation capacities in EU 
firms are numerous and of a high quality, but often small 
in size and fragmented along national and regional lines. 
This leads to duplication and overlap. Focusing on the 
183  European Commission (2010), An Integrated Industrial Policy for the Globalisa-
tion Era Putting Competitiveness and Sustainability at Centre Stage, Communi-
cation from the Commission, COM(2010) 614.
184  Innovation Union Scoreboard 2010: The Innovation Union’s performance 
scoreboard for Research and Innovation (2011), ProInno Europe Report.
185  European Commission (2010), Europe 2020 Flagship Initiative Innovation 
Union, Communication from the Commission, COM(2010) 546.
the sustainable use of natural resources is the driver of 
EU action.
Strategies at firm level can complement these efforts. 
Long-term contracts are a particularly useful tool 
to steady prices and hedge risks. In specific circum-
stances, such contracts can become anti-competitive, 
for instance if resources are obtained from a dominant 
player on the basis of exclusive contracts that result in 
only minor quantities being available on the market 
each year, or in general if the long-term contracts lead to 
market foreclosure. The specific circumstances are now 
well-established in antitrust case law. In general, how-
ever, long-term contracts are often pro-competitive and 
work even better if their pricing is constrained by spot 
markets that cater to supplementary short-term needs.
Second, firms can reduce scope for strategic leverage 
by relying on several suppliers. This proves difficult at 
times, as bottlenecks emerge in complex supply chains. 
Moreover, many suppliers are small and prone to risks 
inherent in cyclical businesses. The financial crisis has 
exposed such problems and weakened parts of indus-
trial supply chains, which has prompted responses that 
have not always been pro-competitive, e.g. takeovers 
that have privatised assets that had formerly been 
accessible to all buyers.
Recent events, such as the global repercussions of the 
Japan earthquake and tsunami, have added to these 
concerns and made supply chain management a num-
ber one priority for many global businesses. In fact, the 
old wisdom of the undisputedly beneficial effects of an 
enhanced global division of labour cannot be main-
tained any longer. Greater strategic state intervention, 
supply chain interruptions for an increasing number of 
reasons (e.g. natural disasters, piracy), and increasing 
market concentration are strong disruptive factors. Prox-
imity starts to matter more, not only for innovation  — 
where this principle has been long established — but 
also for access to resources as such.
6.4.2. Innovation
Maintaining and strengthening a competitive, low-
carbon and resource-efficient industrial base in Europe 
Box 6.6: Critical raw materials
In order to develop priority actions, the Commission has identified a list of critical raw materials, based on the risk 
of a supply shortage in the next ten years and the importance for the whole value chain. In all, 14 such critical raw 
materials figure on this list: antimony, beryllium, cobalt, fluorspar, gallium, germanium, graphite, indium, mag-
nesium, niobium, platinum group metals, rare earths, tantalum and tungsten. These critical raw materials have or 
should become a core strategic dimension of industrial, trade, research and competition policies.216
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competitiveness and giving them a ‘home base’ to com-
pete globally.187 In the era of globalisation, however, 
deepening the Single Market goes hand in hand with 
opening it to the outside world. This opening to imports 
and investments from trading partners is crucial for eco-
nomic growth within Europe. Competitive pressure on 
EU firms from non-EU businesses provides important 
incentives for them to remain innovative and rapidly 
adapt to global evolutions.
Access for European companies to foreign markets
The successful removal of tariff barriers to trade, 
achieved under multilateral and bilateral agreements, 
has significantly increased global trade. It has benefited 
EU businesses, helping them to recover from the crisis. 
While it is necessary to pursue these efforts, the focus 
has shifted to non-tariff and other ‘behind the border’ 
barriers188 (offsets, burdensome customs procedures, 
discriminatory technical regulations, etc.). These obsta-
cles are more difficult to identify and to remove. Fur-
thermore, the crisis has unsurprisingly turned out to 
be a period of increased protectionism, precisely in the 
form of hidden or ‘low intensity’ barriers. Access to the 
Single Market, with its 500 million consumers, remains 
very attractive to foreign firms, so reciprocity is a highly 
efficient instrument for reducing non-tariff trade barri-
ers.189 The economic weight of the Single Market grants 
the EU considerable influence on regulatory issues in 
such a context. It also allows it to achieve leadership in 
standardisation and other policy fields where regulatory 
competition will increase.
Furthermore, European companies investing abroad 
need a secure legal framework for doing so. Their capital 
investments and also their technical know-how (espe-
cially in the form of IPR) need to be protected against 
arbitrary interventions by the government or lack of 
effective access to the courts or dispute settlement 
mechanisms. This is especially so for small and medium-
sized enterprises, which find it particularly challenging 
to be active abroad.
Finally, distortions in international trade and invest-
ment can result from strategic macro-economic policy 
choices, such as fixed exchange rates. Exchange rates 
significantly influence the relative competitiveness of 
industries and enterprises from different countries. 
187  European Commission (2010), Towards a Single Market Act, For a highly com-
petitive social market economy, 50 proposals for improving our work, business 
and exchanges with one another, Communication from the Commission, 
COM(2010) 608.
188  European Commission (2007), Global Europe, A stronger Partnership to Deliver 
Market Access for European Exporters, Communication from the Commission, 
COM(2007) 183.
189  Accordingly, the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), for 
instance, contains specific reciprocity clauses. http://www.wto.org/english/
docs_e/legal_e/gpr-94_e.pdf.
European dimension and going beyond mere national 
initiatives is necessary, not only to overcome the scar-
city of public resources, but also to acquire a recognised 
weight at global level. This necessitates the pooling of 
EU efforts, for example by increasing contributions to 
cross-European initiatives, such as European platforms, 
the Lead Market Initiative, public-private partnerships, 
innovation partnerships, Framework Programme sup-
port for collective projects of firms from several Mem-
ber States, or other policy measures. Such policies all 
encourage cross-border convergence and synergies. 
They indeed serve to make strategic European interests 
a priority.
Within such a framework, it is of the utmost importance 
to help EU firms to become or remain innovation lead-
ers. This includes efforts to ensure their goods or ser-
vices are low-carbon and resource-efficient. Targeted 
efforts are for example needed to support the early 
uptake of KETs186 (such as industrial biotechnology, 
advanced materials, nanotechnology, micro- and nano-
electronics, photonics, and advanced manufacturing 
systems) to unleash their full beneficial impact in other 
industrial sectors. New initiatives to address societal 
challenges also need to be strongly encouraged, in the 
field of technology as well as in the field of services.
6.4.3.  Access to markets
Access to resources and a strong innovation perfor-
mance fail to deliver optimal results if access to mar-
kets, particularly outside the EU, is a problem. In fact, 
both the recovery from the crisis and some tendencies 
in the context of globalisation, where newly emerging 
competitors might bring forward infant industry argu-
ments or implement other policies that favour their 
native companies, result in a significant risk of protec-
tionism. European businesses are largely dependent 
on non-EU markets and integrated global value chains. 
In the future, the main growth potential for European 
businesses is expected to come from non-EU markets. 
European companies can furthermore profit from geo-
graphical diversification to hedge against crises that are 
geographically limited or affect different world regions at 
different times. All of this means that the need to ensure 
fair access to markets worldwide is a key ingredient for 
EU policy in a globalised economy, the more so when 
Europe faces ever more competitive trading partners.
Access to the Single Market ‘home base’
Deepening the Single Market plays an essential part 
in building and strengthening European companies’ 
186  European Commission (2010), European Competitiveness Report 2010.217
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of regional development considerations are already 
assessed with a view to the impact on the sector, if 
the beneficiary has more than a 25 % market share or, 
should the market be underperforming, if the capac-
ity increase resulting from the investment exceeds 5 % 
of the consumption of the market. State aid rules also 
exclude certain sensitive sectors from regional state 
aid (for example the steel industry). Furthermore, aid 
schemes targeting specific sectors have to be notified 
individually. The assessment of these schemes takes into 
account the impact on the sector concerned.
For all types of company adjustment strategies, the EU 
policy approach should continue to be based on iden-
tifying and taking into account the pro-competitive 
effects of projects and initiatives on the EU market. Such 
pro-competitive effects in turn can contribute to increas-
ing the competitiveness of the companies involved.
6.5.  Implications for the interface 
between industrial policy and other 
competitiveness-related policies
Any reflections on the general principles governing 
a policy approach have their litmus test in their practical 
application. This reality check is all the more important 
— yet particularly difficult — if the issues addressed are 
new and complex, necessitating a careful balancing of 
objectives (such as free trade vs targeted intervention) 
the implications of which are not fully clear in advance. 
This certainly applies to the developments discussed in 
this chapter, which form a moving target and which are 
only now starting to draw the attention of both policy 
makers and the wider public.
What is certain in such a context is that individual poli-
cies aiming to enhance competitiveness, such as indus-
trial and competition policies but also trade, internal 
market and other policies, need to engage in a well 
coordinated exploitation of policy synergies based on 
sound and joint analysis of socioeconomic develop-
ments, which by necessity starts with fact finding. The 
discussion of the industrial and competition policy 
interface in the 2002 Competitiveness Report pointed 
to the existence of such synergies and the merits of 
exploiting them. Events since then have reinforced this 
observation.
The subsequent discussion in this section therefore 
advances and deepens this discussion in the light of 
recent and expected future developments. Two princi-
ples apply:
1.    This discussion is driven by practical examples of 
particular relevance at this moment in time. They 
should not be seen as a complete list of issues to 
be addressed but rather as typical examples. In 
Solutions that aim to create a global level playing field 
must therefore address all aspects of the existing imbal-
ances if they are to be effective.
6.4.4. Restructuring 
The structural weaknesses of the EU economy exposed 
by the crisis cannot be ignored if the objective is to 
achieve medium- and long-term growth and secure 
jobs. Changes should aim, on the one hand, to ensure 
a transition to more sustainable and innovative produc-
tion and/or new business models. On the other hand, 
they may be conceived to manage structural excess 
capacities or to accompany changes at firm level, rang-
ing from ‘engaging in new business models and prod-
ucts to definite market exit’.190
Although, in order to successfully compete, any firm and 
any sector must be ready to adjust, some sectors are 
more concerned by the need to find new business mod-
els or markets than others. These include, for instance, 
the automotive sector, the basic metals industries, 
mechanical and electrical engineering, shipbuilding or 
the printing industry.
First, it is essential to consider that restructuring pro-
cesses constitute an inherent element of the life-cycle 
of each enterprise. Companies must constantly adjust 
their strategies to the changing environment and to 
their internal evolution. This being said, many firms have 
come into difficulties almost exclusively because of the 
crisis and the lingering difficult access to finance. For 
these firms, when facing adjustment needs the issue of 
access to finance becomes existential.
Second, restructuring concerns both firms and whole 
sectors. While the responsibility for restructuring is 
always considered as primarily that of firms themselves, 
the issue becomes more complex and sensitive when it 
comes to the restructuring of sectors. It might be worth 
offering sectors some space to collectively rethink their 
role and place in the global arena, in order to collectively 
contribute to their own restructuring processes and to 
ensure, if needed, the orderly winding down of busi-
nesses. This topic becomes even more complex, but cer-
tainly not less relevant, when considering the impact of 
restructuring on value chains. Decisions by single com-
panies — or sectors — can substantially influence the 
competitiveness of other, related companies or sectors.
The overall sector dimension should also be taken into 
account in all public policies and decisions relating to 
firms. In the field of state aid, for example, decisions 
taken on aid for large investment projects on the basis 
190  ‘An integrated Industrial Policy for the globalisation era putting competitive-
ness and sustainability at Centre Stage’.218
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These improvements constitute a shift towards a more 
sophisticated assessment of economic reality. It also 
allows the Commission to contribute to competitive-
ness through a more sophisticated evaluation of notified 
mergers and acquisitions. Despite the fact that many of 
the more than 2000 mergers notified to the Commis-
sion since 2004 have touched upon crucial industries or 
transactions with far-reaching economic consequences, 
the Commission has managed, with 1835 clearances, 
117 conditional clearances and only three prohibitions, 
to ensure that these transactions are fully in line with 
the EU’s competitiveness objectives.192 In fact, the Com-
mission has not prohibited any merger with any indus-
trial policy relevance since the 2004 Merger Regulation 
entered into force.
In this context, it should be stressed that European 
merger control policy has not prevented European com-
panies from becoming champions on global markets. 
The Commission’s practice rather shows the contrary. 
Prominent cases, including EADS, Glaxo/Smithkline, 
GdF/Suez and SAP/Sybase, not only demonstrate that 
there is no inevitable antagonism between the idea of 
allowing companies to fully benefit from the enlarged 
Single Market ‘base camp’ and the need to protect Euro-
pean consumers.193 They also show that the European 
Commission, within and in accordance with existing EU 
competition rules, takes into account businesses’ con-
cerns about their competitiveness on markets outside 
the EU and the need for size in this regard — concerns 
that will become ever more pressing in the globalisation 
era — as ‘Europe needs European champions that are 
able to grow on their own merits and to run with their 
legs in the global race.’194
The economic trends identified in the preceding sec-
tions and the dynamic character of the EU policy frame-
work mean that decision making has to be constantly 
adapted. This does not necessarily require new rules; 
in fact, the current rules provide enough flexibility if 
properly interpreted.195 It however calls for a vigilant eye 
for these new developments and a constant updating 
of the detailed application of the tools. For this reason, 
the Commission regularly assesses the effectiveness of 
its policy and enforcement tools in order to ensure that 
they reflect market realities and the latest economic 
192  Figures are for the period between January 2005 to March 2011 (referrals to 
the Commission or to the Member States explain the difference in figures).
193  Speech by Vice-President Almunia on 28 September 2010 on ‘The past and 
the future of merger control in the EU’:   
http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/10/486&
format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en;   
further examples include Lufthansa/SN Brussels Airlines, Lufthansa/Austrian 
Airlines, Air France/KLM, EDF/British Energy and Carrefour/Promodès.
194  Mario Monti, A New Strategy for the Single Market, Report to the President of 
the European Commission, 09 May 2010.
195  The core of substantive EU merger secondary law/guidance dates from 2004 
and 2008. An (albeit important) exception is the Market Definition Notice (OJ 
97/C 372/03), which has not been revised since 1997.
fact, new manifestations of the challenges facing 
European industry materialise by the day, and any 
assessment of them needs to draw on the general 
tools discussed above and applied below in related 
fields.
2.    The development of a consistent policy framework 
that addresses all challenges noted above has to 
be preceded by a sound analysis, including assess-
ment of their likely impact on the main dimensions 
of European competitiveness. This will take time. In 
many instances, however, there is a need for swift 
and timely policy action, which in the absence of 
enhanced legal tools and instruments needs to build 
upon a reinterpretation and extension of the current 
framework. The following considerations therefore 
start from the legal status quo, which by no means 
excludes that bolder steps are considered and pre-
pared in parallel.
6.5.1.  Securing the strength of the European industrial 
value chain
The following remarks provide examples of how existing 
competition and trade policy instruments can be used 
and extended to continue safeguarding industrial com-
petitiveness in the context of the challenges outlined 
above. The sub-section below starts with merger control 
and antitrust enforcement, whereas state aid rules are 
considered in a subsequent sub-section.
6.5.1.1.   Applying merger control and antitrust enforcement to 
support industrial competitiveness
As discussed in section 6.3, the legislative framework 
evolves in line with broader socioeconomic develop-
ments. This also applies to competition rules, where 
European merger control and antitrust regimes have 
undergone significant changes over the last decade. 
The more economic approach to merger control, 
applied since the 2004 reforms and supplemented by 
the 2008 round of guidance documents,191 has resulted 
in a framework that is increasingly focused on the eco-
nomic impact of concentrations on competition in the 
European Economic Area (EEA). The antitrust rulebook 
has been developed with a similar objective in mind 
and provides increasingly better guidance on the rel-
evant economic considerations to companies, which 
since 2003 are responsible for self-assessing that their 
conduct is in line with these rules.
191  The most important are the revised Merger Regulation No 139/2004 of 20 
January 2004, the Horizontal Merger Guidelines (OJ 2004/C 31/03) of 05 Feb-
ruary 2004, and the Non-Horizontal Merger Guidelines (OJ 2008/C 265/07) of 
18 October 2008.219
Chapter 6 — EU Industrial Policy and Global Competition: Recent Lessons and Way Forward
the economy than is customary in the EU. These non-
market interventions present some challenges for apply-
ing merger and antitrust rules to cases in the extensive 
grey area between the public and private sectors. The 
instruments developed to take into account public sec-
tor links in the Member States or other market econo-
mies are therefore applied to a much wider spectrum 
of possible government interference (e.g. to establish 
the true ownership/control of enterprises in non-market 
economies). In merger control for instance, the Commis-
sion’s 2008 Consolidated Jurisdictional Notice provides 
a framework for assessing state influence on undertak-
ings. This has also been employed in practice in cases 
involving non-EU state governments (recent examples 
are the Bluestar/Elkem, DSM/Sinochem and Petrochina/
Ineos mergers). Quite often, the problem in such cases is 
the difficulty of obtaining from those countries the infor-
mation necessary to perform a thorough assessment.
The pressure to restructure and the benefits from doing 
so are multiplied in an open economy with rapid tech-
nological progress. Since restructuring, in terms of adap-
tation to both cyclical and structural changes, is primar-
ily the responsibility of firms, the regulatory framework 
must allow them to act on their responsibility. Compa-
nies aiming to restructure via mergers or acquisitions 
will in many instances depend on approval under the 
merger control regime. Restructuring attempts that do 
not go as far as a merger and which instead are imple-
mented via coordination between companies must be 
in line with the antitrust rules on cooperation between 
undertakings. For both merger control and antitrust 
action the toolbox is in place — in merger control for 
example the failing firm defence, the counterfactual 
defence, or the efficiency defence can be cited, while 
antitrust action has the specialisation Block Exemption 
Regulations and the guidelines on horizontal coopera-
tion agreements. Recent merger cases have included 
very elaborate restructuring analysis and have clearly 
demonstrated that a return to profits via the creation of 
a monopoly goes beyond reasonableness (e.g. Olympic/
Aegean). Companies that need to exchange information 
on past and present strategic data (for example demand 
or capacities) that can be crucial for the allocation of 
production to high-demand markets may benefit from 
the more detailed guidance given in the revised Hori-
zontal Guidelines.
Finally, the intensified competition between economic 
areas also requires a continued focus on the cost of 
doing business in Europe. An effective regulatory 
regime, maintaining the competitiveness of European 
industry, by its very nature requires resources from 
companies involved in proceedings. The Commis-
sion’s efforts to reduce the length of investigations (e.g. 
through the recent introduction of settlement proce-
dures) and increase the transparency and predictabil-
ity of enforcement can contribute to keeping Europe 
learning and to take into account the interests and con-
cerns voiced by industry.
A number of features in the application of EU merger 
control policy can be said to contribute to EU industrial 
competitiveness. The first concerns geographic market 
delineation or, more generally, the geographical scope 
of competitive constraints in evaluating mergers or mar-
ket positions. At least as regards investment goods and 
intermediary products (less so for branded consumer 
goods), markets are becoming ever wider and falling 
transport costs coupled with better IT inter-linkages are 
increasingly facilitating global competition. In times of 
global integration, markets are becoming EEA-wide or 
wider. In this regard, the Commission is determined to 
maintain its current practice of assessing such develop-
ments as and when they materialise taking into account 
the specific facts of the case, e.g. by adequately taking 
rising competition from newly emerging countries into 
account (such as in the decision on Arsenal/DSP).
The massive increase in the division of labour on 
a global scale and the rise of globally distributed inte-
grated value chains also require a special focus on the 
vertical relationships between companies. While this 
trend has proven, in essence, to be pro-competitive and 
to allow European enterprises to benefit from econo-
mies of specialisation, it has also added complexity and 
vulnerability to the environment that companies face. 
Again, it is primarily for companies to guard themselves 
against these risks (as exemplified by the recent trend 
to near-sourcing). The regulatory regime — merger 
control ex ante and antitrust ex post — will continue to 
face the task, among others, of preventing, respectively, 
the emergence of dominant positions in these value 
chains and the abuse of dominant positions or signifi-
cant impediments to competition. The global reach of 
both policies (as the effect matters, not the location of 
companies) plays an important role if suppliers are con-
centrated outside the EU.196
In a more dynamic global environment, it may be 
increasingly relevant to evaluate the benefits and effi-
ciencies brought by agreements and transactions. 
Where dynamic efficiencies can be expected to play 
a very prominent role, even though their evaluation 
is more difficult and requires more time, a pro-active 
approach is warranted. As regards specific merger effi-
ciencies, the Commission will look at such efficiencies 
where the parties make such claims (it being under-
stood that it is for the parties in such cases to provide 
the necessary evidence from the outset).
As detailed in section 6.2.2 above, the governments of 
some emerging economies have a much greater role in 
196  Global sourcing also presents the problem of how to take into account indi-
rect sales in cartel cases.220
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policy perspective, it is important to closely monitor 
and assess the consequences, the more so when pub-
lic authorities in non-EU countries are involved in such 
transactions. For example, recent scientific research 
suggests that mergers and acquisitions by Chinese 
companies, which often are state-owned, are increas-
ingly strategic, building upon the underlying principle 
of ‘digesting rather than investing’.197
As a result, major EU competitors (including recently 
‘free trade’ ones, such as Canada and Australia) have 
recently strengthened their policy toolkit to be able 
to prevent malpractices and better preserve national 
interests. Although some EU Member States have simi-
lar systems in place, the EU as a whole remains one of 
the most open economic blocs in the world. A careful 
and balanced analysis seems warranted to assess how 
to maintain this openness while taking into account the 
increasingly strategic dimension in global competition. 
This process would usefully build on input from and 
constant dialogue with European industry to flag risks. It 
could also involve a broader activation of existing frame-
works, whether EU country teams abroad or information 
exchange mechanisms in the public realm.
As a complement, notably in the short run, existing 
instruments such as the Commission’s merger control 
system can continue to be applied, either directly or 
through meaningful exploitation of unused opportu-
nities, to provide a ‘safety net’ for takeovers that could 
potentially restrict competition, such as by blocking 
downstream access to an essential input or eliminat-
ing innovative ‘mavericks’ in a specific industry. In fact, 
merger control disallows such negative competitive 
effects unless sufficient clear-cut remedies are offered 
to offset them.
However, the EU merger control system is neutral as 
regards the origin of the merging parties and applies in 
the same way to EU and non-EU companies. It is firmly 
rooted in the idea that competitive market structures 
need to be maintained to benefit consumers and busi-
nesses. This neutrality ensures that the merger review 
process is transparent, manageable and predictable to 
the investing community. It is also in line with the EU’s 
long-established commitment to openness to the rest of 
the world, and gives the EU a moral high ground in argu-
ing for non-discriminatory treatment at international 
level regarding the outgoing investments of European 
companies in third countries. At the same time, though, 
the merger control system ensures that global mergers 
and acquisitions do not have any negative impact on 
prices, innovation and choice in Europe.
197  E.g. Ping Deng (2009): ‘Why do Chinese firms tend to acquire strategic assets 
in international expansion?’, Journal of World Business 44 (2009) 74–84.
attractive as a place to invest. This is even more impor-
tant if one considers that multiple jurisdictions all over 
the world often wait with their assessment of a transac-
tion until they know the final position of the European 
Commission. The Commission, as one of the leading role 
models for competition policy worldwide, has a natural 
role to play in aligning substantive and procedural tools 
around the world and thereby tackling the problem of 
the ever increasing cost of multi-jurisdictional filings and 
preventing inconsistent demands on enterprises from 
different national competition authorities.
6.5.1.2.  Making full use of policy toolkits in the global context
Monitoring and assessing the risks of disruption of 
production chains as well as establishing the balance 
between economies of scale, security of supply and 
technological leadership in a specific economic con-
text is the primary responsibility of businesses. They 
are closest to the market and thus have the best avail-
able information. Moreover, they are the first to feel the 
consequences. And yet, the increasing involvement of 
states, in particular non-EU non-market economies that 
have their own approach to the delineation between 
private and public interests, creates an asymmetry that 
European industry on its own cannot handle. 
Traditional forms of disruptive threats to the EU’s indus-
trial value chains are usually directly linked to distorted 
price competition. Current European trade defence 
instruments (anti-dumping, anti-subsidy and safeguard 
measures), designed in conformity with WTO rules, 
enable the European Commission to address most of 
these issues. However, in the context of the interna-
tionalisation of value chains and ‘low intensity protec-
tionism’, new threats to the integrity of value chains 
have emerged. On top of the risks outlined above, the 
recent economic and financial crisis has demonstrated 
how exposed key suppliers, which are often SMEs, 
can become if access to finance deteriorates, which 
is often unconnected to individual economic perfor-
mance. In fact, one lesson from the crisis is that many 
European manufacturing sectors active in global value 
chains depend on the timely delivery of key inputs 
produced by a handful of relatively small suppliers, in 
some instances only one or two. In line with the concept 
developed in section 6.3.3, these can be considered as 
‘strategic’, as they are often indispensible not only for 
a sector as a whole but for more than one single manu-
facturing activity. In addition, the products manufac-
tured with their input have significance not only for 
applications in various sectors but also in specific public 
policy contexts.
Such strategic importance for the integrity of the Euro-
pean industrial fabric increasingly turns these com-
panies into targets for acquisitions. From an industrial 221
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shortcomings, in particular through the generalisa-
tion of early prenotifications. Beyond helping to save 
time, this also serves to clarify the context of a project 
from the beginning and to establish a clear view of the 
rationale and impact of any aid needed for European 
companies.
It is also essential to raise stakeholders’ awareness of the 
need for the Commission to have access to useful and 
updated data on markets and sectors, in particular if 
they have global dimensions. While the Commission can 
in most cases rely on its own resources, there are specific 
situations where cross-sector information is required 
and where the early supply of such data by Member 
States and companies can accelerate the assessment of 
a project.
The time needed for assessment could also be reduced 
by more dynamic cooperation between the Commission 
and Member States. At the same time, sustained advo-
cacy activities whereby the Commission seeks to explain 
to stakeholders the possibilities offered by the state aid 
framework, to enable them to make the best use of the 
rules, can also contribute to further reducing the length 
of the assessment process, for instance in the field of 
R&D&I. In fact, as most of the state aid rules currently 
in force are the result of legislation adopted following 
the 2005 State Aid Action Plan, they have so far been 
applied for a relatively short period of time. Therefore, 
both companies and Member State authorities still need 
to gain broader experience and sufficient knowledge of 
the practical use of these rules.
6.5.2.2.   Maintaining a strong and diversified industrial base in 
Europe
To achieve the objective of maintaining a competitive 
and diversified industrial base, which could in turn con-
tribute to the smart, sustainable and inclusive growth 
target set by the Europe 2020 strategy, the EU has to 
ensure that firms find the appropriate business environ-
ment they need to grow and innovate, to carry out their 
activities or to change their business models and strate-
gies. This forward-looking strategy requires that access 
to finance is improved for all types of companies in the 
value chain, with a view to adequately addressing their 
needs and projects.
Globalisation trends put pressure on Europe as a loca-
tion for doing business, not only directly but also 
through a lack of important suppliers or raw materials. 
From an industrial competitiveness perspective, state 
aid policy contributes to addressing this challenge by 
recognising that a strong competitive market struc-
ture in Europe is an objective of common interest. In 
general, and as explained above, effective access to 
finance must be ensured in a continuous way. State aid 
Addressing efficiently both traditional and ‘innovative’ 
forms of threats to the integrity of the EU’s industrial 
value chains requires the EU to develop a stronger hori-
zontal coordination of its various instruments and poli-
cies. A more in-depth articulation of competition, trade 
and industrial policies has to be developed, in order 
to ensure a coherent and consistent approach to the 
protection of industrial value chains. A particularly cru-
cial issue for this horizontal approach is the conditions 
under which such protection is allowed. An example 
from the current regulations governing trade defence 
instruments is the ‘Community interest test’ to deter-
mine whether the implementation of planned meas-
ures is in the interest of European industries, users and 
consumers. Such a mechanism for a horizontal approach 
would be based on the concept of European interest, as 
defined in section 6.3.3.
6.5.2.  Enhancing the scope, impact and timing of 
targeted state support
Industrial policy objectives that aim to enhance com-
petitiveness are complemented by state aid control, 
which aims to safeguard the undistorted functioning of 
the Single Market, in particular in a period when Mem-
ber States’ room for manoeuvre is limited by fiscal con-
straints due to the economic and financial crisis. While 
existing instruments could be screened for unused 
potential, including procedural improvements, any 
extensions to the existing framework should be consid-
ered with care and based on the proper identification of 
well-demonstrated needs.
6.5.2.1.   Timely and efficient state aid assessment in a global 
context
Business success first and foremost depends on entre-
preneurial vision and its translation into viable business 
plans. State aid often provides an indispensible addi-
tional impetus to bridge specific phases in the devel-
opment of new products and processes not otherwise 
accommodated by the market, but it remains a supple-
ment to and not the raison d’être for economic activity.
In order to speed up the decision-making process and 
to address the time issue as such, which is a key dimen-
sion for competitiveness, especially in R&D&I projects, it 
is essential to continue improving the information flow 
between the Commission and stakeholders. Despite the 
best efforts of the Commission to minimise the time 
state aid decisions take, long delays — often caused by 
inefficient information flows outside the Commission — 
still occur, which may in certain cases be incompatible 
with the often urgent financing needs of enterprises. 
The recent procedural simplifications and the adop-
tion of the Best Practices Code help to address such 222
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research centres, and Member States, for example in 
relation to KETs.
European state aid policy can indirectly contribute, 
within its own logic, to the promotion of such cross-
border initiatives. For instance in the field of R&D&I, the 
current rules already encourage cooperation beyond 
national frontiers through a higher aid intensity appli-
cable to cross-border projects. This possibility has so far 
not been much used by Member States, since it is still 
culturally and politically difficult for national authori-
ties to fund the costs of a project which is not entirely 
located within their territory. However, in the face of 
increased global competition, trans-border coopera-
tion between firms has to be understood as a necessity 
not only for the success of a project but for pursuing the 
strategic European interest as a whole, including the 
interests of the territories of the Member States grant-
ing the aid. In this respect, it may also be noted that 
the state aid notion of a ‘project of common European 
interest’, provided for by Article 107(3)(b) TFEU and the 
2006 Framework on State Aids to R&D&I, has so far rarely 
been used by Member States.
6.6. Conclusions
The last decade has witnessed the emergence of trends 
that will permanently transform the arena in which 
European industry operates. Within the EU, enlargement 
has unleashed a socioeconomic dynamic that provides 
firms with new opportunities and a strong base camp, 
but the Single Market is as yet unfinished. Outside the 
EU, globalisation has greatly widened potential mar-
kets, but also intensified competition and resulted in the 
emergence of major new players on a global scale, not 
all of which play by the market economy rule book. The 
economic and financial crisis has resulted in fiscal con-
straints that reduce leverage at Member State level. As 
discussed in detail above, these challenges necessitate 
the stepping up of efforts to enhance the competitive-
ness of European industry, which in turn requires a stra-
tegic European response that bundles resources from 
lower levels of decision-making.
This chapter started by enquiring how the relationship 
between the EU’s set of competitiveness-related policies 
(exemplified by but not confined to the EU’s industrial 
and competition policies, considered to be comple-
mentary in the 2002 Competitiveness Report) could 
be further improved in the light of ‘new challenges 
that emerge at an accelerating rate: new markets, new 
ways of doing business, new drivers of growth and of 
dynamic competition.’198 The response is clear: more 
than ever, the global nature of the main challenges 
198  European Commission (2002), p. 93.
often contributes to improving such access to finance, 
in particular when the market does not provide suffi-
cient alternative means of finance, for example through 
venture capital funds. Moreover, access to finance can 
be relevant for specific activities, such as R&D&I, where 
market failures exist. In this field, there is a need to con-
solidate the Single Market, which forms the base camp 
for European companies, in order to decrease the inno-
vation divide between poor and developed regions. 
In fact, in a context of rigid fiscal constraints in several 
Member States, it is important to improve the use of the 
Structural Funds for innovation priorities. The experi-
ence gained within the current programming period 
should usefully guide any initiative to improve the sta-
tus quo.
Moreover, difficulties in access to finance could ham-
per the development of projects in technologies where 
Europe is leader or intends to invest to become one, 
such as KETs, referred to in the Industrial Competi-
tiveness Communication. In addition, lack of financial 
resources could prevent exploration and development 
of the unused innovation potential in services, essential 
to address the many societal challenges faced by the 
EU. In both cases, well-targeted state support can com-
pensate for financial markets that have turned overly 
risk-adverse.
6.5.2.3.   Support for early adjustment processes and 
restructuring of European enterprises
While companies and sectors know best their needs for 
restructuring and are in principle responsible for these 
processes, wherever necessary and appropriate state aid 
could usefully support such processes in various ways. 
As mentioned in section 6.4.4, all companies at almost 
all stages of their business life constantly adjust their 
business strategies: some may already find themselves 
in structural difficulties, whereas others are in a stable 
situation but in transitional adjustment.
Independently of any difficulties, such companies may 
need, at one point in time, state support in order to 
accompany the transition or to address their structural 
problems and ensure and/or restore long-term viability, 
as the biggest problem for firms undergoing restructur-
ing is access to finance.
One of the main challenges encountered by European 
firms is the simultaneous expansion of their potential 
markets and the emergence of global competitors cov-
ering increasingly larger parts of the value chain. This 
double trend puts pressure on European firms, which 
have to modernise, innovate and access new markets at 
the same time. The main challenge for many of them is 
size; hence, it could be beneficial to further explore the 
potential for cross-border cooperation between firms, 223
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Explanatory notes
Geographical coverage: all indicators in tables 7.1 to 7.8 
refer to EU-27. The indicators in tables 7.9 and 7.10 refer 
to the individual Member States, EU-27, the US, Japan, 
Brazil, China, India and Russia.
Production index199: The production index is an index of 
final production in volume terms.
Labour productivity: this indicator is calculated by com-
bining the indexes of production and number of per-
sons employed or number of hours worked200. There-
fore, this indicator measures final production per person 
of final production per hour worked.
Unit Labour Cost: it is calculated from the production 
index and the index of wages and salaries and measures 
labour cost per unit of production. “Wages and salaries” 
is defined (Eurostat) as “the total remuneration, in cash 
or in kind, payable to all persons counted on the payroll 
(including homeworkers), in return for work done during 
the accounting period, regardless of whether it is paid 
on the basis of working time, output or piecework and 
whether it is paid regularly wages and salaries do not 
include social contributions payable by the employer”. 
Relative Trade Balance: it is calculated, for sector “i”, as 
(Xi-Mi)/(Xi+Mi), where Xi and Mi are EU-27 exports and 
imports of products of sector “i” to and from the rest of 
the World.
Revealed Comparative Advantage (RCA): 
199  The data are working-day adjusted for production.
200  The data are working-day adjusted for hours worked.
The RCA indicator for product “i” is defined as follows: 
where: X=value of exports; the reference group (‘W’) is 
the EU-25 plus 38 other countries (see list below); the 
source used is the UN COMTRADE database. In the cal-
culation of RCA, XEU stands for exports to the rest of 
the world (excluding intra-EU trade) and XW measures 
exports to the rest of the world by the countries in the 
reference group. The latter consists of the EU-25 plus 
the following countries: Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, 
Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Azerbaijan, Baha-
mas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, 
Bolivia, Bosnia Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, 
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, 
Cape Verde, Central African Rep., Chad, Chile, China, 
China, Hong Kong SAR, China, Macao SAR, Colombia, 
Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, 
Dem. People’s Rep. of Korea, Dem. Rep. of the Congo, Dji-
bouti, Dominican Rep., Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Equa-
torial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, 
Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Hondu-
ras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jamaica, 
Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, 
Lao People’s Dem. Rep., Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, 
Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Maurita-
nia, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Nepal, Neth. Antilles, 
New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Occ. 
Palestinian Terr., Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Rep. of Korea, Rep. of Moldova, 
Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Ser-
bia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Somalia,, South Africa, Sri 
Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Switzerland, Syria, 
Tajikistan, TFYR of Macedonia, Thailand, Timor-Leste, 
RCAi =
XEU,i
XEU,i
i
XW,i
XW,i
i
CHAPTER 7
SECTORAL COMPETITIVENESS INDICATORS226
European Competitiveness Report 2011
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, 
Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Rep. of Tanzania, 
Uruguay, USA, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Yemen, 
Zambia, Zimbabwe.
For services, countries consist of EU-25 plus the 
following 75 countries: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, 
Armenia, Aruba, Australia, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Belarus, Bermuda, Bolivia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, 
Botswana, Brazil, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, 
Chile, China,P.R.: Mainland, China,P.R.:Hong Kong, 
China,P.R.:Macao, Costa Rica, Croatia, Egypt, El Salvador, 
Ethiopia, The Gambia, Georgia, Guatemala, Guinea, 
Honduras, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Israel, Japan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Republic of Korea, Kuwait, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Macedonia, Malaysia, Mauritius, Mexico, 
Moldova, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, 
Namibia, New Caledonia, New Zealand, Norway, 
Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Russian 
Federation, Saudi Arabia, Republic of Serbia, Seychelles, 
Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka Switzerland, Tanzania, 
Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United 
States, Uruguay, Zambia.
Data sources: Tables 7.1 to 7.6 are based on Eurostat’s 
indicators. Tables 7.7 to 7.9 are based on United Nations’ 
COMTRADE. Table 7.10 is based on IMF, OECD and Euro-
stat data.227
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